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The safe operation of complex systems such as nuclear power plants requires 
close coordination between the human operators and plant systems.  In order to 
maintain an adequate level of safety following an accident or other off-normal event, 
the operators often are called upon to perform complex tasks during dynamic 
situations with incomplete information.  The safety of such complex systems can be 
greatly improved if the conditions that could lead operators to make poor decisions 
and commit erroneous actions during these situations can be predicted and mitigated.  
The primary goal of this research project was the development and validation of a 
cognitive model capable of simulating nuclear plant operator decision-making during 
accident conditions.   
Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment methods can improve the prediction of 
human error events by providing rich contextual information and an explicit 
consideration of feedback arising from man-machine interactions.  The Accident 
  
Dynamics Simulator paired with the Information, Decision, and Action in a Crew 
context cognitive model (ADS-IDAC) shows promise for predicting situational 
contexts that might lead to human error events, particularly knowledge driven errors 
of commission.  ADS-IDAC generates a discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) by 
applying simple branching rules that reflect variations in crew responses to plant 
events and system status changes.  Branches can be generated to simulate slow or fast 
procedure execution speed, skipping of procedure steps, reliance on memorized 
information, activation of mental beliefs, variations in control inputs, and equipment 
failures.  Complex operator mental models of plant behavior that guide crew actions 
can be represented within the ADS-IDAC mental belief framework and used to 
identify situational contexts that may lead to human error events.   
 
This research increased the capabilities of ADS-IDAC in several key areas.  The 
ADS-IDAC computer code was improved to support additional branching events and 
provide a better representation of the IDAC cognitive model.  An operator decision-
making engine capable of responding to dynamic changes in situational context was 
implemented.  The IDAC human performance model was fully integrated with a 
detailed nuclear plant model in order to realistically simulate plant accident scenarios.  
Finally, the improved ADS-IDAC model was calibrated, validated, and updated using 
actual nuclear plant crew performance data.  This research led to the following 
general conclusions:  
 A relatively small number of branching rules are capable of efficiently capturing a 
wide spectrum of crew-to-crew variabilities. 
  
 Compared to traditional static risk assessment methods, ADS-IDAC can provide a 
more realistic and integrated assessment of human error events by directly 
determining the effect of operator behaviors on plant thermal hydraulic 
parameters.   
 The ADS-IDAC approach provides an efficient framework for capturing actual 
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The safe operation of complex systems requires close coordination between 
the human operator and the physical hardware.  For example, nuclear plant control 
room operators must efficiently perform complex tasks following an accident in order 
to maintain an adequate level of public safety.  Oftentimes, operators face dynamic 
conditions with incomplete information and little time to consider options.  Safety can 
be greatly improved if the conditions that could lead operators to make poor decisions 
and commit erroneous actions can be predicted and mitigated.  Current techniques for 
predicting human errors largely rely on a static analysis of the tasks an operator must 
perform [1].  Unfortunately, static analyses cannot capture the dynamic factors and 
feedback loops that influence human behavior.  A simulation-based approach that 
dynamically couples human and hardware performance may provide a better 
prediction of operator behavior.  The primary goal of this research project is the 
development and validation of a nuclear power plant operator cognitive model.  The 
secondary goal is the application of the cognitive model within a dynamic simulation 
environment in order to identify situational factors that can lead to human errors.    
1.1.1 Operator Errors During Nuclear Plant Operations 
  
Nuclear power plants present several unique hazards to the health and safety 




radioactive fission products that, if released, pose a serious threat to public health and 
the environment.  Even after a reactor core shutdown, fission product radioactive 
decay continues to produce a substantial amount of heat that must be removed to 
prevent core damage and a radiological release.  Although nuclear plants have 
automatic systems to prevent fission product release and provide core cooling, the 
operators play a vital role in ensuring plant safety.  Numerous studies have shown 
that human error can be a significant contributor to the overall risk of nuclear power 
plants [2-4].   
The 1979 accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 2 nuclear plant highlights 
several important factors that can create an error forcing situation.  The TMI-2 
nuclear power plant automatically shut down on March 3, 1979, following an 
unanticipated failure of the main feedwater system.  Although this was an abnormal 
event, it is not an unexpected event and safety systems existed to mitigate this type of 
accident.  Emergency feed water pumps started automatically, but misaligned valves 
prevented proper flow from this backup safety system. Immediately following the 
plant shutdown, a relief valve on the reactor coolant system opened but failed to fully 
close, resulting in leakage of reactor coolant.  Despite these failures, the reactor core 
was adequately cooled due to the actuation of the emergency core cooling system.  
However, the operators failed to realize that (1) valve misalignments in the 
emergency feedwater system prevented makeup cooling water from reaching the 
steam generators, and (2) the reactor coolant pressure relief failed to close, resulting 
in leakage of coolant from the reactor core.  The operators, erroneously believing that 




failure to correctly interpret plant symptoms), reduced the flow from the emergency 
core cooling system.  The reduction in emergency core cooling system flow was an 
operator error that resulted in significant reactor core damage.  The event was 
eventually terminated when a new operating crew arrived for shift change and 
identified the open relief valve and re-initiated adequate core cooling flow.  The TMI 
accident was caused, in part, by failure of the operators to adequately perceive 
relevant plant information, form a correct mental model of the situational context, and 
execute actions that could safely terminate the event.  Although human errors have 
not resulted in a serious nuclear accident in the United States since 1979, safety 
significant human error events continue to occur [2, 5].   
 
Engineered Safety Feature Bypass Events 
Nuclear power plants are equipped with a variety of engineered safety features 
designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents.  Engineered safety systems 
typically support critical functions such as core cooling, fission product containment, 
and support services such as electrical power.  Although these systems are often 
designed to operate automatically, they can be bypassed by the operators to allow 
maintenance, testing, and plant startups and shutdowns.  In general, bypassing a 
safety system is strictly controlled by plant procedures since it can render plant safety 
systems inoperable.  In 1995, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted 
a review of operational events involving the bypass of engineered safety features [5].  
This review identified nine inappropriate engineered safety features bypass events 




operators intentionally took actions that rendered key safety systems inoperable, 
contrary to both their training and procedural guidance. It should be stressed that 
these actions were not associated with malicious intent – rather, these events often 
resulted from the inappropriate resolution of conflicting operational goals.  Although 
none of these events resulted in significant safety consequences, the inappropriate 
bypassing or inhibition of safety systems can have dire outcomes, as evidenced by the 
accident at Three Mile Island.  
 
Human Error Contribution to Operational Events 
Human errors have contributed to the risk significance of many operational 
events at nuclear plants [2].  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently sponsored 
a review of forty-eight risk significant operating events that occurred during the 
period of 1992 through 2000.  In general, the operating events involved losses of 
electrical power or failures of emergency core cooling systems.  Of the forty-eight 
events, researchers determined that human error significantly influenced the risk of 
thirty-seven events.  Where it was possible to obtain quantitative results, the average 
human error contribution to the event risk increase was 62%.  Errors by the control 
room operators were present in 54% of events.  More surprisingly, for the events 
where human error was a factor, researchers determined that, in each case, four or 
more human performance issues had contributed to the risk significance.  The study 
noted that further work should be done to better understand the risk impacts and 





Results from the U.S. NRC Individual Plant Examination Program 
In 1988, the NRC issued Generic Letter 88-20, “Individual Plant Examination 
for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities,” which requested that utilities identify plant-
specific vulnerabilities that could be fixed with low cost improvements.  Severe 
accidents are generally defined as events involving a substantial amount of nuclear 
core damage and represent challenges beyond the normal licensing basis of the 
nuclear plant.  One goal of the Individual Plant Examination (IPE) program was to 
identify human actions important to severe accident prevention and mitigation.  The 
results of the IPE program were summarized in NRC NUREG-1560, “Individual 
Plant Examination Program: Perspective on Reactor Safety and Plant Performance” 
[6].   Although the results for individual plants varied by a considerable amount, it 
was generally found that a relatively few number of human failure events could 
contribute significantly to overall plant risk.  For example, a failure to align an 
alternate water source to the emergency core cooling system during a loss of coolant 
accident can contribute up to 17% of the total core damage risk for a pressurized 
water reactor.  The failure to manually depressurize a boiling water reactor to allow 
low pressure systems to provide cooling water to the reactor core could contribute up 
to 45% of the total core damage risk.  It should be noted that the IPE program was 
principally focused on errors associated with delays or omissions in the execution of 
procedural actions or recovery actions for failed equipment.   Consequently, the IPE 





As just illustrated, human error is a significant contributor to the overall 
public health risk from nuclear power plants.  In particular, errors associated with the 
bypass or defeat of safety systems and the aggregate impact of multiple human errors 
represent a particular challenge.  It should be noted that these errors have not arisen 
from malevolent intentions on the part of the operator.  Indeed, the operators 
responsible for operational errors either have not recognized that they have deviated 
from standard operating practices or believe that their deviation was in the best 
interest of plant safety.  Consistent with this observation, deliberate acts of sabotage 
by the operators historically have not been included in nuclear plant risk studies.  
Furthermore, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s probabilistic risk assessment 
procedure guide notes that “it is assumed that all plant personnel act in a manner they 
believe to be in the best interest of the plant” [7].  Therefore, the scope of operator 
actions that should be considered in a nuclear plant risk assessment can be generally 
reduced to those actions that arise through a systematic decision-making process by a 
well-intentioned operator.  The ability to model knowledge-based behaviors that may 
be activated under inappropriate circumstances can improve the accurate prediction 
and mitigation of human performance errors and improve the overall safety of nuclear 
plants.    
 
1.1.2 Need for Better Human Error Analysis Tools 
 
 Human reliability assessment (HRA) models are used to predict operator 




Many of the so-called first generation HRA models were based on either time-
reliability curves or simple information processing models [8].  For example, the 
Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [9] assigns nominal human 
error rates based on activity characteristics derived from a task analysis.  These 
nominal error rates can then be modified by performance shaping factors that account 
for items such as operator experience level and stress.  Second generation HRA 
models, such as the Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM), are 
built upon a stronger cognitive foundation [8].  Rather than assigning error 
probabilities based on functional tasks, the CREAM model first decomposes operator 
tasks into distinct cognitive activities (e.g., communication, diagnosis, monitoring) 
and human functions (e.g., observation, interpretation, planning, and execution).  
Human error rates are then determined based on the cognitive activity, human 
functions, and relevant performance shaping factors.  Both the first and second 
generation HRA methods generally depend on a priori knowledge of the tasks that 
will be performed by the operator during an accident sequence.   Because the scope of 
the task analysis supporting these methods is usually established by plant procedures, 
evaluating human error rates for actions outside the scope of the procedures presents 
a challenge.     
Previous research efforts have found that nuclear plant operators can be 
induced to commit unsafe actions under certain error forcing situational contexts [10].  
Situational context includes factors such as the system state, the operator’s state of 
mind, and the sequence and timing of events.  In particular, four important 




1. Plant operators and plant components are interacting parts of an overall 
system that responds to upset conditions. 
2. The actions of operators are governed by their beliefs as to the current state 
of the plant. 
3. The operators have memory; their beliefs at any given point in time are 
influenced by the past sequence of events and by earlier trains of thought. 
4. A number of operators are involved during the accident. 
These observations point to the need to develop analysis techniques that can explicitly 
model the dynamics and feedback of nuclear systems while capturing the cognitive 
behavior and limitations of operators performing within a crew environment. 
Although the dynamic interaction and feedback between man and machine 
strongly affects the situational context and potential for operator error, these dynamic 
effects are difficult to model with first or second generation HRA methods.  
Simulation-based HRA methods can address many of the shortcomings of earlier 
HRA methods.  For example, the dynamic interaction and feedback resulting from 
operator actions can be directly modeled.  The time-dependent behavior of 
performance influencing factors such as stress, fatigue, and work load can also be 
modeled within a simulation environment.  Simulation-based methods can augment 
the data usually derived from time consuming and expensive control room simulator 
experiments conducted with actual control room crews.  A computer simulation 
model can also explore a wider range of accident conditions than would be possible 
with actual control room operators in a simulator.  An added benefit of simulation 




performance on a similar task allows the analyst to benefit from feedback and 
develop greater accuracy and coverage [12].  Finally, a simulation approach allows a 
better determination of the consequences of a human error event.  By coupling an 
operator model with a plant system model, one can determine the impact of each error 
event on the system – thus it becomes a straightforward matter to determine if a 
human error event has an actual risk impact.   
The Accident Dynamics Simulator with the Information, Decision, and Action 
in a Crew context cognitive model (ADS-IDAC) provides a means to achieve these 
human error analysis goals.  The main objective of this research effort is to improve 
the modeling and simulation capabilities of the ADS-IDAC code to support better 
simulations of human behavior. 
 
 
1.2 Project Objectives  
  
The main objectives of this research are the following: (1) development of a 
cognitive engine capable of representing the decision-making behavior of a nuclear 
plant operator; (2) implementation of the cognitive engine within the ADS-IDAC 
simulation environment; (3) validation of the ADS-IDAC operator, and (4) 
development of general ADS-IDAC analysis procedures for human performance 
prediction.  These objectives and the associated research activities are described in 




1.2.1 Development of Operator Decision-Making Engine 
  
The ADS-IDAC simulation model requires a cognitive engine to guide 
operator decision-making.  The purpose of the cognitive engine is to form a 
situational assessment from perceived information (diagnosis), to identify and select 
suitable goals based on the situational assessment, to identify and select suitable 
strategies for obtaining goals, and to prioritize and resolve conflicts among the 
selected goal/strategy sets.  The cognitive engine is based largely on a recognition 
primed naturalistic decision making (RPD) model [13, 14].  The RPD model attempts 
to simulate the behavior of experienced decision makers under time pressure. Because 
the RPD model is unable to capture all reasonable and expected operator behaviors; it 
was necessary to augment the RPD framework in order to capture the inherent 
variability in the human decision making process.  For example, variations in operator 
response times and the selection of control values for key plant parameters were 
simulated with stochastic models.  The following components were developed within 
the operator cognitive engine: 
 
Information Filtering 
A key feature of the ADS-IDAC simulation model is that all operator 
behaviors arise from perceived data rather than the direct output from the plant 
thermal-hydraulic plant model.  Before an operator can use any plant information, the 
data must first pass through the operator’s perception filter.  Because the perception 
filter can either screen out or distort data obtained from the plant model, the operator 




incomplete or inaccurate data to guide his/her decisions and actions, human error 
events may occur.  A goal of the ADS-IDAC project is to identify situations and 
contexts where operators may implement inappropriate knowledge-based actions due 
to limitations of the perception filtering process.  Therefore, it is necessary to develop 
information filters capable of masking or distorting information under certain 
situational contexts.   
 
Diagnosis Module 
Another key feature of the cognitive model is the formulation of a situational 
assessment through a diagnosis process.  Rasmussen has identified two basic 
diagnosis strategies – symptomatic search and topographic search [15].  A 
symptomatic search uses basic feature matching to identify memorized events that 
match the observed symptoms.  The topographic search process seeks to identify 
differences between the actual system condition and the operator’s mental 
representation of normal or planned operation.  The symptomatic search strategy 
generally has a lower cognitive burden than the topographical strategy but is 
dependent on the ability to pattern match to a previously experienced event.  
Conversely, the topographic strategy has a higher cognitive burden, but is better able 
to deal with novel situations.  A diagnosis module that uses a fuzzy logic approach to 
perform a symptomatic feature matching process has been developed [16].  To 
support a topographic search strategy, it is necessary to develop a reasonable mental 
representation of the nuclear plant system within ADS-IDAC.  One approach of 




mass and energy conservation laws [17, 18].  Consequently, a major focus of this 
activity is decomposing the plant into energy and mass flows that are consistent with 
typical operator mental representations of the reactor plant.   
 
Rule Sets, Goals, Strategies, and Actions  
A major component of this research process was the identification of heuristic 
rules used by operators to direct behavior.  Under the RPD paradigm, activation of a 
particular rule or rule set will be determined by the operator’s situational assessment.  
Therefore, in addition to rule set identification, it is necessary to catalog the 
situational context associated with each rule.  For example, a possible heuristic rule 
might be “prevent overfill of the reactor coolant system by reducing makeup flow.” 
Under normal operating conditions, application of this rule could prevent an 
unnecessary loss of pressure control and a challenge to plant safety relief valves.  
However, during the Three Mile Island accident, application of this rule led directly 
to a core melt event.  A lesson learned from the Cognitive Event Simulator (CES) 
research (see Section 2.4.3.1) was that while an extremely detailed rule set might 
provide good performance under certain conditions, it does not adapt well to new 
situations and may not provide a reasonable representation of human behavior.  
Consequently, an objective of this activity is the development of a minimum rule set 





Memory Management and Goal Prioritization 
ADS-IDAC includes a memory model that includes working memory, 
intermediate memory, and a knowledge base.  In order to effectively implement a 
memory model, it is necessary to develop better methods to group, prioritize, and 
utilize memorized information.  One possible approach is to group information based 
on a simple surface similarity approach (i.e., information is grouped by the associated 
system).  However, expert decision makers tend to utilize structural similarities to 
group information [19].  Structural similarity refers to the underlying physical 
principles associated with the information.  Thus, a goal of this activity is to develop 
a method of grouping information in a manner more consistent with an operator’s 
mental representation of the reactor plant.  
  
Performance Influencing Factors 
ADS-IDAC employs both static and dynamic performance influencing factors 
(PIFs) to influence and shape operator behavior.  As the name suggests, static PIFs 
are constant parameters intended to represent the fixed environmental and 
organizational factors that affect crew behavior.  Conversely, dynamic PIFs reflect 
transient conditions and model variations in the operator’s mental state during a 
scenario.   The IDAC model includes fifty performance influencing factors (PIFs) 
which can be used to influence operator behavior [20].  The IDAC model includes the 





 Mental State – associated with the operator’s cognitive and emotional 
state; 
 Memorized Information – associated with perception and recall; 




 Team-Related Factors - pertains to coordination requirements among crew 
members; 
 Organizational Factors – associated with management influences on 
behavior; 
 Environmental Factors - relates to environmental conditions that affect 
behavior (harsh environment, physical access, etc.); 
 Conditioning Events - unanticipated changes of system state. 
 
Due to time, resource, and data limitations, this project does not attempt to implement 
and validate the effects of all fifty PIFs on the operator cognitive model.  Instead, this 
project focused on implementing and validating a small subset of PIF factors that are 




1.2.2 Calibration of the Operator Model 
  
Even when personnel selection procedures, training programs, and 
administrative programs are consistently implemented, nuclear plant operators can 
exhibit significant crew-to-crew performance variabilities.  These performance 
variabilities can arise from differences in crew knowledge, skills, and experience; 
crew specific organizational factors; and operator preferences and tendencies.  Within 
a dynamic risk assessment, variability is modeled by introducing new branches into a 
dynamic event tree.  The path along a set of serially connected branches defines a 
specific accident scenario.  Branches can be generated to simulate slow or fast 
procedure execution speed, skipping of procedure steps, reliance on memorized 
information, activation of mental beliefs, variations in control inputs, and equipment 
failures.  A calibration process must be developed to represent observed crew 
behaviors within a generalized ADS-IDAC branching rules and knowledge 
framework.  The goal of this process is to characterize crew behavior in a manner that 
preserves generalizability without the development of overly prescriptive branching 
rules. 
1.2.3 Validation Activities 
  
In order to verify, to the extent possible, that the ADS-IDAC is capable of 
appropriately simulating operator behavior, the research project also involved a 
validation component.  In this project, the validation process focused on validating 
the results and outcomes of the model rather than its functional details.  Typical 




validity [21].  Face validity refers to the degree that the model captures important and 
relevant behaviors as judged by potential users.  By its nature, face validity is a 
largely subjective and weak measure of overall validity, but can influence the level of 
confidence that users have in model results.  Content-related validity refers to the 
inclusion of all pertinent factors that can influence the capability of the model to meet 
its objectives.  In this case, content-related validity implies that the ADS-IDAC model 
addresses factors that significantly influence the identification of nuclear plant error 
forcing situations.  Criterion-related validity refers to the capability of the model to 
predict operator behaviors and, where possible, provide results consist with other 
modeling techniques. 
 
1.2.4 Development of General Analysis Procedures 
 
 In order to support implementation of the ADS-IDAC approach for human 
reliability analysis, general procedures must be developed.  These procedures are 
needed to provide a consistent approach to creating and validating the operating 
knowledge base, developing a realistic representation of the reactor plant system, and 
formulating inputs needed to implement the ADS-IDAC approach. 
 
1.3 Overview of Dissertation 
  
 This dissertation report describes the background, development, 




Chapter 2 provides a general overview of the theoretical background supporting 
ADS-IDAC, and Chapter 3 provides a description of the ADS-IDAC model.  
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 describe the implementation of information, decision-making, 
and action modules of the IDAC model in the ADS-IDAC simulation code.  Chapter 
7 describes the implementation of the static and dynamic performance influencing 
factors that affect operator behavior.  Chapter 8 describes branching rules used to 
construct a dynamic event tree.  Chapter 9 describes the calibration activities used to 
ensure that ADS-IDAC realistically modeled operator behavior, and Chapter 10 
describes the validation of the model.  Chapter 11 summarizes the main conclusions 
of this project and provides recommendations for future work.  A number of 
appendices are also included that document features of the ADS-IDAC operator 
knowledge base, provide detailed simulation results, and describe the operation of the 
simulation code. 
1.3.1 Theoretical Foundations for Operator Modeling (Chapter 2) 
  
This Chapter discusses the basic theory underlying human cognition and 
decision making, as it applies to the ADS-IDAC project.  Specific topics discussed 
include the decision-making context for a nuclear plant control room; a summary of 
the literature pertaining to cognitive modeling and decision-making; a summary of 
current human reliability analysis approaches; and a summary of the contributions of 




1.3.2 ADS-IDAC Overview (Chapter 3) 
 
 Chapter 3 describes the main components of the ADS-IDAC simulation 
model.  Included in this section is an overview of computer code architecture, code 
input requirements, and the output data generated by ADS-IDAC. 
 
1.3.3 Information Processing Module (Chapter 4) 
  
 Chapter 4 describes the Information processing module, the first step in the 
Information, Decision-Making, and Action execution (IDA) cognitive model.  Main 
topics include information gathering and processing, and the content of the operator 
knowledge base.  Specific features of the operator knowledge base include a 
description of the plant functional decomposition – the method used to link plant 
components to specific plant safety functions; knowledge based actions and mental 
beliefs; and the modeling of plant operating procedures.  
 
1.3.4 Decision Making Module (Chapter 5) 
  
 The main features of the ADS-IDAC decision-making engine are described in 
Chapter 5.  This section includes a description of the goal and problem solving 
strategy selection processes; the use of discrete mental beliefs to model more complex 
forms of operator interactions with the nuclear plant model; and the diagnostic 




1.3.5 Action Execution Module (Chapter 6) 
  
 The Action execution process, the last step of the IDA cognitive model, is 
described in Chapter 6.  This section discusses the modeling of operator actions, 
including methods for handling crew variability; and the procedure step-skipping 
module.  The ADS-IDAC procedure step-skipping, a type of an error of omission, 
illustrates how the information gathering processes, the operator knowledge base, and 
other factors that influence operator behavior can reflect the dynamic contextual 
factors that can lead to operator errors. 
 
1.3.6 Performance Influencing Factors and Crew Model (Chapter 7) 
  
 Human performance can be influenced by many factors, including the external 
environment (e.g., lighting, temperature, and noise), ergonomics (e.g., control panel 
layout, clarity of procedures), mental factors (e.g., stress, workload, knowledge, 
experience), and organizational influences (e.g., assigned responsibilities, peer 
checking).  Based on the time scale selected for the analysis, these factors can be 
considered to be either static or dynamic.  Chapter 7 provides an overview of the 
performance influencing factors included within the ADS-IDAC model and the 





1.3.7 Dynamic Event Tree Construction (Chapter 8) 
  
 Chapter 8 provides an overview of dynamic event tree construction during an 
ADS-IDAC simulation.  Guiding dynamic event tree branching through the use of 
branching rules is the main technique for simulating variabilities in crew behavior.  
The main categories of branching rules are described, as are methods used to focus 
computational effort on more significant aspects of the analysis. 
 
1.3.8 Implementation of ADS-IDAC Approach (Chapter 9) 
  
 Chapter 9 describes the general procedures developed to realistically model 
nuclear plant thermal hydraulic systems, calibrate the IDAC human performance 
model, and apply ADS-IDAC to the prediction of sources of crew variability.   An 
underlying assumption of the ADS-IDAC approach is that deviations from the 
normative (or expected) set of operator behaviors following an accident can 
sometimes lead to a degraded plant state.   This section also discusses methods 
developed to process the results of experiments using actual plant operators into a 
form suitable for incorporation into the ADS-IDAC knowledge base. 
 
1.3.9 Validation and Verification (Chapter 10) 
 
 Chapter 10 describes the validation efforts used to demonstrate the utility of 
ADS-IDAC to the analysis of human performance issues during nuclear power plant 




ADS-IDAC model to other accepted HRA techniques (content validity), 
demonstration that ADS-IDAC generates realistic and reasonable results for a variety 
of accident scenarios (face validity) and an illustration of the predictive capabilities of 
ADS-IDAC using experimental data from the Halden Reactor Project simulator 
(criterion validity). 
 
1.3.10 Conclusions (Chapter 11) 
  
 Chapter 11 summarizes the key conclusions arising from this research effort 









2. Theoretical Foundations for Operator Modeling 
 
 This section begins with an overview of the ADS-IDAC model prior to the 
start of this research project.  This information provides the starting point for this 
research effort.  Because environmental and organizational factors can influence 
human behavior, a description of the nuclear plant control room environment is then 
provided.  This is followed by a discussion of human error taxonomies and their 
relationship the underlying cognitive model used to define human error.  In order to 
place the contributions of this research into proper perspective, a general overview of 
human reliability analysis methods is provided, with particular emphasis on the use of 
simulation approaches to human error analysis and prediction.  Finally, the specific 
contributions arising form this research effort are described. 
 
2.1 Overview of the ADS-IDAC Model 
 
 
The IDAC (Information, Decision, and Action in a Crew context) cognitive 
model serves as underlying framework for operator behavior.  IDAC decomposes the 
operator’s cognitive flow into three main process: information processing, decision-
making, and action execution [22].   The domain of applicability of IDAC is 
constrained to environments characterized by high levels of training and explicit 
requirements to follow procedures [23].  These constraints simplify the modeling by 
limiting the degrees of freedom from the broader human response spectrum.  In 




tasks and communicating with one another.  The individuals differ by the content of 
their memory, by their mental state, and by the goals and strategies they employ. 
 
The IDAC model includes the following cognitive processes (see Figure 1): 
 Information processing includes the capability of filtering incoming 
information to simulate the limitations of human perception.  An operator 
must actively attend to incoming information in order for the filtering and 
perception process to be initiated. 
 In the decision-making process, the operator develops a situational assessment 
of the current plant state based on perceived information.  Because an operator 
may not reach a conclusion about the plant state with complete certainty, the 
cognitive model can assign a “degree of belief” (or subjective probability) 
about the operator’s confidence that the perceived plant state is correct.  Based 
on the perceived plant state, the operator will generate high level goals to 
guide further activities.  The operator attempts to achieve the goals by 
implementing an appropriate problem-solving strategy.   
 In the action execution process, the operator selects actions consistent with the 





Figure 1- Overview of the IDAC Cognitive Model 
 
These information, decision, and action processes are supported and 
influenced by the operator’s mental state and memory.  The operator’s mental state 
includes factors such as cognitive mode, emotional state, and physiological stressors.  
Memory is decomposed into three main areas: working memory, intermediate 
memory, and the knowledge base.  Working memory has a small information storage 
capacity and represents the information the operator is currently processing.  
Intermediate memory has a larger information storage capacity than working memory 
and is used to store information that might later be needed in working memory.   The 
knowledge base contains the factual information about plant performance, 
procedures, diagnosis, and engineering principles that an operator is expected to 
know. 
 
In 2004 Mosleh and Chang [24] noted the following specific research needs for 
ADS-IDAC: 
External World 





 a stronger basis for cognition rules associated with information processing, and 
for selection of goals and problem solving processes; 
 a more explicit representation of operator memory; 
 improvements in the linkage between plant dynamics and the operator’s mental 
state; 
 development of an operator knowledge base that includes general rules of 
behavior for responding to accidents, a representation of the functional and 
physical characteristics of plant systems and related hardware; and  
 validation of the operator behavior model. 
This research project attempts to address each of these issues in order to improve the 
overall capabilities of ADS-IDAC for the prediction of human behavior. 
 
2.2 The Nuclear Control Room Environment 
  
Nuclear plant control rooms are designed to provide a large amount of 
information to the operators.  Much of this information is associated with power 
production and economic considerations (e.g., power output, plant efficiency), but a 
significant portion is intended to provide safety-related information to the operators.  
Audible or visual alarms are usually provided for key parameters, but some control 
rooms have well over one thousand separate alarms.  Thus, information overload 
during an abnormal event can become a problem.  To reduce the potential for 
overload, operators attempt to focus on the most important parameters based on their 
perceived situational assessment.   However, focusing on information believed to be 




operator’s situational assessment or mental model of the plant is incorrect or 
incomplete. 
 
To ensure public safety, the activities of licensed operators are generally 
guided by the license conditions specified for the facility, technical specifications, 
and written procedures.  License conditions include technical and administrative 
requirements that must be met by the facility in order to comply with regulatory 
requirements.  Technical specifications specify safety limits and limiting conditions 
for operation (LCOs).  LCOs specify functional requirements for instrumentation, key 
process variables, and safety-related equipment.  Quality assurance requirements for 
nuclear power plants (10 CFR 50, Appendix B) require that activities affecting the 
capability of plant equipment to perform their intended functions be performed in 
accordance with documented instructions or procedures.  Written procedures have 
been developed to cover most anticipated normal, abnormal, and emergency 
conditions.  However, it is still possible for situations to arise that are not adequately 
covered by procedures.  Therefore, operators are expected to continuously evaluate 
the efficacy of procedures in use to determine if the plant state is improving or 
degrading.  If a procedure fails to effectively mitigate an accident, it may be 
necessary for an operator to deviate from the procedure or change to a different 
procedure.  Indeed, NRC regulations permit a licensed operator to deviate from 
license conditions, technical specification requirements, and procedures when 
necessary to protect public health and safety, provided that a licensed senior reactor 




of control room operators have found that operators use a number of higher level 
cognitive processes such as situational assessment and response planning even when 
following an emergency procedure [25].   
 
Control room decisions often must be made under significant time constraints.  
Although many emergency safety systems are designed to automatically actuate, it is 
often necessary to realign safety systems to alternate or backup water or power 
supplies shortly after an accident.  Additionally, operators must complete some 
critical emergency actions within a relatively short time period.  High workload 
during accident conditions can further influence an operator’s ability to perform 
actions promptly and accurately.  Finally, all nuclear plant operators must work 
within a crew environment.   Within the crew structure, the individual operators may 
not have a holistic view of the plant situational context.  While the senior operators 
are expected to maintain a holistic view of the plant context, the crew members must 
communicate effectively to obtain this same level of understanding.   
2.2.1 Operator Description 
 
In the U.S., nuclear power plant operators are licensed by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and regulated under the provisions of Title 10, Part 55, 
“Operators’ Licenses,” of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 55).  The 
regulations recognize two qualifications for a licensed operator: operator and senior 
operator.  Only a licensed operator or senior operator is permitted to manipulate the 




permitted to direct the activities of licensed operators.  Regulations also establish 
minimum staffing requirements for a nuclear plant control room.     
 
In order to obtain a license, an operator must meet certain medical 
requirements and pass written and operating tests to determine if he or she can 
operate the plant competently and safely.  Operators generally receive training using 
realistic control room simulators with sufficient fidelity to ensure that simulated 
control manipulations can be performed using the same procedures used in the actual 
plant.  Following initial licensing, operators must periodically stand control room 
watches and must pass a requalification program every two years.   Additionally, 
operators are subject to fitness for duty requirements (e.g., abstinence from alcohol 
prior to assuming the watch and drug screening).   
 
On the basis of their high level of experience and training, most nuclear plant 
operators could be categorized as experts in their field.   A number of research studies 
have identified important differences in the decision-making and problem-solving 
behavior of experts versus novices.  These differences include the following [19]: 
 Experts tend to store knowledge in large interconnected units while novices 
tend to store information in small units.  Consequently, experts are able to 
quickly access information needed to solve problems. 
 Experts develop mental representation of a problem based on underlying 
structural principles while novices tend to represent problems based on the 




 In the area of strategic knowledge, experts tend to work problems from the 
“givens” to the unknown, while novices tend to work from the unknowns back 
to the “givens.”  
Each of these factors has implications for how a nuclear operator develops a 
mental representation of the reactor plant and approaches the decision-making 
process.  For example, these factors tend to support an ADS-IDAC knowledge base 
that links related information using the underlying structural principles of the nuclear 
plant complex.  Additionally, an appropriate diagnostic process model for a nuclear 
plant operator would tend to start with perceived information and lead to a possible 
event diagnosis; rather than working backwards from a possible event diagnosis and 
verifying the existence of supporting information. 
 
2.2.2 The Control Room as a Decision Production Environment 
 
 The IDAC model decomposes the operator’s problem solving and decision-
making into three main processes: information pre-processing (I); decision-making 
(D); and action execution (A) [22].  The information pre-process includes information 
filtering, comprehension and retrieval, relating and grouping, and prioritization.  The 
decision-making process includes situation assessment, diagnosis, and response 
planning.  The action execution process implements the actions identified from the 
decision-making process.  In working through these cognitive processes, the operator 
should consider the following:  
 Information Processing and Situational Assessment – An operator develops a 




information from the plant.  However, plant information can be filtered by sensing 
and mental processes, such that perceived information is not identical to the actual 
state of nature.  Additionally, instruments can fail or provide misleading 
information under certain conditions.  Perception, filtering, interpretation, and 
instrument failures can all result in information conflicts.  An operator might be 
biased to resolve these conflicts by discounting information that does fit into the 
current situational assessment.  The end result of this process is a determination if 
the plant state is abnormal and, if so, a diagnosis of the problem.  
 Selection of Appropriate Goals and Objectives – A high level goal is used to 
develop strategies and actions to mitigate an abnormal event.  Examples of goals 
might include “maintain the plant at power”, “shutdown the reactor”, “shutdown, 
cool down, and depressurize the reactor plant”, or “repair failed instrument.”  An 
operator must formulate an accurate situational assessment of the current plant 
state in order to identify appropriate goals and objectives.  If the operator 
develops an incorrect situational assessment due to information filtering, 
misperception, or misinterpretation, it becomes more likely that inappropriate 
goals or objectives will be selected.  Since goals and objectives will drive the 
selection of follow up actions, the selection of an inappropriate goal could result 
in an error event.  The importance of goal selection is echoed by research studies 
of aircraft accidents that have concluded that goal selection errors were found to 
be the most frequent cognitive error in fatal accidents [26, 27]. 
 Selection of an Appropriate Mitigation Strategy – Once an operator selects an 




strategies might include “follow procedure”, “actively gather information”, 
“problem solve using inductive or deductive reasoning”, “ask for advice,” or 
“wait and monitor.”  If an operator has a high degree of confidence in the 
situational assessment and has determined that existing procedures can mitigate 
the condition, a “follow procedure” strategy would be a likely selection.  
However, if the operator lacks sufficient information to adequately assess the 
situation, he or she might opt for either a “wait and monitor” or “actively gather 
information” strategy to obtain additional information about the plant state before 
taking further action.   
 Resolution of Conflicting Goals or Strategies – The desire to maintain a nuclear 
plant in operation to maintain critical power infrastructure or maximize economic 
gain must be balanced with a desire to maintain public health and safety.  A 
decision to shutdown a plant carries a high economic cost for the utility, 
particularly if a shutdown was not needed.  However, a decision to continue to 
operate when a plant shutdown is required can carry even higher economic and 
social costs.  Goal conflicts can also arise in more mundane decisions, such as 
deciding whether or not to start a complicated test a few hours before a scheduled 
shift change.  Waiting until after a shift change might cause significant schedule 
delays and increase economic costs, but starting the test before the shift change 
could increase the time pressure on the operators and increase the likelihood of 
errors.   
 Prioritization and Sequencing of Goals or Strategies – The decision-making 




associated actions.  For example, during a complete loss of electrical power event, 
an operator might generate goals to provide adequate reactor core cooling, restore 
a source of electrical power, and prevent damage to plant equipment.  Although 
there might not be any conflicts associated with these goals, workload limitations 
might require an operator to prioritize which goals will receive the greatest degree 
of attention.  There might also be conditions where the advancement towards the 
highest priority goal is temporarily blocked – in this case, the operator could shift 
resources and attention to a lower priority goal that is achievable.  Operators must 
prioritize goals and actions in a rational and adaptable way such that highest 
priority goals receive sufficient attention but efficient progress can be made 
toward the achievement of all goals. 
 Selection of Appropriate Actions – there are often multiple methods of 
accomplishing certain actions.  An action can be selected on the basis of its 
relative costs and benefits, complexity, prerequisites needed to be met to 
accomplish the actions, or personnel preference.   For example, emergency 
cooling water for the nuclear plant can often be obtained from either a limited 
source of high purity water or an unlimited source of low quality water (e.g., sea 
water).  High purity water can be used without causing damage to plant 
components, but may not be sufficient to meet safety needs.  The unlimited low 
quality water supply can meet all immediate safety needs, but may result in 
excessive corrosion and long term damage to plant components.  The operator 
must balance short term safety goals against longer term economic goals when 





In any decision-making environment, several factors can impact the decision-
making process.  These may include the following [28]: 
 Values which define factors that are important to the decision maker;   
 Objectives which define the decision-maker’s desired goal states; 
 The certainty (or uncertainty) of information that must be considered; and, 
 The possible consequences of the decision.  
 
The decision-making process can consist of either a single decision point or a 
sequence of decisions.  If the process is a sequence of decisions, decisions early in the 
process can obviously affect decisions that must be made later in the process. 
In the case of a control room decision-making, a series of decisions must be made 
with uncertain information.  Because of the significant public health impact that a 
nuclear accident represents, the consequences from each decision could be 
significant.  Factors such as values and objectives will largely depend on the 
personnel preferences of individual operators.  However, the personnel selection and 
training programs for nuclear operators should instill some level of consistency in 
values and objectives.  
   
Although the control room decision-making environment is somewhat 
structured due to the regulatory requirements imposed on a nuclear plant, many 
decisions must still be made based on the judgment and experience of the operators.  




been a focus of training activities may place operators in an unfamiliar decision-
making mode.  These ‘unstructured’ decisions might place operators at a higher error 
potential.  Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Théoret have examined the decision-making 
process associated with so-called ‘unstructured’ decisions [29].  Briefly, unstructured 
decisions are decisions that have not been encountered in quite the same form and for 
which no predetermined or ordered set of responses exists in the organization.  A 
framework for unstructured decision making was developed that identified three 
phases of decision-making: identification, development, and selection (see Figure 2).  
Identification is primarily concerned with the decision-maker recognizing that a 
problem exists.  Development consists of a diagnosis routine followed by activities to 
identify possible solutions.  Candidate solutions can arise from either a search and 
screening process to identify solutions that have been used for other similar problems 
or a problem-specific design process to develop a unique solution for the current 
problem.  The selection process is characterized by an evaluation-choice routine 
followed by an authorization process to approve the selected alternative.  Evaluation 
can be performed by any of three of possible processes: judgment (where a single 
decision-maker simply makes up his/her mind based on experience), bargaining 
(where a decision is reached by a group of decision makers with competing goals), 






Figure 2 - Simplified Unstructured Decision Production System 
 
Although this framework was based on case studies of long-term decision making 
processes (lasting from one to four years), this model is still useful for identifying 
some key elements in control room decision making.  In particular, the recognition 
phase corresponds to the information block of the IDAC cognitive model.  The 
development and selection phases correspond to the decision block of the IDAC 
model.  Because the time frame of interest for the ADS-IDAC simulation is the first 
few hours of an accident, it is not expected that operators would attempt to identify a 
candidate solution through design; rather they will focus on a search and screening of 
existing solutions.   
 
After the first few hours of an accident, the control room decision making 
structure will change dramatically as emergency response facilities are activated.  In 
general, command and control of the accident response will shift from the control 
room to an offsite emergency operations facility.  The activation of additional onsite 
emergency response facilities such as a technical support center and an operations 












reason the ADS-IDAC simulation model should only be considered to be valid when 
the primary decision making responsibility resides in the control room. 
2.3 Human Error Overview 
  
In order to predict situations that may lead to human error events, it is first 
necessary to define specifically what is meant by the term “human error.”  A clear 
definition is needed to ensure that human error data, when available, can be 
appropriately used, and that the results from a human reliability assessment can be 
unambiguously communicated.  Proposed definitions include: 
 
…all those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical 
activities fail to achieve its intended outcome, and where these failures cannot 
be attributed to the intervention of some chance agency [30]; 
 
… unwanted actions or inactions that arise from problems in sequencing, 
timing, knowledge, interfaces, and/or procedures that result from deviations 
from expected standards or norms that places people, equipment, and systems 
at risk [31]. 
 
Other researchers have resisted providing a definition of human error.  For example, 
Rasmussen views to human error as man-machine or man-task misfits [32],  but  also 
notes that human error is not a stable category of events [33].   Hollnagel also resists 




the error classification scheme in order to better separate actions, causes, and 
consequences [8].  Thus, although a specific definition of error is somewhat elusive, 
there are some common elements among the various treatments of human error 
events.  Notably, human error events arise from an underlying cognitive process and 
produce undesirable consequences.  To understand the causes of human error, it is 
necessary to link the actions that lead to an error event back to the underlying 
cognitive model.  In order to better define the term “human error,” the following 
sections provide an overview of commonly used human error taxonomies.  Error 
taxonomies provide a hierarchical structure for classifying error events and collecting 
error rate data. 
2.3.1 Errors of Commission and Omission 
  
The concept of errors of commission and omission can be seen as an artifact 
of modeling human reliability within a probabilistic event tree framework [34].   
Within this logical structure, human behavior is often modeled as the response to two 
distinct questions: (1) did the operator perform an action, and (2) was the correct 
action performed?   A failure to act is generally called an error of omission, while 
performance of an incorrect act is termed an error of commission.    NUREG-1792, 
“Good Practices for Implementing Human Reliability Analysis (HRA),” provides a 





Error of Omission (EOO): A human failure event resulting from a failure to 
take a required action, that leads to an unchanged or inappropriately changed 
plant configuration with the consequence of a degraded plant state.  
 
Error of Commission (EOC): A human failure event resulting from an overt, 
unsafe action, that, when taken, leads to a change in plant configuration with 
the consequence of a degraded plant state.  
 
Although the potential for EOCs has long been recognized, explicit modeling 
of errors of commission has generally been beyond the scope of commonly used 
probabilistic risk assessment practices [35].   One difficulty in modeling EOCs is 
identification and evaluation of the potentially infinite number of actions that an 
operator might execute in response to an accident.  Conversely, EOOs are somewhat 
easier to model since they are generally constrained by the scope of the facility 
operating procedures.   The EOO/EOC taxonomy largely distinguishes between the 
types of human behaviors that have been historically included in risk assessments 
rather than linking errors to an underlying cause.  Although a goal of cognitive 
modeling approaches such as ADS-IDAC is to provide a means to identify potentially 
risk significant EOCs, the EOO/EOC taxonomy lacks sufficient detail to adequately 
communicate the results of a cognitive human error model.  In fact, researchers such 
as Hollnagel argue that the error of commission and omission taxonomy fails to 




useful to define human error in terms of the underlying cognitive processes rather 
than simply the observed consequence.   
 
2.3.2 Lapses, Slips and Mistakes 
 
 The lapse, slip and mistake error taxonomy links human errors to the desired 
goal of an action.  Lapses are generally associated with forgetting information 
relevant to the formulation of a goal or the execution of an action.  Slips represent a 
discrepancy between the intended goal and overt action while mistakes are associated 
with the selection of an inappropriate goal [36].  Norman identifies six categories of 
slip type errors:  
 Capture Errors – caused when two or more action sequences share common 
starting elements.  The more frequently used sequence can “capture” or 
override a less frequent, but intended, action sequence; 
 Description Errors – caused when the mental description of an action is 
ambiguously defined, leading the operator to act upon an unintended object 
that fits the ambiguous description; 
 Data-Driven Errors – caused when nuisance data overrides correct data; 
 Associative Action Errors – caused when an external trigger, common to two 
or more action sequences, causes the activation of an inappropriate action 
sequence; 
 Loss-of-Activation Errors – caused when the activation of the goal associated 





 Mode Errors – typically associated with the operation of equipment that has 
two or more operating modes.  An error occurs when the selected operating 
mode is not appropriate to the current situation. 
 
Because slip errors manifest themselves as a discrepancy between the desired goal 
state and the result of human action, detection of a slip is normally possible provided 
that suitable feedback is provided to the operator.  Conversely, the actions taken as a 
result of a mistake will be consistent with the selected (though inappropriate) goal.  
Thus, detection of a mistake can be difficult, even if feedback is provided to the 
operator.  Although the lapse/slip/mistake taxonomy is relatively simple, it has 
stronger cognitive foundation than the EOO/EOC taxonomy.  It is worth noting that 
both EOOs and EOCs can result from either a slip or a mistake. 
2.3.3 Skill, Rule, and Knowledge Based Errors 
  
Rasmussen views human errors as the result of man-machine or man-task 
misfits [32].  Systematic misfits are typically considered design errors, while 
occasional misfits due to the variability of the human operator are considered human 
errors.  Rasmussen constructed an error taxonomy based on a cognitive model that 
includes the active intentions, expectations, and subjective goals of the operator.  
Rasmussen’s taxonomy identifies three hierarchies of behavior: 
 Skill-Based: governs the largely subconscious performance in controlled 
situations associated with stored patterns of behavior.  Errors arise from 




 Rule-Based: governs performance in familiar situations controlled by stored 
rules of behavior.  Because rule-based behavior is used to control skill-based 
performance routines, the error mechanisms related to skill based behavior 
remain active in this domain. 
 Knowledge-Based: governs performance in unique, unfamiliar situations for 
which actions must be planned from an analysis and the prioritization of 
various goals.  Because knowledge-based behavior is used to activate stored 
rules, the error mechanisms associated with both rule- and skill- based 
behavior remain active in this domain. 
 
The skill-, rule-, knowledge-based model also includes performance shaping factors 
such as social climate, physiological stressors, physical workload, and emotional 
factors that can condition the operator’s response.  In order to classify an error event 
within this framework, Rasmussen developed a series of questions to determine if an 
error event was skill, rule, or knowledge driven: 
1. Is this a routine situation for which the operator employs a highly skill-based 
procedure?  Errors could arise from manual action variability, topographic 
disorientation (the act is performed on the wrong object), or stereotopic take-
over (another highly skilled act interferes with the activity – similar to 
Norman’s capture errors). 
2. If the situation is not routine, does the operator recognize this fact? Errors 





3. Is the situation covered by normal work practices or planned procedures? 
Errors might arise if the operator fails to recognize that an existing rule covers 
the situation, fails to recall an appropriate procedure accurately, or selects an 
inappropriate procedure.  
4. If the situation is not routine or covered by existing rule-based procedures, 
does the operator recognize that knowledge-based response is needed?  Errors 
might arise if the operator attempts to apply a familiar rule-based action in an 
inappropriate situation.  
5. When a knowledge-based response is needed, does the operator collect 
information of sufficient quality and quantity? Errors might arise if the 
operator attempts to formulate a knowledge-based response with incomplete 
or misinterpreted information. 
6. For a knowledge-based response, does the operator correctly perform 
functional analysis and deduction? Errors might arise the operator cannot 
adequately formulate a response. 
 
Reason later combined the  error taxonomies developed by Norman, Rasmussen, 
and others to create the Generic Error Modeling (GEM) system [30].   In the GEM 
system, Reason links slips, lapses, and mistakes with Rasmussen’s skill-, rule-, and 
knowledge-based framework.  This resulted in three basic error types: (1) skill-based 
slips and lapses, (2) rule-based mistakes, and (3) knowledge-based mistakes.   The 
GEM system also explicitly considers the relative timing of an error event.  Errors 




involving slips and lapses.  These skill-based slips and lapses are usually associated 
with the operator either being inattentive or over-attentive to the process being 
monitored.  Errors that occur after problem detection are generally called problem 
solving failures and involve rule- or knowledge-based mistakes.   Reason states that a 
defining condition for a rule- or knowledge-based mistake is the operator’s 
recognition that a problem exists.  Rule-based mistakes are typically due to the 
misapplication of good rules (i.e., rules that have worked in the past but are applied to 
an inappropriate situation) or the application of bad rules.  Knowledge-based mistakes 
are typically caused by bounded rationality (i.e., the inherent limitations of the human 
cognitive and memory processes) or the presence of incomplete or inaccurate 
information. 
 
A key feature of the GEM system is the preference given to rule-based 
problem solving based on pattern recognition.  Behavior rules are arranged in a 
hierarchy from general to specific.  When an exception to a general rule is 
encountered, the operator will formulate a more specific rule.  Because general rules 
tend to be applicable to a wider range of situations, they often have stronger 
activation then more specific rules.  The model proceeds to a knowledge-based mode 
only when successive attempts to find a rule-based solution fail. 
2.3.3 Errors in the IDAC Modeling Framework 
  
Error within the IDAC framework is defined in terms of the human operator 




the IDAC model is based on mismatches between internal and external reference 
points.  Internal reference points refer to cognitive processes within the IDAC model 
and include information collection, diagnosis, decision, and action processes.  
External reference points are defined as the plant system, procedures, and the 
operator.  Using these reference points, it is possible to identify five broad human 
error categories [37]: 
  
 Plant-Crew Mismatch: erroneous or incomplete information from plant or 
operator observation error; 
 Procedure-Plant Mismatch: erroneous or incomplete procedure;  
 Crew-Plant Mismatch: diagnosis, decision, or execution errors; 
 Crew-Procedures Mismatch: procedure inadequacy from a human factors 
viewpoint or crew lacking knowledge to understand procedure; and, 
 Crew-Crew Mismatch: erroneous or incomplete communication. 
 
A more detailed error taxonomy can be created by decomposition of each of the three 
main cognitive processes in the IDAC model (i.e., information processing, decision-
making, and action execution): 
 Error in information collected due to receipt of incomplete information from 
the plant or from another crew member or information filtering error; 
 Incorrect or incomplete assessment of situation or solution to problem due to 





 Decision error due to inappropriate selection of solution from equivalent 
alternatives or selection of incorrect decision criteria; 
 Error in action execution due to high operator workload or poorly human 
factored environment. 
A taxonomy classification and data collection scheme has been developed based 
on these broad error types [23].  A unique feature of the IDAC error taxonomy is the 
association of human error with the failure to meet a plant need.  In some sense, this 
classification scheme serves a screening function in that human errors that do not 
result in the failure to meet a plant need would not be subject to further evaluation.  
This serves to focus error analysis on the actions that most impact the safety of the 
plant system.  Although defining the “plant needs” can still present a challenge, use of 
this framework within a simulation environment allows one to directly determine 
impact of various human actions on the plant system.  For example, actions that result 
in an overall degradation of the plant state could be considered erroneous, while non-
normative actions that do not result in a degraded plant state would not be considered 




Insight about the usefulness of these various error taxonomies can be gained 
by examining previous attempts to categorize human errors obtained from actual 
operating experiences.  In the 1980s, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
sponsored a series of nuclear plant simulator exercises intended to improve the 




to-act following a stimulus (e.g., alarm).  An objective of the study was to group the 
time-to-act results of the simulator exercises into three performance categories based 
on a skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based taxonomy.  However, it was found that crew 
performance did not readily fit into a skill-, rule-, knowledge-based framework.  
Instead, the researchers identified three new performance categories: 
 Type 1: a response following a change in plant state that is indicated by an 
alarm or value of a monitored parameter.  In this case, crew response times 
fall within a probability distribution following the initial alarm. 
 Type 2: a response following an event that gives rise to a primary cue that 
signals that action must be taken when a secondary parameter is exceeded or 
cannot be maintained below a threshold value.  In this case, the crew response 
is delayed until the secondary parameter reaches the applicable limit. 
 Type 3: a response following an event that gives rise to a primary cue that 
signals that action must be taken before a secondary parameter reaches a 
critical value.  In this case, the crew’s performance fell into two distinct 
categories – some crews immediately took anticipatory action in response to 
the primary cue while other crews waited until the secondary parameter 
neared the critical limit.  
 
A conclusion of this study was that crew behavior was best characterized in terms of 
the cue structure provided by the plant rather than a cognitive framework.  
Furthermore, the behavior of nuclear operators cannot be easily categorized into a 




by the informational structure of available cues.  Rasmussen has cautioned that 
“human error is not a stable category of events and transfer of frequency data from 
one context to another depend on a subtle understanding of the psychological 
mechanisms and intimate intuition within both contexts.”  Rather than attempting to 
strictly define and quantify human error events, he stressed the need to create 
feedback loops around the human operator to make the effects of slips and mistakes 
observable and reversible [33]. 
 
Within the ADS-IDAC simulation environment, the distinction between errors 
of omission and commission has little meaning since both error types flow from the 
same cognitive model.  Furthermore, the development of an information-driven 
decision-making model can readily accommodate the insights regarding cue structure 
found during the EPRI simulator studies.  From this perspective, it is more important 
to clearly define the plant outcomes that constitute an error condition and then 
identify how the cognitive process led to the undesired outcome.  Only then can the 
plant design, procedures, and operator training be improved to prevent or mitigate the 
undesired outcome. 
 
2.4 Human Reliability Analysis Approaches 
  
 A key aspect of a probabilistic risk assessment is the identification and 
quantification of potential human error events for important operator actions.  The 




task analysis.  The task analysis requires an analyst to decompose complex operator 
actions into smaller units that can be more easily analyzed.  The task analysis (in 
addition to other supporting activities such as plant familiarization, operator 
interviews, and expert elicitations) will lead to identification of potential error events.  
Once error events are identified, a quantification method is used to estimate the 
probability that an operator will commit the error during the scenario of interest.  
Error quantification is typically based on the task type, various performance shaping 
factors that account for factors that influence operator behavior, possible 
dependencies between multiple actions that must be performed, and some 
consideration of time available to perform the action of interest.  Human reliability 
methods generally all involve a qualitative task analysis followed by the application 
of a quantification method.  However, the focus and decomposition level of the 
qualitative task analysis and the numerical methods used to quantify error events 
depend on the underlying human behavior model supporting the method.  Looking at 
the historical evolution of HRA techniques, these methods can be categorized into 
three broad categories, or generations, based on their treatment of cognitive and 
contextual factors [1].   
 
2.4.1 First Generation Approaches 
  
Many of the first generation HRA models were based on either time-reliability 
curves or simple information processing models, such as a signal-organism-response 




[9] assigns nominal human error rates based on activity characteristics (including 
time availability) derived from the qualitative task analysis combined with 
performance shaping factors that account for some contextual factors.  The level of 
task decomposition is more closely associated with the action type (e.g., operating a 
switch, closing a valve, executing a checklist) than the underlying cognitive processes 
driving operator behavior.  Because these early first generation models had limited 
treatment of human cognitive processes, they are limited in their ability to fully 
account for contextual factors. 
2.4.2 Second Generation Approaches 
 
Second generation HRA models, such as the Cognitive Reliability and Error 
Analysis Method (CREAM), are built upon a stronger cognitive foundation than first 
generation methods [8].  Rather than assigning error probabilities based on functional 
task decomposition, the second generation methods generally decompose operator 
tasks into distinct cognitive activities (e.g., communication, diagnosis, monitoring) 
and human functions (e.g., observation, interpretation, planning, and execution).  
Human error rates are then determined based on the cognitive activity, human 
functions, and relevant performance shaping factors.  Both the first and second 
generation HRA methods generally depend on a priori knowledge of the tasks that 
will be performed by the operator during an accident sequence.   Because the scope of 
the task analysis supporting these methods is usually established by plant procedures, 





2.4.3 Simulation-Based Approaches (Third Generation) 
  
Simulation-based approaches continue the evolutionary process from first and 
second generation human reliability approaches.   In light of previous research efforts 
that have found that nuclear plant operators can be induced to commit unsafe actions 
under certain error forcing situational contexts [10], the ability to better model 
contextual factors should lead to improvement in human error prediction.  Situational 
context includes factors such as the system state, the operator’s state of mind, and the 
sequence and timing of events.  The dynamic interaction and feedback between man 
and machine strongly affects the situational context and is difficult to model with a 
first or second generation HRA method.   
 
Simulation-based HRA methods can address many of the shortcomings of 
earlier HRA methods.  For example, the dynamic interaction and feedback resulting 
from operator actions can be directly modeled.  The time-dependent behavior of 
performance influencing factors such as stress, fatigue, and work load can also be 
modeled within a simulation environment.  Simulation-based methods can augment 
the data usually derived from time consuming and expensive control room simulator 
experiments conducted with actual control room crews.  A computer simulation 
model can also explore a wider range of accident conditions than would be possible 
with actual control room operators in a simulator.  An added benefit of simulation 
approaches is that a comparison between the simulation results and actual human 




develop greater accuracy and coverage [12].  Finally, a simulation approach allows a 
better determination of the consequences of a human error event.  
  
Research related to the simulation of nuclear plant operator behavior has been 
active for the last two decades.  During this time, a number of modeling approaches 
have been developed.  In general, these approaches have been based on artificial 
intelligence methods, cognitive models, task analysis models, or stochastic error 
models. A survey of previous research efforts with significant implications for the 
ADS-IDAC approach is presented in the following sections. 
 
2.4.3.1 Cognitive Event Simulator 
  
The Cognitive Event Simulator (CES) was developed for the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission in the early 1990s in order to explore the cognitive demands of problem 
solving in nuclear power plants [39].  The CES model uses a rule based artificial 
intelligence system capable of: 
 Building and maintaining a coherent situational assessment under changing 
environmental conditions; 
 Discriminating between expected and unexpected events based on the 
situational assessment; 
 Performing a diagnostic search to evaluate possible hypotheses that would 
explain unexpected events; and 




The CES model did not attempt to model actual human cognitive processes, but 
instead focused on developing knowledge and reasoning rules capable of successfully 
coping with nuclear plant events.  For example, the CES model had the capability to 
monitor at least 232 plant parameters every 10 seconds – far in excess of the 
capabilities of a human operator.  It was assumed that the development of the 
artificial intelligence model would provide insights into the cognitive processes used 
by a human operator.  The basic goal of the CES model was to identify a single cause 
for all observed abnormal indications.  In comparisons with human simulator crews, it 
was noted that CES was able to develop a coherent hypothesis more quickly than 
human crews.  Further, human crews tended to develop disjointed hypotheses for 
seemingly unrelated indications, while CES was able to rapidly “connect the dots” 
into a single diagnosis.   
 
Although CES demonstrated good predictive capabilities in a limited number 
of situations, the goal of the ADS-IDAC project is to model a human operator, not a 
perfect decision maker.  In order for CES to be a useful tool for identifying error 
forcing context, it would be beneficial if it was subject to the same vulnerabilities and 
shortcomings as a human operator.  Furthermore, the reliance on a strict rule based 
approach appeared to become a significant detriment when attempting to extend the 
system capabilities into new areas.  Therefore, CES approach was not used as a basis 
for the ADS-IDAC model, but instead served as an example of potential pitfalls to 




terminated further CES development and instead shifted its research focus to 




The Cognitive Simulation Model (COSIMO) was developed by the 
Commission of European Communities in the early 1990s to simulate the behavior of 
a nuclear plant operator during accidents [40].  The COSIMO cognitive model 
included four main functions: information filtering, diagnosing, hypothesis 
evaluation, and action execution.  Information filtering was based upon physical 
salience and cognitive salience – only data that passed through these filters was 
perceived and used for further cognitive functions.  The diagnosis function was 
performed by matching perceived data (i.e., data that had passed through the filtering 
process) to data stored in the operator’s knowledge base.  The matching operation 
was performed using similarity matching and frequency gambling.  Each potential 
diagnosis was assigned a ‘support’ score based on its similarity to symptoms stored in 
the knowledge base and its relative base rate frequency.  The diagnosis with the 
highest support score was then compared to an evaluation threshold based on the 
operator’s cognitive state – if the diagnosis support score did not exceed the threshold 
value, the diagnosis process would be repeated. Once a diagnosis with a sufficiently 
high support score was identified, suitable follow up actions would be identified.  
COSIMO was structured to utilize action arising from either a rule-based frame or a 
knowledge-based frame.  Rule-based frames are proceduralized actions while 




heuristic rules and general engineering knowledge.  COSIMO models three basic 
error types: cognitive collapse, unadapted change, and cognitive lock-up.  Cognitive 
collapse is inability to reason clearly and is associated with information overload.  
Unadapted change occurs when an operator responds to new events without taking 
past events into proper account.  Cognitive lock-up occurs when an operator 
continues to act in accordance with a hypothesis that should be revised or abandoned. 
 
The COSIMO model was compared to actual human operator simulator 
experiments to determine how well the model reproduced human behavior [41].  The 
experiments used four nuclear plant operators to examine responses to five different 
events.  During these experiments, two operator behaviors were identified that were 
not modeled in COSIMO – problem decomposition and timing of actions.  It was 
observed that operators tended to use a strategy of decomposing the major event into 
a series of sub-problems.  Furthermore, it was not necessary for an operator to 
diagnosis an event before applying a decomposition approach and stabilizing the 
reactor plant.   Also, operators timed actions based on the rate of change of plant 
parameters and feedback from the reactor plant.  These results suggested several areas 
where the COSIMO model could be improved: 
 Capability to decompose problems into sub-problems; 
 Ability to obtain plant feedback based on executed actions; 
 Modeling of causal relationships between actions and plant responses; 





The last capability was identified based on the observations that operators, even when 
under high time pressure, still used some limited inferential problem solving, rather 
than simple decision heuristics.   
 
The COSIMO model experience has important implications for ADS-IDAC.  
Both the goals and basic architecture of COSIMO and ADS-IDAC are similar.  The 
physical and cognitive salience based information filtering models in COSIMO could 
be easily modified and implemented within the ADS-IDAC framework.  The use of a 
diagnostic method based on similarity matching and frequency gambling is very 
similar to the existing ADS-IDAC framework.  ADS-IDAC also addresses some of 
the shortcomings of COSIMO, notably the ability to support problem decomposition 
into sub-problems.   Interestingly, the experience with COSIMO underscores the need 
to model knowledge based problem solving strategies.  Unfortunately, the knowledge 
based framework, which has direct applicability to the ADS-IDAC model, was never 




The Adaptive Control of Thought – Rational (ACT-R) model is a first principles 
approach to modeling human cognition and performance [42].  The ACT-R model 
includes two basic forms of knowledge: declarative memory for storing information 
chunks and production rule for implementing proceduralized tasks [43].  The ability 
to access the information stored in a declarative memory chunk is a function of its 




context, a noise component, and a stochastic retrieval property.  Production rules are 
activated by a similarity matching process that compares the current context to rules 
for implementing individual production rules.  ACT-R includes five basic cognitive 
modeling paradigms:  
 Instance Learning – As problems are solved, the problem solution is stored in 
memory as examples for future problem solving. 
 Competing Strategies – Based on the past success of different problem solving 
strategies, the best (i.e., the strategy with highest utility) can be identified and 
used for future problem solving situations. 
 Individual Differences – The model allows differences in individual cognitive 
ability (e.g., short term memory capacity, psycho-motor speed, or memory 
recall) to be simulated. 
 Perceptual and Motor Processes – ACT-R interacts with an external 
environment through perceptual and motor processes that include the 
capability for modeling timing behavior, inputs, and outputs. 
 Specialization of Task-Independent Cognitive Strategies – The ACT-R model 
can generate new production rules by combining existing rules through a 
learning process. 
The use of production rules in ACT-R lends itself to modeling rule based errors such 
as the selection of inappropriate rules.  The ACT-R model has found widespread use 
in modeling basic cognitive tasks such as puzzle problem solving [44].  A drawback 
of the ACT-R approach is that modeling has tended to focus on the “micro-cognition” 




have attempted to apply ACT-R to more complex situations.  For example, Byrne and 
Kirlik [42] recently used ACT-R to model runway incursion events for the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration.  
 
Although the architecture of ACT-R differs greatly from the ADS-IDAC 
framework, there are a number of modeling concepts that seem applicable to a 
nuclear plant operator cognitive model.  Specifically, the use of declarative memory 
chunks for factual information and the use of production rules for proceduralized 
actions.  Additionally, the activation and retrieval models used in the ACT-R context 




The Analysis of Dynamic Accident Progression Trees (ADAPT) dynamic 
event tree approach was developed by Ohio State University in collaboration with 
Sandia National Laboratory.  The ADAPT method is intended to facilitate the 
analysis of post-core damage scenarios (i.e., Level 2 PRA1) [45].  ADAPT has been 
linked to the MELCOR severe accident thermal hydraulic analysis code.  MELCOR 
can model a wide range of severe accident phenomena including core degradation and 
                                                 
1 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) studies are generally categorized into three distinct levels. 
Level 1 PRA refers to a risk study that spans the period from an event initiator to core damage.  The 
result of a Level 1 PRA is the core damage frequency of a nuclear plant.  A Level 2 PRA study bins 
the various Level 1 core damage results into distinct plant damage states and explores severe accident 
phenomenology (i.e., post core damage) such as core heat, melt, relocation, fission product transport, 
and containment performance.  The result of a Level 2 PRA is a vector of fission product release 
categories and their respective frequency.  A Level 3 PRA uses the fission product release categories to 
determine the health and safety consequences to the public by modeling factors such as meteorological 
conditions, population density, protective measure effectiveness (e.g., sheltering or evacuation), and 
radiological response.  The results of a Level 3 PRA may include metrics such as prompt fatality or 




relocation, containment performance, radionuclide transport and release, and 
hydrogen production.  This approach has been applied to the automated development 
of Accident Progression Event Trees (APETs).  APETs are used to analyze severe 
accident phenomenology and containment system response following a core damage 
event.  Similar to ADS-IDAC and other dynamic event tree methods, ADAPT-
MELCOR addresses sequence variability through the use of branching rules.  For 
example, ADAPT-MELCOR has been used to analyze a station blackout scenario 
using phenomenological branching rules for creep rupture of major reactor coolant 
system components (e.g., pressurizer surge line, hot leg, and steam generator tubes), 
hydrogen combustion in containment, recovery of power, and relief valve failures. 
 
A focus of the ADAPT-MELCOR research effort has been on improving 
efficiency and processing speed through parallelization of the computer code by 
spreading the computational effort over multiple computers.  A method has also been 
developed using a “code-agnostic” approach to permit ADAPT to interface with 
different thermal-hydraulic engines, provided certain requirements are met.  Despite 
these advances, ADAPT-MELCOR currently has very limited modeling of operator 
actions and cognitive decision-making processes.  Furthermore, the simplified 
ADAPT-MELCOR plant model currently described in the literature does not appear 
to provide the full range of interactive controls necessary for an operator model to 
realistically simulate the plant operating procedures.  Consequently, while this 




PRA techniques (particularly in the Level 2 area), ADAPT-MELCOR has limited 




The Monte Carlo Dynamic Event Tree (MCDET) [46] is a dynamic 
probabilistic risk assessment tool developed by the Gesellschaft für Anlagen-und 
Reaktorsicherheit (GRS), a non-profit research organization largely supported by the 
Federal Republic of Germany .  MCDET is capable of combining stochastic behavior 
with a thermal hydraulic simulation code.  The MCDET approach generates a 
dynamic event tree (similar to ADAPT-MELCOR and ADS-IDAC approaches), but 
uses a Monte Carlo simulation to model the stochastic behavior of timing parameters 
and system state changes.  An initial step in an MCDET analysis is to divide the 
random parameters of a problem into two groups: (1) the generally continuous 
variables handled with Monte Carlo simulation, and (2) the remaining variables 
(generally discrete state transitions) modeled with event tree branching events.  The 
actual analysis is performed in two steps.  The first step generates sets of parameter 
values for the continuous variables using Monte Carlo simulation.  In the second step, 
for each set of parameter values selected with Monte Carlo simulation, a discrete 
dynamic event tree is generated based on the possible combinations of discrete state 
transitions.  This results in a collection of dynamic event trees with each tree 
representing a unique combination of continuous variables selected by Monte Carlo 
simulation and the branching events within each tree representing discrete state 




severe accident nuclear code is used as the thermal hydraulic model in MCDET, 
providing capability to simulate post-core damage scenarios.  The MCDET approach 
has been applied to the analysis of a station blackout scenario for a pressurized water 
reactor [46].   
 
Recent research activities have added a Crew Module to MCDET to permit 
the simulation of crew interactions with the plant model, including communications 
and performance shaping factors such as operator knowledge, ergonomics, and stress 
[47].  The crew model is based on a “script and routine” approach.  Specifically, 
predefined operator tasks can be activated when certain prerequisite conditions are 
achieved (e.g., parameter values exceed a predefined threshold, component states, 
etc.).  The plant information needed to activate scripts and routines is captured in a 
“key vector.”  While the timing of operator actions can be represented in the model, 
the current crew model does not simulate mental processes and the cognitive behavior 
of the operators.  While the crew model has been used to analyze a secondary side 
feed and bleed [47] accident scenario, the current model has not focused on operator 




The theoretical foundation for ADS-IDAC has been under development for over a 
decade [23, 37, 48-50].  Early research efforts focused on developing necessary 
infrastructure to link a dynamic event tree scheduler driver with a thermal hydraulic 




early research efforts resulted in the development of the Accident Dynamics 
Simulator (ADS) approach which linked a thermal hydraulic representation of a 
nuclear power plant with a scheduling module capable of generating a dynamic event 
tree [51].  Parallel development of the Information, Decision, and Action (IDA) 
cognitive model established the theoretical basis for the model-based human 
reliability approach used in ADS-IDAC [23, 37, 48].  Later research efforts linked the 
ADS dynamic event tree scheduler and elements of the IDA cognitive model 
(extended to include crew interactions) to the RELAP thermal hydraulic nuclear plant 
analysis code [24].  The key distinctions between the ADS-IDAC current research 
effort and methods such as MCDET and ADAPT-MELCOR is the associated risk 
analysis domain and the treatment of human performance.  Because the thermal 
hydraulic engine for ADS-IDAC is the RELAP code, the risk analysis domain is 
limited to Level 1 PRA studies (i.e., up to, but not beyond core damage).  The use of 
the MELCOR severe accident code in MCDET and ADAPT-MELCOR allow these 
methods to explore post-core damage scenarios, including core melt and transport; 
containment performance; and fission product release.  Adapting ADS-IDAC to use a 
severe accident code such as MELCOR, though feasible, is beyond the scope of this 
research effort.  The application of parallel processing techniques, such as those used 
for ADAPT-MELCOR, can improve execution speed to increase the practicality of 
performing dynamic PRA studies.  Although beyond the scope of this research effort, 
other researchers have developed and demonstrated parallel processing capabilities 





Despite the maturation of the ADS-IDAC research program, several important 
limitations and needed enhancements were identified.  Key areas focus areas for this 
research activity included improvements to the operator cognitive model, full 
development and implementation of a comprehensive operator knowledge base, and 
model validation.  The foundations for these improvements are described in Section 
2.5 and specific contributions of the current research effort are described in Section 
2.6.    
2.5 Cognitive Modeling Foundations 
  
 ADS-IDAC utilizes the IDAC cognitive model to drive predictions of human 
behavior. Although the basic structure of the IDAC cognitive model had been 
developed when this project was begun [22-24, 37, 50], a number of implementation 
details were missing from the model.  For example, the specific model approaches for 
the following implementation aspects of the IDAC had not yet been included:  
 information gathering and filtering; 
 information assessment, event diagnosis, and situational assessment; 
 modeling of skill- and rule-based actions; and 
 the detailed structure of the decision-making model. 
This section begins with a summary of relevant literature in the areas of information 
processing (Section 2.5.1), systematic biases in human decision-making (Section 
2.5.2), and the foundations of naturalistic decision-making which provide the basic 




highlights the background information necessary to develop the detailed models 
needed to fully implement the IDAC model  
2.5.1 Information Filtering, Evaluation, and Utilization 
  
 ADS-IDAC is largely an information-driven modeling approach.  Although 
the operator decision-making engine and associated knowledge base play a vital role 
in selecting appropriate operator responses for a given situation, an underlying 
assumption is that an operator responds to a perceived situation in predictable ways.  
Within this context, variations in the perception of information can drive behavior 
variability.  Information filtering, assessment, and utilization all play an important 
role in capturing human performance variability. 
 
2.5.1.1 Information Filtering 
 
Most information-rich environments provide both useful data signals and 
distracting noise.  Often, both signal and noise are distributed according to some 
random process and can overlap.  The major challenge to a decision maker is filtering 
out noisy data in order to act only on genuine signals.  One method of performing this 
filtering operation, derived from signal detection theory, is to establish a signal cutoff 
that establishes a binary decision threshold (see Figure 3) [53].   A parameter value 
that exceeds the cutoff threshold is considered to be a valid signal, while a value 
below the cutoff is considered to be noise.  Unfortunately, a value above the cutoff 




















Figure 3 - Signal Noise Interaction 
 
In general, four distinct outcomes could occur: 
 Hit – the operator correctly identifies a true abnormal signal deviation and 
takes action; 
 Correct Rejection – the operator correctly identifies the signal as within 
normal bounds and takes no action; 
 False Alarm (FA) – the operator incorrectly interprets a noisy signal as a true 
deviation and takes action; 
 Miss – the operator incorrectly dismisses an abnormal signal deviation as 
noise and takes no action. 
 
The cutoff threshold establishes the relative ratio of hits, corrected rejection, false 
alarms, and misses within a specific environment.  Various techniques have been 
proposed to find an optimum cutoff threshold that maximizes hits and correct 
rejections while minimizing misses and false alarms.  For example, each of these 




of the noise and signal, an optimum cutoff value can be assigned that maximizes 
utility for the decision maker.  However, research studies have indicated that decision 
makers, even after obtaining significant experience, often violate optimum cutoff 
strategies.  To improve the agreement between signal detection theory and observed 
decision maker behavior, cutoff reinforcement learning (CRL) models have been 
proposed [54].  In general, CRL models assume that a decision maker will establish 
and adjust the cutoff value based on a learning process over a series of repeated trials.  
The learning process model includes factors such as positive reinforcement, 
generalization, and forgetting.   
 
Barkan, Zohar, and Erev [55] compared four strategies for setting signal detection 
cutoff values for general industrial safety environments.  The strategies included two 
static approaches based on utility and prospect theories, and two dynamic cutoff value 
approaches based on hill-climbing and cutoff reinforcement learning models.  Each of 
these models included the notion that a “miss” did not always result in an accident – 
instead they assigned a conditional probability for an accident given that a miss event 
occurred.  From the perspective of feedback and reinforcement, the probabilistic 
outcome for a miss introduces additional uncertainty since a decision maker cannot be 
sure if a non-accident outcome was due to a correct decision or a lucky near-miss.  
This study found that the cutoff reinforcement learning model captured several key 
behaviors, including initial tendencies toward risky behavior, slow learning toward 
optimum cutoff placement, and decreased learning speed as the conditional 




strategies do not allow adjustment of the cutoff value based on learning, the utility 
and prospect theory approaches do not model learning effects during repeated trials.  
 
Application to ADS-IDAC Operator Model 
Nuisance alarms are a potential source of operator distractions in the nuclear 
plant control room [56].  Nuisance alarms may be generated by maintenance and 
testing operations or by equipment failures.  These alarms do not provide relevant 
information pertaining to the plant state and may distract operators from more 
important duties.  A dynamic signal detection theory approach may provide a means 
to appropriately model operator behaviors in response to an alarm signal or an 
abnormal parameter measurement.  For example, during maintenance or testing 
operations where nuisance alarms might be expected, an operator may “increase” 
their threshold to alarm conditions and be less likely to notice a true alarm.  After 
maintenance and testing conditions are completed, the operators may not immediately 
return to their previous cutoff level and instead will need to ‘relearn’ an appropriate 
threshold.  The identification and processing of nuisance alarms would also be 
expected to be a learning process, where an operator may pursue an initial alarm 
condition with a high level of diligence but follow-up on subsequent alarms with less 
vigor if the condition is perceived to represent noise.  Additionally, training and 
experience would tend to establish nominal cutoff values for operators over time.  
New situations (such as accident conditions) or differing levels of experience among 




cutoffs.  The cutoff reinforcement learning model is beneficial for the construction of 
a dynamic parameter filtering function within the ADS-IDAC operator model. 
 
2.5.1.2 Information Assessment and Utilization 
 
 
In the mid-twentieth century, Egon Brunswik developed a lens model 
framework to explain certain processes in human judgment [57].  In his model, 
Brunswik separated internal psychological processes from the external world by a 
‘lens’ composed of informational cues (see Figure 4).  Each cue provides information 
about the true state of the external world in proportion to its ‘ecological validity.’  A 
cue’s ecological validity is analogous to the probability that the cue accurately 
predicts the state of the external world.  The model assumes that an individual makes 
judgments about the state of the external world through a process of cue utilization.  
In essence, the Brunswikian Lens Model can be used to explain (at least in a 
qualitative sense) how judgments can become distorted from the true external world.  
For example, if the cue validities assumed by an individual do not agree with true 
ecological validities, or if the cues are utilized in a non-optimum manner, an 





Figure 4 - Brunswikian Lens Model 
  
 
Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbolting later modified the Brunswikian Lens 
Model and placed it inside a larger Probabilistic Mental Model (PMM) framework 
[58].  The PMM theory introduces two strategies for making immediate judgments: 
(1) use of a local mental model where judgments are made with certainty based on 
memory and logic, and (2) a probabilistic approach where a judgment is made based 
on probabilities obtained from the external world.  The theory also introduces the 
concept of a target variable related to the decision basis for the judgment.  For 
example, they noted that if an individual is asked “Which city has the larger 
population, San Diego or Birmingham?” the appropriate target variable is population. 
The PMM theory assumes that an individual will first attempt to make a judgment 
using a local mental model based on memorized information.  However, if sufficient 
information cannot be retrieved from memory to make a judgment, the individual will 
resort to a probabilistic method.  In this example, an individual might attempt to infer 
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the relative populations of San Diego and Birmingham based on knowledge of the 
airports, professional sports teams, and key industries located in each city.  The key 
difference between these strategies is that under a local mental model an individual 
attempts to retrieve information about the target variable directly from memory, while 
under the probabilistic approach the individual attempts to infer the target variable 
based on similarity of the problem to some reference class of objects.  The inferred 
target variable value is based on the reference class and the internal “cue validities” 
used by the individual.  The PMM theory uses the term “cue validity” rather than 
“ecological validity” to make the distinction between an individual’s internalized 
experience with external world and the true “ecological validity.”  An individual is 
considered to be well adapted to the environment if his or her “cue validities” 
correspond to the true “ecological validity.”   
 
Juslin, Olsson, and Bjorkman [59] further extended PMM theory by adding 
sampling error and response error components.  Sampling error accounts for 
differences between an individual’s internal cue validities and the true ecological 
validity in the external world.  Two sources of sampling error are proposed: (1) 
limited experience with the external world, and (2) formulation of internal validities 
using only a sub-set of representative cases stored in long-term memory.  To account 
for differences between an individual’s true confidence and reported confidence, the 
model also introduces a random response error.  Using the combined sampling and 
response error model, Juslin, Olsson and Bjorkman predicted that over-confidence in 




A reduction in sampling error results in better correspondence between an 
individual’s internal cue validities and the true ecological validity.  Additionally, in 
environments with low predictability considerably more experience will be needed to 
achieve correspondence between internal cue validities and ecological validities.   
 
Application to ADS-IDAC Operator Model  
The extension of PMM theory by Juslin, Olsson and Bjorkman to include 
sampling and response errors has an important implication for the ADS-IDAC 
operator model.  In the nuclear plant context, one could view cues as the symptoms of 
an abnormal event.  For example, cues associated with a loss of reactor coolant 
accident might include decreasing reactor coolant pressure and high radioactivity 
levels in the containment building.  To make an appropriate judgment about the 
meaning of these cues, an operator would need to rely on cue validities developed by 
past experience and training.  Since the experience levels of operators might vary and 
training may not be directly representative of actual plant conditions, the operator’s 
internal cue validities may differ from the true cue ecological validity.  Also, 
operators may have different strategies for cue utilization which may result in 
different conclusions about a given plant state.  Finally, since operators will generally 
communicate their beliefs and conclusions to other crew members, response errors 
could skew the perception of other members of the crew.  In summary, the PMM 
theory with sampling and response error can provide a useful framework for 




2.5.2 Heuristics and Biases in Cognitive Processes 
  
The term “heuristics” refers to the relatively simple rules that people 
sometimes use to make judgments and decisions. According to Tversky and 
Kahneman [60], people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce 
the complex task of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgment 
operations.  Tversky and Kahneman note that heuristics are economical and usually 
effective, but can sometimes lead to systematic and predictable errors.  Gigerenzer, in 
making an analogy to visual illusions, notes that (1) our brain is not paralyzed by 
uncertainty when sufficient information is not available, (2) heuristic principles are 
used to make a “good bet”, and (3) this bet is based on the assumed structure of the 
environment [61] .   Gigerenzer notes that heuristics are “not simply hobbled versions 
of optimal strategies” [62].  Indeed, he has placed heuristics within a broader decision 
making context of bounded rationality – where simple heuristics replace optimization 
strategies and the environmental structure is exploited to provide more adaptive, real 
world solutions. 
In their 1974 paper, Tversky and Kahneman [60] introduced three main 
categories of heuristics: representativeness, availability, and adjustment and 
anchoring.  Representativeness refers to similarity an object has with a larger class of 
objects.  Tversky and Kahneman noted that individuals tend to make systematic 
errors when assessing if an object belongs to a certain class, notably the failure to 
properly account for the base-rate frequency of the class in the environment and the 
failure to adequately consider effects of sample size.  Availability refers to the ease in 




Classes of objects that are more easily retrieved from memory will tend to be assessed 
as having a higher base-rate frequency than classes of objects that are more difficult 
to retrieve.  If an individual does not have direct knowledge of events that can be 
retrieved from memory, he or she might attempt to construct a mental model to 
generate the needed frequency data.  In this latter case, the ease with which a mental 
model is constructed will tend to increase the perceived base rate frequency of the 
object class.  The creation of this mental model is closely related to the “simulation 
heuristic” [63].   When using a simulation heuristic, people construct a mental model 
to bridge an initial state with a target event by introducing a series of intermediate 
events.  The target event is considered to be more probable if the intermediate events 
do not include exceptional or rare conditions.  The simulation heuristic can also be 
demonstrated by evaluating “what if” scenarios for a given target event.  In this later 
case, people will tend to restore any exceptional intermediate events back to a 
nominal state to break the casual chain of events in order to ‘undo’ a target event.  
Adjustment and anchoring refers to the process where people estimate a value by 
using available information to make adjustments to an initial starting value.  
Kahneman and Tversky noted that people tend to make insufficient adjustments from 
the starting value and therefore tend to bias their final estimates toward their starting 
point.  
 
Tversky and Kahneman [60] noted that there are a number of contextual 
factors that can influence the systematic errors arising from heuristics.  Framing 




individual judgment (e.g., a more favorable description may lead to a more optimistic 
prediction).  Individuals may also develop inappropriate confidence in the validating 
of information (validity illusion).  For example, an individual may exhibit a tendency 
to be more confident in predictions when given consistent data (even though the 
consistency might be due to dependencies among the data) than when predicting 
outcomes based on a more varied but statistically more significant set of data.   It has 
also been noted that individuals tend to overestimate the probability of conjunctive 
events (i.e., the probability of a series of related outcomes) and underestimate the 
probability of disjunctive outcomes.  This may result in people having unwarranted 
optimism about the success of an outcome, particularly when assessing complex 
systems in which a chain of events must succeed for overall success of the system.  
Anchoring and adjustment effects can affect an operator’s expectations about how the 
system should respond to a set of actions.  Consequently, the failure to accurately 
predict system response may result in an operator developing either an unwarranted 
pessimistic or optimistic view of the plant state. 
 
The heuristics and biases literature has not been without controversy.  With 
regard to context, Gigerenzer [64] has noted that the use of content-blind norms (i.e., 
application of a normative model for reasoning that does not consider context), is not 
appropriate for evaluating human judgment.  Gigerenzer argues that the attribution of 
human behavior based on a heuristic and bias approach may not appropriately capture 




referenced the classic conjunction fallacy associated with the “Linda Problem”2  [65] 
in his discussion, he also provides an example in his 2005 paper illustrating the 
importance of contextual information [61].   In the 2005 paper, Gigerenzer relates the 
results of a research study where participants where asked to pour half the contents of 
a full glass into an empty glass.  Participants were then asked to select which glass 
was “half full” or “half empty.”  Gigerenzer notes that participants relied on their 
prior knowledge of which glass was initially full when making their selection, thus 
demonstrating that eliminating contextual information from the problem (by equating 
a half full glass with a half empty glass) fails to capture the characteristics of human 
intelligence.   
 
Wallsten [66] noted several situations where systematic errors attributed to 
heuristics may not strictly apply.  For example, with regard to consideration of base-
rates, he noted that expert may be more sensitive to base-rates compared to novice 
judges; the specificity of information provided by the problem may reduce the 
relevance of base-rate information; and the lack of salience of the base-rate 
information may reduce its weighting.  Similarly, factors such as the sample to 
population ratio, problem wording, and experimental designs that fail to account for 
individual differences may explain the failure of experimental subjects to adequately 
                                                 
2 The “Linda Problem” refers to an experimental study intended to explore the conjunction fallacy.  
Subjects are presented with a description of “Linda” that generally includes the following elements:  
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright.  She majored in philosophy. As a student 
she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in 
antinuclear demonstrations”.  Subjects are then asked to select which of the following two alternatives 
is more probable: (1) Linda is a bank teller, or (2) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist 
movement.  Subjects often incorrectly choose alternative (2) even though alternative (1) is more likely.  
Kahneman and Tversky concluded that the availability and representativeness heuristics can make the 




consider sample size.  Wallsten’s main conclusion was that the limitations associated 
with heuristics should not be overly generalized – rather a broader theory of heuristics 
should include the above factors. 
 
Application to ADS-IDAC Operator Model 
Given the time constraints for judgments and decisions associated with 
nuclear plant operations, it is likely that operators use some form of heuristics to 
make efficient decisions.  For example, nuclear operators must continually assess 
emergent conditions to determine if they represent significant accident events or 
minor inconveniences.  In essence, this problem is one of deciding the 
representativeness of abnormal events – is the alarm more representative of a major 
plant fault or a simple burned out fuse?  In large part, this assessment is based on the 
operator’s belief about the relative frequency of major accident events and more 
minor problems such as instrument failures.  Because accident events are relatively 
rare, operators would probably not have memories of past events and would need to 
rely on a mental model based on knowledge and past training to place an abnormal 
symptom into a useful context.  The contextual factors affecting operator decision-
making may be strongly biased by experience and the memory of recent events.   
Once a mental model is developed, an operator might attempt to construct causal 
links leading to the perceived state.  This process could bias the operator toward 
consideration of lengthy causal event chains containing more likely events than a 
shorter chain composed of rare events.  This bias could be further reinforced by 




model to be more likely than the individual events themselves (similar to the 
conjunction fallacy).  To the extent practical, the ADS-IDAC decision-making engine 
was constructed to accommodate these factors. 
 
2.5.3 Naturalistic Decision Making 
  
Naturalistic decision making (NDM) theory attempts to model how people make 
decisions in familiar, real-world contexts [67].   NDM is characterized several key 
elements [68]: 
 Ill-structured problems; 
 Uncertain, dynamic environments; 
 Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals; 
 Action/feedback loops (a series of sequential decisions must be made, with 
early decisions affecting the context of later decisions); 
 Time stress; 
 High stakes; and, 
 Multiple players. 
The Recognition Primed Decision-Making (RPD) model is an NDM model that was 
formulated to explain how experienced firefighters identify and carry out a course of 
action without having to compare the merits of alternative actions [13].  This model 
was based in part on the observations that: (1) rarely did experienced fire ground 
commanders consider even two options concurrently, and (2) a search for an optimal 




operation [14].   In general, decisions are made within the RPD framework by a 
process of matching the current situation to a familiar or prototypical situation based 
on experience.  Depending on the situational context and the decision-makers level of 
familiarity with the context, the RPD decision making process can take three different 
forms:  
 Level 1 - Simple Match: The decision maker is able to recognize the current 
situation based on a feature matching process for relevant cues, goal states, 
expectancies, and typical actions.  In this case, the decision process is simply a 
straightforward implementation of the typical actions for the recognized 
situation. 
 
 Level 2 – Diagnose the Situation: The decision-maker is unable to obtain an 
adequate level of recognition for the current situation to enable use of the 
simple match strategy.  In this case, a story building process may be used to 
augment or explain uncertain or missing cues.  If the story building process 
results in adequate recognition of the situational context, the typical actions 
for situation can be implemented. 
 
 Level 3 – Evaluate Course of Action: The decision maker performs a mental 
simulation of a possible course of action to determine if the action will result 
in undesirable consequences.  If undesirable consequences are found, the 






The RPD model has several key characteristics, notably: the first option generated by 
the decision maker is usually workable, the process relies on serial generation and 
evaluation of alternatives (rather than concurrent evaluation), the process does not 
attempt to find the optimal course of action, and the process focuses on situational 
assessment and mental simulation.   
 
One controversial area for NDM models is defining what is meant by a 
decision error [69].  A working definition proposed by Lipshitz is that decision errors 
within a NDM model are “deviations from some standard decision process that 
increase the likelihood of bad outcomes.”  An important feature of this definition is 
that bad outcomes can still occur as a result of sound decision process.  Despite the 
possible difficulty in applying this definition, several researchers have examined 
factors that may increase the potential for poor outcomes within an NDM framework.  
For example, simulation experiments with naval combat information center crews 
found that the order that information was perceived by decision makers significantly 
influenced situational assessments associated with identifying an aircraft as civilian or 
military [70].  In particular, researchers noted that subjects tended to bias judgments 
in favor of more recent cues, even when earlier cues offered contradictory evidence.  
Another experiment examined the role of the “sunk-cost bias” and situational 
assessment in pilot decisions to continue visual flight into adverse weather [71].  The 
sunk-cost bias predicts that pilots would be more likely to continue a flight into 




(i.e., the pilot has already invested a significant amount of time in the flight and 
would be biased to reach the desired goal).  However, simulator experiments 
conducted with licensed pilots indicated that pilots were actually more likely to 
continue flights into adverse weather encountered earlier in the flight.  This result was 
attributed to pilots placing more weight on the pre-flight weather briefing and less 
weight on actual weather observations early in the flight and increasing the weight of 
observed conditions later in the flight (as information from the pre-flight briefing 
became outdated).  These studies underscore the influence of an accurate situational 
assessment on the eventual outcome of a decision. 
 
Application to ADS-IDAC Operator Model 
The RPD model has important implications for the ADS-IDAC cognitive 
model.  The environments where RPD methods have been used are very similar to the 
nuclear plant control room.  Specifically, nuclear operators routinely face uncertain, 
dynamic situations; have competing goals; time stress; and high stakes.  The RPD 
model places greater emphasis on the operator’s situational assessment.  Therefore, 
factors that influence information perception and evaluation can have a large 
influence on the potential for error events.  A potential challenge of implementing the 
RPD model in ADS-IDAC is the need to formulate a mental simulation of possible 
alternatives when a simple match process is inadequate.  This requires the 
development of a coherent mental model of the plant systems and the capability to 





2.6 Contributions of This Research to Human Reliability Analysis  
  
 This research project contributes to the fields of dynamic probabilistic risk 
assessment and human reliability in five main areas:  
 enhancement to the modeling capabilities of the ADS dynamic risk assessment 
approach to support a wider variety of branching options, including stochastic 
timing variability, decision-making behaviors, procedure step-skipping.  
 the development of an operator decision-making making engine capable of 
realistically representing control room operator performance 
 demonstration of a full integration of a detailed human performance model with a 
realistic nuclear plant simulation; 
 development of methods to organize and analyze human performance data within 
a model-based human reliability framework; and  
 model calibration and validation through the use of actual nuclear plant operator 
performance data. 
Each of these contributions is discussed in the remainder of this section. 
2.6.1 Enhanced Dynamic Risk Assessment Branching Capability 
 
ADS-IDAC generates a dynamic event tree during accident scenarios by 
activating branching points when certain conditions are met.  Each branching point 
includes two or more individual event branches, each of which represents distinct 
combinations of system and operator states.  Collectively, the branching points 
describe the topology of a discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) associated with an 




the DDET branching points from the initiating event to an end state.  The generation 
of branching points is controlled by a set of general rules that define the specific 
activation conditions for a branching point.  A key focus of this research effort has 
been extending the branching capabilities of ADS-IDAC to enable the realistic 
modeling of control room behaviors.  This effort has resulted in the development of 
DDET branching rules capable of modeling stochastic timing variabilities among 
control room crews. Additionally, branching options have been developed to model 
variability in certain decision-making processes such as the activation and execution 
of skill-, and rule-based actions.  Finally, enhanced capabilities to capture variability 
in crew goal and problem solving style selection and procedure execution have been 
added to the ADS-IDAC simulation code. 
2.6.2 Development of Operator Decision-Making Engine 
  
In order to more fully evaluate the role of contextual factors in influencing 
operator behaviors, it is necessary to develop a decision-making model capable of 
simulating the key types of decisions made by nuclear plant operators during accident 
scenarios.  The decision-making model should have a number of characteristics, 
including a firm theoretical basis and the capability to represent features such as 
information gathering, perception and biasing; high-level goal and strategy selection; 
and static and dynamic influencing factors.  Key elements of the decision-making 
process include the ability to support situational assessment through the use of a 
diagnostic module and the capability to link elements of the control room 




systems based on knowledge and experience.  The decision-making engine must also 
draw on an extensive knowledge base that represents not only proceduralized 
operator behaviors, but also catalogs significant skill- and rule-based activities.  A 
key output of this research project has been the development of a decision-making 
engine that incorporates these elements.  The decision-making engine responds to 
dynamic contextual factors and shows promise for advancing the state of knowledge 
in modeling and predicting a variety of human errors.   
2.6.3 Full Integration of Human Performance and Plant Models 
  
 
In order to realistically represent the contextual factors that can influence 
operator behavior, it is necessary to develop a detailed simulation of both the nuclear 
plant complex and the knowledge base used by operators to interact with the plant.  A 
key focus of this research effort has been building a detailed model of a typical 
pressurized water reactor that includes all significant controls, indications, and alarms 
that the operators would normally rely on to address accident situations.  The operator 
knowledge base was developed to accommodate a comprehensive suite of plant 
operating procedures, diagnostic information, non-proceduralized actions, and an 
underlying mental model of nuclear plant systems.  In order adequately simulate the 
possible range of crew-to-crew variability, the needed infrastructure to support a 
variety of possible dynamic event tree branching rules was also developed.  These 
branching rules can represent variations in timing, control input variations, activation 





2.6.4 Human Performance Data Collection and Analysis 
  
A model-based human performance analysis method such as IDAC provides a 
structured framework for the collection, storage, and analysis of human performance 
data.  For example, the ADS-IDAC operator knowledge base provides a means to 
capture within a structured framework non-proceduralized operator actions; 
diagnostic information used by operators; and the linkage between plant components 
and the functions they support based on the operator’s understanding of plant 
operation.  A key insight from this research project is that operator performance data 
stored within the ADS-IDAC operator knowledge base repository can be readily be 
applied to new situations and problems.  This provides a means to leverage limited 
and human performance experimental data collected with actual operating crews to a 
wider range of potential scenarios using a simulation approach.  This can extend the 
usefulness of expensive experimental data to explore a wider range of operator 
performance variabilities.  
2.6.5 Model Calibration and Validation 
  
A challenge associated with the development of a complex model is that 
model parameters must be calibrated and some form of validation must be completed 
in order to establish the usefulness of the model.  A significant portion of this 
research effort has involved using experimental data collected with actual nuclear 
plant operating crews to calibrate and validate the models used in the ADS-IDAC 
simulation code.  The timing of this project has fortuitously coincided with an 




calibrate and validate ADS-IDAC against two sets of operator crew experiments 
performed at the Halden Reactor Project facilities in Halden, Norway.  This research 
project not only demonstrates methods and approaches that can be used to calibrate a 
human performance model, but also establishes the usefulness of the ADS-IDAC 







3. ADS-IDAC Overview 
  
 This section provides an overview of the main components and features of the 
ADS-IDAC simulation code.  In addition to a discussion of the architecture of the 
simulation code, also described are input requirements, simulation control, and output 
data. 
3.1 Main ADS-IDAC Components 
  
 The ADS-IDAC model consists of three main components (Figure 5): the 
thermal hydraulic nuclear plant simulation model, the operator IDAC cognitive 
model, and the control panel which serves as the interface between the plant and 
operator models.  The nuclear plant model is can be influenced by two factors – input  
 
Figure 5 - Main Features of ADS-IDAC 
 
from the control panel (e.g., manipulation of plant components) and activation of 
hardware failures.  The operator model is influenced by information obtained from 
RELAP Plant Model











the control panel (and other members of the operating crew) and the set of static and 
dynamic performance influencing factors.  The control panel, which serves as an 
information bridge between the operator and plant models, can be influenced by 
instrument failures that can cause bias or filter information received by the operator 
from the reactor plant.  Information flow among each of these components is 
managed by the ADS scheduler.  The schedule ensures information exchange among 
these components is appropriately synchronized, activates branching events based on 
the event tree branching rules, and ends sequences when termination criteria are met. 
3.1.1 Nuclear Plant Thermal Hydraulic Model 
  
The nuclear power plant thermal-hydraulic model in ADS-IDAC provides a 
rich contextual environment for the analysis and prediction of operator behaviors.  
The current version of ADS-IDAC utilizes the RELAP5/MOD 3.2 computer code 
[72] to provide a transient simulation of nuclear power plant operation.  The RELAP5 
code can simulate a wide variety of accident initiators and provides the capability to 
model key safety systems, controls, and instruments.  Advantages of RELAP5 include 
its proven capabilities as a transient analysis tool and the availability of detailed 
power plant models.  However, due to the intrinsic limitations of the RELAP5 code, it 
is not currently possible to model core damage states and severe accident scenarios.  
Consequently, ADS-IDAC is currently limited to the analysis of scenarios up to the 
start of core damage.   Adaption of ADS-IDAC to a more versatile thermal-hydraulic 






Although RELAP5 plant models have been previously developed to support 
safety analyses and other regulatory uses, these models require some modification in 
order to exploit the full capabilities of ADS-IDAC.  In general, ADS-IDAC requires 
the following modifications to an existing RELAP5 input model: 
 Replacement of all conservative analysis assumptions with realistic best estimate 
parameters.  These include trip setpoints, reactor power level, timing of automatic 
safety system actuations, and other key plant parameters. 
 Modification to safety system models to replace simple boundary conditions with 
a more realistic representation of controls, instrumentation, and alarms.  These 
modifications include modeling of redundant trains of multi-train systems, 
provisions for control of significant components such as key pumps and valves, 
and representation of critical support systems such as water supplies and electrical 
power. 
 Addition of systems and components that provide a significant portion of the 
mitigative functions provided by the abnormal and emergency operating 
procedures.   
 Implementation of interactive control interfaces for all significant components to 
allow the ADS-IDAC operator model to manipulate plant components.  This 
includes the addition of a “manual” control mode for components that normally 
utilize an automatic control system (e.g., feed water regulating valves or power 





This research project has successfully integrated ADS-IDAC with a realistic three-
loop, pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant RELAP model.  The current plant 
model includes over 75 controls, 180 indicators, and 70 alarms.  To improve feedback 
to the operator, the plant model includes reactivity and core power control features 
such as control rod movement, boration, and turbine load adjustment.  Where 
necessary, controls for major pumps and valves in all front line safety systems (e.g., 
emergency core cooling and auxiliary feed water) were also added to the existing 
RELAP input model.  As a result of these efforts, all major components referenced in 
the plant emergency procedures have been represented in the ADS-IDAC thermal-
hydraulic model.   
 
ADS-IDAC provides four possible control inputs for each component that can 
be manipulated by the operator: (1) changing the component operating mode (e.g., 
automatic vs. manual mode), (2) setting a specific control value for a component 
(e.g., throttling control valve to 50% open), (3) incrementing the control setting of a 
component (e.g., throttling open a control valve by an additional 10%), and (4) setting 
a control value based on a perceived parameter (e.g., setting the steam dump target 
pressure equal to the perceived main steam header pressure).  These capabilities 
provide sufficient flexibility to realistically model all significant operator interactions 




3.1.2 IDA Cognitive Model 
 
 
 The Information, Decision, and Action (IDA) cognitive model provides a 
framework for modeling individual operator behavior [23].  The basic elements of the 
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Figure 6 - Basic Elements of the IDA Model 
 
of three main processes – information perception and processing, decision-making, 
and action execution.  These cognitive processes are supported by a memory model 
consisting of three distinct units.  Working memory stores recently perceived 
information, has a relative finite capacity, and is analogous to the operator’s short 
term memory.  Information residing in working memory is transferred to intermediate 
memory and is available for later retrieval.  The capacity of the intermediate memory 
is assumed to be unlimited, but information may be forgotten (or decay) over time.  
The knowledge base is the preeminent repository of all information that the operators 
knows about the system, including procedures, facts, and past experiences.  Within 




memory and the knowledge base.  Over time, information stored in intermediate 
memory can be eventually transferred to the knowledge base during a learning 
process.  Information can be retrieved from both intermediate memory and the 
knowledge into working memory when needed.   
 
Operator behavior is influenced by static and dynamic performance 
influencing factors (PIFs) that capture internal and external factors that can affect 
cognitive performance [20].  The IDAC model groups PIFs into eleven broad 
categories: 
 Cognitive modes and tendencies – alertness and attention 
 Emotional arousal - stress 
 Strains and feelings – task and time loading 
 Perception and appraisal – situation perception and awareness of roles 
 Intrinsic characteristics – confidence and motivation 
 Memorized information – knowledge, experience, and skills 
 Organizational factors – work practices and tools 
 Team-related factors – cohesiveness, coordination, and leadership 
 Conditioning events – latent hardware, software, and human failures 
 Environmental factors – physical access, lighting, temperature, etc. 
 Physical factors – fatigue, physical limitations 
 
The status of the PIFs defines the operator’s mental state and influences the cognitive 
performance of the operator.  Specifically, the operator’s mental state influences the 
information processing, decision-making, and action execution processes. 
 
3.1.3 Crew Model 
  
The ADS-IDAC crew model currently includes a decision-maker and an 
action-taker.  The decision-maker is analogous to senior reactor operator (SRO) and 




room, each operator has unique roles and responsibilities.  The SRO selects the high 
level goal and directs all written plant procedures.  The RO performs all interactions 
with the nuclear power plant model through the ADS-IDAC control panel.  ADS-
IDAC currently supports three high level goals: maintain normal operation, 
troubleshoot abnormal conditions, and mitigate accident conditions.  Any of four 
problem solving strategies can be used to achieve these high level goals: 
 Wait and Monitor – a passive information gathering strategy; 
 Instinctive Response – perform simple skill based actions that are activated by 
matching perceived information to memorized situation-response profiles; 
 Follow Written Procedures – implement formal written procedures (e.g., 
abnormal or emergency operating procedures); 
 Knowledge-Based Reasoning – use a diagnostic process to guide crew actions in 
order to balance the flow of mass and energy within plant systems. 
  
The selection of a specific goals and strategies is based on the plant information 
perceived by the operator and performance influencing factors.  In general, the SRO 
selects an appropriate problem solving strategy for the crew based on the current high 
level goal and other factors.  However, the SRO and RO may implement the 
Instinctive Response strategy whenever the perceived conditions match a memorized 
situation-response profile. 
 
Each individual operator in ADS-IDAC is provided with profiling data that 




knowledge base.  The knowledge base includes rules for diagnosing plant events [16]; 
a functional decomposition and mapping of plant controls, indicators, and alarms; and 
rules for activating instinctive response actions.  In addition to the knowledge base, 
the operator profile also includes data needed to: (1) calculate performance 
influencing factors; (2) define the operator’s tendencies to skip procedure steps or 
pursue specific problem solving strategies; (3) manage memorized information; and 
(4) establish the timing of actions and communications.  The flexibility afforded by 
the operator profile allows the simulation of a variety of operator performance 
tendencies.  Specifically, performing influencing factors associated with problem 
solving styles, perception and appraisal of information, and utilization of memorized 
information can all be captured within the operator profile. 
 
3.1.4 Scheduler and Simulation Control 
  
ADS-IDAC generates a discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) to explore the 
impact of component failures and operator behaviors on plant safety.  The DDET is 
constructed by allowing changes in plant and operator states at discrete points in time.  
Plant state changes include component actuations and failures while operator state 
changes may include decisions and interactions with plant hardware.  This approach 
is categorized as an implicit state transition approach [73] and permits analyst-
supplied rules to be used to direct plant and operator state changes.  A main limitation 
of this approach is that the computational effort needed to obtain a solution 




increases.  This exponential growth is known as sequence explosion and can limit the 
practicality of a simulation approaches. 
 
The ADS-IDAC scheduler and simulation control module balances solution 
completeness with computational effort by focusing computational effort on certain 
sequences.  During an ADS-IDAC simulation, component and operator state changes 
are permitted to occur at discrete branching points.  State changes are modeled by 
generating one or more sequence branches at each branching point.  Specific 
branching points and the number of branches generated at each branching point are 
defined by a set of analyst-supplied branching rules.  Branching rules can be 
constructed to include sequence initiators, hardware and process variables, operators 
actions, and software (see Figure 7) [24].  A set of sequence termination rules are also 
identified to prevent excessive expansion of the DDET. 
 





 The process flow of the ADS-IDAC scheduling and simulation control 
functions are described in Figure 8.    Scheduling control is handled by two nested 
timing loops.  The inner loop handles execution of the RELAP thermal hydraulic 
plant model and is identified as blocks 4, 5, and 6 in Figure 8.  The outer loop 
provides executive control over functions related to dynamic event tree generation, 
including initiation of initiating events, branching, and sequence termination.  
Consequently, execution of the ADS-IDAC code is controlled with two main time 
step parameters: (1) the internal RELAP5 time step (ΔtRELAP), and (2) the ADS-IDAC 
time step (ΔtADS-IDAC).  The RELAP5 time step establishes the incremental time step 
used in the reactor plant model thermal hydraulic calculation and is set low enough to 
ensure stable and accurate thermal-hydraulic modeling results.  The ADS-IDAC time 
step establishes the incremental time step used by the ADS-IDAC scheduler module.  
Each ADS-IDAC time step, the scheduler pauses the execution of the RELAP5 
thermal hydraulic code in order to update operator model data, activate hardware 
failures and initiating events, and manipulate controls.  Between these ADS-IDAC 
scheduler time step pauses, RELAP5 runs without interruption using the time step 
control specified in the RELAP input deck.  The inner loop RELAP time step is 
typically set to a maximum value of approximately 20 to 50 milliseconds, while the 
outer loop ADS-IDAC time step is set at least an order of magnitude higher at 0.5 to 





Figure 8 - ADS-IDAC Simulation Executive Control 
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The outer ADS-IDAC executive control loop performs the following 
functions: 
 Activate initiating events (Block 7): ADS-IDAC can simulate two types of 
hardware failures: time based failures and conditional failures.  Time-based 
failures are activated at a pre-determined time during an event sequence and 
generate only a failure branch (i.e., no success branch is initiated).  Conditional 
failures are activated when a specific condition occurs (e.g., a component state) 
and generate both a success branch and a failure branch.  Initiating events are 
typically modeled as time-based failures (e.g., an accident condition or transient is 
initiated at a specific time) while component failures during an event sequence 
(e.g., failure of mitigative equipment to function) are generally treated as a 
hardware failure. 
 Update control panel information (Block 8): All indicators, alarms, and 
component states are updated based on the current RELAP thermal hydraulic 
data.  However, simply updating control panel indicators does not automatically 
update the operator’s perception of the plant state.  The operator must first 
perceive and memorize information from the control panel in order to use the 
updated information. 
 Activate hardware failures (Block 9): Component failures activated by a change 





 Execute operator interactions with the thermal-hydraulic plant model (Block 10): 
The crew interacts with the thermal-hydraulic model through the use of RELAP 
interactive controls.  A crew action changes the value of the associated interactive 
control in the RELAP thermal-hydraulic model; when RELAP is restarted in 
Block 4, the result of the interactive variable change can influence the reactor 
plant simulation.  This step performs the action step of the IDAC cognitive model.   
The actions arising from the information processing decision-making process 
from the previous outer loop time step (i.e., the actions arising from the crew 
decision making processes in Blocks 13 and 14 are executed during the 
subsequent time step in Block 10). 
 Perform information processing and decision-making processes for each crew 
member (Blocks 11 – 14): These steps implement the information and decision-
making processing of the IDAC cognitive model.  Actions arising form these 
process steps are executed in subsequent outer loop time steps in Block 10. 
 Queue new dynamic event tree branches (Block 16) When a new sequence is 
identified, the ADS-IDAC scheduler stores all information related to the current 
plant and operator for later use.  Information related to placement of the new 
sequence within the simulation Discrete Dynamic Event Tree is also saved (e.g., 
identity of parent sequence branch, number of new sequences generated, and 
events to be partitioned among the new sequences).  New sequences are then 
placed in a holding queue to await later simulation. 
 Terminate sequences (Block 17), activate new dynamic event tree branches 




steps is to determine if any termination criteria have been met by the current 
sequence.  In general, three criteria can be used to terminate a sequence: (1) the 
simulation time has reached the specified truncation time, (2) the sequence 
reached the specified probability cutoff value, or (3) the sequence was terminated 
by a special procedure following command or the activation of a special alarm 
condition.  The later condition allows the analyst to stop a sequence when a 
specific condition or parameter value is reached.  
A detailed description of the ADS-IDAC simulation executive and simulation control 
is included in Appendix K. 
 
3.2 ADS-IDAC Input Requirements 
  
 ADS-IDAC requires a significant amount of input information in order to 
define control panel instrumentation, controls, and alarms; populate the operator 
knowledge base; identify accident initiating events and plant hardware failures; and 
provide branching rules and sequence termination criteria needed to construct the 
dynamic event tree.  Although creation of an initial suite of input files can be resource 
intensive, much of the input data is generically applicable to a wide range of possible 
scenarios.  For examples, control panel descriptions, procedure content, and sequence 
termination criteria can be generically applied to a wide spectrum of abnormal and  





3.2.1 Control Panel 
  
All plant status information perceived by the operations crew must be 
displayed on the ADS-IDAC control panel and all control manipulations must be 
performed through the control panel interface.  This control scheme is similar to an 
actual control room, with the ADS-IDAC control panel serving as the main 
information interface between the operators and the reactor plant model.  Three main 
categories of information can be displayed on the ADS-IDAC control panel: (1) 
reactor plant thermal hydraulic parameters (e.g., temperature, pressure, flow rate), (2) 
component operating state (e.g., on, off, open, closed), and (3) alarms.  Indicators for 
thermal hydraulic parameters can display both the value of an indicator or the rate of 
change of the target parameter.   The rate of change of a parameter can be used to 
provide a trend display for use by the simulated operators (similar to a strip chart 
recorder).  Component operating state information can be used to model simple panel 
status lights (e.g., pump operating status).   Finally, alarms based on parameter 
values, component operating state, or the difference between two parameters can be 
displayed on the control panel.   
 
Operators may manipulate active components in the RELAP model using two 
types of controllers: (1) continuous variable control with fine adjustment capability 
(control values can be assigned over a range of acceptable values), and (2) discrete 
controllers that permit simple component state changes (e.g., open, close, off, or on).  
Continuous variable controls are used for components such as throttle valves and 




model.  Discrete controllers are used for components with a small number of 
operating states such as pumps or control switches.  
 
The plant control panel input files establish the linkage between the RELAP 
thermal hydraulic model and the ADS-IDAC operator model.  All interactions with 
the thermal hydraulic model involving active components (e.g., pumps, valves, and 
setpoint controllers) utilize the interactive variable feature of RELAP.  Input data is 
needed to describe the specific interactive variables that will serve as communication 
channels to link the RELAP plant model to specific control panel controls.  For 
example, the panel controls used to stop and start the emergency core cooling system 
are linked to specific interactive variables in the RELAP plant model.  Depending on 
the value of the interactive variable, the thermal hydraulic model can change the state 
of the associated pump or valve component.   All other information exchange such as 
parameter values and component states is communicated by linking the ADS-IDAC 
control panel to the associated control variable, hydrodynamic component, or logical 
flag within the RELAP model.  In general, temperature, pressure, and flow data is 
communicated by linking ADS-IDAC to the associated hydrodynamic component 
and parameter of interest in the RELAP model.  Values that must be calculated such 
as subcooling margin, average temperatures, and liquid levels, are generally handled 
with control variables.  In these cases, the ADS-IDAC control panel is linked to the 
associated control variable in the RELAP model.  Some alarms and safety system 
actuations are modeled with logical trip variables; in these cases, ADS-IDAC is 




the ADS-IDAC control panel for a three loop pressurized water reactor is provided in 
Appendix B. 
3.2.2 Operator Knowledge Base 
  
Each individual operator in ADS-IDAC is provided with unique knowledge 
base and operator profile to guide the operator’s behavior.  The knowledge base 
includes rules for diagnosing plant events; a functional decomposition and mapping 
of plant controls, indicators, and alarms; and rules for activating instinctive response 
actions.  In addition to the knowledge base, the operator profile also includes key 
parameters for calculating performance influencing factors; defining the operator’s 
tendencies to skip procedure steps or pursue specific problem solving strategies; 
managing memorized information; and timing of actions and crew interactions.  The 
operator profile contains information pertaining to the calculation of performance 
influencing factors, problem solving styles, perception and appraisal of information, 
and utilization of memorized information.  Section 4.3 provides additional detail on 
the operator knowledge base and Chapter 7 provides an overview of performance 
influencing factors in the ADS-IDAC model. 
3.2.3 Plant Hardware Failures 
  
ADS-IDAC allows the analyst to model two types of hardware failure events: 
(1) time dependent failures, and (2) conditional demand failures.  Time dependent 
failures allow the analyst to initiate hardware state changes, including failures, at a 




failure events, such as failure of pump or a turbine or reactor trip, or may also activate 
accident initiators included in the RELAP thermal hydraulic model such as losses of 
reactor coolant or steam line breaks.  Conditional failures are triggered when a 
specified component changes operating state.  For example, activation of the reactor 
trip alarm can be used to generate a conditional failure of an auxiliary feedwater 
pump.  Time dependent failures generate only a single failure event sequence branch 
while conditional failures generate two event sequence branches – a success path and 
a failure path.  However, both failure types permit the operators to attempt to recover 
the failed equipment.  If the operator attempts to recover failed equipment, additional 
sequence branches representing component recovery and permanent failure are 
generated.  Thus, each conditional failure event can result in three outcomes: (1) the 
equipment does not fail, (2) the equipment initially fails but is later recovered, and (3) 
the equipment fails and is unrecoverable.  Time dependent failures result in two 
possible outcomes: (1) the equipment initially fails but is later recovered, and (2) the 
equipment fails and is unrecoverable. 
 
Appropriate input data must be provided by the analyst to describe how ADS-
IDAC handles component failures.  All failure events must by linked to an active 
component controller on the ADS-IDAC control panel.  For time dependent initiating 
events associated with passive component failures (e.g., piping system leaks and 
ruptures), this generally requires that an artificial controller be set up on the ADS-
IDAC control to activate the accident initiators3.  For all failures, the analyst must 
                                                 
3 Accident initiators that are not related to active component failures are typically modeled in RELAP 




specify the associated control panel controller, the desired failure state, the failure 
probability, and the recovery probability.  For time-dependent failures, the failure 
time is specified; for conditional failures, the component that triggers the failure event 
is specified.  A detailed discussion of the input requirements is provided in Appendix 
K. 
3.2.4 Dynamic Event Tree Control 
  
In order to achieve complete scenario coverage using dynamic probabilistic 
risk assessment methods, it is necessary to explore a large number of accident 
sequences.  New accident sequences are generated when a branching rule is activated; 
this leads to the generation of two or more distinct sequences depending on the 
number of system or operator states specified by the associated branching rule.  ADS-
IDAC can generate event sequence branches for a wide range of events.  The current 
version permits the generation of branches based on the following elements: 
 Component failures and recovery (discussed in Section 3.2.3); 
 Time required to initiate the actions associated with a mental belief (i.e., activate 
skill- or rule-based behaviors) (new feature added by this research); 
 Stochastic time variability required to perform a specific control panel action 
(new feature added by this research); 
 Control input variations when executing control panel actions (new feature added 
by this research); 
                                                                                                                                           
adjacent system.  For example, a steam generator tube rupture is modeled by inserting a normally 
closed artificial valve between the primary and secondary sides of a steam generator tube.  When a 
steam generator tube leak is initiated, the valve is opened to a position commensurate to the desired 
leakage rate.  When a failure is initiated in this manner, operator recovery to terminate the leakage by 




 Omission (skipping) a proceduralized or skill- or rule-based action (new feature 
added by this research). 
The analyst must specify the branching rules that activate these various branching 
events.  Hardware failure branching rules identify the affected components, the 
activation conditions, and the failure and recovery probabilities.  For timing related 
branching events, the analyst must identify the specific action or mental belief that 
will trigger branch generation and the number of branches that are generated.  The 
conditional probability for each time branch is calculated from the timing distribution 
specified for the associated action or mental belief.  Similarly, control input variation 
branching rules specify the associated action and a probability table that specifies a 
discrete control input value and its associated probability.   An error of omission (i.e., 
step-skipping) is modeled as a binary branching event – either the step is performed 
or it is omitted.  Step-skipping is not activated by branching rule; instead the analyst 
specifies a skipping probability cutoff value, and if the calculated step-skipping 
probability is higher than the cutoff value, a step-skipping branching event is 
generated.  This allows the analyst to suppress lower probability skipping events to 
prevent the generation of excessive numbers of event tree branches during a 
simulation (i.e., sequence explosion).   
 
Simulating a large number of sequences often requires a significant amount of 
computational power and time.  Therefore, uninteresting sequences are often 
terminated or truncated.  ADS-IDAC provides several methods to terminate or 




elapsed time, sequence probability, and conditional events.  Branching rules and 
sequence termination criteria are described in greater detail in Section 8.3 and the 
specific input requirements are provided in Appendix K. 
 
3.3 ADS-IDAC Output  
 
ADS-IDAC generates a number of output data files that describe the dynamic 
event tree sequences to allow the analyst to identify conditions leading to a 
degradation in the safety of the nuclear plant.  Since a goal of the ADS-IDAC 
research project is to provide a tool to study the influence of context on operator 
behavior, sufficient output information is provided to fully characterize the contextual 
factors.  Three general categories of output files are generated by ADS-IDAC: 
dynamic event tree information, crew information and performance influencing 
factors, and thermal hydraulic data.  The output files are all written in plain text file 
format and can be imported into a third-party program such as MS Excel for data 
analysis and visualization.  A detailed description of the ADS-IDAC output files is 
provided in Appendix K. 
3.3.1 Discrete Dynamic Event Tree 
  
 The ADS-IDAC output provides all information required to construct a 
graphical representation of the dynamic event tree.  Specific output for each 
branching event includes: 
 type of branching event and number of branches generated; 




 the sequence identifiers associated with the branching event.   
Although earlier versions of ADS-IDAC included sufficient post-processing 
capability to graphically generate the event tree, this capability is no longer 
functional.  This capability can be added into a future update of the ADS-IDAC code, 
but is beyond the scope of the current research effort.   
 
In addition to the data needed to reconstruct the dynamic event tree, ADS-
IDAC also provides a sequence summary list and a complete narrative description of 
each sequence.  The sequence summary lists all event sequences generated during the 
simulation along with the associated sequence probabilities, termination times, and 
reasons the sequences were ended.  The sequence narrative provides a time history of 
all control room alarms, crew communication, branching events, and operator 
interactions with the control panel.  A sample sequence narrative for an 
uncomplicated reactor trip scenario is provided in Appendix E. 
3.3.2 Crew Behavior and Influencing Factors  
  
Crew related output data includes the state of all dynamic performance 
influencing factors, diagnostic output, information gathering information, and the 
output from the procedure step-skipping module.  Dynamic performance influencing 
factor information includes a time history of each dynamic PIF (system criticality, 
time constrained loading, and information loading) for each operator including the 




information summarizes the time history of the relationship values for all events 
include in the diagnostic matrix for each operator.   
 
The ADS-IDAC information processing model includes a control panel scanning 
feature for active information gathering (see Section 4.1.2.2).  During each scan 
cycle, ADS-IDAC outputs a listing of each parameter and its associated priority level 
included in the operators scan queue.  This information includes the following 
elements: 
 the time of the scan cycle; 
 identification of the associated operator; 
 the total size of the associated operator’s scan queue (i.e., the total number of 
control panel items scanned); and 
 the contents of the operator’s scan queue (i.e., specific alarms, components, 
and parameters included in the control panel scan). 
  
Because each operator can have a unique knowledge base and may perceive different 
information during the course of an accident scenario, PIF values, diagnostic, and 
control panel scanning results for each member of the operating crew are not 
identical. 
 
 Because the operators do not execute procedure steps simultaneously, 
procedure step-skipping information for each operator is combined into a single 
output data file.  The data output summarizes data associated with the ADS-IDAC 
procedure step-skipping module and includes the following information: 
 sequence time; 
 the associated operator; 
 the procedure name and step number; 




 the relevance value of the action to operator’s current situational assessment; 
 other dynamic factors associated with step-skipping model including the time 
constraint loading for the operator;  
 static factors associated with the procedure step; and 
 calculated probability of skipping associated step action (i.e., committing an 
error of omission). 
 
The crew behavior and influencing factors output information provides a complete 
time history of the factors associated with the operator’s mental state and the impact 
the mental state has on operator behavior. 
3.3.3 Thermal Hydraulic Data 
  
 The ADS-IDAC definition of a human error event is based on the impact 
human activities have on meeting a plant’s functional needs.  Therefore, in order to 
determine if a specific set of operator behaviors constitute an error event, it is 
necessary to fully understand the impact operator actions have on plant thermal 
hydraulic processes.  ADS-IDAC provides a sequence-specific comprehensive time 
history of all control panel parameter values; component and alarm states; and 
controller input values.  This allows the analyst to review the time history of plant 
parameters to determine if safety margins were compromised or if safety limits were 
exceeded as a result of the operator activities during a specific sequence.  Although 
earlier versions of ADS-IDAC included limited graphical capabilities to view key 
parameter histories, this capability no longer exists.  This feature can be added into a 
future update to the ADS-IDAC code, but is beyond the scope of the current research 





4. Information Processing and Knowledge Base Modules 
  
A key feature of the ADS-IDAC simulation model is that all operator 
behaviors arise from perceived data rather than the direct output from the plant 
thermal-hydraulic plant model.  Before an operator can use any plant information, the 
data must first pass through the operator’s perception filter.  Because the perception 
filter can either screen out or distort data obtained from the plant model, the operator 
may possess incomplete or inaccurate information.  Furthermore, the cognitive 
processes for each operator are supported by an individualized knowledge base.  The 
knowledge base represents the memorized information, skills, experience, and 
abilities available to the operator.  If the operator uses this incomplete or inaccurate 
data to guide their decisions and actions, human error events may occur.  A goal of 
this research is to develop necessary modeling and simulation capabilities in ADS-
IDAC to identify situations and contexts where operators may implement 
inappropriate actions due to limitations of the information perception process or the 
operator knowledge base.   
4.1 Information Collection 
 
A key feature of the ADS-IDAC information collection process is that the 
operator’s attention is generally directed to data that the operator perceives as most 
relevant to the current plant state.  For example, if the operator has perceived a 
problem with the feed water system, attention generally will be focused on relevant 




the operator does not possess infinite information processing capabilities, shifting 
focus to a new area will result in reduced attention to other areas.  Therefore the 
dynamic information collection model causes the operator to spotlight information 
perceived to be relevant and to ignore information deemed less important.  If the 
operator has developed an accurate situational assessment, this process serves to 
improve the efficiency of limited information processing capabilities.  However, if 
the operator’s situational assessment is incorrect, the operator is more likely to miss 
important information and be less likely to mitigate an accident event. 
 
Information drives all important operator behaviors in the IDAC model and 
influences goal and strategy selection, formulation of the operator’s event diagnosis 
and situational assessment, the activation of non-proceduralized actions, and the 
verification of the impact of recent operator actions (see Figure 9).  Observations of 
nuclear plant control room activities have determined that operators actively and 
passively gather information from a variety of sources [74].  Active information 
gathering occurs when the operators specifically seek information about the status of 
a parameter, alarm, or component state.  Active information collection generally 
refers to two main types of information collection – information gathering directed by 
procedures and periodic control panel scanning.  Since the operator intends to gather 
and use actively collected information, this information would have a lower 
likelihood of being filtered.  Passive information gathering occurs when the operator 




actuation of an alarm.  Because passively gathered information is not intentionally 
collected and may not be pertinent to the operator’s perceived plant state, 
 
Figure 9 – Information Sources and Uses 
 
it has an increased likelihood of being bypassed or missed.  All information, 
regardless of whether is collected actively or passively, is subject to biasing. 
 
All perceived information is stored in a memory repository for later use.  
Information that is available but not perceived is not placed in memory and is not 
available for later use.  When the operator requires information, the memory is 
searched to determine if the information has already been perceived.  If the 
information is stored in memory, the operator may use the stored data depending on 
the preferences and tendencies established in the operator’s profile (i.e., does the 
operator tend to rely on information in memory when available, or is updated 
information always sought).  Using information already stored in memory can be 
more efficient for the crew because it is readily available and is not subject to further 
 





















biasing, filtering, or communication errors.  However, depending on the recency of 
the information, it may no longer accurately represent actual plant conditions. 
4.1.1 ADS-IDAC Information Processing 
 
 The ADS-IDAC information processing module is shown in Figure 10.  The 
information processing stage of the IDAC cognitive model consists of three main 
steps: (1) gathering information, (2) sorting information based on its origin and the 
type of information, and (3) initial information processing.  Information being 
actively processed during this stage can be considered to be held in the equivalent of 
short term memory.  At the conclusion of the information processing stage, all 
information (including any biasing factors) is transferred to the operator’s 
intermediate memory4. 
 
ADS-IDAC employs a central communication clearinghouse (or 
“blackboard”) architecture for handling all information interchange.  All 
communication items (or communication packets) initiated by members of the 
operations crew and the control panel are posted to the central blackboard.  Each 
communication packet identifies the sender, intended recipient, type of 
communication, and the content of the message.   For the purposes of ensuring 
adequate control over communication processes, the control panel is considered to be  
                                                 
4 Operator memory in ADS-IDAC consists of three areas: short term memory, intermediate memory, 
and long term memory.  Short term memory is used to temporarily store information that has just been 
collected.  Once data in short term memory is perceived, it is stored in intermediate memory.  
Information in intermediate memory can be used to support decision-making, but may decay over time.  
Long term memory is static and consists of the factual information the operator knows about the 





Figure 10 - ADS-IDAC Information Processing 
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a model agent equivalent to an operator.  For example, the reactor plant might post 
the actuation of an alarm to the blackboard with all operators identified as intended 
recipients.  Similarly, when the reactor operator attempts to open a valve or start a  
pump, a message for the reactor plant is posted to the blackboard.  The information 
processing stage begins with each control room operator and the reactor plant control 
panel scanning the communication blackboard to identify any messages listing them 
as the intended recipient (Block 2).  All communication blackboard information that 
is addressed to the operator (and has not been designated as being withheld from the 
operator) is loaded into that operator’s short term memory.   
 
After information is obtained from the communication blackboard, a series of 
sorting steps are used to categorize the new information (Blocks 5, 7, and 21).  
Information can originate from three sources: internally from “within” the operator 
and externally from the control panel or from another operator.  Internal information 
transfers information related to cognitive decisions within the operator’s own 
memory.  This internal information refers to distinct decisions made by an operator 
and includes changes in high level goals, new problem solving strategies, execution 
of a new procedure step, and new mental beliefs.  External information from the 
control panel includes the status of control actions, component states, parameter 
valves, and alarm information.  Information can also be transmitted among the control 
room crew members.  In the current implementation of ADS-IDAC, only the reactor 
operator (action-taker) can interact with the nuclear plant model and only the senior 




information exchange is related to the execution of proceduralized activities directed 
by the decision-maker.  Information exchanges related to the execution of control 
panel activities requested by the decision-maker are categorized as ordered activities. 
 
Following information sorting, limited pre-processing is performed.  Since 
internal information resides within an operator’s memory it is immediately perceived 
and acted upon.  Consequently, when a communication packet related to the selection 
of a new goal or strategy, the operator immediately updates his or her memory with 
the new information.  Similarly, new mental beliefs are immediately activated.  If a 
newly activated mental belief is associated with a skill- or rule-based mental 
procedure, the mental procedure is added to an execution queue for later action.  
Information related to procedure execution immediately updates the operator’s 
internal procedure place-keeping module to note the new active procedure step.  
Because both activation of procedures and mental beliefs can be used to activate new 
mental beliefs, new data related to these information categories are used to update the 
confidence levels of the operator’s mental beliefs (blocks 15 and 27 in Figure 10).  
Externally derived information from the control panel is not immediately acted upon; 
instead it is used to update mental belief information and sent to memory for later use 
during the decision-making module.  Externally generated ordered activity 
information (including manipulation of controls or the verification of plant data) 
requested by the decision-maker are entered into an action queue when perceived by 




the ordered action queue and executes queued actions.  Following the information 
pre-processing stage, the operator will initiate the decision making process. 
 
4.1.2 Control Panel Scanning 
 
One form of self-directed information gathering routinely utilized by control 
room operators is control panel scanning [75].   An important feature of control panel 
scanning is that operators will often monitor a subset of parameters more closely 
based on the ongoing plant status.  Within the ADS-IDAC model, this focusing 
process is controlled by the operator’s control panel “scan queue”.  The scan queue 
contains a listing of parameters that the operator monitors on a frequent basis.  Scan 
queue parameters may include instruments, alarms, and component states.  The 
number of items contained in the scan queue is limited by the individual capabilities 
of the operator, the amount of attention the operator can apply to information 
gathering, and the operator’s perception of the current plant state.  As the number of 
monitored items in the scan queue increases, the operator improves his or her ability 
to accurately assess and diagnosis the plant state.   
 
Two main factors determine which items are included in the operator’s scan 
queue: (1) the maximum size limit of the queue, and (2) the priority level of each item 
in the queue.  The maximum size of the scan queue (NScan Queue) is determined by 
Equation 1. 
 





The constants NBaseline, γ1, and γ2 are set in each operator’s profile and serve to 
calibrate the model to the desired operator performance level.  NBaseline establishes the 
maximum amount of information that can be contained in the scan queue while the γ 
factors ( 0 < γi < 0.1) set the sensitivity of the dynamic scan queue limit to the 
information load and system criticality PIFs.  Qualitatively, as the information load 
increases (as indicated by a high value of PIFInfo Load), the scan queue size will 
decrease to prevent an information overload.  If there is a significant degradation in 
the plant level of safety (as indicated by a high value of PIFSystem Criticality), the size of 
the scan queue decreases to force the operator to focus limited attention resources on 
the most serious problems.   
 
As an accident scenario progresses, certain events (such as the actuation of an 
unexpected alarm) will prompt the operator to add new items to the scan queue.  
When items are added to the scan queue, each item is assigned an initial priority level 
based on its relative importance.  At fixed time intervals, the priority level of each 
scanned item is reduced if the safety functions associated with the monitored item are 
not perceived as relevant to the current plant state.  The component functional 
decomposition included in each operator’s knowledge base serves as the linkage 
between functional role of each item in the scan queue and the plant state diagnosis.  
For example, if the operator determines that a reactor coolant system leak has 
occurred, pressurizer level will be perceived as a relevant item to the plant state but 




the maximum size limit (NScanQueue), low priority items are eliminated until the scan 
queue size restored to less than the maximum limit.  Because items that are 
considered to be functionally relevant to the current plant state will maintain a high 
priority level, they will be retained in the queue.  In this manner, the items contained 
in the scan queue are dynamically adjusted to permit the operator to shift focus to 
areas of the plant that are perceived to be most important while keeping the overall 
information loading at an acceptable level. 
 
 Figure 11 provides a simplified overview of the how the control panel scan 
queue may evolve over time as new information becomes available to the operator.  
During normal operation, the operator will generally focus on a high level set of 
parameters in order to ensure that plant systems are operating normally.  In this 
example, typical parameters may include reactor power output, coolant temperature 
and pressure, and key water levels.  If new information is received, such as actuation 
of an alarm, the operator may shift attention to parameters closely associated with the 
alarming condition.  Thus, if a low pressurizer water level alarm is noted, the operator 
may begin to regularly monitor pressurizer water level and the reactor coolant level 
control system. If adding these parameters to the scan queue results in too much of a 
monitoring burden, the operator may stop monitoring parameters that are considered 
to be within normally operating limits (in this case steam generator water levels).  If 





Figure 11 - Dynamic Control Panel Scan Queue 
 
on parameters perceived to be important to the situation, while irrelevant parameters 
and those that are not problematic may be ignored. 
4.2 Information Filtering 
  
 As previously noted, the ADS-IDAC operator model does not receive 
information directly from the plant thermal hydraulic model; instead the information 
must first be perceived and stored in intermediate memory in order to be utilized for 
later decision-making activities.  The perception process may cause available 
information to be ignored (either through inattention or deliberate screening) or 
distorted by biasing.  One way information may be missed or otherwise ignored is if a 
procedure step intended to gather information is skipped through an error of 
omission.  Thus, skipping a step in either a formal written procedure or a memorized 
procedure can have the effect of censoring information from the operator.   
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Another way otherwise available information may be withheld from the 
operator is if the he or she is unable to pay adequate attention to the information due 
to cognitive limitations.  This can occur due to either inattention on the part of the 
operator or when a period of high information load causes the operator to ignore 
information that is thought to be less critical.  The control panel scan queue provides 
a means to simulate this type of behavior through adjustment to the maximum scan 
size permitted for each operator. A higher scan queue limit will allow the operator to 
monitor more parameters and obtain an improved situational assessment of the plant 
state.  Setting a lower scan queue limit reduces the number of parameters that can be 
periodically monitored and allows the analyst to simulate the operator’s information 
processing and short term memory limitations.  The actual scan queue limit is 
dynamically adjusted during the simulation and may be less than this input value due 
to the influence of certain performance influencing factors.  When the size of the scan 
queue exceeds the dynamic limit, low priority parameters are removed form the 
queue until the size limitation is met. 
 
 Finally, ADS-IDAC allows the analyst to establish biasing factors that can be 
used to either simulate failed instrumentation or influence how the operator perceives 
information.  When no filtering or bias takes place, an operator perceives the actual 
value of a plant indicator obtained directly from the RELAP thermal-hydraulic model.  
When a failed indicator or perception distortion is being simulated, a biasing factor is 
applied to the parameter values obtained from the RELAP model.  Several biasing 




instrumentation, and instruments that cannot read above or below a preset threshold 
value.  When a parameter is biased in this manner, the operator may use inaccurate 
data when assessing the procedure step expectations, knowledge-based action 
prerequisites, and activation criteria for hard wired mental beliefs. 
 
4.3 Operator Knowledge Base 
  
Within the ADS-IDAC environment, cognitive processes for each operator are 
supported by a unique knowledge base.  The knowledge base represents the 
memorized information, skills, and abilities available to the operator.  Specific items 
included in the knowledge representation include: 
 written and memorized procedures,  
 diagnostic guidance,  
 a functional decomposition model of reactor plant systems, and  
 rules governing the activation mental beliefs.   
ADS-IDAC allows the analyst to capture both the structure and content of written 
plant procedures.  In general, procedure steps specify an intended action, associated 
expectations, and contingency actions if the expectations are not met.  With this 
procedure framework, actions, decision points, and procedure transfers can be 
realistically modeled.  The diagnostic guidance portion [16] of the knowledge base 
supports the inference-based identification of plant events and the selection of 
knowledge-based actions.   The functional decomposition model links reactor plant 




tendencies (i.e., step-skipping), and prioritizes information gathering.  Finally, mental 
beliefs are based on information perceived by the operator and represent discrete 
observations and decisions.  Collectively, mental beliefs characterize each operator’s 
situational assessment of the plant state. 
4.3.1 Plant Functional Decomposition 
  
This research effort has extended the capabilities of ADS-IDAC to model the 
omission of certain procedure steps and the execution of knowledge-based actions.   
Both of these new features rely on the ability to link needed safety functions to 
operator’s assessment of the current plant state.  This linkage is provided by a 
functional decomposition map that identifies the key plant functions supported by all 
controls, instruments, and alarms available to the operator.  A diagnosis engine 
supports the operator’s plant state assessment by identifying degraded safety 
functions based on perceived parameter values, component states, and alarms.  The 
relative importance of a procedure step is determined by comparing the functions of 
the plant equipment referenced by the step to the operator’s current plant assessment.  
Procedure steps associated with equipment that has little relevance to the operator’s 
plant assessment are considered to have a higher likelihood of being skipped.  For 
example, a procedure step associated with activation of a containment pressure 
suppression system would be more likely to be skipped if the operator had not 
identified a high containment pressure condition.  Additionally, factors such as step 
complexity, procedure type, and the operator’s mental state influence the probability 




actions intended to mitigate degraded plant safety functions.  Thus, if the operator 
diagnoses a safety function failure, an appropriate knowledge-based action can be 
activated to restore the function. 
 
Step-skipping and the inappropriate execution of knowledge-based actions are 
two important potential sources of operator errors.  Although these behaviors appear 
to be unrelated, they can both arise from the operator’s perception and assessment of 
the nuclear plant state.  For example, a procedure step that requires the operator to 
perform an action that is thought to be irrelevant to the current plant state (e.g., 
checking containment pressure when no evidence of coolant leak into containment 
has been perceived) might be skipped by an operator, particularly when time pressure 
is high.  Similarly, an operator might be tempted to execute a knowledge based action 
that is thought to directly relate to the perceived plant state (e.g., stopping emergency 
core cooling injection when the pressurizer water level is believed to be high), even 
when this action is not directly addressed by the procedures.  The common feature 
shared by both of these examples is the ability of an operator to relate an action to a 
perceived plant state.  Consequently, a central feature of the operator knowledge base 
is the development of a mental or conceptual model of the reactor plant.  A 
conceptual model allows people to predict the effects of their actions [36].  Therefore, 
the conceptual plant model in ADS-IDAC serves as the main connection between 
operator actions and desired consequences.  An operator’s reactor plant conceptual 




IDAC functional decomposition provides the framework upon which the operator’s 
conceptual model of the reactor plant is built. 
 
4.3.1.1 Plant Knowledge Structure 
 
In the United States, nuclear power plant operators are licensed by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and regulated under the provisions of Title 10, Part 55, 
“Operators’ Licenses,” of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 55).  In order to 
obtain a license, an operator must meet certain medical requirements and pass written 
and operating tests to determine if they can operate the plant competently and safely. 
Following initial licensing, operators must periodically stand control room watches 
and pass a requalification program every two years. On the basis of their high level of 
experience and training, most nuclear plant operators should be categorized as experts 
in their field.    
 
A number of research studies have identified important differences in the 
decision-making and problem-solving behavior of experts versus novices.    For 
example, experts develop mental representation of a problem based on underlying 
structural principles while novices tend to represent problems based on the surface 
appearance of the problem [19].  Therefore, the method used to categorize plant 
components in the ADS-IDAC knowledge base should reflect underlying engineering 
principles rather than physical similarities.  While it is possible to categorize plant 
components based on physical similarities (e.g., categorizing pumps and valves based 




functions supported by the component, linkages to other components, and prerequisite 
conditions associated with component operation.   
 
Inspired by the Multilevel Flow Modeling technique [18], a functional component 
categorization based on the flow of energy, mass, and momentum is used in ADS-
IDAC.  In this modeling scheme, the reactor plant is viewed as a collection of mass, 
energy, and momentum flow paths, each containing sources and sinks.  For example, 
in a PWR, the reactor core is a source of energy, while each steam generator is 
considered to be an energy sink.  Because the reactor coolant system carries the 
energy released in the reactor core to the steam generators, any imbalance between 
energy production and removal will impact the reactor coolant energy state.  In 
general, the following rules are used to identify mass, energy, and momentum 
imbalances: 
 Energy flow imbalances are generally indicated by changes in temperature for 
subcooled single phase systems and changes in pressure for saturated two phase 
systems;   
 Imbalances between mass sources and sinks are generally related to net inventory 
measures such as tank or vessel levels; and 
 Momentum imbalances are generally indicated by changes in flow rates. 
 
Although this modeling technique provides a powerful mechanism for linking 
components within a functional framework, a key issue is the level of plant system 




decomposition level is set too high, there will be insufficient resolution between 
component functional groups to differentiate key components from less important 
ones.  If the decomposition level is set too low, the model will not represent the 
integrated plant functional model typically used by operators.  
 
4.3.1.2 Identification of Key Plant System Groups and Functions 
 
 
In order to functionally categorize plant components, it is first necessary to 
identify the flow path boundaries.  Plant system groups are used to represent the 
boundaries for mass, energy, and momentum flow paths.  In general, it is desirable to 
make the plant system group boundaries as broad as possible in order to maximize the 
ability to link plant components within the operator knowledge base.   
 
The strong coupling among nuclear plant systems presents a significant 
challenge when identifying functional system groups.  Within a nuclear plant, energy 
flow is often carried by moving fluids such as the reactor coolant or main steam 
systems; therefore, changes in mass flow rate can directly impact energy flow.  
Consequently, coupling can result in imbalances in one flow type influencing a 
second flow type within the same system group or a connected system group.  
Coupling can also mask the cause of disruption in energy, mass, or momentum flow.  
For example, changes in reactor coolant system temperature due to an imbalance 
between reactor core power and turbine load (an energy flow imbalance) can result in 




might be interpreted as a mass flow imbalance).    An additional consideration is the 
diagnostic capability afforded by the system groupings.  It is desirable to constrain the 
system group boundaries such that a flow imbalance within a grouping can be linked 
to a manageable number of potential causes.  In practice, the identification of the 
system groups requires a balance between maximizing the linkage between plant 
components, minimizing undesirable coupling, and providing a high level of 
diagnosticity.  Five functional system groups have are used in the current ADS-IDAC 
PWR model (Table 1). 
Table 1 - Pressurized Water Reactor System Groups 
System Group Flow Paths 














(1) Each steam generator is considered a separate system group 
(2) The secondary system group includes the turbine, main steam, 
main feed, and condenser systems. 
 
The level of decomposition shown in Table 1 provides sufficient resolution to 
differentiate between the functions supported by control panel equipment while 
maintaining the ability to integrate high level plant functions.  The operator’s 
assessment of the adequacy within each functional group is based on the perceived 
trends in energy, momentum, and energy flows.  Three trend categories are currently 
used: stable, increasing, and decreasing.  During normal, steady-state operation, the 




stable condition indicates that a deficiency in the affected flow path has occurred and 
mitigative measures are required to stabilize the condition.   
 
4.3.1.3 Component Functional Map 
 
The component map describes the functions associated with every control, 
indicator, and alarm available to the ADS-IDAC control room crew.   Each operator 
knowledge base includes a unique component functional map in order to match 
operator behavior to a desired level of knowledge, skills, and abilities.  A three 
parameter coding scheme is used to identify component functions.  The first 
parameter identifies the type of flow (i.e., energy, mass, or momentum).  The second 
parameter identifies the system group that transports the energy, mass, or momentum 
flow.  The third parameter identifies how the component affects (or is associated 
with) the flow balance in the system group.  Thus, a possible component functional 
code might read: “energy flow, reactor coolant system, energy source”.  More than 
one functional code can be assigned for a single component. 
 
As an example of the functional coding method, consider the functional 
decomposition of the following three components: (1) the turbine trip alarm, (2) the 
reactor coolant system loop average temperature, and (3) the manual reactor scram 
switch.  Each of these components is associated with the flow of energy within the 
reactor coolant system.  Specifically, the turbine trip alarm indicates the possible loss 
of an energy sink from the reactor coolant system, the manual reactor scram switch 




average temperature indicates an imbalance between energy sources and sinks.  The 
component functional map allows each of these components to be meaningfully 
linked within the operator knowledge base. A sample functional decomposition map 
for a three loop pressurized water reactor is provided in Appendix C. 
4.3.2 Mental Beliefs 
 
Mental beliefs represent discrete decisions or observations and serve as the 
basic decision-making building blocks in ADS-IDAC.  Examples of mental beliefs 
can include basic observations such as “Decreasing Pressurizer Level” or more 
complicated diagnostic conclusions such as “Possible Steam Generator Tube 
Rupture”.  Each mental belief includes profiling parameters that specify when the 
belief can be activated and the operator actions taken as a consequence of the belief.  
Rich mental models of plant behavior and complex operator actions can be created by 
appropriately combining mental beliefs. 
 
The implementation of the mental belief model in ADS-IDAC was inspired, in 
part, by the Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model [13].  The RPD model 
describes decisions made by experienced persons operating under dynamic conditions 
with time pressure and ambiguous information.  Key observations supporting the 
RPD model are that experienced decision-makers often use a pattern matching 
process when selecting an appropriate course of action and that the decision process 
does not usually involve simultaneous evaluation of multiple action alternatives.   




assessment to a memorized prototypical situation.  Because prototypical situations are 
directly linked to typical courses of action, once the decision-maker identifies a 
sufficient match, an appropriate course of action is apparent.  Consequently, the RPD 
model shifts the decision-making focus from the evaluation of multiple possible 
alternatives to information gathering and situational assessment.  Consistent with the 
RPD model, ADS-IDAC mental beliefs are triggered by a pattern matching process 
that compares the operator’s perceived situational assessment to a set of prerequisites 
that define the activation conditions for the mental belief.  An additional motivating 
factor for the implementation of mental beliefs is the observation that nuclear plant 
operators engage in important situational assessment and decision-making activities 
in parallel with written procedure following [25].  Mental beliefs provide a means to 
overlay decision-making tasks with procedure following in order to obtain more 
realistic operator behavior.  For example, mental beliefs can be used to activate 
actions that are either not adequately described by plant procedures or may be 
performed in addition to procedural actions.  Additionally, mental beliefs can be used 
to model continuous activities performed in parallel with written procedures. 
 
To demonstrate the use of mental beliefs, an application example involving 
the control of auxiliary feedwater flow following a reactor a shutdown has been 
developed.  Following the shutdown of a pressurized water reactor, makeup water to 
the steam generators (SGs) is provided by the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system.  
The AFW system generally consists of two main subsystems: one subsystem with 




pump.  Each SG normally is equipped with two AFW supply throttle valves – one for 
the motor driven subsystem and one for the turbine driven subsystem.  When the 
AFW is in standby, all throttle valves are normally fully open to provide the 
maximum available flow to the SGs.  Once SG water levels are restored to the desired 
control band, the operators will adjust AFW flow to match steam demand and 
minimize reactor coolant system cool down.  Although AFW control is an important 
task, it is often considered to be within the “skill-of-the-craft” for a reactor operator.  
Consequently, plant procedures may require that the operators adjust AFW flow to 
maintain SG levels within a specified range, but do not provide detailed guidance on 
controlling AFW flow rate (e.g., when to open or shut the AFW throttle valves, the 
magnitude of control adjustments, and the frequency of flow adjustments).  The main 
mental tasks needed to control AFW include: (1) detection of a condition requiring 
AFW, (2) verification of correct system alignment, (3) detection of a low SG level 
condition requiring an increase in AFW flow, and (4) detection of a high SG level 
condition requiring a decrease in AFW flow.  The ADS-IDAC mental belief network 
used to accomplish these tasks is shown in Figure 12. 
 
The AFW control process is initiated when the operator perceives the 
actuation of the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (MDAFP) autostart alarm.  
Actuation of this alarm activates the “Possible Safety System Actuation” mental 
belief which will direct the operator to check the operating status of the MDAFPs.  If 
the operator perceives that one of the MDAFPs is running, the “MDAFP Running” 




system alignment.  Following activation of the “MDAFP Running” mental belief, if 
the operator perceives a low SG level condition (and the MDAFP throttle valve is not 
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Figure 12 - Task Network for Controlling Auxiliary Feedwater Flow 
 
already fully open), the operator will execute a mental procedure to incrementally 
open the throttle valve.  Similarly, if the operator perceives a high SG level condition 
(and the MDAFP throttle valve is not fully closed), the operator will execute a mental 
procedure to incrementally close the throttle valve.  An important feature of ADS-
IDAC is that the operator only acts on perceived information, rather than the raw data 
from the thermal-hydraulic plant model.  Perception filters can block or distort plant 
information possibly leading to an inaccurate situational assessment and inappropriate 




the mental belief activation and reset times, the analyst can mimic a variety of AFW 




Two main types of procedures are used in ADS-IDAC: (1) written procedures, 
and (2) memorized mental procedures.  Written procedures represent formal 
proceduralized guidance contained in normal, abnormal, and emergency operating 
procedures.  Memorized mental procedures represent the skill- and rule-based actions 
routinely used by the operators that do not require formal procedure guidance. 
 
Four general types of procedural actions can be executed: (1) changing the 
component operating mode (e.g., automatic vs. manual mode), (2) setting a specific 
control value for a component (e.g., throttling control valve to 50% open), (3) 
incrementing the control setting of a component (e.g., throttling open a control valve 
by an additional 10%), and (4) setting a control value based on a perceived parameter 
(e.g., setting the steam dump target pressure equal to the perceived main steam header 
pressure).  These capabilities provide sufficient flexibility to realistically model all 
significant operator interactions with the plant model. 
 
ADS-IDAC includes the capability to represent both the structure and content of 




expectation-mitigation format.  In this procedure framework, each step specifies the 
following: 
 an operator action;  
 a set of expectations that are anticipated to occur as a result of the action; and  
 a mitigative action if the expectations are not met. 
Within ADS-IDAC, the analyst specifies the content and logic of each step action and 
several parameters that control how the step is executed.  Figure 13 provides an 
example of the coding of an emergency operating procedure step in ADS-IDAC.    
 
E_0 Step_4.1 "Check Safety Injection Status"
3153 3165 1.0 1.0
1
A_Safety_Injection 3109 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 100.0
4
A_Lo_SG_Pressure_SI 3045 0.0 1.0 1.0 3023 3002
Block_Main_Steam_Isolation 3045 0.0 0.5 2.0 3022 3003
A_Hi_Cont_Pressure 3045 0.0 1.0 1.0 3023 3003
A_Lo_PZR_Pressure_SI 3045 0.0 1.0 1.0 3023 3002
Block_Low_Press_SI 3045 0.0 0.5 2.0 3022 3003
Safety_Injection 3002 0.0 1.0 1.0 3023 3045
3110
E_0 Step_4.2 1.0 100.0
ES_0.1 Step_1.1




Step Profile Base Skip Probability
Logical Relationship
 
Figure 13 - Example ADS-IDAC Procedure Step 
 
The example instructions shown in Figure 13 are needed to execute an early step in 
the entry emergency operating procedure for a typical pressurized water reactor.  The 
specific format and content for coding procedure steps in ADS-IDAC is provided in 
Appendix K.  The objective of this step is to check the status of the emergency core 
cooling system.  If emergency core cooling is needed, the operator continues with the 




orderly normal shutdown of the reactor plant.  Several key features of the procedure 
step profile are highlighted: 
 Step Profile – The step profile provides a description of the type of procedure (an 
emergency operating procedure, is coded as “3153” in the ADS-IDAC simulation 
computer code), the type of procedure step (a diagnosis step, coded as “3165”), 
and a parameter that indicates the complexity of the step (“1.0”). 
 Base Skip Probability – The base skip probability is modeled with a Beta 
distribution and establishes the baseline probability for omitting the step (i.e., an 
error of omission).  In this case, a Beta distribution with α = 1.0 and  β = 100.0 is 
specified (resulting in a mean skip probability of approximately 0.01). 
 Expectations, Expected State, and Logical Relationship – In this case four 
separate expectations are specified: 
i. Existence of conditions that would actuate the low main steam pressure 
engineered safety feature when this feature has not been previously 
blocked by the operator; 
ii. High containment pressure; 
iii. Existence of conditions that would actuate the low reactor coolant system 
pressure safety feature when this feature has not been previously blocked 
by the operator; or 
iv. Actuation of the emergency core cooling system. 
 
The logical relationship parameter permits complex combinations of plant states 
or parameters to be specified.  If any of the above expectations are not met, the 
operator will perform the response not obtained action.   
 Timing Parameters – The time required to perform each action or verify the status 
of each expectation is specified by the analyst using a three parameter Weibull 
distribution.  The Weibull probability distribution is used to capture stochastic 




 Response Not Obtained Action – If any procedure step expectations are not met, 
the operator will perform this action.  In this case, a procedure transfer to continue 
the current procedure at step 4.2 is specified.  If the expectations are met (i.e., 
emergency core cooling is not required), the operator will transfer to procedure 
ES 0.1, Step 1.1. 
 
Generally, a written procedure is continued until the procedure is completed. 
However, the procedure flow may be interrupted by procedure transfers (which direct 
the crew to a different procedure), activation of an instinctive response action, or 
abandonment of the “Follow Written Procedure” strategy.  Two types of procedure 
transfers can be modeled: (1) a permanent procedure transfer and (2) a temporary 
transfer to an auxiliary procedure followed by resumption of the initial procedure.  
When a permanent transfer is executed, the original procedure is terminated and will 
not be reactivated when the new procedure is completed.  When a temporary transfer 
is executed, the original procedure will be recommenced at the step where it was 
interrupted when the new procedure is completed.  ADS-IDAC executes a temporary 
procedure transfer when the new procedure is either a mental procedure or a 
functional recovery guideline.  An example of the first type of procedure transfer is 
the transfer from a general reactor trip procedure to a more specific emergency 
procedure (e.g., transfer from the E-0 to E-3 procedures during a steam generator tube 
rupture event).  The second type of transfer supports implementation of functional 
recovery guidelines that are used to temporarily interrupt the current procedure to 




operators detect a loss of heat sink following a reactor trip – in this case the operators 
leave the reactor trip procedure, perform appropriate steps of the loss of heat sink 
functional recovery guideline, and then return to the reactor trip procedure following 
restoration of the heat sink function.  During a temporary procedure transfer, the 
operator “remembers” the previous procedure step in effect before the transition and 
returns to this step after the temporary transition procedure is completed.  Because 
only the Decision Maker is permitted to direct the performance of a written 
procedure, ADS-IDAC places restrictions on the types of procedure transitions 
available to each operator.  The Action Taker may initiate a memorized mental 
procedure and transition to other mental procedures, but may not initiate or transition 
to a written procedure.  The Decision Maker may initiate and transition between all 
procedure types. 
 
Four types of event sequence branches can be generated during procedure 
execution: (1) mental procedure activation time branches, (2) action execution time 
branches, (3) action control value branches, and (4) step-skipping.  After a mental 
belief is activated, the associated memorized mental procedure is initiated after the 
activation time delay has elapsed.  Mental procedure activation time branches allow 
the analyst to examine the impact of variations in the time delay between the 
perception of conditions that activate the mental belief and the execution of the 
associated skill- or rule-based actions.  Action execution time branches enable 
multiple event sequence branches to be generated to model variations in the time 




value branches can be used to model variations in control inputs such as control valve 
positioning and the setting of control system target setpoints.  Finally, procedure step-
skipping branches model the omissions of procedure actions based on the relevance 
of the step actions to the operator’s situational assessment.  The ADS-IDAC step-





5. Decision-Making Module 
  
The decision-making process immediately follows the information processing 
stage.  During the decision-making process each operator assesses current plant 
conditions, evaluates his or her current high-level goal and associated strategy for 
achieving the goal in light of his or her situational assessment, identifies specific 
actions in accordance with the selected problem-solving strategy, and implements 
memorized skill- and rule-based activities through the activation of mental beliefs.   
 
5.1 Decision-Making Within ADS-IDAC 
 
The decision-making process is the heart of the ADS-IDAC approach to crew 
modeling.  All crew interactions with the nuclear plant model are identified through 
the decision making process.  Because the decision-making engine is based on an 
information driven architecture, small variations in perceived information may lead 
significant changes in the output from the decision-making process.  For example, 
biasing or ignoring a critical parameter or other piece of information may lead the 
crew to initiate inappropriate actions in response to an accident.  It is this feature that 
enables ADS-IDAC to show promise for predicting and analyzing errors of 
commission. 
 






















































































begins with an update to the operator’s situational assessment based on new 
information perceived during the information processing stage (Block 1).  The 
diagnostic process updates the operator’s assessment of the status of key plant 
functions (see Section 4.3.1.2) and the status of the various accident categories 
identified in the operator knowledge base (described in greater detail in Section 
5.5.1.2).   After the operator’s situational assessment is updated, a determination is 
made if an abnormal signal has been detected (Block 2).  In this context, an abnormal 
signal refers to a condition that is incompatible with continued power operation and 
requires the operators to shift their focus to an accident response mode.  An abnormal 
signal is defined as the perception of a reactor trip condition5 or the relationship 
value6 in any accident related event diagnosis exceeding a pre-established threshold.  
The threshold value used for this determination is one of the static PIF factors 
included in the operator profile (see Section 7.2.2).  If an abnormal signal is detected, 
the operator will suspend implementation of any in-progress low priority activities 
that may have been previously initiated.  In some cases, these low priority activities 
have limited mitigative impact during an accident or are incompatible with plant 
conditions (e.g., reducing turbine load is no longer needed once the reactor has 
tripped).  
 
 The next phase in the decision-making process is to determine if any skill- or 
rule-based were previously activated and added to an action queue (Block 5).  If any 
                                                 
5 The operator knowledge base includes two special reserved mental beliefs: “Reactor_Tripped” and 
“Normal_Operation”.  The “Reactor_Tripped” mental belief is used to diagnosis an abnormal 
condition, while the “Normal_Operation” belief is used for the goal selection process.  The conditions 
that activate these beliefs are not pre-defined and the analyst can assign appropriate prerequisite 
conditions to each these mental beliefs. 
6 For the purposes of this discussion, the term relationship value can be loosely interpreted as the 




such actions exist, the action is selected for execution during the Action stage and 
further decision-making activities are bypassed.  This process prioritizes the 
execution skill- and rule-based actions over procedurally driven activities. 
 
 The operator next evaluates the appropriateness of the current goal (Block 9) 
and strategy (Block 13).  If the goal or strategy needs to be updated, further decision-
making activities are suspended and the new goal or strategy is sent to the 
communication blackboard for implementation during the next information 
processing phase. If no goal or strategy updates are needed, the decision-maker 
verifies the availability of the action-taker to execute ordered activities (Block 15).  
Since the decision-maker cannot operate control panel equipment, the action-taker 
must execute any action that the decision-maker needs to perform that requires the 
control panel.  Therefore, if the action-taker is not available to receive and execute an 
ordered action, further decision-making is suspended until the action-taker is 
available.  If the action-taker is able to receive an order from the decision-maker, an 
appropriate problem-solving approach is followed based on the selected strategy 
(Block 16).  In the current implementation of ADS-IDAC, the procedure-following 
and knowledge based reasoning strategies cannot be active simultaneously.  Once an 
appropriate action is identified in a procedure (Block 17) or using a knowledge-based 
approach (Block 19), the decision-making process ends.  The identified action is 





5.2 Goal Selection 
 
The selection and verification of a high-level goal is the one of the first steps 
in the decision-making process.  ADS-IDAC currently supports four high level goals: 
 maintain normal operation; 
 monitor; 
 troubleshoot abnormal conditions; and  
 maintain global safety.   
 
Each of these goals drives specific operator behaviors.  For example, selection of the 
“troubleshoot abnormal conditions” goal enables the activation of knowledge-based 
actions.  Activation of the “mitigate accident conditions” goal initiates the emergency 
operating procedures if procedure usage is enabled for the operator.  The selection of 
a specific goal is based only on information perceived by the operator and the status 
of the static performance influencing factors associated with goal selection (see 
Section 7.2).  In general, the decision-maker selects the high level goal for the 
operating crew; the other operators will then update their respective goals to match 
the decision-maker’s goal.   
 
The decision-maker goal selection process is shown in Figure 15.  As 
discussed in Section 5.1, the operator re-evaluates their high-level goal every time the 
decision-making process is activated.  The first step in the goal selection process is an 
assessment of the current plant conditions (Block 2).  The operator knowledge base 
includes a “Normal_Operation” mental belief that describes of the plant parameters 
associated with a normal full power operating condition.  Although this description 




operating condition description for a pressurized water reactor might include the 
following elements:  
• Reactor Coolant System Temperature 
• Reactor Coolant System Pressure 
• Pressurizer Level 
• Steam Generator Water Levels 
 
The analyst should specify the expected values for these parameters during normal 
plant operating conditions.  Additionally, the analyst can adjust a threshold parameter 
 
Figure 15 - Goal Selection Process (Decision Maker) 
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that establishes how many of the specified conditions must be met in order for the 
operator to conclude that the plant is in a normal operating state.  If a the 
“Normal_Operation” mental belief is activated, the operator selects a goal of 
maintaining normal operation.  If the plant is not normally operating, the operator 
selects either the a monitoring or troubleshooting goal depending on the preferences 
specified in the operator profile (Block 4, see Section 7.2.3).  If a monitoring goal is 
selected, the operator will continue information gathering activities to improve the 
assessment of plant status.  If the operator detects an abnormal plant condition or 
determines that a reactor trip has occurred (Block 6), the maintain global safety goal 
is activated (the criteria for assessing Block 6 is identical to the criteria used in Figure 
14, Block 2).  If a troubleshooting goal is selected, the operator will initiate 
knowledge-based actions based on identified plant functional needs.  The operator 
can transition from troubleshooting to maintaining global safety margin only if a 
reactor trip condition is detected.  The operator may return to a maintain normal 
operation goal from either the monitoring or troubleshooting goal if plant conditions 
return to a normal status.  However, once the maintain global safety goal is activated, 
the operator cannot transition to a new goal (i.e., the operator may not return to either 
the normal operation, monitoring, or troubleshooting goals).  Following evaluation 
and selection of an appropriate goal, the decision-making process proceeds to 




5.3 Problem Solving Strategy Selection 
 
The problem solving strategy establishes the overall approach the crew uses to 
achieve their selected goal.  Four problem solving strategies can be used to achieve 
high level goals: 
 Wait and Monitor – a passive information gathering strategy intended to improve 
the operator’s situational assessment; 
 Instinctive Response – perform simple skill- or rule-based actions that are 
activated by matching perceived information to memorized situation-response 
profiles; 
 Follow Written Procedures – implement formal written procedures (e.g., 
abnormal or emergency operating procedures); and 
 Knowledge-Based Reasoning – use a diagnostic process to guide crew actions in 
order to balance the flow of mass, momentum and energy within plant systems. 
 
The strategy selection process for the decision-maker is shown in Figure 16.  To 
ensure that crew actions are coordinated, an order of precedence for problem solving 
strategies has been developed.  The following rules guide the transition between 
operator problem solving strategies: 
 The “Wait and Monitor” strategy has the lowest order of precedence and is only 
activated if no other problem solving strategy is active; 
 The “Knowledge-Based Reasoning” and the “Follow Written Procedure” 




 The implementation of high priority “Instinctive Response” strategy actions will 
interrupt all other strategies.  Lower priority instinctive response actions may 
interrupt other strategies depending on the crew’s high level goal and the 
individual operator profile.  Once the instinctive response actions are complete, 
the operator will return to the previous strategy. 
 














































The main determinant in selecting a strategy is the operator’s high level goal.  
However, because a memorized mental procedure can initiate the emergency 
operating procedures, if the decision-maker has a queued written procedure for 
execution (Block 4), the procedure following strategy can be activated regardless of 
the high-level goal.  For example, a mental memorized procedure might cause the 
operator to initiate the emergency procedures in order to execute a controlled 
shutdown of the reactor plant (thus queuing the appropriate written procedure).  This 
strategy transition criterion will enable the operator to initiate the emergency 
procedures prior to selection of the “Maintain Global Safety Margin” goal. 
 
5.4 Mental Beliefs 
  
Within ADS-IDAC, mental beliefs represent discrete decisions or conclusions 
that the operators reach based on their situational assessment.  Three main types of 
mental beliefs are used in ADS-IDAC: (1) symptom-related mental beliefs that 
support the event diagnosis process, (2) rule-based mental beliefs that trigger 
memorized procedures, and (3) mental beliefs that represent intermediate decisions 
and are used as prerequisites for building more complex beliefs.  An example of how 
a network of mental beliefs can be used to model complex operator behaviors is 





Mental beliefs include a number of properties that describe the conditions 
required to activate the belief and resultant actions.  Each mental belief is associated 
with prerequisite conditions that describe the prototypical situation that activates the 
belief.  Prerequisites may include alarms, component states, parameter values, active 
procedures, and other mental beliefs.  A confidence level activation threshold is used 
to specify how many of the specified prerequisite conditions must be met in order to 
activate the associated mental belief.  Three parameter Weibull probability density 
functions are used to model an activation time delay and a reset time delay for each 
belief.  The activation time delay specifies the time lag between activation of the 
mental belief and execution of the associated action.  The reset time delay is used to 
control repeated activations of a mental belief.  When a mental belief is activated, a 
reset timer is started and subsequent reactivation of the mental belief is blocked until 
the reset timer has expired.  The reset capability is needed to model skill- or rule-
based actions that must be performed in a repetitive manner (such as adjustment of 
AFW flow following a reactor trip).  The activation status of all mental beliefs is 
updated when the operator perceives new information. 
 
Each mental belief may be associated with a mental procedure.  Mental 
procedures specify memorized skill- and rule-based actions typically performed by an 
operator without reference to a written procedure.  In general, mental procedures 




 Alarm response procedures – information gathering intended to confirm the 
conditions associated with the alarm and improve the operator’s situational 
assessment;   
 Diagnostic procedures – directed information gathering in order to identify a 
specific component problem.   Diagnostic procedures are used when the operator 
needs to use more complicated logical inference than can be accomplished with 
mental beliefs alone; 
 Control procedures – memorized procedures that represent automatic skill-of-the-
craft actions performed by control room operators.  Adjustment of auxiliary 
feedwater flow following a reactor shutdown is an example of a typical control 
procedure; 
 Mitigation procedures – memorized procedures intended to mitigate degrading 
plant conditions (e.g., manual safety injection actuation following perception of 
low pressurizer level). 
 
The content of mental procedures is guided by two fundamental principles: (1) the 
actions can be performed without reference to a written procedure and (2) the 
procedure can be accomplished within a short time period (generally within a few 
minutes).  The first principle limits mental procedures to relatively simple skill- or 
rule-based tasks.  The second principle prevents a single task from monopolizing the 
operator’s attention during rapidly changing events.  If needed, complex or lengthy 
tasks can be decomposed into smaller discrete tasks to meet these guiding principles.  




specified) is added to a queue list in the operator’s memory.  The order that queued 
mental procedures are executed depends on the specified priority level for the 
procedure (higher priority procedures are performed first) and the activation time 
delay.  A sample of typical mental beliefs is provided in Appendix D.  A detailed 
discussion of this topic is also included in Appendix K. 
 
5.5 Diagnosis and Situational Awareness 
  
In general, previous research efforts in nuclear plant accident diagnosis 
methods have focused on the development of control room operator aids to improve 
operator diagnostic capabilities during plant events (e.g. [76-78]).  However, the 
focus of this research was the development of a model capable of approximating an 
operator's heuristic approach to event diagnosis.  Consequently, the approach 
attempted only to obtain reasonable results, rather than the best or most accurate plant 
diagnosis for a given set of conditions. Based on a review of the available literature 
on nuclear plant diagnosis methods, it was determined that a fuzzy-logic inference 
method provided the best diagnostic approach for the ADS-IDAC application.  In 
particular, the fuzzy-logic method is capable of representing a large amount of 
operator knowledge in the relatively compact form of a symptom-event relationship 
table.  The method also accommodates probabilistic uncertainty in the diagnosis 




5.5.1 Diagnosis Model Description 
  
An event-symptom matrix was constructed to specify the probabilistic 
relationship between a set of plant symptoms and events.  The probability values in 
the matrix can be interpreted as the probability of observing a particular symptom 
given that a specific event has occurred.  During the ADS-IDAC simulation, the 
operator’s confidence level for each plant symptom is periodically recalculated based 
on data obtained from the plant thermal-hydraulic model and the operator’s ability to 
perceive this data.  Standard fuzzy-logic mathematical techniques have been used to 
evaluate the likelihood of plant events given a set of input symptoms [79-81].  These 
techniques provide a lower and upper probability bound for each event.  While both 
the upper and lower bounds are related to the confidence level in perceived 
symptoms, the lower bound indicates the degree to which all the symptoms associated 
with a given event have been observed.  The upper bound estimate indicates if the 
symptom confidence levels are consistent with the expected values for the event. 
 
A limitation of the fuzzy inference method is its inability to discriminate 
among incompatible events when provided with contradictory symptom information.  
Additionally, a likely event identified by the method may only explain a subset of the 
observed symptoms.  Consequently, a combination of two or more events may be 
needed to account for the full spectrum of observed symptoms.  Although these 
limitations reduce the usefulness of this approach as a diagnostic operator aid, they 
provide an advantage within the ADS-IDAC environment since a larger spectrum of 





5.5.1.1 Symptom Selection 
 
The selection of symptom inputs was guided by several goals: (1) provide a 
realistic representation of the plant information readily available to the control room 
operators, (2) ensure the number of symptoms was consistent with the limitations of 
the operator's short term memory; and (3) adequately discriminate among similar 
initiating events.  Consequently, ten symptoms were selected for this model: 
• Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Average Temperature  
• Reactor Power 
• RCS Pressure 
• RCS Loop Flowrate 
• Pressurizer (PZR) Water Level 
• Containment Pressure 
• Steam Generator (SG) Water Level 
• Feed Water (FW) Flowrate 
• Main Steam (MS) Flowrate 
• SG Pressure 
 
With the exception of containment pressure, PWR plant control room operators 
typically monitor these indicators on a continuous basis.  Although not continuously 
monitored, a containment pressure indicator is available to the operators and was 
included to provide discrimination between coolant leakage events occurring inside 
and outside containment.  Three possible states were considered for each symptom: 
increasing trend, decreasing trend, or steady state. Within the ADS-IDAC simulation 
environment, an operator’s confidence in each of these symptom states is specified by 





5.5.1.2  Event Selection  
 
Events were selected and categorized to ensure compatibility with the high-
level operator goals used in the ADS-IDAC cognitive model.  Examples of high-level 
goals include "maintain normal operation," "troubleshoot," or "maintain global 
safety."  Within the ADS-IDAC environment, an operator’s problem-solving behavior 
is a product of his or her high-level goals and mental state.  The operator’s mental 
state includes factors such as cognitive mode, emotion, stress, and perception.  
Because an operator's high-level goals and problem-solving strategy can influence the 
selection of an event diagnosis, events were grouped into four broad categories: 
 Normal Operating Events - events that are expected to occur with a relatively high 
frequency (i.e., at least several times a year) during normal plant operation and 
would not typically preclude continued power operation.  These events include 
normal power level changes and control system failures. 
 Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOOs) – abnormal events that are expected 
to occur one or more times during the life of the plant and are not expected to 
cause fuel damage.  AOOs include events such as turbine trips, losses of main 
feedwater, and losses of reactor coolant flow.    
 Accidents – abnormal events that could result in fuel damage and significant 
radiological consequences.  Examples of accidents include significant losses of 
primary or secondary coolant, SG tube ruptures, and anticipated transients without 
a reactor scram. 
 Imbalances - events that identify mass or energy flow imbalances within nuclear 




multilevel flow modeling technique [18] which decomposes complex systems into 
mass and energy flow paths.  The imbalance diagnosis category supports ADS-
IDAC problem-solving strategies associated with the restoration of an imbalanced 
parameter back to a balanced condition.   
 
Each of these event categories can be associated with specific high-level operator 
goals and problem-solving strategies.  For example, if a set of perceived symptoms 
results in the identification of both a normal operating event and an accident event, an 
operator would be more likely to select the normal operating event if his or her high 
level goal was to “maintain normal operation."  The same set of plant symptoms can 
result in different diagnoses depending operator’s high level goal and problem-
solving strategy.   
 
5.5.1.3  Event-Symptom Matrix 
 
Implementation of the fuzzy logic diagnostic approach requires the creation of a 
two-dimensional numerical matrix that describes the relationship between symptoms 
and events.  Each numerical value in the matrix represents the strength of the 
relationship between a symptom and an event.  A value of 0.0 indicates that the 
symptom and event are unrelated, while a larger value (up to a maximum value of 
1.0) indicates a stronger relationship.  In general, a higher relationship value indicates 
that operator has a greater level of confidence that the symptom would be observed 
given that the associated event has occurred.  Because the relationship matrix is 




relationship values are assigned using heuristic rules or preferably an expert 
elicitation process rather than a formal thermal-hydraulic analysis.  For the purposes 
of this research study, the following heuristic rules were used to grouped event 
symptoms into the broad categories of primary, secondary, and tertiary symptoms: 
 Primary symptoms directly relate to the initiating event and are expected to be 
observed with a high degree of confidence;   
 Secondary symptoms are the result of the primary symptoms and are normally 
expected to be observed, but with a lower degree of confidence than primary 
symptoms; and    
 Tertiary symptoms may arise due to the presence of primary or secondary 
symptoms but can be mitigated by either control system operation or thermal 
hydraulic feedback mechanisms.  Consequently, tertiary symptoms may not 
be observed and are assigned a low degree of confidence.   
 
After the symptoms of each event were categorized, relationship values were assigned 
based on engineering judgment and the guidelines of Table 2. 
 
Table 2- Symptom-Event Relationship Values 
Symptom Type Relationship Value Range(1) 
Primary 0.7 – 1.0 
Secondary 0.4 – 0.7 
Tertiary 0.1 – 0.4 
(1) A higher value indicates a stronger relationship 
between the symptom and event. 
 
It should be noted that the fuzzy logic quantification approach is based on set 
membership (i.e., determining if a specific event is included within the membership 
of a set of events associated with the observed symptoms).  Therefore, the 
quantification results are expressed in terms of membership values rather than a true 
probability or degree of confidence.  Membership values range from 0.0 to 1.0, with 




interest and the perceived symptoms.  It is possible that a thorough and carefully 
executed expert elicitation process using experience control room operators may be 
able to strengthen the conclusions that can be drawn from this fuzzy logic 
quantification approach.  However, since this research project was intended to 
demonstrate only the feasibility and usefulness of this diagnostic approach, use of a 
controlled expert elicitation process to populate the relationship matrix was deemed 
to be outside the scope of this research effort.  Consequently, the results obtained 
from the diagnostic approach are expressed in terms of membership or relationship 
values, rather than true probabilities. 
 
To illustrate the heuristic method for assigning relationship values, one can 
consider the occurrence of an uncomplicated reactor trip.  The primary symptoms for 
this event include decreasing core power due to insertion of the control rods and a 
consequent decrease in the RCS average coolant temperature.  Decreasing pressurizer 
water level is considered to be a secondary symptom since it is caused by the 
contraction of the primary coolant due to the decrease in average coolant temperature.  
Decreasing reactor pressure is considered to be a tertiary symptom because operation 
of the reactor pressure control system will tend to mitigate the pressure decrease 
caused the decreasing pressurizer water.  Therefore, decreasing core power and 
decreasing average temperature would be expected to be the most likely symptoms to 
be observed and would be assigned a high relationship value.  Decreasing pressurizer 
water level would be assigned a mid-range relationship value, and decreasing reactor 





A simplified procedure was used to assign relationship values for symptoms 
associated with imbalance events.  In order to increase the likelihood of obtaining a 
high level of confidence in an imbalance diagnosis, it is necessary to minimize the 
number of symptoms associated with each imbalance event.  Therefore, nuclear plant 
was decomposed into several major subsystems in order to associate each imbalance 
event with a single primary symptom (Table 3).  
 
Table 3 - Primary Indicators for Imbalance Events 
System Imbalance Primary Indicator 
Pressurizer Energy Pressurizer Pressure 
Mass PZR Water Level Reactor Coolant 
Energy Average Loop Temperature 
Mass  SG Water Level SG  
(secondary side) 
Energy  SG Pressure 
   
A summary event-symptom relationship table is presented in Appendix A. 
 
The quantitative output from the diagnosis engine is related to the 
membership relationship of each event to the perceived symptoms.  If the set of 
perceived symptoms matches the symptom set of a certain event, that event will have 
a high membership value.  A consequence of the fuzzy logic approach is that an event 
may have a high membership value even if it only accounts for a subset of the 
perceived symptoms.  Therefore, the fuzzy inference method is unable to discriminate 
among events that only partially explain all perceived symptoms or resolve 




multiplying the event membership value by a correction factor based on the fraction 
of perceived symptoms explained by the event.  Because the plant functional 
decomposition is intended to break complex plant behaviors into smaller functional 
units, the correction factor is not applied to imbalance events.  It is also worth noting 
that the diagnostic limitations of the fuzzy inference method can be advantageous 
when attempting to model the confusion or biases that real operators might 
experience. 
 
5.5.1.4 Diagnosis Quantification 
 
 
Each event symptom in the ADS-IDAC simulation is represented by a set of 
plant state expectations that may include alarm status, plant parameter data, and 
component operational states.  For example, the event symptom “Decreasing 
Pressurizer Water Level” can be represented by the three plant state expectations: (1) 
a low pressurizer water level alarm, (2) a decreasing trend rate for pressurizer water 
level, and (3) a pressurizer water level below a threshold value.  The operator’s 
confidence in an event symptom is the ratio of expectations that have met the 
specified criteria to the total number of expectations specified for the event symptom.   
Following the calculation of event symptom confidence, the relationship for each 
event is determined.  The event relationship value is represented by two probability 
values: a lower bound (LB) estimate and an upper bound (UB) estimate.  The 













Where S refers to the symptom confidence level, i is the symptom set index and 
ranges from 1 to N (where N is the total number of symptoms considered in the 
model), j refers to the event set index and ranges from 1 to M (where M is the total 
number of events considered in the model), and rij refers to the event-symptom matrix 
value representing the expected probability of observing symptom i given than event j 
has occurred. 
 
5.5.2 Diagnostic Examples 
 
To illustrate the use of the fuzzy-logic diagnostic inference method, two 
example cases are presented in Section 5.5.2.1 and 5.5.2.2.  The first example 
demonstrates the capability of the fuzzy-logic diagnosis method to identify a range of 
possible initiating events given a set of hypothetical symptoms.  The second example 
shows how the diagnosis method can be used to replicate actual nuclear plant 
misdiagnosis events obtained from industry operating experience.  The same event-
symptom matrix was used for each of the two examples to demonstrate the flexibility 
of the method over a wide range of events. 
 
Case 1: Steam Generator Tube Rupture Diagnosis 
 
A steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) is caused by the failure of the SG tube 
pressure boundary between the reactor coolant and the secondary coolant systems.  
The pressure boundary failure diverts reactor coolant from the pressurizer to the 
secondary side of the associated SG.  This results in a decreasing pressurizer water 




for the addition of reactor coolant into the SG secondary, the SG water level control 
system will tend to decrease feedwater flow.  In this basic example, the following 
symptoms were used as input for the model (Table 4): 
Table 4 - SGTR Example Symptoms 
Symptoms Confidence 
Level 
FW Flowrate Decreasing 0.4 
PZR Water Level 
Decreasing 
0.5 
RCS Pressure Decreasing 0.3 




The confidence level can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of belief an 
operator has about a specific symptom.  For example, a confidence level of 0.5 
indicates that an operator believes with 50% certainty that the associated symptom 
represents a true change in plant status rather than a minor transient condition or 
background noise.  Relationship levels of less than 100% could be due to a lack of 
confirmatory information or ambiguous plant data.  During the ADS-IDAC 
simulation, the operator’s confidence level for each plant symptom is periodically 
updated based on newly perceived information.  In this example, application of the 
diagnostic method resulted in the identification of the following possible events 
(Table 5).  In this case, a diagnosis of an SGTR event has a high probability of 
occurrence (lower bound of 0.3 and an upper bound of 0.8).  The relationship values 
for events within the imbalance class tend to be higher than events in other event 
classes since they rely only on a single symptom input.  It should be noted that while 
only the SGTR event can explain all of the observed symptoms, the method does not 





















Controller Failure - 
SG Water Level 
0.0 0.4 
Leak – RCS System 0.3 0.7 
Loss of Coolant 
Accident 
0.3 0.4 Accident 
SGTR 0.3 0.8 
Mass Imbalance – 
RCS (low mass) 
0.5 0.8 
Mass Imbalance - 
SG (high mass) 
0.7 1.0 Imbalance 
Energy Imbalance -
PZR (low energy) 
0.3 0.6 
 
from either a simultaneous failure of the pressurizer water level, RCS pressure, and 
SG water level control systems or an RCS leak in combination with a SG level 
control failure.  Identification of a range of possible initiating events allows 
examination of conditions that may result in operator misdiagnosis.  It should also be 
noted that three functional imbalance events had high relationship values based on the 
perceived symptoms: low reactor system mass, high SG mass, and low pressurizer 
energy.  All of these functional imbalances are consistent with the diversion of reactor 
coolant form the pressurizer to the ruptured steam generator.   
 
Within the ADS-IDAC environment, the selection of a likely diagnosis among 
these alternatives is probabilistically modeled and is influenced by the operator’s 
mental state, high level goals, and problem-solving strategy.  Consequently, an 




diagnosis within the normal operation event category such as a control system failure 
rather than believing that an event within the accident category has occurred.  
Similarly, an operator using a problem-solving strategy involving the elimination of 
mass and energy imbalances would be more likely to select a diagnosis within the 
imbalance event class (e.g., "high SG mass balance") rather than an event within the 
normal operation or accident event categories.  Thus, the same set of symptoms can 
generate a variety of plausible diagnosis options and follow-up actions. 
 
The ADS-IDAC environment models the operator's follow-up actions in 
response to an initiating event by simulating operator actions that change the plant 
state (e.g., initiating emergency core cooling systems, shutting isolation valves, or 
starting pumps).  For example, a diagnosis of an SGTR could be mapped to the 
actions contained in the appropriate emergency operating procedure.  Similarly, a 
diagnosis of a high mass imbalance in the SG could lead the operator to take actions 
such as reducing feedwater flow or increasing SG water loss by increasing steam 
demand.  By simulating operator follow-up actions based on a range of possible 
diagnoses, operator actions that result in further plant state degradation can be 
identified. 
 
Case 2: Pressurizer Spray Valve Malfunction Diagnosis 
 
During a startup at the Crystal River Unit 3 nuclear plant on December 8, 
1991, control room operators were unable to promptly diagnosis a failed open 
pressurizer spray valve [82, 83].  The operators incorrectly concluded that the cause 




the control rods several times in an attempt to increase the average reactor coolant 
temperature and reactor pressure.  The operators were unable to stop the continuing 
pressure decrease and the reactor automatically tripped due to low reactor pressure.  
Following the reactor trip, an operator, believing that the cause of the pressure 
decrease would be quickly brought under control, bypassed the emergency core 
cooling system to prevent automatic actuation of the system [84].   
 
During the event, the operators believed that they observed an increase in 
steam demand, a reduction in average coolant temperature, and an RCS pressure 
decrease.  This perception may have been biased by earlier operations tasks involving 
changes in steam demand. However, later investigation identified that both steam 
demand and average coolant temperature were stable during the event.  The 
difference between the actual and perceived symptoms might be explained by a 
confirmatory bias which led the operators to misinterpret information in order to 
support their perceived plant status rather than objectively assessing all available 
information.  Consequently, two sets of symptoms were used to characterize the 
event: (1) the operators' perceived symptoms and (2) the actual event symptoms 
(Table 6).  






















These symptom sets resulted in the following initiating event diagnosis (Table 7 and 
Table 8): 























AOO Leak – MS System 0.0 0.6 
 























AOO Leak – MS System 0.0 0.2 
 
In both the perceived and actual symptom cases, an RCS pressure controller failure 
was identified as the most likely event.  An increase in steam demand was also 
identified as a possible event diagnosis for the perceived set of symptoms.  Increasing 
steam demand is categorized as a normal operation event and is typically associated 
with operator actions to maintain the balance between reactor power and steam 
demand.  Therefore, an operator believing this diagnosis might be expected to 
increase reactor power (by withdrawal of control rods) to balance the increased steam 
loading.  Furthermore, the belief that an accident has not occurred could bias an 




bypassing an engineered safety feature to prevent an unnecessary transient).  In this 
case, the inference method not only provides a rational basis for the operator’s unsafe 
actions during the event, but also correctly identifies a pressure control system failure 
(i.e., a stuck open spray valve) as the actual event cause.   
 
5.5.3 Application of the Diagnostic Process 
 
In the current version of ADS-IDAC, the diagnostic engine supports three 
functions: (1) the identification of an abnormal event requiring the initiation 
emergency operating procedures (EOPs), (2) the activation of knowledge-based 
actions based on the identification of mass, energy, or momentum flow imbalances in 
the reactor plant, and (3) the determination of a component’s relevance to the 
operator’s situational assessment.   The need to initiate EOPs is determined by 
comparing the maximum membership value for anticipated operational occurrences 
and accidents to a pre-defined emergency threshold specified in the operator’s 
knowledge base.  When the emergency threshold value is exceeded, the operator will 
initiate the EOPs.  By varying the magnitude of the operator’s emergency threshold 
(see Section 7.2.2), the analyst can adjust the time lag between event initiation and 
start of the EOPs.  When the diagnostic engine calculates a high membership value 
for a plant functional imbalance, a set of knowledge-based actions are activated to 
restore the functional balance.  Knowledge-based actions are described in greater 
detail in Section 5.6.  Finally, during the execution of procedural actions, the ADS-
IDAC model compares the functions performed by the component referenced in the 




associated with an identified functional imbalance (e.g., the opening the pressurizer 
spray valve when the operator has diagnosed a high energy condition in the 
pressurizer), the action is assigned a high relevance score.  The relevance score is 
used to determine the probability of skipping a procedural step and is discussed in 
more detail in Section 6. 
 
5.6 Knowledge-Based Actions 
 
A key goal of the current ADS-IDAC research effort  is modeling knowledge-
based actions that an operator might perform outside the scope of the emergency 
procedures.  The plant functional decomposition map and diagnostic engine described 
in Section 4.3.1 provide a means to identify situations where operators might execute 
actions they believe to be reasonable given their situational assessment but are not 
necessarily covered by plant procedures.    Examples of such actions include reducing 
reactor coolant system water injection when pressurizer level is high or decreasing the 
steam dump rate when steam generator pressure is low [85].   Within ADS-IDAC, 
knowledge-based actions can be activated when, based on the operator’s perceived 
plant state, the event membership value of a functional imbalance diagnosis exceeds a 
pre-defined threshold value.  For example, an imbalance diagnosis of “low mass in 
the reactor coolant system” might lead an operator to increase reactor coolant system 
injection flow, reduce normal letdown flow, or actuate emergency core cooling 
systems.  Knowledge-based actions have the following characteristics and properties 




 Action rules are organized within functional imbalance diagnostic groups.  Each 
possible functional imbalance event can be associated with a list of actions 
intended to mitigate the associated mass, energy, or momentum imbalance. 
 Each functional imbalance diagnosis group is assigned a priority level in order to 
reflect the relative importance of the associated actions to the operator.  For 
example, actions intended to address inadequate core cooling might be sequenced 
before actions to address low steam generator inventory in a single steam 
generator.  The priority can be adjusted to reflect an operator’s knowledge, 
experience, and problem solving style. 
 Each action can be assigned a set of prerequisite conditions that must be met prior 
to execution of the action.  Prerequisites are used to better model the heuristic 
rules an operator might use to activate a specific action.  Prerequisites can be 
associated with plant parameters, component states, alarms, active procedures in 
use, and an operator’s mental beliefs. 
 Once an action in a functional diagnosis group has been activated, further actions 
within the functional area will be blocked for a pre-defined dormancy period.  The 
dormancy period allows the operator to address other, possibly lower priority, 
functional areas. 
Because the activation of knowledge-based actions depends on the information 
perceived by the operator, information filtering, distortion, or biases may impact 
when action rules are activated.  This can lead to human error events such as the 






As an example of  the implementation of knowledge-based actions, consider the 
mitigative actions associated with a steam generator tube rupture.  The EOPs direct 
the operator to isolate the affected steam generator and reduce primary pressure in 
order to equalize reactor coolant system pressure and ruptured steam generator 
pressure.  This action reduces coolant leakage through the ruptured steam generator 
tube and facilitates refill of the reactor coolant system.  Although a knowledge-based 
paradigm for execution of this action may not match the efficiency and stability 
afforded by the EOPs, knowledge based rules can be used to achieve a similar end 
state.  Table 9 provides an overview of the functional diagnoses and associated 
knowledge-based actions that could achieve depressurization following a steam 
generator tube rupture.  The detailed knowledge-based model used for this scenario is 
provided in Appendix F. 
 
Immediately following the initiation of the steam generator tube rupture, the 
operators would likely note a decreasing mass condition in the reactor coolant system.  
Based on low pressurizer level, a knowledge-based action to actuate emergency core 
cooling would be activated.  Should the operator identify either a high steam 
generator radiation condition or an uncontrolled level increase in the ruptured steam 
generator, a mental belief that a steam generator tube has occurred would be formed.  
This mental belief would satisfy other action prerequisites in Table 9 and lead the 




generator.  If these actions were successful, the operator would eventually identify a 
high mass condition in the pressurizer and terminate emergency core cooling 
 








Low mass in the reactor 
coolant system 
Isolate chemical and volume 
control system letdown 
 Low pressurizer water level 
 Actuate emergency core cooling 
systems 
 Low pressurizer water level 
High mass in the reactor 
coolant system 
Stop emergency core cooling 
injection flow 
 Adequate sub-cooling margin and 
pressurizer water level 
Low energy in the 
pressurizer system 
Reduce reactor coolant system 
temperature by decreasing the 
setpoints of the SG atmospheric 
relief valves 
 Operator goal to reduce reactor 
coolant system temperature and 
low subcooling margin 
High mass in a steam 
generator 
Isolate steam generator (e.g., 
shut main steam, main 
feedwater, and auxiliary 
feedwater isolation valves  
 Mental belief that reactor is shut 
down and a steam generator tube 
rupture has occurred. 
 
 Open pressurizer spray valve  Mental belief that reactor is shut 
down and a steam generator tube 
rupture has occurred. 
 RCS pressure greater than 
ruptured SG pressure 
 Close pressurizer spray valve  Mental belief that reactor is shut 
down and a steam generator tube 
rupture has occurred. 
 RCS pressure less than ruptured 
SG pressure 
 
providing that adequate sub cooling margin existed. Other supporting actions, such as 
cooling the reactor coolant system to support depressurization, could also be 
identified in the operator’s knowledge base. 
 
To illustrate this example, a simulation was conducted for an accident 
involving a main steam line break (MSLB) followed by an induced steam generator 




following approach using the Halden emergency operating procedures for this event, 
and (2) a knowledge-based approach using the rules outlined in Table 9.  The 
response of pressurizer pressure and minimum subcooling are presented in Figure 17 
and Figure 18.  Both knowledge-based and procedurally driven approaches 
maintained a sufficient safety margin to prevent a core damage event from occurring.  
In particular, both approaches essentially reached the same end state, with reactor 
coolant system pressure approximately equal to steam generator pressure (thus 
terminating the SGTR event) and a adequate degree of subcooling.  The main 
distinction between the two approaches is that the procedurally driven strategy 
initiated a reactor coolant system cool down prior to depressurization.  This 
established a significant minimum subcooling margin prior to the depressurization.  
Conversely, the knowledge driven approach focused on termination of the loss of 
reactor coolant through the steam generator tube rupture and therefore a 
depressurization of the reactor coolant system was initiated earlier in the event.  For 
the knowledge driven approach, reactor coolant system cooldown was driven by the 
impending loss of subcooling margin; consequently this approach had a much smaller 
margin to loss of subcooling than the procedurally driven method.  Although this 
example is not intended to make any representation about how an actual crew would 
utilize knowledge-based actions, it does demonstrate the feasibility of building a 
knowledge driven model in the ADS-IDAC environment.  Furthermore, it highlights 
how the strategy selection process can lead to very different operator interactions with 






























Figure 17 - Pressurizer Pressure Response 
 
 




































6. Action Execution Module 
  
The third and final stage of the IDAC cognitive model is action execution.  
Within ADS-IDAC, action execution refers to active interactions with the reactor 
plant model that alter the operating state of a plant components, directed information 
gathering, and the activation of procedure steps.  The type of action and manner in 
which it is executed are dependent on the operator’s action-response mode. Based on 
the results of the decision-making process, the operator model will select one of the 
following action-response modes:  
 Actions specified in formal written procedures (e.g., emergency operating 
procedures); 
 Skill- or rule-based actions arising from the activation of a mental belief; and 
 Knowledge based actions based on the identification of a specific plant 
functional need. 
 
In general, actions associated with written procedures and skill- and rule-based 
responses can include active component state changes, information gathering, and 
activation of new procedure steps.  Actions resulting from the knowledge-based 
action-response mode are restricted to active component state changes and some 
limited information gathering activities. 
  
Similar to an actual control room, ADS-IDAC provides four possible control 
inputs for each active component that can be manipulated by the control room crew: 
1) changing the component operating mode (e.g., automatic vs. manual mode);  





3) incrementally adjusting the control setting of a component (e.g., throttling open a 
control valve by an additional 10%); and  
4) setting or adjusting the setpoint of an automatic controller (e.g., setting the steam 
dump target pressure equal to the perceived main steam header pressure).   
These capabilities provide sufficient flexibility to realistically model all significant 
active operator interactions with the plant model.   
 
Many procedure steps are not associated with active changes to component 
operating states, but are instead intended to gather information about the operating 
condition of plant components or parameters.  Therefore, ADS-IDAC action 
execution model also supports information gathering and verification.  Information 
gathering can be conducted as single discrete event or can take place on a recurring 
basis.  One time information gathering typically is used to verify the status of a 
parameter that is not routinely monitored, such as verifying that emergency core 
cooling systems started on demand.  Recurrent monitoring is usually needed to 
monitor that state of a parameter that provides significant information about plant 
safety and may be used to activate additional follow-up activities.  For example, some 
procedures may require the operators to monitor water levels in the pressurizer or 
steam generators and require specific follow-up actions if the level decreases below a 
pre-established threshold.  Recurrent monitoring is performed by adding the 
parameter of interest to the operator scan queue (see Section 4.1.2).  It should be 
noted that all information gathering activities are subject to perception processes and 




with a tendency to rely on memorized information may not re-verify the status of a 
plant parameter if it has been previously perceived.  Items contained in an operator’s 
control panel scan queue may be removed if the scan queue becomes too large and 
the information is not perceived to be relevant based on the operator’s situational 
assessment. 
 
The final type of action execution is the activation of procedure steps.  Skill- 
and rule-based memorized procedures are activated when the prerequisite conditions 
for the associated mental belief are met.  Formal written procedures can be activated 
either by the operator crew detecting an accident condition or when triggered by a 
memorized procedure.  Once the crew initiates formal written procedures, they may 
transition among several plant procedures to mitigate the accident event.  In order to 
ensure proper executive control of the event simulation, certain rules are enforced for 
allowable procedure activations: 
 Both the action-taker and the decision-maker can activate memorized procedures.  
Because only the action-taker can  interact with the control panel, the decision-
maker may require the action-taker’s assistance to complete a memorized 
procedure. 
 Only the decision-maker can follow a formal written procedure.  This is 
consistent with nuclear plant standard practices that the senior reactor operator 
directs emergency operating procedures.  This also has certain advantages in 




A more detailed discussion of the implementation of plant procedures is provided in 
Section 4.3.3. 
   
6.1 Performance Variability 
  
Even when personnel selection, training programs, and administrative programs 
are consistently implemented, nuclear plant operators can exhibit significant crew-to-
crew performance variabilities.  These performance variabilities can arise from 
differences in crew knowledge, skills, and experience; crew specific organizational 
factors; and operator preferences and tendencies.  If the sources of crew-to-crew 
variability can be modeled within a human reliability analysis, the prediction and 
mitigation of nuclear plant operator errors can be improved.   ADS-IDAC provides a 
several types of branching events that can be used to model typical crew-to-crew 
variabilities: 
 Action control value branches – For procedure step actions associated with a 
quantitative control input (e.g., opening a throttle valve to 10% open), two or 
more branches can be generated to explore the effect of variations in the control 
input.  This branching rule can be used to model variations in how control room 
operators control certain transient events during operations (e.g., reactor coolant 
system cooldown and depressurization rates). 
 Action time branches – Every operator action is associated with a probability 
distribution that describes the time required to accomplish the action.  In the 




is used to model the variability in action execution time.  Activation of this 
branching rule allows the analyst to generate two or more sequence branches, 
each of which represents a sample taken over a different partition of the action 
time probability distribution. 
 Information Biasing – Information read from the control panel can be biased by 
the operator’s perception process, resulting in the collection of inaccurate plant 
data.  For each operator, ADS-IDAC allows the analyst to specify instrumentation 
that is subject to biasing along with the type of biasing factor that is applied (e.g., 
additive, proportional, etc.).  Information biasing is discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.2. 
 Step-Skipping – Every procedure step includes several parameters to specify the 
likelihood that the step may be omitted during the action execution stage.  The 
procedure step-skipping module is described in Section 6.2. 
Prior to each ADS-IDAC event simulation, the analyst must specify what branching 
rules can be activated.  This allows a thorough exploration of potential crew 
variabilities without an excessive generation of branching events and a sequence 
exploration condition.  Section 9.2.1 provides a general framework for identifying 
appropriate branching rules for an event scenario. 
6.2 Procedure Step-Skipping 
 
 Procedures in ADS-IDAC follow a standard three part format consisting of an 
action, one or more conditions that should result from the action, and contingency 
actions that should be performed if the expected conditions are not met.  This is 




format commonly used at some nuclear plants.  An important aspect of this modeling 
approach is that ADS-IDAC is capable of capturing not only the content, but also the 
structural format of the plant procedures.  Because procedures are structured such that 
the contingency actions are only performed if the action expectations are not met, the 
expectations occasionally use unusual phrasing.  For example, an expectation 
intended to verify that the steam generators are intact might be worded “no steam 
generator pressure decreasing in an uncontrolled manner.”  The interpretation of this 
condition would likely be influenced by the operator’s biases and their situational 
assessment.  ADS-IDAC is capable of representing these type of complex action 
expectations. 
   
ADS-IDAC supports the modeling of omission of certain procedure actions in 
order to model step-skipping behavior.  In order to provide adequate executive 
control over the simulation, step-skipping behavior is limited to the initial step actions 
and the contingency “response not obtained” actions.  Although, ADS-IDAC cannot 
currently model the skipping of whole procedure sections (e.g., jumping from step 5 
to step 15), if the steps within a section are subject to the same dependent factors, the 
model can generate sequences where all section steps are skipped.  The likelihood of 
skipping a sub-step is calculated by adjusting a base probability value by dynamic 
and static multipliers.  These multipliers reflect procedural characteristics, the 
relevance of the action to the operator’s situational assessment, and the state of 




6.2.1 Static Factors 
  
Static factors refer to the properties of the procedure and are not expected to 
change during the accident event.  In ADS-IDAC, static factors include procedure 
type, step objectives, and step complexity.  These factors are summarized in Table 10. 
Table 10 - Procedure Step-Skipping (Static Factors) 
Static Factor Example 
Type of Procedure  Normal 
 Abnormal 
 Optimal Recovery Guidelines (EOPs) 
 Functional Recovery Guidelines (FRGs) 
 Alarm Response 
 Memorized Actions (Skill of the Craft) 
Type of Step  Verification Steps 
 Prerequisite Steps 
 Decision Making Steps 
 Objective-Related Action Steps 
 Monitoring Steps 
Complexity of Actions  Location of Actions  
 Step Structure  
 Familiarity with Action 
 
In the U.S., quality assurance program requirements require that plant operators to 
specify the manner in which procedures are to be executed [86].  The methods used 
by operators to execute procedures can vary depending on the type of procedure.  
Routine procedural actions that are frequently repeated may not require the procedure 
to be present.  Conversely, procedures covering infrequent or complex tasks should 
normally be present at the job site and followed.  Six procedure types are considered: 
normal operating, alarm response, abnormal, emergency optimal recovery guidelines, 
emergency functional recovery guidelines, and mental (skill of the craft) procedures.  




adherence tendencies of the operators (with high values indicating a lower adherence 
tendency).    
 
The objectives of procedure steps may also affect the operator’s adherence 
tendency.  For example, steps that are clearly aligned with the high level objectives of 
a procedure are unlikely to be skipped while monitoring or verification activities 
might be more likely to be missed.  ADS-IDAC uses the following five categories to 
group step objectives: monitoring, prerequisite, verification, objective-related, and 
diagnosis-related steps.  Monitoring steps require the operator to periodically check 
the value of a parameter or condition while verification steps require the operator to 
ensure that an expected condition exists.  Prerequisite steps support later actions but 
are not directly associated with the high level goals of the procedure.  Objective-
related steps are directly associated with the high level goals of the procedure.  
Diagnosis steps require the operators to assess the plant state and possibly transfer to 
a new procedure path.  Similar to the procedure type, the analyst assigns a factor from 
1 to 10 to reflect the operator’s tendency to skip these various step types.   
 
The complexity of the procedure step is also considered a static factor.  
Complexity can refer to the step structure, the type of action, and the presence of 
actions inside and outside of the control room.  Similar to the static procedural 
factors, the static step complexity factor ranges from 1 to 10, with a higher value 
reflecting a greater tendency for action skipping.  Based on recent research that 




simpler or more complex steps [87], this factor reflects the likelihood of adherence 
due to step complexity rather the actual step complexity.  The three static factors 
(procedure type, step objective, and complexity) are multiplied together to provide an 
overall static factor (fstatic) for step-skipping. 
 
6.2.2 Dynamic Factors 
  
Two types of dynamic factors are used to adjust the basic step-skipping 
probability: (1) performance influencing factors, and (2) the relevance of the action to 
the operator’s situational assessment.    
Table 11 - Procedure Step-Skipping (Dynamic Factors) 
Dynamic Factor Description 
Time Constraint Loading 
 Based on time until a critical parameter 
exceeds a specific threshold  
 Represents plant dynamics  
Action Relevance 
 Measures the relevance of the step action to 
the operator’s situational assessment 
 Action is closely associated with an identified 
plant need have high relevance 
 
Because high time pressure may influence an operator’s tendency to skip procedure 
steps, the time constraint loading performance influencing factor (PIF) is included in 
the step-skipping model.  The time constraint load PIF varies in the range of 1 to 10, 
with a higher value indicating increased time pressure.  The relevance of an action to 
the operator’s situational assessment is determined by comparing the functions of the 
component references by the action to the output from the diagnostic engine.  The 
plant component functional map (Section 4.3.1.3) specifies all functions supported by 




included in the diagnostic engine.  Based on information perceived by the operator, 
the diagnostic engine calculates a membership value for each imbalance diagnosis.  A 
relevance score for each component action is then calculated by Equation 4. 
)4(10 21 EquationR d  
where R is the relevance factor and d is the maximum membership value of all 
functional imbalances associated with the action.  Because d varies from 0.0 to 1.0, 
the relevance factor, R, varies from 0.1 for highly relevant actions to 10.0 for 
irrelevant actions (a low value of R is associated with a lower step-skip probability).  
Because the amount and accuracy of plant data perceived by the operator changes 
over time, the relevance factor is a dynamic quantity.  An operator with an accurate 
situational assessment will be less likely to skip pertinent actions, while an operator 
with a poor situational assessment may skip important steps.  Actions that are not 
associated with a specific component (such as procedure transfers) are assigned a 
relevance factor of 1.0.  The action relevance factor (R) is multiplied by the time 




Based on the static and dynamic step factors, an adjusted step-skipping probability is 
calculated using Equation 5 [88]: 
                                                 
7 Because the time constraint load PIF can range from 0 to 10, an adjusted PIF value is used to 
calculate the fdynamic factor.  When the time constraint load PIF is less than 1, the relevance factor is 
multiplied by 10(PIF – 1.0), otherwise, the PIF factor is used directly.  This results in a fdynamic range of 















where Pbase is the basic step-skipping probability and Pskip is the adjusted probability.  
The dynamic calculation of the step-skipping probability provides a number of 
advantages, including: (1) the ability to consider procedure type, step intent, and step 
complexity, (2) the influence of time pressure, and (3) the ability to link step-skipping 
tendencies to the operator situational assessment through the relevance factor.  An 
example application  of the procedure step-skipping model is presented in Sections 









7. Performance Influencing Factors and Crew Model 
 
 Within the IDAC model, the crew model specifies the roles and 
responsibilities for each member of the control room crew, communication protocols, 
preferences and tendencies, and decision-making dependencies.  Performance 
Influencing Factors (PIFs) are those elements that could alter to course of a plant 
event due to their effect on human response.  Taken together, the ADS-IDAC crew 
model and associated PIFs provide a means to realistically simulate nuclear plant 
control room crew performance and to explore factors that could lead to error events. 
7.1 Human Performance Influencing Factors 
  
Operator and crew behavior is influenced by static and dynamic performance 
influencing factors (PIFs) that capture internal and external factors that can affect 
cognitive performance [20].  The IDAC model groups PIFs into eleven broad 
categories: 
 Cognitive modes and tendencies – alertness and attention 
 Emotional arousal - stress 
 Strains and feelings – task and time loading 
 Perception and appraisal – situation perception and awareness of roles 
 Intrinsic characteristics – confidence and motivation 
 Memorized information – knowledge, experience, and skills 
 Organizational factors – work practices and tools 
 Team-related factors – cohesiveness, coordination, and leadership 
 Conditioning events – latent hardware, software, and human failures 
 Environmental factors – physical access, lighting, temperature, etc. 





Proper implementation of a PIF model provides a means for capturing the 
dependencies that affect individual operator and crew behaviors, such as procedure 
step-skipping and decision-making preferences.   
 
ADS-IDAC employs both static and dynamic performance influencing factors 
(PIFs) to influence and shape operator behavior.  Static PIFs are constant parameters 
intended to represent the fixed environmental and organizational factors that affect 
crew behavior.  Conversely, dynamic PIFs reflect transient conditions and model 
variations in the operator’s mental state during a scenario.   Dynamic PIFs provide an 
important mechanism for providing transient feedback to the operator model.  
Although certain static PIFs might be expected to change over time (e.g., the impact 
of increased training effectiveness on crew performance), the main distinction 
between static and dynamic PIFs is the time scale over which these factors change.  
Because an ADS-IDAC analysis is generally limited to the initial phase of an accident 
scenario, any factor that does not change significantly over a few hours is considered 
to be static. 
7.2 Static Performance Influencing Factors 
  
 Static PIFs include all the human behavior influencing factors that are 
considered to remain constant over the initial control room response to an accident or 
other abnormal event.  The current implementation of ADS-IDAC is intended to 
simulate control room crew performance up to the point that emergency response 




Center and the Emergency Operations Facility are staffed and operational (typically 
within a few hours after an accident initiator), the dynamics of crew decision-making 
and operator response changes as these facilities begin to manage and coordinate the 
accident response.  In general, the ADS-IDAC static PIFs involve organizational 
factors, team-related factors, and intrinsic operator characteristics.  Additionally, a 
number of dynamic PIFs rely on static parameters that influence how the dynamic 
factors are calculated.  For example, information load is modeled with a dynamic PIF, 
but the formula used to determine the PIF value depends on several static factors that 
characterize the operator’s information processing capabilities.  The specific static 
parameters used in the calculation of dynamic PIFs are discussed in Section 7.3.  
Three broad categories of static PIFs have been implemented in ADS-IDAC: memory 
limitations and use, activation thresholds, and goal and problem solving strategy 
selection.  
7.2.1 Memory Limitations and Use 
  
 The operator model includes a memory capability that allows the operator to 
store and use previously perceived information.  This provides an enhanced ability to 
model contextual factors associated with the operator’s recent experience.  The 
memory model includes two basic static PIFs that characterize the tendency of the 
operators to rely on memorized information and the operators’ information gathering 
and perception capacities.  Both of these factors are associated with the memorized 




Use of Memorized Information 
This static PIF parameter establishes the branching probability for enabling 
the operator’s use of previously perceived (and memorized) plant data.  When the use 
of memorized information is enabled, the operator will use previously perceived 
information stored in intermediate memory (if available and current) to address data 
requirements of procedure expectations and knowledge-based action prerequisites.  
When the use of memorized information is blocked, the operator will always obtain 
current information from the plant control panel.  The use of memorized information 
can reduce activity execution time but may result in the use of outdated and incorrect 
information.   This factor is set in the range of 0.0 to 1.0 and represents the branching 
probability that the operator will initially attempt to use information already present 
in memory.  Intermediate values will cause a branching point to be generated early in 
the simulation where one branch enables the use of memorized information (with the 
branching probability set to the input value) and a second branch blocks the use of 
memorized information (with the branching probability set to the complement of the 
input value).   
 
Even when the use of memorized information is enabled, the operator may 
block the use of previously perceived information if it has not been recently 
perceived.  The likelihood that the operator will use previously memorized 
information is specified by probability density functions that define a memory 
residency time for information related to an alarm status, component state, and 




total of nine separate parameters) are used to model each of these information 
categories.  When the use of memorized information is enabled, the operator will 
check to determine if desired information has been previously perceived.  If the 
information had been previously perceived, a Monte Carlo simulation is used to 
calculate a maximum information residency time.  If the age of the perceived 
information is less than the maximum information residency time obtained from the 
Monte Carlo simulation, the operator will use the memorized information.  If the age 
of the perceived information is greater than the maximum residency time, the 
operator will obtain the current alarm state from the control panel.   
 
Short Term Memory Capacity – Control Panel Scanning 
The operator control panel scanning model (see Section 4.1.2) dynamically 
focuses operator attention on the parameters, component states, and alarms that the 
operator believes are most pertinent to the perceived plant state.  The maximum 
number of items that can be monitored by the scan queue is established by dynamic 
limits based on the status of the information load and system criticality dynamic PIFs.  
This maximum scan queue limit is specified individually for each operator and is 
considered to be a static PIF.   A higher scan queue limit will allow the operator to 
monitor more parameters and obtain an improved situational assessment of the plant 
state.  Setting a lower scan queue limit reduces the number of parameters that can be 
periodically monitored.  This flexibility allows the analyst to simulate the operator’s 
information processing and short term memory limitations.  When the size of the scan 




scan queue until the size limitation is met.  Thus, an operator with a lower scan queue 
limit will have greater difficulty monitoring sufficient information to maintain an 
accurate situational assessment. 
 
7.2.2 Activation Thresholds 
 
 Several key features of the operator decision-making model are linked to 
situations in which a critical parameter is exceeding a pre-determined cutoff value or 
activation threshold.  As discussed in Section 2.5.1.1, the Cutoff Reinforcement 
Learning Model assumes that a decision maker will establish and adjust an activation 
cutoff value based on a learning process over a series of repeated trials.  The learning 
process model includes factors such as positive reinforcement, generalization, and 
forgetting.  Inspired by this model, ADS-IDAC includes static PIFs that establish 
critical activation thresholds.  Although the Cutoff Reinforcement Learning 
thresholds are dynamic, over the time span of interest in an ADS-IDAC simulation, it 
is reasonable to assume a static threshold.  However, if desired, these PIFs can be 
adjusted to reflect changes in an operator’s experience, confidence, or tendencies to 
ignore or act upon information associated with a degrading plant state.  Two primary 
categories of thresholds are currently implemented in ADS-IDAC – the detection 
threshold for an abnormal plant condition and the probability threshold to activate 





Detection of Abnormal Condition 
This parameter establishes the diagnostic threshold for detection of an 
abnormal condition.   As described in Section 5.5, the ADS-IDAC model includes a 
fuzzy logic diagnostic engine that supports the operator’s situational assessment of 
the plant state.  Three major classes of plant events are included in the diagnostic 
process: (1) normal operating events, (2) anticipated operational occurrences, and (3) 
design basis accidents.  Based on the information perceived by the operator, the 
diagnostic engine calculates a membership value for each possible diagnostic event.  
These membership values range from 0.0 to 1.0 and represent the degree of matching 
between the event symptoms and the symptoms that have been perceived by the 
operator.  Each time step, ADS-IDAC recalculates the maximum membership value 
of all events within the anticipated operational occurrence and design basis event 
categories.  If this maximum membership value exceeds the abnormal signal 
threshold, the operator will conclude that an abnormal condition exists.  The 
abnormal condition diagnosis does not “reset” once it is activated, even if the 
maximum membership values for anticipated operational and design basis events later 
decrease below the threshold.  This parameter effectively establishes the operator’s 
sensitivity to detecting an abnormal event.  If the parameter is set to a high value, the 
operator will require more information to support an abnormal condition diagnosis.  
A lower value reduces the information requirements for detecting an abnormal 
condition, but might result in the operator reaching a “false positive” conclusion for 
an abnormal event.  In practical terms, setting a high value tends to delay the 




lower value tends to support earlier activation of this perception.  The determination 
that an abnormal condition exists influences the goal selection process and may lead 
to activation of the emergency operating procedures.  This threshold value can be 
used to characterize the operator’s self confidence level (an intrinsic characteristic in 
the IDAC model) or the operator’s perceived severity of the consequences associated 
with their diagnosis (a perception and appraisal characteristic). 
 
Following the identification of an abnormal condition or the perception of a 
reactor trip, the operator will suspend all low priority mental procedures.  The priority 
of a mental procedure is represented by an integer value of 1 or greater.  High priority 
procedures are associated with a lower priority value (i.e., the highest priority 
procedures have a priority value of “1”).  The profile for each operator includes a 
static PIF to define the priority threshold for mental procedures.  Once an abnormal 
condition has been detected, the operator suspends the execution of all active and 
queued mental procedures with a priority level lower than the specified threshold 
value.  For example, if the priority threshold is set at 2, all mental procedures with a 
priority value of 3 or greater will be suspended.   The purpose of this parameter is to 
allow the operator to interrupt mental procedures that are no longer appropriate 
following a reactor trip or while mitigating an accident event.  Because the abnormal 
condition diagnosis is not reset, the suspension of low priority mental procedures can 
occur only once during an accident sequence.  Thus, low priority mental procedures 
that are activated following the initial diagnosis of a reactor trip or abnormal event are 






Procedural steps in ADS-IDAC have three main components: (1) initial action 
activity, (2) expectations associated with the initial action activity, and (3) a non-
response action that is executed if the action expectations are not met.  The operator 
may skip either the initial action activity or the non-response action.  Evaluation of 
the action expectations cannot be skipped.  ADS-IDAC dynamically calculates the 
probability of skipping each procedure step executed by the operator (see Section 
6.2).  If the calculated step-skipping probability exceeds a preset threshold value, two 
dynamic event tree branches are generated – one branch executes the associated 
procedure step while the second branch skips the step.  The branching probability for 
the step-skipping branch is set equal to the calculated branch probability, and the 
branch probability for execution of the step is equal to the complement of the skip 
probability.  If the calculated skip probability is less than the skip action threshold, 
the associated procedure step action is executed and no branching point is generated.  
Thus, the procedure step-skip action thresholds set the minimum probability for 
generating a branching point for skipping the initial and non-response actions for a 
procedural step.   
 
The skip threshold was originally intended simply to suppress the generation 
of excessive numbers of low probability branching points.  Although sequence 
truncation limits would serve a similar purpose, these limits are not applied until the 




suppress low probability branches before they are generated.  The analyst can reduce 
the excessive generation of procedure step-skipping branches by increasing the skip 
action threshold.  Use of the skip threshold also provides the analyst an additional 
degree of freedom in specifying procedural adherence tendencies of the control room 
crew.  In this manner, the thresholds can be considered a static PIF that characterizes 
the operator’s tendency for attentiveness to the current task (a PIF grouped under 
cognitive modes and tendencies in the IDAC model).  Setting the skip thresholds to 
higher values can be used to model crews with a higher likelihood to adhere to 
procedural requirements (e.g., setting the thresholds equal to 1.0 will suppress all 
skipping behavior). 
7.2.3 Goal and Problem Solving Preferences 
  
 ADS-IDAC includes two static PIF factors to represent the operator’s 
preferences regarding goal and strategy selection.  The troubleshooting probability 
and procedure-use probability PIFs support the goal selection process and influence 
the crew’s selection of problem solving strategy.  These PIFs are related to the 
operator’s intrinsic characteristic PIF group in the IDAC model and characterize the 
crew’s problem solving style.   
 
The troubleshooting probability establishes the branching probability that the 
decision-maker will activate the troubleshooting goal when plant parameters indicate 
an abnormal condition (see Figure 15).  When the troubleshooting probability is set to 




troubleshooting.  A value of 0 will cause the decision-maker to bypass the 
troubleshooting goal in favor of monitoring the situation.  For intermediate values, a 
branching point will be generated with two operator goal branches.  One branch will 
activate the troubleshooting goal with a branch probability equal to the 
troubleshooting probability.  The other branch will activate the monitoring goal with 
a complimentary branching probability.  When the troubleshooting goal is activated, 
the crew can implement knowledge-based actions to address the abnormal condition 
(see Figure 16).  This PIF parameter is currently implemented only for the decision-
maker. 
 
The procedure-use probability establishes the branching probability that the 
decision-maker will transition from the troubleshooting goal to the maintaining global 
safety goal (see Figure 15) after a reactor trip has occurred.   When the procedure-use 
probability is set to 1, the decision-maker will always abandon the troubleshooting 
goal in favor of the maintaining global safety goal when a reactor trip condition is 
detected.  A value of 0 will cause the decision-maker continue activation of the 
troubleshooting goal regardless of the reactor status.  For intermediate values, a 
branching point will be generated with two operator goal branches.  One branch will 
activate the transition from the troubleshooting goal to the maintaining global safety 
margin goal with a branch probability equal to the procedure-use probability.  The 
other branch will block the transition to the maintaining global safety margin goal and 
therefore allow the crew to continue troubleshooting activities.  Activation of the 




strategy.  Effectively, this parameter allows the crew to transition from a knowledge-
based approach to accident mitigation to a procedure following approach.  This 
parameter is currently implemented only for the Decision Maker.   
 
7.3 Dynamic Influencing Factors 
  
The ADS-IDAC simulation currently includes three dynamic PIFs: 
information load, time constraint load, and criticality of system condition.  These 
PIFs serve as the main feedback mechanism between the thermal hydraulic model and 
the operator’s mental state.  The value for each of these dynamic PIFs ranges from 0 
to 10.  For these PIFs, a higher PIF value indicates a more adverse condition (e.g., 
higher information load, more time constrained situation, or degraded system 
condition).  Information load is currently used as a surrogate measure of the 
operator’s passive information load, task related load, and non-task related load – 
three items which are included within the strains and feelings PIF group in the IDAC 
model [20].  The criticality of system condition PIF factor is included under the 
perception and appraisal IDAC PIF group.  
7.3.1 Time Constraint Load  
 
The time constraint load PIF represents the time available until a monitored 
plant parameter exceeds a critical threshold.   Because operators will normally 
monitor more than one important parameter, the overall PIF value is based on the 




data defining how the time constraint load PIF value is calculated, including a listing 
of plant parameters used to calculate the time constraint PIF value along with the 
associated critical threshold values.  Typical parameters that may be included in the 
calculation of the time constraint PIF include steam generator water levels, 
pressurizer water level, and reactor coolant system pressure.  In order to model the 
potential dependence between operating mode and critical parameter threshold 
values, two different threshold levels are used to calculate the PIF value – a normal 
operation threshold and an accident threshold.  When the operator’s high level goal is 
maintaining normal operation, monitoring, or troubleshooting an abnormal condition, 
the normal operation threshold is used.  These goals are associated with at-power 
operation; therefore, time limitations would be expected to be driven primarily by the 
desire to maintain normal operation by avoiding a reactor trip.   If the operator 
switches to the goal of maintaining global safety margins (or if a reactor trip has 
occurred with the troubleshooting goal active), the time constraint PIF value is based 
on the accident threshold.  The use of two different threshold values allows ADS-
IDAC to capture an operator’s changing sensitivity to key parameters depending on 
the overall perceived plant condition.  In general, the normal accident threshold is set 
to a level corresponding to reactor plant trip set points.  The accident level threshold 
is normally set to a less restrictive value that is more indicative of the availability of a 
key safety function.  For example, if a plant that has an automatic reactor trip on low 
steam generator (SG) water level, an operator might focus on the time available until 
the reactor trip set point is reached during an uncontrolled decrease in SG level.  




maintaining adequate decay heat removal capability from the steam generator - a 
function that can be often be performed with a much lower SG level.  Thus the 
normal threshold might be set equal to the low SG water level reactor trip set point 
while a less restrictive value is used for the accident threshold.  Like all information 
processed by the operator model, the time constraint load PIF value is based on 
information perceived by the operator rather than data obtained directly from the 
thermal-hydraulic model.  Perceived data may differ from the actual parameter value 
in thermal-hydraulic model due to time lags in updating perceived data and any 
distortions introduced by perception filtering and biasing.   
 
The first step in determining the time constraint loading PIF is to determine 
the time available until each time constrained parameter exceeds a critical threshold 









In Equation 6, ti,available is the time until the value of parameter i (Pi) exceeds threshold 
value Pi,Threshold and iP   is the rate of change of parameter Pi.  If an updated parameter 
value has not been perceived since the last PIF update, ADS-IDAC will extrapolate 
the parameter value based on the previously perceived parameter value and trend.  To 
prevent this extrapolation process from artificially inducing an influence on operator 
behavior, when a parameter becomes the most time limiting factor, the scan queue 
(see Section 4.1.2) is verified to ensure the operator is actually monitoring the 




added to ensure that the limiting PIF value is based on perceived information rather 
than an extrapolation process.  An updated PIF value associated with each monitored 
parameter (PIFi,TimeConstraint) is then obtained using the value of  ti,available from Equation 





















The tuning constants tLower and tUpper are used to calibrate the PIF value to the desired 
operator characteristics.  Equation 7a is applicable only when ti,available is between 
tLower and tUpper.  If the minimum time available exceeds tUpper, the time constraint PIF 
value is set to 0.  If the minimum time available is less than tLower, the PIF value is 
assumed to saturate at a value of 10 (see Figure 19).  


















Figure 19 - Time Constraint PIF 
 
In order to more realistically model dynamic changes in the time constraint 
PIF factor, the updated value of PIFi,TimeConstraint is passed through a lag filter to 
simulate the gradual buildup and decay of stress associated with time constrained 
loading.  If the value of  PIFi,TimeConstraint has not saturated at the maximum PIF value 


















PIFOld  is last updated PIF value; 
PIFUpdated is the output from the lag filter; 
PIFNew is the updated and unfiltered PIF value obtained from Equation 7a; 
tlapse is the time constraint loading PIF update periodicity (in seconds);  and  
τbuildup is the buildup time constant (in seconds). 
 
Once the PIF value for a monitored parameter reaches saturation at the maximum 
value, the parameter PIF value is allowed to decay using the following formula 
(Equation 7c): 





PIFUpdated is the output from the lag filter; 
tcurrent is the current simulation time (seconds); 
tthreshold is the time that the parameter exceeded the accident threshold value; 
and 
τdecay is the decay time constant. 
 
This decay feature is intended to account for a decrease in induced time constraint 
loading once a parameter has passed a critical threshold, and the operator is unable to 
recover.  In this case, the operator would likely focus on other critical parameters 
where mitigation actions may be more successful.  The timing parameters can be 
adjusted by the analyst to match desired crew characteristics.  The overall value for 
the time constraint PIF value is the maximum value of PIFi,TimeConstaint for all 






 In order to demonstrate the behavior of the dynamic PIF factors, an example 
steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) scenario was analyzed. The appropriate 
response to a SGTR event requires several dynamic interactions with the reactor 
plant, including initiation of emergency core cooling, isolation of the ruptured steam 
generator, cool down and depressurization of the reactor coolant system, and 
termination of emergency core cooling.  Each of these steps either initiates or 
terminates a significant trend in a key reactor plant parameter.  The thermal-hydraulic 
response for the event is shown in Figure 20.  As can be seen in Figure 20, a slow 
pressurizer level decreasing trend begins immediately after the SGTR is initiated at 
approximately 180 seconds.  The water level in the ruptured SG (SG A) remains 
relatively unperturbed during the initial phase of the accident because the SG water 




























































After the operators manually initiate the emergency core cooling system, the reactor 
plant shuts down, and the SG water level control system can no longer compensate 
for the reactor coolant leakage into the SG; consequently, SG A water level begins 
increasing at roughly 700 seconds.  The net cooldown of the reactor coolant following 
shutdown causes the pressurizer water to decrease below the indicating range despite 
the high makeup flow from the emergency core cooling systems.  As the operators 
work through the emergency operating procedure, they will initiate a cooldown and 
depressurization to equalize pressure across the SG tube and terminate the coolant 
leak.  After the leakage into the ruptured SG is terminated, the pressurizer level 
increases rapidly, requiring the operators to terminate emergency core cooling 
injection before the pressurizer is completely filled.  Once the emergency core 
cooling injection is stopped, the operators can re-equalize reactor coolant and SG 
pressure to stabilize plant conditions.  Thus, the response to this accident causes 
significant transients on SG water level, pressurizer level, and reactor coolant 
pressure – all factors that would be expected to cause time constraint loading on the 
operating crew. 
 
Figure 21 shows the response of the dynamic time constraint loading PIF to 
the SGTR accident.  Shortly after the SGTR is initiated, the PIF value increases due 
to the pressurizer water level slowly decreasing toward the operational limit of 10%.  




will slowly decay toward zero.  However, the increasing SG water level will 
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Figure 21 - Time Constraint Loading Response to SGTR 
 
fills.  Operator action to isolate other sources of makeup flow (e.g., auxiliary 
feedwater) into the steam generator slows the rate of level increase and temporarily 
reduces the time constraint loading associated with SG water level.  The leakage of 
reactor coolant through the ruptured tube will continue to increase SG water level, 
and time loading associated with SG level will begin to build again a short time later. 
The time loading associated with SG water level will eventually saturate and begin to 
decay.  Once the operators initiate reactor coolant system cooldown, the decrease in 
pressure will cause additional time loading – this is an expected condition since the 
operator must closely monitor the pressure decrease to ensure that adequate safety 
margins are maintained.  Additionally, pressurizer level increases rapidly; this 




loading.  The time constraint PIF varies in direct response to the operator’s perception 
of adverse trends in key plant parameters and provides a representative measure of 
time available until a critical threshold is exceeded.   
 
7.3.2 Information Load 
 
The information loading dynamic PIF represents the operator’s mental 
workload associated with the perception, processing, and communication of 
information.  All information available from the nuclear plant thermal hydraulic 
model and crew communications must first pass through the operator’s perception 
filter before it can be memorized and used.  Consequently, the flow rate of 
information through the perception filter provides a convenient measure of each 
operator’s information processing workload.  The formula used to calculate the 











The variable IRate represents the operator’s dynamic information processing rate and 
the constants α and β are calibration parameters.  The calibration parameters can be 
adjusted to reflect an individual operator’s information handling capabilities.  
Equation 8 is applicable only when IRate is between α and β. If the information 
processing rate is less than α, the PIF value is set to 0.  If the information processing 























Figure 22 - Information Load PIF 
 
Example Application 
 The dynamic response of the information loading PIF to the same accident 
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Figure 23 - Information Loading Response to SGTR 
  
feature of the information loading PIF is that it appropriately tracks periods of high 
and low procedurally driven activity.  Because the decision-maker directs all 




continuously communicated between the crew members when procedure activity is 
high.  For example, the PIF decreases during a briefing hold that occurs at 
approximately 1500 seconds – during this period, the operators are not executing any 
procedure actions, thereby reducing the operator’s information processing load.  
Shortly after the briefing hold, the operators rapidly execute a series of actions needed 
to isolate the ruptured steam generator.  This is denoted by a period of relatively high 
information loading around 2000 seconds.  Also noteworthy is the information 
loading peak when the operators initiate emergency core cooling.  The initiation of 
emergency systems and shutdown of the plant trigger numerous control room alarms 
that the operators must process, thus temporarily increasing the information 
processing rate.  The information loading PIF provides another dynamic PIF that 
varies in response to real operator activity and plant conditions. 
7.3.3 Criticality of System Condition 
  
The criticality of system condition PIF represents the operator’s perception of 
the level of degradation of key safety functions.  This PIF is loosely based on the 
safety parameter display system used in U.S. nuclear plant control rooms [89]. The 
value of the system criticality PIF corresponds to the aggregate deviation of key 
safety parameters from a nominal value.  Each operator profile identifies the 
parameters used to calculate this PIF, the threshold limits associated with each 
parameter, and the weighting factors used to aggregate the parameter contributions.   
Typical parameters used to calculate the system criticality PIF include reactor coolant 




level, and reactor vessel water level.  The contribution from each identified parameter 
to the overall criticality of system condition PIF value is denoted as the parameter 
criticality (PIFParameter Criticality).  Given a set of high and low threshold limits, the 
parameter criticality corresponds to the magnitude of the parameter’s deviation from 




















Figure 24 - Parameter Criticality PIF 
 
As shown in Figure 24, the parameter criticality considers both high and low 
deviations from the nominal safe state.  For example, a low level of reactor coolant 
system subcooling margin might indicate inadequate core cooling and an increased 
potential for core damage, while an excessive amount of subcooling might indicate an 
overcooling event and a potential pressurized thermal shock condition.  The overall 
criticality of system condition PIF value is based on a weighted sum of the individual 











The ωi value in Equation 9 is the weighting factor for parameter i.  A higher value of 




Additionally, the rate of change of the PIF value provides an indication if the overall 
plant health is improving or worsening. 
 
Example Application 
 The response of the system criticality PIF to the example SGTR accident 
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Figure 25 - System Criticality Response to SGTR 
 
tends to have a more stable response to the SGTR accident that the time constraint 
and information loading PIF factors.  Shortly after the initiation of the SGTR, the 
system criticality PIF begins to increase due to the deviation of pressurizer level from 
its normal operating range.  As the operators initiate emergency procedures, the rate 
at which the system criticality PIF increases begins to level off, but the value 
continues to slowly increase until the operators take action to reduce reactor coolant 
system pressure and stabilize plant conditions.  Because the water levels in the 




emergency operating procedures, there is some residual value in the system criticality 
PIF near the end of the scenario.  Similar to the time constraint and information 
loading PIFs, the system criticality PIF dynamically and realistically responds to 
changing plant conditions.  Notably, the operator actions required by the emergency 
operating procedures are able to mitigate the increase in the system criticality PIF and 
return the PIF to a relatively low value. 
7.4 Crew Communication and Coordination 
  
The ADS-IDAC crew model currently includes a senior reactor operator 
(SRO) and a reactor operator (RO).  Similar to an actual control room, each operator 
has unique roles and responsibilities.  The SRO selects the high level goal and directs 
all written plant procedures.  The RO performs all interactions with the nuclear power 
plant model through the ADS-IDAC control panel.   
 
Certain crew activities require coordination and communication between the 
control room operators.   For example, only the decision-maker can direct the 
performance of proceduralized actions and only the action-taker can manipulate the 
control panel.  Therefore, the execution of a procedure step requires the decision-
maker to direct the action-taker to perform the specified action followed by a report 
from the action-taker to the decision-maker that the action had been accomplished.  
The time required to perform inter-crew communication is established by the nominal 




parameter establishes the communication delay time (in seconds) and is controlled by 
the sender of the information. 
 
The time required to perform an operator action is specified by the three-
parameter Weibull probability distribution function in each mental or written 
procedure action step. However, it is sometimes desirable to globally change action 
time in order to model a fast or slow crew.  Therefore, the operator profile includes a 
time multiplier factor to proportionally adjust the time required for the operator to 
execute activities.  The action time multiplier is uniformly applied to all operator 
activities, including communication, action execution, and decision-making activities.  
A factor of 2.0 doubles the activity execution time compared to the baseline time 
while a factor of 0.5 reduces the activity execution time by a factor of ½.  No 
dynamic event tree branches are generated by this parameter. 
 
Within ADS-IDAC, the crew can interact with the plant model by manipulating 
components or gathering information from instruments and alarms.  For 
computational convenience, all crew interactions with the nuclear plant model follow 
a standard sequence of events (termed the “action block” process).  Because only the 
RO is permitted to interact with the ADS-IDAC control panel, any task initiated by 
the SRO must first be communicated to the RO.  If the RO is not occupied with 
another task, the RO executes the requested action and communicates the status of the 
task back to the SRO.  The SRO then compares the status report information to the 




(2) performs a contingency action.  If the RO is busy when the SRO initiates an 
action request, the request is held in an “ordered action” queue until the RO is able to 
execute the task.  For instinctive response actions that are self-directed by the RO, the 
action block process is shortened to include only the RO’s control panel interaction 
followed by a determination by the RO if the action expectation had been met.   
Consequently, self-directed actions by the RO can usually be accomplished more 
quickly than actions directed by the SRO.  
 
To ensure that crew actions are coordinated, an order of precedence for problem 
solving strategies has been developed.  The following rules guide the transition 
between operator problem solving strategies:  
 The “Wait and Monitor” strategy has the lowest order of precedence and is only 
activated if no other problem solving strategy is active. 
 The “Knowledge-Based Reasoning” and the “Follow Written Procedure” 
strategies are mutually exclusive and cannot be activated simultaneously. 
 High priority “Instinctive Response” strategy actions will interrupt all other 
strategies.  Lower priority instinctive response actions may interrupt other 
strategies depending on the crew’s high level goal and the individual operator 
profile.  Once the instinctive response actions are complete, the operator will 
return to the previous strategy. 
 Transitions between problem solving strategies are not permitted when an action 
block is active.  Once the current action block is completed, the operator may 




 The initial activation of the “Follow Written Procedure” strategy will 
automatically transition the operations crew to the specified emergency operations 
entry procedure (e.g., E-0).  Subsequent activations of the “Follow Written 
Procedure” strategy will cause the operator to implement a new procedure (if 
specified) or return to the previous procedure and step. 
 
These rules ensure the executive control of the simulation is well coordinated and 





8. Discrete Dynamic Event Tree Generation 
  
ADS-IDAC generates a dynamic event tree during accident scenarios by 
activating branching points when certain conditions are met.  Each branching point 
includes two or more individual event branches, each of which represents distinct 
combinations of system and operator states.  Collectively, the branching points 
describe the topology of a discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) associated with an 
initiating event.  A specific accident sequence is defined by the unique path through 
the DDET branching points from the initiating event to an end state.  The generation 
of branching points is controlled by a set of general rules that define the specific 
activation conditions for a branching point.  Although the branching rules are 
predefined, the creation of branching points depends on the dynamic behavior of the 
reactor plant and operator decision-making models.  Consequently, a simulation 
approach is needed to determine the branching points that are generated along a 
specific accident sequence trajectory.  Because branching points can represent 
variability in crew actions, a calibration process has been developed to translate 
observed crew behaviors into relatively simple set of branching rules that can be 
applied within the rich contextual environment provided by ADS-IDAC.  The 
calibration process is described in Section 9.2.  This research study has demonstrated 
that relatively complex variations in crew-to-crew performance can be captured with 





Because the branching rules guide the construction of the accident sequence 
DDET, these rules also define the scope of the ADS-IDAC analysis.  However, a 
challenge of the DDET approach is that the size of the simulation state-space grows 
exponentially large as the number of branches increases.   This phenomenon, known 
as sequence explosion, can limit the ability to complete an ADS-IDAC simulation 
within a reasonable time period.  In general, branching rule definitions should capture 
a sufficient range of crew variability while minimizing the potential for sequence 
explosion.  ADS-IDAC also allows the analyst to terminate an accident sequence 
when the sequence probability drops below a minimum threshold value, the 
sequence’s simulated time limit exceeds a maximum limit, or a thermal-hydraulic 
parameter exceeds a specified threshold value.  In practice, branching rules and 
sequence truncation criteria must balance the desire for full problem coverage with 
computing platform limitations.   
 
Branching rules can be constructed to reflect variations in plant hardware and 
crew responses to plant events.  By appropriately combining these branching rules, a 
wide spectrum of possible plant and operator states can be simulated.  ADS-IDAC 
provides the capability to generate branching points to model variability in operator 
and plant hardware performance  
8.1 Operator Performance Branching Events 
  
 A key research goal for the ADS-IDAC project is to develop a human 




human error events.  Therefore, a primary focus for event tree branching is capturing 
a wide range of potential human performance variability.  ADS-IDAC currently 
supports branching events associated with all phases of the IDAC information 
processing, decision-making, and action execution processes. 
8.1.1 Information Processing 
  
The ADS-IDAC operator model is capable of using previously perceived plant 
information to support the decision-making process.  For example, if a procedure 
expectation requires the operator to verify the state of a plant parameter, the operator 
can either actively gather information on the parameter from the control panel or rely 
on their memory of the parameter value if the information had been previously 
perceived.  Use of memorized information can be more efficient since it reduces the 
time required to evaluate plant conditions.  However, depending on the time delay 
between initially gathering the information and its eventual use, the operator’s 
memorized data may not represent an accurate assessment of plant conditions.  In 
order to allow exploration of this effect, each operator profile includes a PIF to enable 
the use of memorized information.  The PIF can be used to toggle between 
information processing modes, or be set such that a branching point is generated early 
in the simulation to explore the impact of either using or not using memorized 
information.  Only one branching point associated with the use of memorized 
information is generated during a sequence – once the branching rule is activated, all 
subsequent information processing will use memorized information as specified by 




basis rather than a crew basis so crew members may use different information 
processing modes during a sequence. 
8.1.2 Decision-Making 
  
 The ADS-IDAC decision-making process (described in Section 5) includes 
the ability to generate branching events for several key processes.  These processes 
include goal and strategy selection and the activation of mental beliefs.  Goal 
selection influences the high level problem solving approach used by the operating 
crew to address an accident event (e.g., use of written emergency operating 
procedures vs. knowledge-based troubleshooting).  Mental beliefs represent high 
level observations, decisions, conclusions or ideas that the operator formulates 
regarding his/her assessment of plant status.  Once a mental belief is activated, it can 
be used to activate other beliefs or drive the operator to perform skill- or rule-based 
actions or initiate a formal plant procedure. 
 
8.1.2.1 Goal Selection 
  
ADS-IDAC provides two branching rules to model variations in the crew’s 
selection of a high level goal.  The troubleshooting and procedure-use PIFs are 
included in each operator’s profile and can be used enable certain goal  selection 
preferences.   These branching rules can be used generate two branches when they are 
activated: one that will enable either the troubleshooting or maintaining safety 
margins goals, and another that blocks activation of these goals.   As described in 




proceduralized knowledge-driven actions to mitigate an accident event.  Use of 
knowledge-based actions can result in more efficient accident mitigation since the 
crew is more likely to expend resources directly addressing adverse plant functions.  
However, this mitigation mode may also result in inappropriate actions if the 
operator’s situational assessment is incorrect.  If plant conditions continue to degrade 
during troubleshooting activities, the crew may transition to the more formalized 
procedure following problem-solving strategy depending on the setting of the 
procedure use PIF.     
 
8.1.2.2 Mental Belief Activation 
 
Every mental belief in an operator knowledge base includes an activation  
probability that characterizes the branching rule associated with the belief.  When the 
prerequisite conditions for a mental belief are satisfied, two sequence branches can be 
generated – one branch where the mental belief is activated and another where the 
mental belief is left un-activated (or bypassed)8. Activation of a mental belief has two 
primary impacts: (1) enabling of skill- or rule-based follow-up actions, and (2) 
potential activation of prerequisite conditions for other mental beliefs.   As described 
in Section 4.3.2, mental beliefs can be used to model complex non-proceduralized 
operator behaviors and form a significant portion of the operator knowledge base. 
                                                 
8 To allow the analyst to prevent the excessive generation of sequence branches, activation 
probabilities set very close to 0.0 or 1.0 will only generate a single event sequence branch.  
Intermediate values will generate two braches with the split probability for mental belief activation set 





8.1.3 Action Execution 
  
 ADS-IDAC provides three primary means to generate dynamic event tree 
branches during the action execution  phase.  These branching events include timing 
variability, control input variability, and procedure step-skipping. 
 
8.1.3.1 Timing Variability 
 
Each proceduralized and non-proceduralized action executed by the operators 
includes timing parameters that specify the time required to perform the action.  In 
the current version of ADS-IDAC, a three-parameter Weibull distribution is used to 





























α is scale factor for the distribution (in seconds) 
β is the shape factor 
f is the probability density for time t 
t is the time to perform the associated action (in seconds) 
μ is the minimum time (in seconds) 
 
The analyst can specify timing branching rules to generate one or more event 
sequence branches when the associated action is executed.  If only one branch is 
generated, the time required to perform the action is set equal to the mean of the 













If more than one timing branch is generated, the required action time for each branch 
is determined by partitioning the probability density function.  For example, if i 
branches are to be generated, the timing probability density function is partitioned 























































































In this equation, (j-1)(1/i) represents the lower cumulative probability bound for 
partition j while (j)(1/i) represents the upper bound.  The maximum cumulative 
probability upper bound is limited to 0.999999 to ensure stability of the numerical 
solution algorithm.  Calculating the mean time for each partition, rather than using a 
random sampling technique, allows ADS-IDAC to generate reproducible results 
while ensuring that the desired range of timing variability is explored.    
 
 An example application of timing branch generation is shown in Figure 26.  
This example shows the crew response to a steam generator tube rupture event using 
a procedure-following strategy.  In this case, three timing branches were used to 




procedure – a fast crew, a nominal crew, and a slow crew.  A case with no operator 
actions is also shown in the figure for comparison.  As seen in the figure, the 
generation of timing branches not only changes the time that actions are executed 
during an event sequence, but can also result in changes in the thermal-hydraulic 
response of the plant.  In this case, timing variability in initiating the emergency 
operating procedures changes both the time that key actions are performed (such as 
cooldown of the reactor coolant system) and the response of key plant parameters 
(such as the maximum pressurizer level obtained during the accident sequence).  
 





























Figure 26 - Operator Timing Variability During a SGTR 
 
 
8.1.3.2 Control Input Variability 
 
When procedures require the operators to adjust a continuous variable, the 
crews may exhibit variability in their control input.  For example, when initiating a 
reactor coolant system cooldown, a conservative crew may establish a relatively slow 




crew may establish a faster rate in order to achieve the desired end state more quickly.  
The analyst can model these different styles through the use of control input 
variability branching rules.  When an action is associated with a quantitative control 
input (e.g., opening a throttle valve to 10% open), two or more branches can be 
generated to explore the effect of variations in the control input.  The branching rule 
is characterized by a table that provides the desired control input for each branch 
along with a branch probability.   
 
An example application of this branching rule is shown in Figure 27.  In this 
scenario, the crew is using a functional recovery guideline to mitigate a complete loss 
of feedwater event.  If no high pressure source of feedwater can be recovered, the 
procedure directs the operators to depressurize the steam generators in order to align a 
lower pressure water source (e.g., condensate pumps or fire main water).  For this 
scenario, two control input branches were generated when the crew initiated 
depressurization of the steam generators.  One branch  modeled a conservative crew 
that established a relatively slow depressurization rate by opening a steam dump 
valve to the 5% open position.  The other branch modeled a more aggressive crew 
that opened the steam dump valve to the 25% open position to establish a faster 
depressurization rate.  As can be seen in Figure 27, the more aggressive crew was 
successful in establishing a much faster depressurization rate.  Although the faster 
rate would be expected to reduce the time required to achieve the desired low 
pressure condition, in this case, the crew inadvertently activated a plant protective 




depressurization is detected.  Once the steam dump path is isolated, the crew will 
need to shift to an alternate depressurization path.  Because the slower 
depressurization rate used by the more conservative crew did not exceed the setpoint 
of the automatic isolation system, they were able achieve depressurized conditions 
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Figure 27 - Control Input Variability During a LOFW Accident 
 
 
the use of the control input branching rule, but also underscores the additional level of 
realism that can obtained from a dynamic simulation approach to event analysis.  
 
8.1.3.3 Procedure Following 
 
When an operator executes either a mental or written procedure step, either 
the step actions or contingency actions may be omitted or skipped (see Section 6.2).  
The likelihood of skipping a step is dynamically calculated based on the step 




associated action to the operator’s perceived situation assessment.  When a procedure 
step is skipped, two branches are generated: one branch where the action is 
performed, and another branch where the action is omitted.  To prevent excessive 
branch generation, the analyst can specify a minimum probability threshold value for 
step-skipping behavior in each operator profile. If the dynamically calculated step-
skipping probability is less than the minimum threshold, no branching event is 
generated.  The minimum threshold value establishes one of the static PIFs for 




8.2 Hardware Branching Events 
 
ADS-IDAC allows the analyst to model two types of hardware failure events: 
(1) time dependent failures, and (2) conditional failures.  Time dependent failures 
generate hardware faults at a prescribed time during the simulation and are used to 
model initiating events.  Conditional failures are triggered when a specified 
component changes its operating state to a pre-selected target value.  Time dependent 
failures generate only a single failure event sequence branch while conditional 
failures generate two event sequence branches – a success path and a failure path.  
Conditional failures can only be used to model failures to start (i.e., demand failures).  
Modeling the failure of equipment to continue to run once actuated is beyond the 





Both time dependent and conditional failures permit the operators to attempt 
to recover the failed equipment.  If a recovery is attempted, two additional branches 
are generated – a successful recovery branch and a permanent failure branch.  Thus, 
each equipment failure event can result in three outcomes: (1) the equipment does not 
fail, (2) the equipment initially fails but is later recovered, and (3) the equipment fails 
and is unrecoverable. The hardware branching rules use the Beta probability 
distribution to characterize both the failure and recovery probability of the equipment. 
 
An example of a conditional failure is shown in Figure 28.  In this scenario, a 
reactor trip is initiated at approximately 180 seconds.  Upon actuation of the reactor 
trip, a conditional hardware failure is activated that generates two sequence branches: 
in one branch no additional hardware failure occurs, and in the other branch, the 
pressurizer power operated relief valve fails to a partially opened position.   
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At approximately the 900 seconds into the PORV failure event sequence, the crew 
attempts to manually isolate the failed relief valve.  When the recovery action is 
attempted, two additional branches are generated: a recovery branch where the 
operators re-establish normal control of the failed valve and a failure branch where 
the valve has permanently failed.  A strength of a dynamic simulation approach is that 
hardware failure events can be completely integrated with the operator performance 
model.  This integration provides rich context for each event sequence in the dynamic 
event tree.   
 
8.3 Event Sequence Termination 
  
In order to achieve complete scenario coverage using dynamic probabilistic 
risk assessment methods, it is necessary to explore a large number of accident 
sequences.  However, simulating a large number of sequences often requires a 
significant amount of computational power and time.  Excessive branch generation 
can lead to sequence explosion and the inability to complete an analysis in a practical 
amount of time.  Therefore, uninteresting sequences are often terminated or truncated 
to permit computational resources to be focused on more interesting sequences.  In 
general, two means to direct sequence generation are available to the analyst: 
specifying the number of branches generated at branching points and terminating 





As noted in Section 8.1.3, timing and control input branching rules permit the 
analyst to generate two or more event sequences at each branching point.  Although 
generating more event sequences allows better refinement in the problem solution, it 
can come with a high resource cost.  Therefore, generation of multiple timing or 
control input branches should be reserved for actions that have a reasonable 
likelihood of leading to a degraded plant state.  This topic is discussed in more detail 
in Sections 9.2 and 9.3.    
 
ADS-IDAC provides several methods to terminate or truncate accident 
sequences.  Truncation methods are based on sequence elapsed time, sequence 
probability, and conditional events.  The following truncation methods are available 
in ADS-IDAC: 
 Sequence Truncation Time - This option allows the user to set a maximum 
simulation time limit for each sequence.  Once the event sequence simulation has 
run for the specified truncation time, the sequence is terminated. 
 Sequence Probability - This option terminates a sequence when the sequence 
probability is less than the specified probability cutoff value.  The cutoff value 
should carefully balance the desire to avoid excessive branch generation with 
ensuring that high consequence, low probability sequences are evaluated. 
 Procedure Non Response Action Termination - This option allows the user to 
terminate a sequence if a set of procedure step expectations are not met.  To 




response action.  When the ADS-IDAC simulation scheduler encounters the 
reserved key word during procedure execution, the sequence is terminated.   
 Alarm Activation - This option terminates the sequence if an alarm with special 
reserved prefix is actuated.  In general, this option is used to detect a significant 
degradation in the level of plant safety.  For example, the analyst can customize 
alarms that actuate when excessive fuel temperatures or degraded core cooling 
conditions occur.    
Although beyond the scope of the current research effort, sequence termination 
criteria can eventually be used to calculate an overall failure probability for an event 
of interest.  For example, if sequence termination alarms were established for fuel 
temperatures or heat transfer conditions associated with a core damage condition, 
summing up the sequence probability for all sequences that were terminated by these 







9. Implementation of ADS-IDAC Approach 
 
 As described in previous sections, implementation of the ADS-IDAC 
approach requires integration of a realistic nuclear plant thermal hydraulic model with 
a comprehensive crew behavior model.  The nuclear plant model must include all 
plant controls, indicators, and alarms associated with significant procedural steps and 
skill-, rule-, and knowledge-based actions.  The operator knowledge base used to 
drive the crew behavior model must include sufficient information to adequately 
represent operator knowledge, experience, and behavior characteristics.  In summary, 
a substantial amount of information and data is required to develop an ADS-IDAC 
model.  
 
In order to ensure that the operator knowledge base is capable of modeling 
actual crew performance, a calibration process has been developed to translate actual 
crew operating experience data into the ADS-IDAC knowledge base.  A key 
consideration during the calibration process is ensuring the knowledge base includes 
an adequate scope to capture observed crew-to-crew variability.  Only once a 
complete thermal hydraulic model has been built and the operator knowledge base 
has been populated and calibrated, can ADS-IDAC be run in a predictive mode to 
identify situational contexts that may lead to inappropriate crew behaviors. 
 
This chapter describes the process used to build an adequate representation of 




approach to ensure that the nuclear plant model realistically models all system 
controls, alarms, and indications needed to execute significant operator actions has 
been developed.  Similarly, a formalized process for populating the operator 
knowledge base is described.  These calibration processes are illustrated through the 
use of data obtained from the OECD Halden Reactor Project during the international 
HRA empirical study.  Finally, a systematic procedure for using ADS-IDAC in a 
predictive mode is described.  
   
9.1 Thermal Hydraulic Model Development 
  
The key mechanism used to generate plant feedback to the operator model is 
the nuclear plant thermal hydraulic model.  The current version of ADS-IDAC 
utilizes the RELAP5/MOD 3.2[72] computer code to provide a transient simulation of 
nuclear power plant operation.  The RELAP5 code can simulate a wide variety of 
accident initiators and provides the capability to model key safety systems, controls, 
and instruments.  Advantages of RELAP5 include its proven capabilities as a 
transient analysis tool and the availability of detailed power plant models.  However, 
due to the intrinsic limitations of the RELAP5 code, it is not currently possible to 
model core damage progression and severe accident phenomenology.  Consequently, 
ADS-IDAC is currently limited to the analysis of scenarios up to the start of core 
damage.   Adaption of ADS-IDAC to a more versatile thermal-hydraulic engine, such 
as the MELCOR code, has been identified as a future research activity.  However, the 




limitation to current research interests.  ADS-IDAC has been developed to model the 
first few hours of an accident scenario – prior to the activation and staffing of the 
nuclear plant emergency response facilities such as the technical support center (TSC) 
and offsite emergency facility (EOF).  Once the TSC and EOF are activated (within 
approximately one hour of the accident), the dynamics of crew decision making 
changes dramatically.  Because most accident scenarios of interest would require 
several hours to progress to a core damage state, the inability of RELAP to capture 
the phenomenology of core damage progression does not impose a more stringent 
limitation than the existing crew decision-making models. 
 
Although RELAP is widely used and numerous nuclear plant models have 
been developed to analyze accident scenarios, the level of realism required for an 
ADS-IDAC simulation necessitates that certain additional features be included in the 
plant model.  These features are often not necessary when using RELAP to perform 
conventional deterministic analyses of accident scenarios, but are important to 
support crew interactions with the plant model when there are hardware failure 
events.  Even an existing plant model will require several modifications and additions 
to support an ADS-IDAC dynamic PRA approach.  Because existing RELAP plant 
models are often available, one focus of this research project has been on converting a 
RELAP plant model developed for a deterministic safety analysis for use with ADS-
IDAC.  However, the general guidelines and methods outlined here would still be 




IDAC.  More detailed guidance and instructions for developing the ADS-IDAC 
thermal-hydraulic plant model are provided in Appendix K. 
 
9.1.1 General Approach 
  
Although RELAP5 plant models have been developed previously to support 
safety analyses and other regulatory uses, these models require some modification in 
order to exploit the full capabilities of ADS-IDAC.  In general, ADS-IDAC requires 
the following modifications to an existing RELAP5 input model: 
 Replacement of all conservative analysis assumptions with realistic best estimate 
parameters.  These include trip setpoints, reactor power level, timing of automatic 
safety system actuations, and other key plant parameters. 
 Modification to safety system models to replace simple modeling assumptions 
(e.g., representing a multi-train safety system with simple boundary conditions) 
with more realistic representations of controls, instrumentation, and alarms.  
These modifications include modeling of redundant trains of multi-train systems, 
provisions for control of significant components such as key pumps and valves, 
and representation of critical support systems such as water supplies and electrical 
power. 
 Addition of systems and components that provide a significant portion of the 
mitigative functions provided by the abnormal and emergency operating 




 Implementation of interactive control interfaces for all significant components to 
allow the ADS-IDAC operator model to manipulate plant components.  This 
includes the addition of a “manual” control mode for components that normally 
utilize an automatic control system (e.g., feed water regulating valves and power 
operated relief valves). 
 
ADS-IDAC has been successfully integrated with a three-loop, pressurized water 
reactor nuclear power plant RELAP model.  The current plant model includes over 75 
controls, 200 indicators, and approximately 100 alarms.  To improve feedback to the 
operator, the plant model includes reactivity and core power control features such as 
control rod movement, boration, and turbine load adjustment.  Where necessary, 
controls for major pumps and valves in all front line safety systems (e.g., emergency 
core cooling and auxiliary feed water) were also added to the existing RELAP input 
manual.  As a result of these efforts, all major components referenced in the plant 
emergency procedures have been represented in the ADS-IDAC thermal-hydraulic 
model.   
9.1.2 System and Control System Modeling 
 
The RELAP thermal hydraulic model provides two key functions for ADS-IDAC: 
(1) the dynamic and realistic representation of plant parameters, and (2) the ability to 
interact with the thermal hydraulic model by changing component or system 
operating states.  The ADS-IDAC control panel (see Section 3.2.1) links the operator 




variety of operator control inputs to the thermal hydraulic model including valve 
position changes, starting or stopping of pumps, safety system actuations, and control 
system setpoint changes.  In general, four possible control modes can be used for each 
controllable component:  
1) changing the component operating mode (e.g., automatic vs. manual mode),  
2) setting a specific control value for a component (e.g., throttling control valve 
to 50% open),  
3) incrementing the control setting of a component (e.g., throttling open a control 
valve by an additional 10%), and  
4) setting a control value based on a perceived parameter (e.g., setting the steam 
dump target pressure equal to the perceived main steam header pressure).   
These capabilities provide sufficient flexibility to realistically model all significant 
operator interactions with the plant model.  However, in order for the operator 
behavior model to control a component, a suitable system model must be added to the 
RELAP plant model. 
 
Safety System Modeling 
 
In general, only front line safety systems such as emergency core cooling and 
auxiliary feedwater are included in existing RELAP nuclear plant models.  These 
systems are usually modeled as simple boundary conditions and generally lack 
realistic controls and status indicators.  For example, the high pressure safety 
injection system for a three loop pressurized water reactor is usually modeled using 




loop (Figure 29).  The time dependent volume generally represents an infinite source 
of fluid, while the time dependent junction provides a specific mass flow rate of 
injection fluid based on a predefined formula (e.g., mass flow might be a function of 
reactor coolant system pressure).  While these abstract modeling elements can 
accurately represent the main safety system functions under certain conditions, they 
lack a direct correspondence to the controls and indicators found in a nuclear plant 
control room.  In order to improve the realism of the model, it is necessary to modify 
the system models to add multiple trains, control valves, and piping elements. 
 
Figure 29 - Typical RELAP Mitigative System Model 
 
The modified system model for use with ADS-IDAC includes separate subsystem 
trains for safety system and realistically models potentially hydraulic dependencies 
for loop injection flow (Figure 30).  In this modified model, time dependent volume 
“A” and time dependent junction “A” represent one pump train of a two train system.  
Each pump train joins into a common header (as is usually the case for an actual plant 
safety system) and then splits to provide water flow to each reactor coolant system 
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 Capability to independently control multiple safety system trains and individual 
loop flows; 
 More realistic representation of actual pump head/flow characteristics since the 
improved model more closely matches the actual plant configuration; 
 Improved modeling of injection flow dependencies between the reactor coolant 
loops.  Since the injection flow is supplied from a common header (the common 
hydraulic volume), the improved model does not decouple the loop injection to 
one loop from the other loops (e.g., high injection flow to loop 1 will decrease 
injection flow to loops 2 and 3). 
 
Figure 30 - Mitigative System Modeling in ADS-IDAC 
 
The system level modeling for all front line safety systems in an existing RELAP 
input deck (e.g., high pressure safety injection, low pressure safety injection, and 
auxiliary feedwater) must be reviewed to adjust overly simplified modeling 
approaches and ensure that the model closely approximates the actual configuration 
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In general, RELAP input deck plant models developed for generalized safety 
analyses do not include detailed models for support systems such as electrical power, 
cooling water, or lubricating oil.  These support system dependencies can either be 
modeled directly or through use of appropriate logical dependencies within the plant 
model.  When the added realism of a detailed model is not required, it is usually 
sufficient to use a simple logical dependency.  For example, a loss of offsite electrical 
power can be modeled by establishing logic conditions that cause the failure of all 
components powered directly from offsite power (e.g., reactor coolant pumps, 
turbine-generator auxiliary systems, and condenser circulating water).  A similar 
procedure can be used for other support systems such as cooling water and lubricating 
oil.  In this manner, support system dependencies are simulated without the need for 
developing a detailed support system model. 
 
Non-Safety System Modeling 
Nuclear plant systems are generally divided into two categories: safety-related 
systems and non-safety-related systems.  Safety related systems include all the plant 
systems, structures, and components needed to establish licensing requirements for 
the protection of public health and safety.  Although non-safety systems may be used 
to accomplish similar functions as safety systems, they are generally not credited in 
licensing safety evaluations (unless their operation can result in an adverse impact).  
Safety systems are subject to stringent quality assurance requirements and are 




generally associated with power generation and include major plant systems such as 
the turbine and generator, and portions of the main steam and feed systems.   
 
Because the RELAP thermal hydraulic program is generally used to perform 
accident analyses in support of nuclear power plant licensing, non-safety related 
components, equipment, and systems normally used during power operation are often 
omitted or simplistically modeled.  For example, if the turbine-generator system is 
included in the plant model, turbine load is often set at a full power value with no 
means available for adjustment.  Similarly, existing RELAP models for non-safety 
control systems such as makeup and letdown functions do not provide a sufficient 
range of flexibility to model an adequate range of operator interactions.  Therefore, 
the RELAP plant model must be reviewed to identify features that need to be added 
to provide the capability to model operator behaviors that might occur during power 
operation.  Typical examples include:  
 turbine generator load control; 
 non-safety related interlocks or protective features (e.g., turbine runbacks); 
 charging/letdown system operation; 
 nuclear reactivity control systems (e.g., control rods, emergency boration); and 
 condenser steam dump control. 
 
The addition of these features provides control over functions frequently referenced 
in the plant operating procedures, and allows the operator model to interact with the 




may preclude continued operation or delay a return to power operation, operators may 
initially use non-safety systems to maintain plant conditions after an abnormal event.  





An existing RELAP plant model will usually include several automatic control 
systems to maintain key thermal hydraulic parameters at a predefined setpoint.  
Typical examples include pressurizer level control, reactor coolant pressure control, 
feed water control, and steam pressure control systems.  Often, these RELAP control 
systems correspond to actual control systems in the nuclear plant.  Occasionally, a 
control system will be added to simulate operator interactions with the model.  In 
addition to improving the realism of the plant model, control systems enhance the 
stability of the thermal hydraulic model.  For example, in the absence of a dynamic 
control system, small errors in initializing the thermal hydraulic model (such as a 
mismatch between steam and feed water flow rates) can cause significant deviations 
over time.    
 
In order to ensure control systems are appropriately modeled for use with ADS-
IDAC, all automatic systems in the RELAP model are reviewed to determine if they 
correspond to an actual control system or if they were added to simulate operator 
actions.  Since the crew behavior model in ADS-IDAC controls all operator 




to an actual plant system must be disabled or removed.  Additionally, any automatic 
control system that does correspond to an actual plant system must be modified 
within the RELAP input deck to permit the ability to manipulate equipment from the 
ADS-IDAC environment.  In general, nuclear plant automatic control systems allow 
the operators to take manual control of the final actuating device(s) or change the 
control set point.  In addition to allowing more realistic plant control, the manual 
control mode can also be used to mitigate certain hardware failures and initiating 
events.   Ideally, three modes of operation should be provided for each automatic 
control system: 
i. fully automatic - the automatic control system positions the final actuating 
device(s) to maintain target parameter at the nominal setpoint;  
ii. fully manual control - the operator positions the final actuating device(s); and  
iii. setpoint control - the control system automatically positions the final actuating 
device(s) to maintain the targeted parameter at the operator selected setpoint. 
These operational modes provide sufficient flexibility to carry out most control 
system manipulations referenced in plant procedures. 
 
9.1.3 Plant Model Verification 
  
To the extent possible, the ADS-IDAC plant thermal hydraulic model was 
compared to actual plant operating characteristics to verify key modeling 
assumptions.  Output from the ADS-IDAC plant model used for this research project 




addition, plant data from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR9) for the 
reference ADS-IDAC plant model was used to ensure the accuracy  of the simulation 
model.  Both the ADS-IDAC plant model and FRESH simulator are based on a three 
reactor coolant loop pressurized water reactor design and use very similar control and 
protection systems.  Several key plant operating parameters are compared in Table 
12.  As can be seen in Table 12, the ADS-IDAC plant model compares favorably with 
both the reference plant UFSAR information and the FRESH simulator.  
 
There are several differences between the ADS-IDAC model and the 
HAMMLAB FRESH simulator.  Notably, the full power pressurizer water level and 
wide range steam generator levels are not consistent.  This difference could be due to 
either physical differences in the respective plant models (e.g., component 
configuration differences) or instrumentation calibration differences.   Additionally, 
the full power level of the ADS-IDAC plant model appears to be approximately 2% 
higher than the FRESH simulator (based on full power main steam flow).  During the 
calibration phase of this research study (described in Section 9.2.2), it was also noted 
that there were a number of other key plant differences between the ADS-IDAC and 
FRESH plant models.  Notably, the base ADS-IDAC model includes main steam 
system non-return valves which are intended to prevent backflow from one steam 
generator to another steam generator during certain types of main steam system 
ruptures.  The FRESH simulator model does not appear to include this 
                                                 
9 Title 10, Part 50.71, “Maintenance of records, making of reports” of the Code of Federal Regulations 
requires each nuclear power plant licensee to periodically update the Final Safety Analysis Report 
(FSAR) for the facility.  The UFSAR provides a description of plant systems, operating characteristics, 




Table 12 - Plant Model Comparison 
 






Reactor Power 2660 MW 2660 MW - 
Average RCS 
Temperature 
577 F 577 F 577 F 
Core Exit Temperature - - 624 
Hot Leg Temperature 610 F 610 F - 
Core Differential 
Temperature 
66 F 68 F - 
Narrow Range SG 
Water Level (100% 
Power) 
44% - 44% 
Wide Range SG Water 
Level (100% Power) 
60% - 72% 
SG Pressure (100% 
Power) 
805 psig - 813 psi 
Total Main Steam Flow 
Rate (100% Power) 




2260 psig 2235 psig 2235 psi 
Pressurizer Water 
Level (100% Power) 
51% - 56% 
Pressurizer PORV 
Relief Capability 
60 lbm/sec @ 2200 
psia 
55 lbm/sec @ 2235 psi (Note 1) 
SG Atmospheric Dump 
Valve Relief Capability 
75 lbm/sec @ 800 psi 38 lbm/sec @ 1035 psi ~85 lbm/sec @ 800 psi 
Total AFW Flowrate 175 lbm/sec ~180 lbm/sec 185 lbm/sec 
Motor Driven AFW 
Pump Flowrate (at 
nominal SG Pressure) 
~44 lbm/sec 350 gpm (~45 lbm/sec) - 
Turbine Driven AFW 
Pump Flowrate (at 
nominal SG Pressure) 
~87.5 lbm/sec 700 gpm (~90 lbm/sec) - 
High Head Safety 
Injection Pump 
Flowrate (at normal 
operating RCS 
pressure) 




~54 lbm/sec @ 2000 
psi 
Note 1: Although the PORV relief capacity could not be determined from available information, it was 
concluded that the FRESH reactor coolant system depressurization rate for a partially opened 
pressurizer PORV was consistent with the ADS-IDAC model.  This implies that the PORV capacities 
for the ADS-IDAC model and the FRESH simulator are similar. 
 
plant-specific feature.  Also, the logic and setpoints used to actuate some of plant 
engineered safety features are different in the plant models.  In particular, the FRESH 




steam lines exceeds a specific threshold; the ADS-IDAC base model does not include 
this feature.  These model differences represent a potential limitation on the 
applicability of ADS-IDAC results to HAMMLAB operator experiments.  For 
scenarios where the contextual background is sensitive to these design differences, 
the ADS-IDAC model may not adequately represent plant and crew behavior.  The 
impact of these plant model differences is discussed in more detail in Section 10.2. 
 
9.2 Calibration Mode 
  
Even when subject to similar personnel selection, training, and administrative 
requirements, nuclear plant control room operators can exhibit significant crew-to-
crew variability during non-routine events.  A strength of the ADS-IDAC simulation 
approach is the ability to systematically model the sources of variability.  Therefore, a 
focus of the ADS-IDAC calibration process is to identify and model these potential 
sources of crew-to-crew variability.  In general, ADS-IDAC captures crew variability 
within three main categories: procedure execution, operator mental models of reactor 
plant functions, and operator preferences.   
 
In general, the mapping of actual crew behaviors to ADS-IDAC branching 





Figure 31 - Branching Rule Mapping Process 
 
The first step in the mapping process is to gather operator data from either control 
room observations or simulator exercises.  The operator data is then reviewed during 
the data abstraction and generalization step to identify commonalities and differences 
among crews.  Although this step requires expert judgment, the goal is to group 
observed crew-to-crew variations into the smallest number of behavioral categories 
that are capable of capturing significant crew differences.  For example, if 
variabilities are discovered in the time required to perform a certain action, binning 
crews into slow, nominal, and fast categories might provide a sufficient 
representation of the crew variability.  In the next step, simple branching rules and 
algorithms are developed to map observed behaviors to appropriate branching rules.  
The final step involves the prediction of operator behaviors using these branching 
rules and comparing the predictions to the observed behaviors.  The branching rules 
can then be modified in an iterative process to provide an adequate level of agreement 
between the observed crews and the ADS-IDAC simulation.  The goal of this process 
is to characterize crew behavior in a manner that preserves generalizability without 


















9.2.1 General Calibration Approach 
 
 The objective of the ADS-IDAC general calibration procedure was to develop 
a model of operator cognitive processes capable of replicating the plant response 
obtained during actual nuclear plant control room crew simulator exercises.  For this 
research study, quantitative simulator log data from the HAMMLAB FRESH 
simulator was available to support the calibration process.  The simulator log was 
obtained during experiments conducted in the Fall of 2006 and provides a time 
history of key plant parameters, operator control inputs, alarms, and simulator control 
commands.  This data source provided an extremely detailed record of plant status 
that can be readily compared to the output from the ADS-IDAC RELAP thermal-
hydraulic model.  However, qualitative data characterizing the crew decision-making 
processes and the operators’ underlying motivation and mental state were not 
available.  Therefore, the cognitive decision-making functions carried out by the crew 
were inferred from the crew interactions with the reactor plant.  For example, a crew 
that shut down the reactor early in an accident scenario was judged to have a lower 
tolerance to engage in troubleshooting activities or to maintain the plant at power 
with degraded conditions.   A consequence of this data limitation is that the 
calibration process focused on developing a reasonable crew decision-making model 
that could of replicate observed plant responses to specific accidents, rather than 
explicitly reproducing actual crew decisions, goals, and motivations.  While the ADS-




generate a manual reactor trip or other control input at a time or plant condition 
consistent with observed data, it is impossible to calibrate ADS-IDAC to each 
operator’s detailed cognitive processes without additional data regarding the specifics 
of these processes.  In other words, the ADS-IDAC model currently can be calibrated 
to capture the results of the cognitive decision-making process (e.g., modeling an 
operator action to manually initiate a safety system), but does not address the 
calibration of specific details of the cognitive process (e.g., when the decision is made 
to carry out an action to manually initiate a safety system and the basis for this 
decision).  This approach is consistent with the IDAC model characterization of 
human error defined in terms of plant needs rather than specific operator behaviors.  
While the calibration process is believed to generate a plausible and reasonable 
representation of crew cognitive processes, a detailed validation of the crew cognitive 
model was beyond the scope of this study.  If qualitative data adequately describing 
the crew cognitive decision-making process were to become available, incorporation 
of this information into the ADS-IDAC model could be readily accomplished. 
 
 As previously described, the calibration process includes four general steps: 
collection and analysis of actual crew performance data; generalization of observed 
data; formulation of appropriate branching rules; and prediction of crew behaviors 
using the selected rules.  The process is iterative so that if the selected set of 
branching rules does not adequately replicate the observed plant response, the 





Collection and Analysis of Actual Plant Data 
 The first step in the calibration process is collecting, organizing, and 
analyzing plant data collected from studies of actual control room crews.  Ideally, 
data from multiple crews for the same scenario should be collected to facilitate 
identification of areas where performance exhibits a high degree of crew-to-crew 
variability.  For this research project, the main data source is simulator log data from 
the Halden Reactor Project FRESH simulator.  This data consists of a time history of 
all key plant parameters, control room alarms, and operator control inputs for fourteen 
separate crews.  The plant data is organized in a format to aid the identification of key 
operator inputs and areas of crew-to-crew variability through the use of a spreadsheet 
that provides a time history of key plant parameters for each crew.  A review of the 
governing plant procedures is then conducted to map key proceduralized actions to 
observed changes in plant parameters.  For example, a procedure step that directs the 
operators to shut a main steam isolation valve for a steam generator can be mapped to 
operation of the associated control switch or a rapid decrease in the steam flow from 
the affected steam generator.  The goal is to map as many unambiguous 
proceduralized actions as possible to the observed plant data in order to establish a 
series of performance benchmarks during the accident scenario.  The relative timing 
of these benchmarks can then be used to establish the pacing each crew used during 
scenario.  Additionally, differences in the rate of change of key plant parameters 
between crews during the scenario indicate variability in control inputs.   For 




a reactor coolant system cooldown may indicate differences in steam dump valve 
control inputs for the associated crews. 
 
 Once a set of benchmarks is established between the procedural requirements 
and actual plant performance, the data is reviewed to identify the following: 
 Crew timing variations – The relative spacing of the benchmark points for each 
crew can be directly translated into timing variability. 
 Variations in control inputs – Some crews may use aggressive control inputs that 
result in rapid changes in plant parameters while other crews are may exhibit 
more conservatism when changing plant conditions. 
 Thresholds for Alternate Actions - Procedures may give the crew multiple options 
to accomplish the same function.  In these cases, procedures will typically specify 
a preferred method to accomplish a function, but allow the crew to utilize an 
alternate method if the preferred method is unavailable or ineffective. For 
example, reactor coolant system pressure can be decreased by either opening the 
pressurizer spray valve or the power operated relief valve.  Although a procedure 
may express a preference of one method, the decision when to switch from the 
primary method to an alternate method may be left to the crew’s judgment.  In 
these cases, it may be useful to analyze the rate of change in the target parameter 
or holistically assess plant status to gain insights as to when the crew may decide 
to abandon a primary method. Obviously, it would be better to obtain this insight 




 Skipped Steps – In some cases, a plant conditions may not map to expected 
proceduralized actions if a crew intentionally or unintentionally skips the 
associated procedure step(s). 
 Deviations from Procedures – Some changes in plant parameters will not map to 
proceduralized actions.  In these cases, the crews may have performed a 
knowledge-based action outside the scope of the plant procedure. 
Once the mapping between the governing procedures and plant data is complete and 
specific areas of variability in the observed data from different crews have been 
identified, the operator behaviors are grouped and generalized.   
 
Development of  Operational Narratives and Generalization of  Observed Behaviors  
 The behaviors that are catalogued during the data collection and analysis 
phase are reviewed to identify commonalities and differences among the crews.  In 
order to capture the widest range of crew-to-crew variability with the smallest set of 
branching rules, it is useful to develop an operational narrative to explain crew 
behaviors during a scenario.  These operational narratives can be used to collapse 
several observed deviations and complex behaviors into a single crew decision or 
preference.  The narratives can also be used to explain dependencies between a series 
of actions taken by a crew.   
 
The development of these operational narratives is similar to what is done 
with other cognitively-based HRA models.  For example, the Méthode d’Evaluation 




relies on the development of “little stories” that describe how a human failure event 
occurs [90].  Similarly, A Technique for Human Event Analysis (ATHEANA), one of 
the HRA methods developed by the US NRC, includes the development of a base 
scenario description and associated deviations [10].  In fact, the guidance from the 
MERMOS or ATHEANA approaches can be used to assist in the development of the 
ADS-IDAC operational narratives.  Once an adequate set of operational narratives 
capable of representing observed crew behaviors is developed, these narratives are 
translated into a set of branching rules.  
 
Formation of Appropriate Branching Rules 
 The goal of this phase of the calibration process is to translate the insights 
developed during the formulation of the operational narratives into specific branching 
rules.  As discussed in Section 8, branching rules have been developed to capture 
performance variability and a wide range of crew preferences and tendencies.  Table 
13 provides a summary of mapping of typical sources of crew-to-crew variability to 
the appropriate ADS-IDAC branching rules. 
 
Verification of Selected Branching Rules and Adjustment of  Model 
 Once an initial set of branching rules is developed, the ADS-IDAC simulation 
code is executed to determine the adequacy of calibration.  Plant data obtained from 
the ADS-IDAC simulation is compared to the actual observed crew behaviors to 









Source of Crew-to-Crew  
Variability 
 
ADS-IDAC Branching Rule(s) 
Selection of component target 
control settings (e.g., throttle valve 
positions, manual controller set 
points) 
Action control value branching rule 
Time required to execute 
procedure actions 
Action time branching rule 
Recovery of failed equipment Equipment failure and recovery branching rule 
Omission or skipping of procedure 
steps 








Interpretation of potentially 
ambiguous procedure criteria 
(e.g.,, translation of qualitative 
descriptors such as “decreasing”, 
“increasing”, or steady” into 
context-specific quantitative 
criteria) 
No branching rule currently available.  Conditional 
simulation runs can be run to examine the use of 
different quantitative thresholds for qualitative 
criteria.   
Training, experience, and 
diagnostic capabilities 
Mental belief branch probability branching rule.  
The operator knowledge base should include a 
sufficient spectrum of mental beliefs to capture crew 





Models Time required to initiate automatic 
memorized actions 
Mental procedure activation time branching rule 
Selection of high level goals and 
problem solving strategies 
Troubleshooting probability and procedure use 
probability branching rules 
Tendency to rely on memorized 
information rather than control 
panel readings 
Use of memorized information branching rule 
Delays or breaks during procedure 
execution (e.g., crew briefings) 
Action time branching rule.  Appropriate procedure 
hold steps must be incorporated into ADS-IDAC 







Tendency to manually perform 
anticipatory safety actions prior to 
automatic actions 
Mental belief branch probability rule.  The operator 
knowledge base must include appropriate mental 
belief(s) to activate a memorized mental procedure 
that implements the anticipatory manual action. 
 
performance.  As noted previously, the goal of this calibration process is to 
realistically replicate the plant performance observed during actual control room 
scenarios, not necessarily capture the details and timing of specific crew decisions, 
goals, and motivations.  However, to the extent that more detailed qualitative operator 





9.2.2 Model Calibration Using HAMMLAB Data 
  
The Halden Human-Machine Laboratory (HAMMLAB), a research facility 
affiliated with the international Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), recently participated in a human reliability analysis empirical 
investigation intended to improve the understanding of the strengths and weaknesses 
of various HRA methods [91, 92].  As part of this study, fourteen certified nuclear 
plant control room crews performed four simulator scenarios in the FRESH 
pressurized water reactor (PWR) simulator at HAMMLAB to collect empirical 
human performance data.  Two of the scenarios were associated with a steam 
generator tube rupture event and two of the scenarios were associated with a loss of 
feedwater event.  During the scenarios, the control room crews utilized HAMMLAB 
specific emergency operating procedures which were adapted from the operating 
crews’ home plant procedures.  The crew performance data included simulator log 
data which provided a detailed summary history of key parameter values, alarms, and 
control manipulations.  The data from the steam generator tube rupture scenarios was 
used to calibrate ADS-IDAC using the process outlined in Section 9.2.1.  The goal of 
this effort was to assess the feasibility of modeling actual control room crews with 
simple branching rules in ADS-IDAC.  The data from the loss of feedwater scenarios 
was used to test the predictive capabilities of ADS-IDAC – these scenarios are further 





A steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) is caused by a break in one or more of 
the heat exchanger tubes within a steam generator.  The SGTR break diverts coolant 
water from the reactor core cooling system to the secondary cooling system and the 
main turbine.  Because a SGTR causes a loss of reactor coolant, operators would 
normally observe symptoms of a loss of coolant accident including decreasing 
pressure and reduced pressurizer level.  The diversion of radiologically contaminated 
coolant to the steam generators can result in an increase in steam generator water 
inventory and various radiation alarms in the normally uncontaminated secondary 
coolant system.  Two variations were used for the SGTR scenarios: a relatively 
uncomplicated base case, and a more complex case that included additional plant 
hardware failures.  The base case scenario was a relatively straightforward scenario 
without additional plant equipment failures, and the emergency procedures provided 
adequate crew guidance.  Conversely, the complex scenario included a number of 
additional failures such as a main steam line break, failure of radiation monitoring 
equipment, and failure of the pressurizer PORV.  Only the base case calibration was 
completed for this research project, as the predictive capabilities of ADS-IDAC had 
not yet been confirmed.  The remainder of this section describes calibration activities 
using base case SGTR scenario data. 
 
The main mitigative actions for a SGTR specified in the HAMMLAB procedures 
include: identification and isolation of the ruptured steam generator (SG), cooldown 
of the reactor coolant system (RCS), depressurization of the reactor coolant system to 




to prevent overfill of the RCS.  In order to assess the pace and timing of crew actions, 
the emergency procedures were reviewed to identify operator actions associated with 
these objectives that could be unambiguously identified in the simulator log data.  
These actions serve as timing benchmarks and permit crew-to-crew comparisons of 
procedure execution speed.  The simulator data was also reviewed to identify other 
crew behavior differences such as interpretation of qualitative procedure criteria (e.g., 
interpretation of “stable”, “increasing”, “decreasing”), crew actions not covered in 
emergency procedures (e.g., initial power reduction), and actions that were not 
consistent with procedural requirements.  As a result of these efforts, the following 
areas of crew-to-crew variability were identified for the base case scenario: procedure 
pace and timing; initial power reduction; initiation of reactor trip; early auxiliary 
feedwater isolation; RCS cooldown rate; early termination of cooldown and 
depressurization; pressure equalization; and RCS depressurization method.   
 Procedure Pace and Timing – As noted earlier, the SG tube rupture emergency 
procedure (emergency procedure E-3) contains three main objectives: (1) isolate 
the ruptured steam generator, (2) cool down the reactor coolant system to 
establish an adequate subcooling margin, and (3) depressurize the reactor coolant 
system to terminate the leakage through the failed steam generator tube.  Each of 
these action objectives is associated with a series of closely related operator 
activities; each set of objective actions is known as an action block.  Based on the 
selected timing benchmarks, three procedure hold points were created in ADS-




crew briefings, unexpected delays, and the general procedure step execution speed 
of the crew.  Procedure hold points were located as follows (see Figure 32): 
i. Briefing Hold #1 - Prior to the start of the SGTR emergency procedure, 
Halden Procedure E-3.  The length of this hold point was based on the 
time delay between the actuation of the emergency core cooling system 
and closure of the main steam isolation valve on the ruptured SG in Step 3 
of Halden emergency procedure E-3. 
 
ii. Briefing Hold #2 - Prior to the reactor coolant system cooldown initiated 
in Halden Procedure E-3, Step 7.  The length of this hold point was based 
on the time delay between closure of the main steam isolation in Step 3 of 
Halden Procedure E-3 and initiation of steam dumping in Step 7.  
 
iii. Briefing Hold #3 - Prior to reactor coolant system depressurization 
initiated in Halden  Procedure E-3, Step 16.  The length of this hold point 
was based on the time delay between the termination of the reactor  
coolant system cooldown in Step 7 and the initiation of depressurization in 
Step 16 of Halden Procedure E-3. 
 
 
Figure 32 - Modeling Timing Variability with Action Blocks 
 
 
In addition to the above procedurally driven action blocks, a review of the 




flow to the ruptured steam generator prior to being directed to do so in the Halden 
emergency operating procedure E-310.  Actual crew timing data obtained from the 
FRESH simulator log files were fit to three-parameter Weibull distributions to 
obtain a probabilistic distribution for each procedure hold point (see Table 14).   










Minimum time (μ) 375 25 100 230 
Scaling Parameter (α) 382 212 148 331 
Shape Factor (β) 0.992 1.38 1.07 1.47 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test Statistic (K-S) 
0.292 0.148 0.166 0.122 
Base 
Scenario 
Critical K-S Value 
(0.05 significance) 
0.349 0.349 0.349 0.349 
 
These timing probability distributions can then partitioned into two or more 
branch events to represent variations in crew pacing.  For example, Figure 33 
illustrates the generation of five timing branches based on experimental data from 
the  HAMMLAB facility for procedure hold #2 during the base scenario.  The 
crew performance data is fitted to a three parameter Weibull distribution, which is 
then used to calculate the mean time over each discrete timing interval.  The 
                                                 
10 Halden Procedure E-3, Step 4 directs the operators to isolate auxiliary feedwater flow to the ruptured 
steam generator when the narrow range level is above 10% (the SG level requirement is intended to 
ensure that the ruptured tube is covered with water to provide additional radionuclide scrubbing for the 
leaking reactor coolant).  Halden Procedure E-0, Step 12 (which the operators would perform prior to 
E-3, Step 4,) contains similar guidance but does not specify a minimum SG water level requirement.  A 
review of the HAMMLAB data indicated that seven of the fourteen crews for the base case (and one of 
fourteen crews in the complex case) isolated auxiliary feedwater prior to achieving the 10% minimum 
level specificed in E-3.  This indicates that when the occurrence of a SG tube rupture is relatively easy 
to diagnose, operators may have performed this action prior to reaching step 4 of procedure E-3.  
Consequently, within ADS-IDAC, isolation of auxiliary feedwater was modeled with a skill-based rule 
that was activated when the operators perceive a ruptured steam generator.  The time delay for the 
execution of this action was calibrated to the actual time delay between the initiation of the steam 
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Figure 33 - ADS-IDAC Branching Times 
 
 
interval size is determined by evenly spacing the desired number of branches over 
the cumulative probability distribution.  In this case, five intervals were selected, 
each representing a cumulative probability increment of 0.2. 
 
 Initial Power Reduction – Several crews delayed actuation of the emergency core 
cooling system and initially attempted to reduce reactor power.  To capture this 
behavior, a mental belief was created that would trigger a turbine load reduction 
when the crew perceived the initial indications of a reactor coolant system leak 
and implemented the “troubleshooting” goal.   
 
 Initiation of Reactor Trip – The crews that did not initiate a power reduction 
typically tripped the reactor relatively early in the accident scenario (generally 
within two to three minutes of initiation of the SGTR).  This variance can be 




goal.  The ADS-IDAC decision-making model may activate this goal when an 
abnormal condition is detected and the troubleshooting goal is disabled or 
bypassed (see Section 5.2).  When the global safety margin goal is active, the 
operators will immediately initiate the emergency operating procedures, which 
will lead to a manual reactor trip.  In order to establish the timing of manual 
reactor trip initiation, it is necessary to adjust the abnormal condition detection 
threshold, one of the static PIFs that characterize operator preferences and 
redundancies (see Section 7.2.2).  A lower abnormal detection threshold will 
decrease the time between SGTR initiation and manual trip because the operator 
requires less information to conclude that an abnormal condition has developed.  
A sensitivity study was conducted on the impact of changing the abnormal signal 
detection threshold.  As can be seen in Figure 34, the time to initiate a manual 
reactor trip following initiation of a SGTR increases as the abnormal condition 
detection threshold is increased.  At a value of 0.7, the manual reactor trip is 
delayed long enough to allow the automatic reactor trip (due to low reactor 
coolant system pressure) to shut down the reactor plant. The relationship between 
the abnormal 
Abnormal Condition Threshold vs. Time 
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detection threshold and the time to initiate a manual trip are consistent with the 
cutoff reinforcement model discussed in Section 2.5.1.1.  Specifically, a higher 
threshold value could be used to model an operator who has accumulated 
substantial “near-miss” experience and has tendencies toward risk-seeking 
behavior. 
 
 Early Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation – The HAMMLAB procedures permitted the 
crew to isolate AFW flow to the ruptured SG early if an SGTR event was 
indicated.  To capture observed crew timing variability for this action, the actual 
time lag between the availability of indications of an SGTR and AFW isolation 
was fit to a Weibull probability distribution (see Table 14 ).  Mental procedure 
activation time branches were generated to partition this probabilistic distribution 
to model crew timing variability.   
 
 RCS Cooldown Rate – Although the emergency procedures directed the crews to 
dump steam at the maximum rate, an excessive cooldown rate can actuate an 
automatic main steam isolation signal that isolates the steam dump path.  A main 
steam isolation requires the crew to shift the cooldown method from the 
condenser steam dump to the SG atmospheric steam dump valves and delays the 
cooldown.  Crew variability in selecting a steam dump rate was modeled by 
generating action control value branches to control the throttle position of the 
steam dump valve (a more open throttle position corresponds to a faster cooldown 





 Early Termination of Cooldown and Depressurization – Several crews were 
unable to reach the target temperature or pressure during the RCS cooldown and 
depressurization steps.  These conditions can be modeled in ADS-IDAC with 
conditional runs that utilize overly conservative target values for temperature and 
pressure. 
 
 Pressure Equalization – The HAMMLAB procedures eventually direct the crew to 
equalize pressure between the RCS and the ruptured SG in order to terminate the 
tube leakage.  It was noted that several crews were unable to obtain a stable 
equalized pressure condition.  This variability was modeled by activating a step-
skipping branch that bypassed RCS/SG pressure equalization. 
 
 RCS Depressurization Method – The HAMMLAB procedures required the 
operators to initiate the RCS depressurization using normal pressurizer spray, but 
allowed the pressurizer PORV to be used if the crew believed that the 
depressurization was too slow.  It was noted that crews used different 
interpretations of what constituted a “slow” depressurization.  This behavior was 
modeled by adding a procedural expectation to the ADS-IDAC model that 
prompted use of the PORV when the depressurization rate dropped below a 
threshold value.  Crew variability was captured by performing conditional 






As an example application of capturing observed crew-to-crew variability using 
ADS-IDAC, a simulation was run with the goal of replicating the performance of two 
specific crews.   For this example, five branching events were sufficient to model the 
differences between the two selected crews for the Base case scenario (Figure 35). 
 
Figure 35 - Example SGTR Branching Events for HAMMLAB Crews 
 
These branching events modeled the following crew-to-crew variabilities: 
 Goal Selection – Crew G attempted to initially reduce power and delayed the 
manual reactor trip and actuation of the emergency core cooling system until 
approximately seven minutes after the start of the SGTR.  Conversely, Crew 




the event.  This behavior variance was modeled by enabling the 
troubleshooting goal for Crew G, and blocking the goal for Crew M. 
 Procedure Timing – Crew M moved relatively quickly through the emergency 
procedures and initiated reactor coolant system cooldown relatively faster 
than Crew G.  This timing variability was modeled by Crew M skipping a 
crew brief prior to initiating Procedure E-3 (Procedure Hold #1) and moving 
relatively quickly through the remainder of the procedure (Procedure Hold 
#2).  Crew G was modeled with a nominal length crew briefing prior to the 
start of procedure E-3 and moved at a relatively slow pace through the 
procedure (Procedure Hold #2). 
 Control Input Variability – The SGTR emergency procedure requires the 
crews to rapidly cool down the reactor coolant system by dumping steam at 
the “maximum” rate.  The interpretation of “maximum” in this context does 
not refer to the overall capability of the plant (i.e., the maximum steam 
dumping rate for the system), but rather includes a consideration of other plant 
constraints.  For example, a steam dump rate that is too fast will cause an 
automatic main steam isolation due to the rapid decrease in steam pressure.  
This isolation will interrupt the plant cooldown as the crew to shifts from the 
normal condenser steam dump system (which is now isolated) to use of the 
SG atmospheric relief valves.   Therefore, dumping steam at too fast a rate 
will likely result in a longer time to cooldown as the crew must recover from 
the automatic main steam valve closure.  In this scenario, Crew M dumped 




actuation of the automatic isolation.  Crew G attempted a relatively rapid 
cooldown that resulted in isolation of the steam dump system.  This variability 
was modeled with a control value branching rule. 
 RCS-SG Pressure Equalization – One of the final steps in the emergency 
procedure is to operate the pressure control system to equalize the pressure 
differential between the reactor coolant system and the ruptured steam 
generator.  Once the pressure differential is reduced, the leakage of reactor 
coolant into the ruptured steam generator is terminated.  Failure to equalize 
pressure will result in continued leakage into the steam generator.  During this 
scenario, Crew G successfully equalized RCS and SG pressure, while Crew M 
failed to reduce the pressure differential.  The failure to achieve an equalized 
pressure condition results in several adverse impacts, including a sustained 
high ruptured SG pressure leading to release of coolant through the 
atmospheric steam dump and a continued loss of reactor coolant. 
 
A comparison between reactor coolant system pressure for the actual crews and the 






















































Figure 37 - ADS-IDAC Calibration to HAMMLAB Data 
 
As can be seen, ADS-IDAC effectively captures significant differences between these 
crews, including performance of a downpower maneuver by Crew G, a faster 
procedure execution pacing by Crew M, and the pressure equalization between the 




events, ADS-IDAC effectively captured the crew-to-crew variability of actual control 
room operators. 
 
9.2.3 Calibration Insights and Conclusions 
  
The ADS-IDAC calibration process provides an effective means to 
realistically represent the sources and consequences of observed crew-to-crew 
variabilities.  Complex operator mental models of plant behavior that guide crew 
actions can be represented within the ADS-IDAC mental belief framework.  
Branching rules can be created to simulate slow or fast procedure execution speed, 
skipping of procedure steps, reliance on memorized information, activation of mental 
beliefs, variations in control inputs, and equipment failures.  More importantly, this 
project has demonstrated that a realistic spectrum of control room crew-to-crew 
differences can be captured with a relatively small number of branching rules.  This 
approach allows the generalization of observed data within the IDAC framework.  
Because model based HRA techniques such as ADS-IDAC attempt to capture 
underlying cognitive processes that drive crew behaviors, these models provide an 
efficient framework for capturing actual operator performance data such as timing of 





9.3 Predictive Mode 
  
Once the ADS-IDAC model is appropriately calibrated, it can be used to 
explore situational contexts that may lead to inappropriate operator actions.  A major 
goal of this research project was the development of an analysis tool capable of 
predicting when knowledge-based errors of commission may occur, such as those 
which may arise is when knowledge-based actions are incorrectly used because a 
crew fails to develop an accurate situational assessment.  In addition to supporting the 
analysis of information driven errors, ADS-IDAC is also capable of exploring the 
impact of certain types of errors of omission (e.g., skipping procedure steps) and the 
consequences of crew-to-crew performance variabilities (e.g., timing and control 
input variability).  A key strength of the simulation approach is that the consequences 
of inappropriate actions can be explicitly determined by the thermal-hydraulic model.  
Therefore, human actions that lead to degraded plant states (e.g., excessive fuel 
temperatures or compromised core cooling) can be identified. 
 
A general procedure has been developed for using ADS-IDAC to predict 
situations where human error events may occur.  This predictive approach, described 
in Section 9.3.1, is a qualitative tool at the present time.  Although ADS-IDAC is 
currently capable of quantifying the probability of each accident sequence, further 
research is needed to ensure that probabilistic calculations are adequately calibrated.   
Despite this limitation, ADS-IDAC is capable of providing significant insights 
regarding possible crew responses to accident scenarios and the impact of these 




predictive analysis procedure was exercised using the HALDEN empirical study loss 
of feedwater scenario.  The results of the comparison between ADS-IDAC 
predictions and actual crew behavior are provided in Section 10.2. 
 
9.3.1 General Analysis Approach 
 
As described in Section 8, ADS-IDAC can explore a range of potential 
accident scenarios by activating branching rules when certain conditions are met.  
Each branching point includes two or more individual event branches which represent 
distinct combinations of system and operator states.  Collectively, the branching 
points describe the topology of a discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) associated with 
an initiating event.  A specific accident sequence is defined by the unique path 
through the DDET branching points from the initiating event to an end state.  
Accident sequences that lead to degraded end states (e.g., excessive fuel temperatures 
or otherwise degraded core cooling conditions) can be reviewed to determine if 
inappropriate human actions contributed to the adverse plant state.  Because ADS-
IDAC is capable of representing knowledge-driven actions not specified in plant 
procedures, this approach shows promise for identifying situational contexts that lead 
to errors of commission. 
 
The generation of branching points is controlled by a set of general rules that 
define the specific activation conditions for each branching point.  Although the 




accident sequence depends on the dynamic behavior of the reactor plant and operator 
decision-making models.  Consequently, a simulation approach is needed to 
determine the branching points that are generated along a specific accident sequence 
trajectory.  This project has demonstrated that complex variations in crew-to-crew 
performance can be captured with a relatively small set of generalized branching 
rules.   In order to identify the branching rules that are appropriate for a specific 
accident analysis, a general analysis procedure has been developed.  This procedure 
involves a review of procedural requirements; operator knowledge, skills, and 
experience; and crew preferences and tendencies.  Once sufficient background 
information has been collected and analyzed, this information is translated into a set 
of branching rules for the accident scenario of interest. 
 
Review and Analyze Procedural Framework 
 The relevant operating procedures provide a starting framework for identifying 
potential sources of crew-to-crew variability.  Such variations may include 
differences in procedure pace and timing, control input variations, and the perceived 
importance of each procedure step.  In order to identify these procedurally driven 
factors, the following methodological approach was developed: 
1) Identify major control inputs and component actuations (e.g., stopping or 
starting of major components, opening or closing significant flow control 
valves).   Actions associated with the same goal (e.g., establishing a cool 
down or depressurization of the reactor coolant system) are often clustered 




procedures.  Crews encountering these blocks of related actions during a 
procedure may elect to hold a briefing prior to executing significant plant 
actions.  These blocks are also convenient locations to insert procedure delays 
to model crew variations in the pace and timing of procedure execution.  For 
example, depending on the leadership style of the senior reactor operator, the 
crew’s familiarity with the procedures, and overall operator experience, crews 
might have significant variability in their procedure execution speed.  Both 
timing delays and the conduct of briefings and meetings can be addressed by 
the inclusion of procedure hold points with action time branching rules.  
Branching options can also be exercised to simulate fast, slow, or nominal 
crews (see Section 8.1.3.1). 
 
2) Identify possible operator control input variations.  Procedurally ambiguous 
control manipulations where the operators may use too little or too much 
control input (e.g., opening valve more or less than desired) are potential areas 
for crew-to-crew variance.  Variations in control inputs can be modeled with 
appropriate control value branching events (see Section 8.1.3.2).  
 
3) Identify ambiguous threshold criteria in procedure steps by searching for key 
words such as “increasing,” “steady,” “decreasing,” and “uncontrolled”.  
These keywords highlight steps where crews may exhibit variability in 
interpreting procedural criteria.  For example, crews may use different 




may depend on the situational context and the crew’s knowledge and 
experience.  For example, a crew might conclude that a decreasing trend in 
pressure actually indicates a stable condition if the cause of the decrease is 
well understood and a direct result of operator actions.   Crew variability 
associated with interpretation of potentially ambiguous criteria can be 
modeled with several conditional simulation runs to explore a range of 
threshold values. 
 
4) Assess the main objective of each procedure step.  While some procedure 
steps may support the main procedure objectives, other steps may be 
associated with supporting activities that may have a lower salience or priority 
for the operators.  Therefore, steps that are more directly linked to the main 
procedure objectives would be expected to have a lower likelihood of being 
skipped.    However, some steps that do not appear to be directly linked to the 
procedure objectives may improve the efficiency of the procedure, establish 
prerequisite conditions that support later actions, or delay the onset of core 
damage.  Examples of such actions include: 
a. Tripping the reactor coolant pumps following a loss of secondary heat sink.  
This action reduces heat input to the reactor coolant system but does not 
directly support the main procedure objective to recover feedwater flow to 
the steam generators.  Consequently, the action has a safety impact (reduced 
time available for recovery) but may not be salient to the operators. 
 
b. Blocking automatic safety injection actuation signals prior to an intentional 
cooldown or depressurization to prevent an unnecessary safety system 
actuation.  The failure to block an actuation signal under these circumstances 
can unnecessarily delay mitigative actions, but may not have a high degree of 
relevance to the operators during the accident since it does not directly 





5) Adjust operator knowledge base and procedure step profiles.  The operator 
knowledge base includes a system decomposition that maps each indicator, 
component, and alarm to the functions they support (see Section 4.3.1).  
Additionally, each procedure step includes profiling information that 
describes the objectives and complexity of the step actions (see Section 4.3.3).  
The operator knowledge base and procedure step profiles can be adjusted to 
reflect the expected level of crew knowledge and experience with the 
procedure. 
 
6) Identify all steps that require that require continuous monitoring of a plant 
parameter by the operator.  These steps often require the operator to initiate a 
plant transient (e.g., opening a pressurizer PORV), closely monitor a target 
parameter (e.g., RCS pressure), and terminate the transient when a target 
value is reached.  If the operator fails to monitor the target parameter at 
regular intervals, initiation of the required actions to terminate the associated 
transient could be delayed.  By activating the use of memorized information 
or adjusting the operator’s information gathering capability (see Section 
7.2.1), these types of information processing limitations can be modeled. 
 
7) Identify continuous action steps.  These steps require the operators to take 
specified actions when a monitored parameter exceeds a defined threshold at 
anytime during procedure execution.  This is contrasted with the continuous 




are not normally activated as a result of deliberate action by the operator to 
initiate a plant transient.  Therefore, the conditions requiring activation of a 
continuous action step may be less salient to the operator.  Continuous actions 
can take several forms – steps included in the procedure “fold out” page that 
apply during the entire procedure, notes and cautions within the procedure, 
and special instructions that direct the operators to take certain compensatory 
measures only during specific parts of the procedure.  For example, the 
recovery procedure for an uncomplicated reactor trip might direct the 
operators to initiate emergency core cooling if pressurizer level decreases 
below 10%.  Because these types of steps require the operators to periodically 
monitor certain plant parameters and perform activities outside the normal 
flow of the procedure, one expects them to have a higher likelihood of being 
missed or implemented late.  These steps can be generally modeled with 
appropriate mental beliefs that include activation of the parent procedure and 
the associated parameter threshold values as prerequisite conditions (see 
Section 5.4).  Variability in the execution of continuous action steps can either 
be modeled through the selection of an appropriate activation probability or 
through the use of information filtering or biasing. 
 
8) Identify procedure steps that refer to components that are assumed to have 
failed during the accident scenario.  These procedure steps may trigger the 





Extend Operator Knowledge Base 
The knowledge base represents the memorized information, skills, and 
abilities available to the operator.  Specific items included in the knowledge 
representation include written procedures, diagnostic guidance, a functional 
decomposition model of reactor plant systems, and rules governing the activation 
mental beliefs.  All anticipated procedures associated with the scenario of interest 
should be included in the operator knowledge base, along with additional controls, 
indicators, and alarms needed to support the major procedural actions.  When new 
components are added to the ADS-IDAC control panel, they must be mapped to their 
associated functions in the operator’s system decomposition.  Depending on the level 
of crew experience, training, and abilities, adjustments can be made to the diagnosis 
matrix (see Section 5.5.1.3) and the system decomposition map. 
 
A key part of the operator knowledge base is the set of mental beliefs that 
represent discrete observations and decisions. Collectively, mental beliefs 
characterize each operator’s situational assessment of the plant state.  Therefore, 
mental beliefs that may be pertinent to the scenario of interest should be identified 
based on operator training and experience.  For example, mental beliefs could include 
“uncontrolled steam generator level increase” for a steam generator tube rupture 
scenario and “faulted steam generator” for a main steam line break.  In addition, non-
proceduralized actions that may extend the time available until a safety system must 
be actuated should be identified.  Typical examples include maximizing reactor 




during a partial loss of feedwater.  Also, the conditions under which operators might 
manually activate safety systems or place automatic control systems in a manual 
mode should be identified.  Each of these non-proceduralized actions can be modeled 
with skill- or rule-based procedures that are activated by mental beliefs. Crew 
variability can arise from the failure to reach appropriate belief states, delays in acting 
on beliefs, and setting a higher or lower evidence threshold for a belief.  Each of these 
factors can be adjusted to represent crew-to-crew situational assessment variability 
(see Section 5.4). 
 
Characterize Crew Capabilities, Preferences and Tendencies 
Each individual operator in ADS-IDAC is provided with profiling data that 
guide his or her behavior.  The operator profile also includes data needed to: (1) 
calculate performance influencing factors; (2) define the operator’s tendencies to skip 
procedure steps or pursue specific problem solving strategies; (3) manage memorized 
information; and (4) establish the timing of actions and communications.  The 
flexibility afforded by the operator profile allows the simulation of a variety of 
operator performance tendencies.  Specifically, performance influencing factors 
associated with problem solving styles, perception and appraisal of information, and 
utilization of memorized information can all be captured within the operator profile.  
In order to ensure that the operator profile accurately models the crews of interest, a 
review of plant organizational factors, operator training, and operating experience 




 the tendency of crews to rely on previously memorized information rather than 
use of recent information obtained directly from the control panel indicators.  The 
use of memorized information can reduce activity execution time but may result 
in the use of outdated and incorrect information.   
 the procedural adherence tendency of the crews.  Procedural steps in ADS-IDAC 
have three main components: (1) initial action activity, (2) expectations associated 
with the initial action activity, and (3) a non-response action that is executed if the 
action expectations are not met.  The operator may skip either the initial action 
activity or the non-response action (evaluation of the action expectations cannot 
be skipped in the current ADS-IDAC model).   
 the crew’s threshold level for concluding that an accident has occurred.  Based on 
accumulated evidence, the ADS-IDAC diagnosis engine calculates a value 
representing the potential for the observed information being related to an 
accident condition.  When this calculated value exceeds a preset threshold, the 
crew will transition to the emergency operating procedures and shut down the 
reactor. 
 the tendency to rely on knowledge-based troubleshooting rather than written 
procedures.  Operating crews may attempt to address an emergency condition 
through the use of actions based on their knowledge and experience rather than 
through written procedures.  The ADS-IDAC knowledge base allows the analyst 
to specify the crew’s tendency to use knowledge-based reasoning approaches to 





Once each of these crew preferences and tendencies is reviewed, appropriate operator 
profiling factors can be identified.  In general, these profiling factors are specified for 
each member of the crew by static PIFs (see Section 7.2).   
 
In addition to identifying crew preferences and tendencies, the dynamic PIFs 
include several static constants that specify each operator’s capabilities for processing 
information, assessing plant status, and handling time stress. The appropriate dynamic 
PIF tuning factors should be adjusted to appropriately model these crew performance 
attributes (see Section 7.3). 
 
Identify Specific Branching Rules for the Analysis 
Once sources of crew-to-crew are variability are identified, appropriate 
branching rules must specified for the analysis.  Branching rules cover three broad 
categories: hardware failure events, operator mental models, and crew preferences 
and tendencies.  Specific guidance for creating branching rules can be found in 
Section 8 and Appendix K.  In order to minimize the potential for sequence explosion 
and ensure efficient use computational resources, appropriate sequence end states and 
truncation thresholds should be identified.  End states should be based on a minimum 
set of critical parameters and associated thresholds.  For example, if core damage is 
the degraded state of interest, a sequence can be terminated when fuel temperatures 
exceed a high threshold value (e.g., 2200 F), when the heat transfer is severely 
degraded, or when a substantial portion of the core is uncovered.  Sequences can also 




specified time limit.  Care should be exercised when setting probability truncation 
values in order to ensure that low probability, high consequence scenarios are not 
unnecessarily excluded from consideration.  Time truncation limits should reflect 
inherent limitations in the ADS-IDAC decision-making model.  In particular, the 
ADS-IDAC decision-making model is not valid once decision-making authority is 
shared with emergency operations facilities.  This generally limits the time frame for 
the ADS-IDAC analysis to the first hour or two of an accident scenario. 
 
In order to organize ADS-IDAC simulation runs and facilitate data analysis, a 
simulation matrix should be developed that specifies the detailed computer 
simulations that will be performed.  Due to the computer processing limitations, it is 
not currently practicable to run a single ADS-IDAC simulation capable of exercising 
all branching points.  The main difficulty is the exponential increase in accident 
sequences as the number of branches increases.  As the number of sequences 
increases, the time to complete a simulation run can become prohibitive.  One method 
of overcoming this difficulty is through the performance of conditional runs where a 
reduced number of branching rules are activated and all other branching rules are 
suppressed.  If the combination of branching rules is selected with care, the analyst 
should be able to capture a wide range of potential crew behaviors with minimal 
processing effort.   In general, the analyst should select a combination of three or four 
branching events that reflect risk significant scenarios.  The simulation matrix should 




9.3.2 Human Error Prediction 
 
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, human error within the IDAC model is defined 
in terms of the human operator failing to meet the needs of the nuclear plant system.  
Because the nuclear plant consequences of operator actions are directly simulated 
within ADS-IDAC, actions that lead to an unsafe plant state can be considered to be 
in error. Compared to traditional static risk assessment methods, ADS-IDAC can 
provide a more realistic assessment of human error events by directly determining the 
effect of operator behaviors on plant thermal hydraulic parameters.  This shifts the 
analysis from an assessment of isolated operator actions to a more holistic assessment 
of the control room situational context and the integrated impact of a spectrum of 
possible operator actions on the reactor plant 
 
An important consideration when assessing the potential consequences of 
human actions in the nuclear control room environment is identifying the sources of 
behavior variabilities among operating crews.  As previously noted, even when 
personnel selection, training programs, and administrative programs are consistently 
implemented, nuclear plant operators can exhibit significant crew-to-crew 
performance variabilities.  These performance variabilities can arise from differences 
in crew knowledge, skills, and experience; crew specific organizational factors; and 
operator preferences and tendencies.  Variability is normally defined in comparison to 
a normative case.  For the purposes of this study, normative crew behavior is defined 
as: (1) the execution of procedural requirements without deviation and in a manner 




proceduralized actions in a manner consistent with operator training and the 
recognized and accepted skill-of-the-craft.  Within this context, non-normative 
behaviors can be associated with either beneficial or undesirable operator actions.  An 
underlying assumption of the ADS-IDAC approach is that deviations from the 
normative (or expected) set of operator behaviors following an accident can 
sometimes lead to a degraded plant state.   By examining the situational context 
associated with undesirable deviations, the factors leading to human error events can 









10. Model Validation 
 
In order to verify, to the extent possible, that the ADS-IDAC is capable of 
appropriately simulating operator behavior, this research project includes a validation 
component, focusing on validating the results and outcomes of the model rather than 
its functional details.  Typical validation measures include face validity, content 
validity, and criterion related validity [21, 93].  Face validity refers to the degree to 
which the model captures important and relevant behaviors as judged by potential 
users.  Although face validity is a subjective and relatively weak measure of overall 
validity, it can influence the level of confidence that users have in model results.  
Content-related validity refers to the inclusion of all pertinent factors that can 
influence the capability of the model to meet its objectives.  In this case, content-
related validity implies that the ADS-IDAC model addresses factors that significantly 
influence the identification of nuclear plant error forcing situations.  Criterion-related 
validity refers to the capability of the model to predict operator behaviors and, where 
possible, provide results consist with other modeling techniques.  This validation 
effort addresses the following specific elements: 
 Does the model appear to provide reasonable results for a range of accident 
scenarios? (face validity); 
 Is the model capable of simulating real-world operator behaviors associated 






 Does ADS-IDAC include pertinent human behavior elements? (content 
validity); 
 Is the model consistent with other modeling techniques? (content validity); 
 Does the ADS-IDAC adequately predict operator behavior? (criterion 
validity). 
The validation effort was structured to determine both the reasonableness and 
predictive power of the model.  Specifically, a spectrum of accident scenarios was 
analyzed to determine if the model provides realistic representations of normative 
crew performance.   A general approach for modeling sources of crew-to-crew 
variabilities for postulated accident scenarios was then applied to the loss of 
feedwater (LOFW) HRA empirical study scenarios in order to predict potential 
human error events.  Finally, a comparison of the ADS-IDAC predictions to the 
actual empirical study results was made.  Insights regarding re-calibration of the 
dynamic model are provided.  Due to the lack of available human performance 
statistical data for nuclear plant operators [94], the validity assessment focused on 
qualitative factors, rather than a rigorous quantitative statistical approach.  As more 
nuclear plant operator human performance data becomes available, it should be 
possible to revisit the quantitative aspects of ADS-IDAC validation as part of a future 
validation effort.  For example, ongoing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission efforts 
to collect human performance data under the Human Event Repository and Analysis 
(HERA) [95] may eventually provide sufficient quantifiable data to support additional 
validation of ADS-IDAC.  Despite the limitations associated with the limited 




significant improvements in the capabilities of the ADS-IDAC model and 
demonstrated methods for capturing the rich data obtained from empirical simulator-
based studies. 
 
10.1 Initial Validation (Content Validity) 
  
 The first stage in the ADS-IDAC validation effort was to ensure that the ADS-
IDAC simulation model included the pertinent features necessary to predict human 
error.  This involved a qualitative comparison between the key features of the IDA 
cognitive model, other human error prediction techniques such as ATHEANA and 
SPAR-H, and the specific ADS-IDAC implementation model.  It should be noted that 
the content-related validity assessment used a qualitative approach.  Specifically, the 
focus of this review was whether or not the ADS-IDAC model included the key 
features needed to fulfill its intended purpose of predicting human error events. 
 
The first step of the content validity review was to compare the model 
elements included in ADS-IDAC to the formal IDA model.  For each phase of the 
IDA cognitive process, the key attributes of the IDA model were compared to their 
implementation within the ADS-IDAC computer code.  The results of this 
comparison are provided in Table 15.  Based on this comparison, it is clear that the 
ADS-IDAC simulation model does include the key features and elements described in 




Table 15 - Comparison of IDA Model to ADS-IDAC Implementation 
Cognitive 
Phase 
Key Attributes of the 
IDAC Model [96] 




The control panel scanning module includes 
factors to account for memory capacity and 
relevance of the information.  The filtering 
module includes the capability to model 
quantitative biasing of parameter values.  Section 
4.1.2 and 4.2.   
Information Grouping 
 
The knowledge base functional decomposition 
provides a means to group information that relates 
to a common functional element.  Section 4.3.1.   
Memorization and 
Retrieval 
The operator memory model includes factors to 
model the use of memorized information and the 
information retention capability of the operator.  




ADS-IDAC models both actively and passively 





The ADS-IDAC control panel scanning queue 
includes consideration of the priority of the 
information.  Section 4.1.2. 
Problem Solving High 
Level Goals and Subgoals 
ADS-IDAC models three of the four IDAC high 
level goals.  The goal of “maintain equipment 
safety margin” is addressed by mental beliefs and 
skill- or rule-based actions (see Section 5.4). In 
addition, an intermediate “Monitoring” goal has 
been added to the model.  Section 5.2.   
Problem Solving Strategies 
ADS-IDAC currently models six of the nine 
IDAC problem solving strategies (the instinctive 
response and direct matching strategy have been 
combined).  The limiting reasoning, ask for 
advice, and trail and error strategies are not 
currently modeled.  Section 5.3.   
Decision Making 
Goal and Strategy 
Selection Rules 
Although the specific rules used for goal and 
strategy selection differ from the IDAC model, a 
tractable process is used for goal and strategy 
selection.  Sections 5.2 and 5.3.   
Action Execution Slip errors 
The procedure step-skipping module is capable of 
modeling slip-type errors.  Section 6.2.   
 
 In most human reliability assessment methods, a set of performance 
influencing shaping factors is used to condition the probability of human error based 
on a variety of factors.  These factors typically include consideration of procedure 
adequacy, stress, operator knowledge and experience, ergonomics, and environmental 




these factors, the performance influencing factors currently modeled in ADS-IDAC 
were compared to those described in the IDAC model [20] and the SPAR-H HRA 
method [88].  Although SPAR-H is not a cognitively-based human reliability 
assessment method, it is widely used by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for 
events assessment and the accident sequence precursor program11.  Table 16 provides 
the results of this comparison.  As can be seen, the current version of ADS-IDAC 
includes many of the influencing factors described by both the IDAC and SPAR-H 
methods.  There are still several areas where the ADS-IDAC model can be further 
improved and extended.  For example, ADS-IDAC does not currently include 
consideration of environmental and physical factors.  Further, the treatment of 
organizational and team related factors could be enhanced to improve the accuracy 
and realism of the model.  However, these additional model improvements are 
beyond the scope of the current research effort.  
 
 In addition to the comparisons with cognitive modeling elements and 
performance influencing factors, the ADS-IDAC model includes a number of other 
features that serve to increase confidence in the model results.  These include the 
contents of the operator knowledge base, the basic model for activation of skill- and 
rule-based actions, and the calibration of the thermal-hydraulic plant model.  In 
particular, ADS-IDAC includes the following validating features: 
                                                 
11 The NRC’s accident sequence precursor program systematically analyzes significant operational 
events at commercial power plants to identify potential precursors to severe core damage accident 





 The operator knowledge base includes an accurate representation of plant 
emergency procedures.  In addition to the procedure model being capable of 
representing both the structure and content of plant procedures,  
the procedure model is based on the HALDEN emergency operating 
procedures for the FRESH simulator.  These procedures provide a reasonable 
approximation to the actual procedures used in nuclear power plants of similar 
design.  As discussed in Section 9.1.3, the ADS-IDAC plant model compares 
favorably to the FRESH simulator.   Skill- and rule-based operator action 
tendencies, such as those described for the ATHEANA HRA method [85], can 
be easily adapted for use within ADS-IDAC using the mental belief model.   
 The ADS-IDAC mental belief model (Sections 4.3.2 and 5.4) is based on the 
Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) making model, which describes the 
decision making process utilized by experienced persons during dynamic 
conditions [14].  The main features of the RPD model comport favorably with 
the nuclear plant control room environment, notably dynamic conditions, 
action-feedback loops, high stakes, and experienced decision makers working 
in a team environment.  The RPD approach has also been extended to other 
similar high time stress decision-making environments such as air traffic 
control modeling [97]. 
 The three-loop pressurized water reactor model currently implemented in 
ADS-IDAC includes all significant controls, alarms, and indicators needed to 
execute key mitigative actions described in the HALDEN emergency 




nuclear plant model compares favorably to both the reference plant design and 
the HALDEN FRESH simulator. 











 Attention to Current 
Task 














Not explicitly modeled, but 
dynamic time-constraint load 
and information load PIFs 




 Time-Constraint Load 
 Task-Related Load 
 Non-Task Related Load 
 Passive Information 
Load 
 Confidence in 
Performance 
Available Time 
Dynamic PIFs for time-
constraint and information 
loading (Section 7.3.1 and 
7.3.2) are used to model 
strains and feelings. 
Perception and 
Appraisal 
 Perceived Severity of 
Consequences 
Associated with Current 
Diagnosis 
 Perceived Criticality of 
System Condition 
 Perceived Familiarity 
with Situation 
 Perceived System 
Confirmatory or 
Contradictory Response 
 Perception of Alarms 
 Perceived Decision 
Responsibility 
 Perceived Complexity of 
Strategy 
 Perceived task 
Complexity 
 Perception of Problem 
Solving Resources 
 Awareness of Role, 
Responsibility 
Complexity 
The dynamic PIF factor for 
criticality of system condition 
(Section 7.3.3) provides a 
measure of the perceived 
severity of the situation.  
Complexity factors can be 
included in the procedure 
model (Section 4.3.3).  
Perception of alarms and the 
associated follow-up actions 
can be handled through the use 
of control panel scanning 
(Section 4.1.2) and the 
activation of alarm response 




 Knowledge, Experience 
 Skills 
 Memory of Recent 
Experience, 
Training 
Knowledge and experience is 
modeled within the operator 








IDAC Model [20] SPAR-H [88] 
Implementation in 
ADS-IDAC 
Diagnosis, Actions, and 
Results 
 Memory of Incoming 
Information 
Operator skills can be 
addressed through the use of 
appropriate mental beliefs and 
associated skill- or rule-based 
procedures (Section 5.4).  
Operators can memorize and 




 Self Confidence 
 Problem Solving Style 
 Morale, Motivation, 
Attitude 
- 
Problem solving style can be 
directly addressed by selection 
of appropriate crew 
preferences and tendencies as 




 Harsh Environment 
 Physical Access 
 Visual and Audio Effects 
of Surroundings 
- 









Although conditioning events 
are not explicitly modeled, the 
operators can retain memories 
of previous information and 
events (Section 4.1.1). 
Organizational 
Factors 
 Work Process 
 Human-System 
Interaction 
 Safety and Quality 
Culture 
 Work Environment 
 Tool Availability 
 Tool Adequacy 
 Procedure Availability 





ADS-IDAC is capable of 
accurately representing both 
the content and structure of 
plant procedures (Section 
4.3.3).  Certain elements of 
safety culture can be addressed 
by appropriate activation 












ADS-IDAC models a control 
room crew consisting of a 
senior reactor operator 
(decision-maker) and a reactor 
operator (action-taker) 
(Sections 3.1.3 and 7.4).  
Although communication 
quality is not directly 
monitored, the time to 
communicate can be addressed 
with static PIFs (Section 7.4). 
Physical Factors 
 Fatigue 
 Physical Limitations 
 
Fitness for Duty 








These factors collectively serve to increase the confidence that the ADS-IDAC model 
includes key modeling elements to support a reasonable evaluation of the factors that 
may lead to human error events.  
 
10.2 Model Behavior and Response (Face Validity) 
 
 
 The objective of the face validity assessment is to check that the ADS-IDAC 
model provides “expected” results a variety of accident scenarios.  For example, 
following an uncomplicated reactor shutdown, the plant interactions arising from the 
ADS-IDAC operator model should bring the plant to a safe and stable condition in a 
short period of time.  Furthermore, the model should be able to cope with increasingly 
complex scenarios while still maintaining the ability to reproduce normative crew 
behavior.  For this study, two accident scenarios were evaluated – the first scenario 
involved a reactor trip event while the second investigated the model response to 
conditions similar to those that occurred during the Three Mile Island accident in 
1979.   
 
10.2.1 Reactor Trip Response 
  
 The objective of this phase of the study was to evaluate the ADS-IDAC model 
response to a reactor trip event.  Reactor trips are a relatively common initiating event 




by a turbine trip from a full power operating conditions at three minutes into the 
simulation run.  The following branching rules were considered: 
 A hardware failure event involving a steam dump valve failure.  The steam 
dump system is used to remove excess heat form the primary coolant system.  
However, if a steam dump valve sticks partially open, the continuous bleeding 
of steam from the secondary plant will result in an uncontrolled cooldown of 
the reactor plant.  If the operator recognizes the steam dump failure, they may 
attempt a recovery action to either shut or isolate the failed valve. 
 Following a reactor trip, the steam demand caused by auxiliary equipment or 
leakage may result in an uncontrolled cooldown of the reactor coolant system.  
The continued reactor cooldown may trigger a knowledge based action to shut 
the mains steam isolation valves (MSIVs) to prevent excessive plant 
cooldown.  This manual closure of MSIVs due to excessive plant cooldown 
has been observed at nuclear power plants in the United States [98].  This 
action is also a possible recovery action that can be used to mitigate the plant 
cooldown if actions to recover the failed steam dump valve are unsuccessful.  
Although closure of the MSIVs will terminate the cooldown for this example, 
it isolates the normal condenser heat release path for the plant and may further 
complicate the reactor trip recovery.  For example, the core decay heat must 





The operations crew preference was set to enable the use of procedures (i.e., the 
“following procedure” problem solving strategy was activated).  These analysis 
conditions generated the dynamic event tree shown in Figure 38. 
 
Figure 38 - Reactor Trip Dynamic Event Tree 
 
The simulation was run for a simulated time of one hour, and four event sequences 
(ES) were generated.  Sequence ES-0 represents the uncomplicated base case.  
Sequence ES-1 represents a case were a steam dump valve failed partially open 
following the reactor trip, but was quickly recovered by the operators.  Sequences 
ES-2 and ES-3 are more challenging events were initial operator recovery actions for 
the steam dump valve fail, but manual action to shut the main steam isolation valves 
can isolate the steam leakage.  The operators manually shut the MSIVs during 
sequence ES-2 but fail to do so during sequence ES-3.  During sequence ES-3, the 
continued leakage of steam through the failed and unisolated steam dump valve 
























safety feature.  This safety feature eventually isolates the steam leakage.  The timing 
of key events during these scenarios is summarized in Table 17. 
 













Turbine Trip / 
Reactor Trip 
181 181 181 181 
Steam Dump 
Valve Failure 
- 182 182 182 
Start E-0 252 252 252 252 




- - 419 419 
Reduce AFW 
Flow 
417 314 314 314 
Recover Steam 
Dump 
- 370 n/a n/a 
Initiate ECCS 
(manual due to 
low PZR level) 
- - - 751 
Shut MSIVs - - 486 (manual) 2193 (automatic) 
Re-Start E-0 - - - 768 
Start ES-1.1 - - - 1490 
Terminate HPI 
Injection 
- - - 1649 
Restore Letdown - - 623 1786 
Note: all times are provided in seconds from the start of the simulation. 
Figure 39 through Figure 43 provide the response of several key plant parameters 
during each event sequence.  As shown in Figure 39, pressurizer level immediately 
decreases from its nominal full power level of just below 50% to below 20% 
immediately after the reactor trip due to the rapid cooldown of the RCS following 
core shutdown.  As the RCS continues to cooldown immediately following the 
reactor trip, the density of the reactor coolant increases and the net volume occupied 




ES-0 and ES-1 (following recovery of the failed steam dump valve), the reactor 
coolant cooldown stabilizes at the hot-standby RCS temperature of approximately 
547F and the chemical and volume control system restores pressurizer level to its 
nominal shutdown value of roughly 22%.  During ES-2, the manual closure 
























ES-1 (Stm Dump Recovery)
ES-2 (Manual MSIV Closure)





Figure 39 - Reactor Trip Scenario - Pressurizer Level Response 
 
of the MSIVs shifts the decay heat relief path to the SG atmospheric relief valves 
rather than the condenser steam dump system.  The higher steam pressure control 
setpoint of the SG atmospheric relief valves result in an approximate 20 psi higher 
secondary steam pressure than when using the condenser steam dump system.  This 
results in a slightly higher average coolant temperature once conditions stabilize.  
Because, the pressurizer level control setpoint increases as the average RCS 
temperature increases, the final pressurizer level control setpoint for sequence ES-2 is 
slightly higher than in ES-0 or ES-1.  When the operators manually actuate the safety 
injection system during sequence ES-3 (due to lowering pressurizer water level), the 




operators eventually transfer to ES-1.1 which allows the crew to terminate emergency 
core cooling injection flow.  Once injection flow is terminated, the pressurizer level 
continues to decrease due to continued steam flow through the failed steam dump 
valve.  This trend continues until the MSIVs are automatically closed at 2193 
seconds. 
 The pressurizer pressure response is shown in Figure 40.  In a pressurized 
 






























ES-1 (Stm Dump Recovery)
ES-2 (Manual MSIV Closure)
ES-3 (Automatic MSIV Closure)
Terminate Safety Injection
Automatic MSIV ClosureManual Safety Injection
 
Figure 40 - Reactor Trip Scenario - Pressurizer Pressure Response 
 
water reactor, pressure is maintained by the pressurizer.  The pressurizer is a two-
phase saturated water thermodynamic system and pressure is controlled through the 
use of a pressurizer spray system (which uses the differential pressure generated by 
the reactor coolant pumps) and electric heaters.  The spray system cools the vapor 
space in the pressurizer to reduce pressure, while the electric heaters warm the liquid 
phase and increase pressure.  The nominal pressure control setpoint for both power 




level causes the volume occupied by pressurizer vapor to increase, decreasing 
pressurizer water levels tend to reduce pressure.  Similarly, increasing pressurize 
water level tends to compress the vapor bubble and increase RCS pressure.  
Consequently (and as expected), the pressurizer pressure tends to track pressurizer 
water level.  This is particularly well illustrated in the case of sequence ES-3.  For all 
scenarios, the pressurizer pressure eventually stabilizes to approximately 2250 psi.  
The oscillations in pressure are due to a design feature that keeps a small number of 
pressurizer heaters continuously energized which tends to increase pressure.  The 
periodic cycling of the spray valve keeps pressure within the desired control band. 
 Figure 41 provides the RCS average loop temperature response during the 
four scenarios.  Both the base case (ES-0) and the steam dump recovery case (ES-1), 
show a relatively quick stabilization to the shutdown temperature control setpoint of 
547F.  Sequence ES-2 which involves manual closure of the MSIVs shows a slightly  
























ES-1 (Stm Dump Recovery)
ES-2 (Manual MSIV Closure)










higher stable temperature due to the somewhat higher pressure setpoint of the SG 
atmospheric relief valves.  The figure allows clearly shows the continued RCS 
cooldown associated with the failure to recover or manually isolate the failed steam 
dump valve during sequence ES-4.  The cooldown for this scenario is eventually 
terminated when the MSIVs are automatically closed at 2193 seconds. 
 
Figure 42 provides the SG pressure response to the reactor trip scenario.  
During the base case (ES-0), steam pressure rapidly stabilizes to near 1000 psi.  For 
scenarios ES-1 and ES-2, steam pressure decreases following the reactor trip until the 
failed steam dump valve is either recovered or isolated.  Because the setpoint of the 
SG atmospheric relief valves is higher than the nominal steam pressure associated 
with the condenser steam dump system, the SG pressure stabilizes to a slightly higher 
value for sequence ES-2.  During sequence ES-3, steam pressure continually  

























ES-1 (Stm Dump Recovery)
ES-2 (Manual MSIV Closure)










decreases at a rate of approximately 20 psi/minute until the MSIV automatic isolation 
safety feature setpoint is reached (approximately 500 psi).  Because the SG steam 
pressure is tightly coupled to RCS temperature, Figure 42 show similar trends as 
Figure 41.  Once the MSIVs are closed, the pressure reduction is terminated.   During 
scenario ES-3, the emergency procedure E-0, step 18, directs the operators to check 
for a faulted SG.  This check is made by verifying two conditions: (1) no SG pressure 
decreasing in an uncontrolled manner, and (2) no SG completely depressurized.  If a 
faulted SG condition is observed, the operators transfer to a different emergency 
procedure to isolate the fault (if possible) and stabilize plant conditions. In the ADS-
IDAC implementation of this step, the conditions are verified by checking that the 
rate of SG pressure decrease is less than 25 psi/minute and that all SG pressures are 
greater than 50 psi.  In this case, despite clear indications that the SG pressure was 
decreasing in an uncontrolled manner, the step expectations could be met.  This 
highlights that interpretation of key diagnostic steps symptom-based procedures often 
require a high degree of cognitive effort to correctly interpret plant conditions.  
Because of the wide variety of plant conditions that can exist when the operators 
execute this step, the application of simple decision criteria is likely insufficient to 
lead to a correct diagnosis.  This finding is consistent with actual control room 
operator experience with emergency operating procedures [25]. 
 
Figure 43 provides the response of SG A water level during each scenario (the 
other two steam generators respond in a similar fashion).  Following the reactor trip, 




The mental scheme used for water level control is similar to the model described in 
Section 4.3.2 (see Figure 12).  These scenarios demonstrate that the mental  































l ES-0 (Base Case)
ES-1 (Stm Dump Recovery)
ES-2 (Manual MSIV Closure)




Figure 43 - Reactor Trip Scenario - SG Water Level Response 
 
 
representation for AFW flow control is sufficiently robust to handle a range of 
potential situations.  A unique feature of SG level control is that indicated water level 
is influenced by the steam flow from the steam generator.  Steam flow tends to 
increase the indicated water level, while a reduction in steam flow tends to decrease 
the indicated level.  Consequently, scenarios with a sustained steam demand from the 
SGs tend to have a higher indicated SG water level.  The mental scheme for AFW 
control can account for this effect and still maintain level within the desired control 
band of approximately 25% level.  
 
Despite the relative simple dynamic event tree for this scenario, the four 
sequences illustrate the wide range of plant responses that can be generated from the 




behaved as would be expected in an actual event of this type as demonstrated by the 
relatively rapid establishment of steady state conditions without exceeding normal 
parameter limits or causing the actuation of safety equipment.  The operator recovery 
actions in sequences ES-1 and ES-2, generated by the activation of mental beliefs 
associated with the perception of excessive cooldown of the RCS, effectively 
terminate the adverse parameter trends and result in a stable, safe condition.  This 
example also serves to highlight to diagnostic effort that is required to implement 
event symptom based procedures.  As demonstrated by sequence ES-3, the diagnosis 
of a faulted steam generator cannot be made through the application of simple 
decision criteria and must depend on a holistic evaluation of plant status.  Finally, it is 
important to note that most of the key plant parameters in a nuclear plant are tightly 
coupled.  In this case, a failure of a single condenser steam dump valve has a dramatic 
impact on pressurizer level, RCS pressure and temperature, and SG water level and 
pressure.  An advantage of the ADS-IDAC approach is that the complex relationships 
between physical plant parameters and operator actions are directly simulated in order 
to provide a rich contextual framework. A systematic modeling approach such as 
ADS-IDAC can help the analyst recognize, appropriately model, and gain insights 
about the diagnostic effort needed to effectively implement emergency plant 
procedures. 
 
10.2.2 Three Miles Island Scenario 
  
 In many respects, the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power 




can seriously degrade reactor plant safety.  As discussed in Section 1.1.1, the accident 
was initiated by a turbine generator trip, a relatively common event.  A summary 
timeline of the key accident events is provided in Table 18 [99].  Several 
complications developed as the accident unfolded, including failure of the  
Table 18 - Timeline for Three Mile Island Accident 
Time 
(minutes) 
Events and Comments 
0 
At approximately 4 a.m. on March 28, 1979, a loss of feedwater to the steam 
generators resulted in a turbine trip and reactor shutdown.  Shortly after the reactor 
trip, the pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) lifted (as expected) but 
failed to close, resulting in a loss of reactor coolant.  In addition, the emergency 
auxiliary feedwater system which normally provides makeup water to the steam 
generators in order to remove residual core heat was isolated due to a system valve 
alignment error. 
2 
The two emergency core cooling high pressure injection pumps automatically began 
injecting core coolant in response to a low reactor coolant system pressure condition.  
4.5 
The operators turned off one of the two high pressure injection pumps and restricted 
the flow from the remaining pump in response to a high coolant level in the 
pressurizer. 
8 
The operators restored auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators by opening 
the closed isolation valves. 
73 
Due to the continued loss of reactor coolant from the stuck open pressurizer PORV 
combined with reduced high pressure injection, the reactor coolant system (which 
normally operates with substantial subcooling) reached saturated steam conditions.  
The two-phase steam and fluid mixture in the reactor coolant system led to high 
vibration of the reactor coolant pumps. To avoid damage to the pumps the operators 
turned off the B loop pumps (the pumps in the A coolant loop continued to operate). 
100 
The operators turned off the A loop reactor coolant system pumps due to high 
vibration.  This terminated all forced coolant circulation through the reactor core. 
111 
The reactor coolant outlet temperature began to rise rapidly due to residual decay 
heat generation in the reactor core. 
142 
The operators identified that PORV valve failed to fully reclose after the reactor trip 
and isolated the reactor coolant system leakage by closing downstream block valve. 
149 
Due to the lack of forced core circulation and reduced emergency core cooling high 
pressure injection, the reactor temperature went off-scale at 620°F.  During this 
period portions of the fuel cladding reached temperatures high enough to permit rapid 
oxidation of the zircaloy fuel  cladding (an exothermic reaction that produces 
hydrogen gas) resulting in substantial core damage. 
220 
The operators restored full emergency core cooling high pressure injection flow. 
However, the presence of hydrogen and other non-condensable gases in the reactor 
coolant system hampered efforts to establish effective core cooling.  Approximately 
13.5 hours into the accident, the operators were able to establish subcooled reactor 
coolant system conditions and restart a reactor coolant pump.  This permitted core 





auxiliary feedwater(AFW) system to deliver makeup water to the steam generators 
(SGs) and a partially opened pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) which 
resulted in a small loss of coolant accident.  Although safety systems actuated as 
designed, the operators misinterpreted plant conditions and terminated emergency 
core cooling flow prior to establishing a stable means of decay heat removal.  Of 
particular note was that the operators strongly associated reactor coolant system water 
inventory with pressurizer water level.  In the case of a stuck open pressurizer PORV, 
the pressurizer can have a high indicated level when steam bubble formation in the 
reactor vessel forces reactor coolant into the pressurizer.  Unless the operators are 
aware that the reactor coolant system (RCS) has reached a bulk saturated steam 
condition and a steam bubble has formed in the reactor vessel, a high pressurizer level 
may be misinterpreted.  Improved operator training and plant improvements to add 
more salient indications for both RCS subcooling margin and reactor vessel water 
level were instituted following the TMI accident to help prevent similar accidents in 
the future.  However, the accident highlights the need for systematic methods to 
predict in advance situations that may lead operators to implement well-intentioned 
actions that lead to a serious accident.   
 
 Because one of the objectives of the ADS-IDAC project is to develop a tool 
capable of identifying the situational contexts that can lead to accidents such as the 
TMI event, a key test of model validity is the capability of the code to reproduce the 
conditions leading to the TMI accident.  However, it should be noted that there are 




IDAC.  Although the TMI plant and the current ADS-IDAC plant model both 
represent pressurized water reactors, the TMI unit was a two loop Babcock & Wilcox 
plant design that used a significantly different reactor coolant system and SG design 
than the ADS-IDAC model.  This project demonstrated that the key features of the 
event can be modeled in ADS-IDAC, however the specific accident dynamics and 
consequences differed.   
 
 To model the TMI event, two simulation runs were performed.  The first set of 
scenarios included branching events for the pressurizer PORV failure and recovery 
and the use of either a procedure-following or knowledge-based problem solving 
strategy.  The procedure following strategy implemented the HALDEN FRESH 
emergency operating procedures while the knowledge-based approach utilized the 
functional diagnosis approach described in Section 5.6.  The specific knowledge-
based actions used for this scenario are listed in Appendix F.  No information filtering 
or biasing was introduced into the first set of scenarios.  The initial simulation run 
generated the dynamic event tree shown in Figure 44.   
 
Because the key operator actions associated with the TMI accident were 
knowledge driven and not directed by the plant procedures, the second simulation run 
focused on the knowledge-based problem solving strategy.  In order to model the 
operators’ lack of recognition of the degraded plant decay heat removal state due to 
loss of subcooling margin (i.e., the onset of saturated water conditions in the RCS), 



































Figure 44 - Dynamic Event Tree for TMI Scenario (No Information Biasing) 
 
words, the operators would perceive adequate subcooling margin regardless of the 
actual plant conditions.  This approach can be used to model either an actual 
information perception bias, or a crew that otherwise fails to verify this indication 
(since a high bias will block all possible compensatory actions for this scenario).  The 
























Since the TMI accident involved a failure to recover from the partially opened 
pressurizer PORV, the following event sequences are of most interest: 
 Run 1, Sequence KPS-4 – Procedure Following problem solving strategy with 
no information bias (Figure 44) 
 Run 1, Sequence KPS-6- Knowledge Based problem solving strategy with no 
information bias (Figure 44) 
 Run 2, Sequence KPS-2 – Knowledge based problem solving strategy with 
subcooling margin biased high (Figure 45) 
 
To more realistically model the TMI event, all scenarios were initiated with AFW 
flow control valves in the closed position, a similar functional configuration to the 
TMI event.  The sequence of events for these three event sequences are provided in 
Table 19.   










Actions w/ Bias) 
Turbine Trip /  
Reactor Trip 181 181 181 
PORV Fails  
(~20% open) 182 182 182 
Start E-0 251 - - 
Start ES-0.1 285 - - 
ECCS Actuation 290 290 290 
Return to E-0 292 - - 
Start FRG-H.1 377 - - 
Auxiliary 
Feedwater Flow 
Recovered 600 600 600 
Return to E-0  
(after FRG-H.1) 714 - - 
Start ES-1.1 1471 - - 
Stop 1st HPI 
Pump 1891 386 386 
Start ES-1.2 1935 - - 
Stop 2nd HPI 
Pump - 614 614 
Restart 1st HPI 
Pump - 1678 - 
Stop all RCPs - 1708  1746 
Restart 2nd HPI 
Pump - 1884 - 




During the procedure-following case, the ADS-IDAC operators immediately 
initiate emergency procedure E-0 and transition to supplemental procedure ES-0.1 to 
perform a normal recovery from the reactor trip.  At the time of transition to ES-0.1, 
plant conditions had not degraded to the point where procedures require immediate 
initiation of emergency core cooling.   Shortly after initiating ES-0.1, the operators 
perceive a low pressurizer level due to the PORV leakage (Figure 46) and manually 
initiate emergency core cooling.  This forces the operators to return to procedure  


















KPS 4 - Procedure Following
KPS 6  - Knowledge Based
KPS 2 (BIAS) - Knowledge BasedStop 'B' HPI Pump





Figure 46 - TMI Scenario - Pressurizer Level 
 
E-0.  In addition, the operations crew eventually recognizes the lack of AFW flow 
and initiates functional recovery guideline FRG-H.1 due to a loss of secondary 
cooling.  Initial attempts to recover AFW flow by opening the flow control valves are 
driven by a skill-based action that verifies the AFW valve lineup when an automatic 
demand for AFW is perceived.  This recovery action is considered to be successful 
for all event sequences.  Once AFW flow is restored, the operators exit FRG-H.1 and 




PORV is less than the full capacity of the high pressure emergency core cooling 
system, the operators will eventually transfer to supplemental procedure ES-1.1 to 
terminate coolant injection in a controlled manner in order to stabilize plant 
conditions.  The operators eventually secure one high pressure injection pump and 
transfer to supplemental procedure ES-1.2 to continue the plant recovery (this 
procedure is not modeled in the current ADS-IDAC knowledge base).  A key feature 
of the  


























) KPS 4 - Procedure Following
KPS 6  - Knowledge Based
KPS 2 (BIAS) - Knowledge Based
Stop 'B' High Pressure 
Injection Pump (KPS-4)
Restart High Pressure 
Injection (KPS-6)
 
Figure 47 - TMI Scenario - Minimum RCS Subcooling 
  
procedure based response is that an adequate subcooling margin is continuously 
maintained in the reactor coolant system (Figure 47).  This ensures that the reactor 
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Figure 48 - TMI Scenario - Reactor Vessel Level 
 
The knowledge-based response does not utilize the plant procedures and 
instead relies on a set of actions driven by the operator’s situational assessment.  For 
example, in the initial knowledge-based simulation run (KPS-6), when the operator 
perceives a low mass condition in the pressurizer, a knowledge based action to initiate 
emergency core cooling is activated.  Similarly, when a high pressurizer mass 
condition is identified (in combination with adequate subcooling margin), a 
knowledge based action is activated to secure the high pressure injection pumps.  
Because the knowledge-based approach does not maintain a high degree of 
subcooling for the RCS, a two phase saturated steam/water condition is likely to 
develop in the reactor coolant loops.  When steam voiding in the vicinity of the 
reactor coolant pumps exceeds a preset threshold, the thermal-hydraulic model 
generates a high reactor coolant pump vibration alarm.  This alarm activated a skill-
based operator response to stop the reactor coolant pumps to prevent cavitation 




100 minutes into the accident (see Table 18).  Conversely, this behavior does not 
occur during the procedure-based approach because an adequate subcooling margin is 
maintained and the reactor coolant pumps do not enter a degraded flow regime.   
Although the operators secure high pressure injection early in the accident scenario 
for both the knowledge-based scenarios, the continuous decrease in subcooling 
margin eventually prompts the operators to recognize the degraded core cooling 
conditions in the non-information biased case and restart high pressure coolant 
injection at 1678 seconds (see Figure 49).  The loss of subcooling margin leads to 
steam bubble formation in the reactor vessel and can eventually cause uncovery of 
active fuel.  Although the knowledge-based approach without information biasing 
(KPS-6) leads to a brief decrease in reactor vessel water level (Figure 48), the 
restoration of emergency core cooling flow restores subcooled RCS conditions and 
refloods the reactor vessel.  Conversely, in the information biased case, the operators 
do not  
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recognize and diagnose the significance of a loss of subcooling margin and fail to 
restart the emergency core cooling system.  This leads to a continuous decrease in 
reactor vessel water level as shown in Figure 48 (KPS-2).  If  the reactor vessel level 
is allowed to decrease below the level of active fuel, core damage can occur, as was 
the case in the actual TMI event. 
 
 This example demonstrates several key features of the ADS-IDAC modeling 
approach.  In particular, modeling the TMI scenario highlights the following key 
observations: 
 The ADS-IDAC model is capable of reproducing the knowledge-based behaviors 
observed during the TMI accident with a limited set of rules.  For example, early 
termination of emergency core cooling flow and stopping of reactor coolant 
pumps can easily be modeled within the ADS-IDAC framework. 
 Relatively complex scenarios can be modeled with a limited number of branching 
rules.   
 The procedure-following model is capable of modeling complex transitions 
between the suite of plant operating procedures.  In the procedure following case, 
six separate procedure transfers are executed, similar to what actual crews would 
need to do in this situation. 
 The underlying cognitive model in ADS-IDAC allows small perturbations in 
information perception processes to lead to large variations in operator behaviors.  
For example, the only underlying difference between the two knowledge based 




The modeling of this scenario serves to increase the level of confidence that ADS-
IDAC is capable of reasonably modeling knowledge-driven errors of commission and 
that it can be used to identify situations that might lead to human error events. 
 
10.3 Model Validation with HAMMLAB Data (Criterion Validity) 
 
 
To further validate the capabilities of ADS-IDAC, crew behavior predictions 
were compared to actual crew data obtained during an international Human 
Reliability Analysis (HRA) empirical study at the OECD Halden Reactor Project 
Halden Human-Machine Laboratory (HAMMLAB) facility [100].  As discussed in 
Section 9.2.2, the HAMMLAB study consisted of two sets of simulator experiments, 
each with basic and complex variations.  The first set of experiments involved steam 
generator tube rupture scenarios and were used to calibrate the ADS-IDAC model as 
described in Section 9.2.2.  The second set of experiments involved loss of feedwater 
(LOFW) scenarios and were used to assess the predictive capabilities of the ADS-
IDAC model and analysis methods.  The crew compliment during the Halden 
experiments consisted of three crew members: a shift supervisor (a senior reactor 
operator), a reactor operator, and an assisting operator.  The balance of plant operator 
position, a normal member of operating crew, was not used during the Halden 
experiments.  Within the ADS-IDAC model, the shift supervisor is analogous to the 
decision-maker and the reactor operator and assisting operator are modeled by a 
single action-taker.  Although the HAMMLAB simulator experiments were 




without knowledge of the actual crew performance during the LOFW simulator 
experiments (i.e., the predictions were done in a blind manner).   
 
10.3.1 Loss of Feedwater Scenario Descriptions 
 
During normal reactor plant operation, the steam generators use heat from the 
reactor coolant system to vaporize main feedwater in order to provide steam for main 
turbine operation.  At steady-state conditions, a control system adjusts main 
feedwater flow to maintain the secondary steam generator water level within a 
specified range.   If main feedwater flow is lost due either to a control system 
malfunction or a loss of the main feedwater pump flow, steam generator water level 
rapidly decreases.  To prevent a loss of core cooling, the reactor and main turbine are 
automatically shut down when a low steam generator water condition occurs, and an 
alternate auxiliary feedwater system is actuated to provide cooling water to the steam 
generators.  If the auxiliary feedwater system is unavailable following a loss of main 
feedwater, the operators should normally attempt to recover a source of feedwater 
flow or initiate an alternate means of core decay heat removal. 
HAMMLAB procedure functional recovery guideline FR-H.1, “Response to 
Loss of Secondary Heat Sink,” specifies three key operator actions following a 
complete loss of steam generator feedwater: 
 Stop the reactor coolant pumps to minimize heatup of the reactor coolant system 




 Attempt to recover a source of feedwater flow from either the auxiliary feedwater 
system, main feedwater system, or the condensate system.  If the condensate 
system is used, secondary pressure must be reduced due to the lower pressure 
capability of the condensate pumps. 
 Initiate reactor coolant system feed and bleed cooling if no source of feedwater 
can be recovered.  Feed and bleed cooling is initiated by aligning emergency core 
cooling and opening a relief path in the reactor coolant system. 
A flowchart of the key FR-H.1 operators actions included in the ADS-IDAC model is 
provided in Figure 50.  In order to model timing variations for control room crews, 
three briefing holds were identified in the procedure model: (1) prior to the start of 
the procedure, (2) prior to depressurization of the reactor coolant system if a low 
pressure source of feed is available, and (3) prior to initiation of feed and bleed 
cooling.  Although FR-H.1 does not require the operators to initiate feed and bleed 
cooling until the wide range level in at least two SGs is less than 12%, it was believed 
that some crews would initiate feed and bleed cooling earlier.  Rather than basing 
early initiation of feed and bleed on a specific SG level, it was decided to model an 
early transition through the use of a “watchdog” timer.  The timer monitors the 
elapsed time since initiation of FR-H.1 and transitions to feed and bleed when the 
timer exceeds a preset threshold value.  Thus, either low SG wide range level or a 
fully elapsed watchdog timer can initiate a transition to feed and bleed cooling.  It 
was also noted that operator actions during FR-H.1 step 7 to permit SG feeding from 









core cooling system.  Specifically, step 7.a directs the operators to reduce RCS 
pressure to just below the permissive setpoint for the low pressurizer pressure and 
high steam flow safety injection feature.  An excessive amount of depressurization 
prior to blocking these signals (or allowing RCS pressure to increase above the block 
reset setpoint) could result in an inadvertent safety injection.  Similarly, actions 
during step 7.c to depressurize one or more SGs to a pressure below the condensate 
pump discharge pressure could result in the generation of a safety injection if the 
cooldown is not well controlled.   
 
10.3.1.1  LOFW Scenario Base Case  
 
 
The base case loss of feedwater scenario begins with a complete loss of 
condensate pump flow with the reactor plant operating at 100% power.  The loss of 
condensate flow causes the main feedwater pumps to trip on low suction pressure 
resulting in a complete loss of feedwater to the steam generators.  Steam generator 
levels then rapidly decrease and the reactor automatically trips approximately 20 
seconds after the start of the scenario due to low steam generator water level.  If the 
operators quickly identify the loss of feedwater condition, they may initiate a manual 
reactor trip prior to automatic trip and conserve steam generator secondary inventory.  
Following the reactor trip, both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (MDAFPs) 
and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (TDAFP) are assumed to fail.  The 
operators are expected to diagnose that a complete loss of main and auxiliary 




secondary heat sink.”  Because flow from the condensate pumps, the MDAFPs, and 
the TDAFP cannot be recovered, the control room operators will need to initiate 
primary feed and bleed decay heat removal when the wide range level in two steam 
generators decreases below 12%.  If feed and bleed cooling is not promptly 
established, the reactor core heat generation will increase the reactor coolant system 
pressure and eventually cause the pressurizer PORVs to open.  In order for feed and 
bleed cooling to provide adequate heat removal, it must be established before the 
mass flow rate through the pressurizer PORVs exceeds the injection capability of the 
high head safety injection pumps.  Furthermore, core damage may occur if the 
injection flow is insufficient to prevent the reactor vessel water level decreasing 
below the level of the nuclear fuel.     
 
 
10.3.1.2  LOFW Scenario Complex Case 
 
 
The complex loss of feedwater scenario begins with a partial loss of 
condensate system flow with the reactor plant operating at 100% power.  The partial 
loss of condensate is initiated by the failure of all but one condensate pump.  
However, the remaining condensate pump is degraded with a maximum discharge 
pressure of  approximately 360 psi (normal discharge pressure for the pump is 
approximately  500 psi).  The low condensate discharge pressure causes the main 
feedwater pumps to trip on low suction pressure and results in a complete loss of 
feedwater.  Steam generator levels then rapidly decrease and the reactor automatically 




generator water level.  If the operators quickly identify the loss of feedwater 
condition, they may initiate a manual reactor trip prior to automatic trip and conserve 
steam generator secondary inventory.  Following the reactor trip, both motor driven 
auxiliary feedwater pumps (MDAFPs) and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater 
pumps (TDAFP) are assumed to fail.   
 
The operators are expected to diagnose that a complete loss of secondary 
makeup has occurred and initiate procedure FR-H.1, “Response to loss of secondary 
heat sink.”  With a condensate pump is available (but degraded), the operators may 
attempt to align feedwater flow to the steam generators from the condensate system.  
Because steam generator pressure is significantly greater than the discharge pressure 
of the condensate pump, the operators will need to increase steam flow in order to 
reduce steam generator pressure.  If the operators successfully align the condensate 
system to the steam generators before reaching the initiation criteria for feed and 
bleed cooling, FR-H.1 can be terminated once the narrow range steam generator 
levels are above 10%.  Although steam generator depressurization can lead to 
successful recovery of feedwater flow, higher steam flow reduces the steam generator 
water inventory faster and reduces the time until feed and bleed cooling must be 
initiated.  An additional complication is that two steam generator wide range level 
instrument failures mask the transfer criteria to feed and bleed.  Specifically, the wide 
range level indicator for the A steam generator becomes stuck at a value of 16% and 
the steam generator C indicator reads 15% high (i.e., a constant +15% bias).  Because 




range steam generator level indicators are below 12%, these instrument failures might 
delay or prevent the crew from initiating the appropriate transition. 
10.3.2 ADS-IDAC LOFW Predictions 
 
Based on a detailed review of the HAMMLAB loss of feedwater scenario, the 
associated Halden emergency procedures, and relevant industry operating experience, 
four main categories of crew variability were identified:  
(1) diagnosis and situational assessment;  
(2) timing;  
(3) procedural adherence; and  
(4) control inputs and manipulations.   
These categories are associated with the following crew behaviors: 
 Diagnosis and Situational Assessment: Immediately following the loss of 
feedwater event, an alert crew may quickly diagnosis the cause of the event 
and initiate a manual reactor trip before an automatic trip is actuated.  An 
earlier reactor trip preserves water inventory in the steam generators and 
extends the time available until feed and bleed cooling must be initiated.  
Diagnosis of a loss of heat sink condition requires the crew to perceive low 
steam generator water levels coincident with low feedwater flow.  Although 
the emergency procedures eventually prompt the operators to verify these 
parameters, a situationally aware crew might be expected to monitor these 
parameters and execute an earlier transition to FR-H.1, “Response to loss of 





 Timing:  The ADS-IDAC model included four main sources of timing 
variability.  These include:  
(1) the transition time between recognizing loss of secondary heat sink 
and initiating FR-H.1;  
(2) the time between initiation of FR-H.1 and tripping the reactor 
coolant pumps (FR-H.1 Briefing Hold #1);  
(3) the time between initiation of FR-H.1 and start of secondary 
depressurization (FR-H.1 Briefing Hold #2); and 
(4) the time between satisfying criteria for establishing of feed and 
bleed cooling and actual initiation of feed and bleed (FR-H.1 Briefing 
hold #3).   
Crews may exhibit timing variations due to the conduct of crew briefings or 
differences in procedure execution approaches that result in faster or slower 
procedure pacing. 
 
 Procedure Adherence:  ADS-IDAC includes a procedure step-skipping model.  
The probability of skipping a step action is dynamically calculated based upon 
the baseline skip probability for the step, the type of procedure being 
followed, the step objectives, the relevance of the action to the operator’s 
situational assessment, and certain performance influencing factors.  The 
results from the ADS-IDAC step-skipping model for a representative complex 




be seen in the figure, tripping the reactor coolant pumps as required by FR-
H.1, Step 3, and failing to block automatic safety injection actuation in FR-
H.1, Step 7.4 were highlighted as actions that may be omitted by the crew.  
The failure to trip the reactor coolant pumps increases the heat input into the 
reactor plant and reduces the time available until feed and bleed cooling must 
be initiated.  The failure to block safety injection may result in an inadvertent 
emergency core cooling system actuation which isolates the main feedwater 
system and complicates restoration of a feedwater source to the steam 
generators. 
Step Skip Liklihood (FRG-H.1)



















































Figure 51- Predicted Step-Skipping (Loss of Feedwater Scenario) 
 
During SG depressurization in the complex case, the need to continuously 
monitor SG pressure combined with time pressure may result in some crews 
failing to adequately control the depressurization.  This may lead either to an 




features) or an excessive amount of depressurization (which may delay 
restoration of feedwater). 
 Control Manipulations:  Certain procedure steps require operators to 
manipulate an adjustable control to achieve a specified control setting.  
Typical examples include changing setpoints for automatic control systems or 
adjusting regulating valves.  Control manipulations where operators may 
adjust control settings too little or too much (e.g., opening a regulating valve 
either more or less than desired) are potential sources of crew-to-crew 
variability.  Three main sources of control variability were identified in the 
loss of feedwater emergency procedures: (1) improper selection of reactor 
coolant system target pressure during FR-H.1, Step 7.a, leading to an 
inadvertent safety injection; (2) use of an excessive cooldown rate during the 
FR-H.1, Step 7.c, leading to an automatic main steam isolation; and (3) failure 
to open all available pressurizer power operated valves (PORVs) during FR-




Using the guidance outlined in Section 9.3, a review of Halden emergency 
procedures, and applicable industry-wide operating experience, the following 
potential sources of crew-to-crew variability were identified: 
 Early or Late Reactor Trip: If the control room immediately recognizes that a 
complete loss of feedwater has occurred, they may take action to manually 




event, the reactor will be automatically tripped due to a low-low steam 
generator water level condition.  Initiating a manual reactor trip will preserve 
inventory in the steam generators and provide additional time until feed and 
bleed cooling must be initiated. 
 Detection of Low Auxiliary Feedwater Flow:  The operators are expected to 
initiate FR H.1 when a low auxiliary feedwater condition occurs coincident 
with a low level in all steam generators.  The recognition of low auxiliary 
feedwater flow can either be self-identified by the crew or prompted by the 
emergency procedures.   For both the base and complex scenarios, it is 
expected that the crew transfers to ES-0.1 after verifying that safety injection 
is not required in E-0, Step Once the crew transfers to ES-0.1, they should 
commence monitoring critical safety functions (Halden procedure F-0, 
“Critical safety function status trees”) in accordance with E-0 foldout page 
instruction 3 and ES 0.1 foldout page instruction 3.  The operators are 
prompted to verify auxiliary feedwater flow by the following steps: 
1. ES-0.1, Step 6 requires the operators to verify steam generator water 
levels and feedwater flow; 
2. Status Tree F-0.3, “Heat Sink,” requires the operators to assess both 
steam generator water levels and total feedwater flow. 
If the operators fail to transfer to ES-0.1 following E-0, Step 4, there are 





1. E-0, Step 6, requires that the operators verify the status of the auxiliary 
feedwater pumps.  Because all auxiliary feedwater pumps have failed 
during the scenario, the operators would be expected to recognize the 
low auxiliary feedwater flow condition. 
2. E-0, Step 12, requires the operators to verify total auxiliary feedwater 
flow and specifically directs the operators to transition to FR H.1 if a 
low flow condition is detected.   
3. E-0, Step 22, directs the operators to begin monitoring critical safety 
function status trees.  This may prompt the operators to verify 
feedwater flow in accordance with the heat sink status tree (F-0.3). 
 
In addition to being directly prompted by a procedure, the crew may self-
identify the low auxiliary flow condition based on control panel monitoring 
and diagnostic activities.  Self-identification of the loss of auxiliary feedwater 
may result in an earlier initiation of FR H.1.  Consequently, the operators may 
trip the reactor coolant pumps sooner and extend the available time until feed 
and bleed cooling must be initiated. 
 
 Failure to Stop Reactor Coolant Pumps:  FR-H.1, Step 3, directs the crew to 
trip all operating reactor coolant pumps to reduce the reactor coolant system 
heat input and extend the time available until feed and bleed must be initiated.  
Because the operators may not immediately recognize the benefits of tripping 




will result in a decreased available time until feed and bleed cooling must be 
initiated.    
 
 Inadvertent Safety Injection During Reactor Coolant and Steam Generator 
Depressurization:  During the complex scenario, FR-H.1, Step 7, requires the 
crew to reduce reactor system pressure below 2015 psi in order to block the 
low pressure safety injection signal.  However, if the operator reduces reactor 
coolant system pressure below the safety injection setpoint (~ 1845 psi for the 
ADS-IDAC reference plant) prior to blocking the SI signal, the safety 
injection system may automatically actuate.  Similarly, if the crew fails to 
block automatic safety injection actuation or allows the block to reset due to 
reactor coolant system pressure increasing above 2015 psi, the safety injection 
system may actuate if later steam generator depressurization causes reactor 
pressure to decrease below the safety injection setpoint.  A safety injection 
actuation will increase reactor coolant system inventory and pressure and 
cause isolation of the main feedwater system.  Therefore, the operators will 
need to interrupt ongoing activities to terminate safety injection and reset the 
main feed water isolation.     
 
 Threshold Criteria for Initiation of Feed and Bleed:  FR-H.1, Step 9, directs 
the crew to initiate feed and bleed cooling when the wide range level in two 
steam generators is less than 12% or reactor coolant pressure exceeds 




status, the crew may elect to initiate feed and bleed early, particularly if they 
determine that a source of feed water flow cannot be immediately restored.  
During the complex case, the transition to feed and bleed cooling may be 
delayed because two of the wide range steam generator level indicators are 
stuck at a level above 12%.  Based on the crew’s experience and training, the 
time required to recognize the failed wide range level instrumentation and 
transition to feed and bleed cooling may vary.   
 
In order to facilitate the modeling of variations in the feed and bleed transition 
criteria, a watchdog timer was introduced to trigger initiation of feed and 
bleed following a specific time lag from the start of FR-H.1. For the base case 
scenarios, the watchdog timer is used to force an early transition to feed and 
bleed (i.e., the operators initiate feed and bleed when the watchdog timer 
expires, regardless of SG wide range level).  Because all SG wide level 
instruments are functional in the base case, feed and bleed will also be 
initiated when two SG wide range indicators reach 12% (regardless of the 
watchdog timer setting).  During the complex case scenarios, two of the three 
wide range SG level instruments are stuck at a value above the feed and bleed 
transition criteria.  Consequently, the procedural requirement for feed and 
bleed initiation based on SG level will never be satisfied.  The watchdog timer 
is used to trigger the transition to feed and bleed (i.e., the operators initiate 
feed and bleed when the watchdog timer expires, regardless of  the actual or 





 Reactor Coolant System Bleed Path:  FR-H.1, Step 15, requires the operators 
to open all three pressurizer power operator valves (PORVs).  However, 
because opening all PORVs will result in a rapid depressurization of the 
reactor coolant system, the crew may elect to open the PORVs one at a time or 
open fewer than three PORVs.  However, the failure to establish an adequate 
bleed path may limit the effectiveness of feed and bleed cooling and result in a 
greater likelihood of core uncovery.   
 
 Procedure Pacing and Timing:  In order to model variations in the pace and 
timing of procedure execution, three procedure hold points were identified:  
1. Prior to initiation of FR-H.1, Step 1; 
2. Prior to reactor coolant system depressurization in FR-H.1, Step 7; and 
3. Prior to feed and bleed cooling initiation in FR-H.1, Step 10. 
In the absence of any other source of available timing data, the length of all 
procedure hold points was modeled by a three parameter Weibull probability 
density function with a scale parameter of 200.0 seconds, a shape factor of 
1.75, and a minimum time of 0.0 seconds.  These parameters were set based 
on experience obtained during Phase 1 of the empirical study for the steam 
generator tube rupture scenarios.  The length of these three briefing holds 





A detailed summary of the sources of crew-to-crew variability is provided in 
Appendix G, “LOFW Scenario: Predicted Branching Events.”  LOFW predictions 
were documented in a report [101] that was provided to Halden and U.S. NRC 
staff associated with administration of the HRA empirical study. 
 
10.3.4 Preliminary Comparison to HAMMLAB Experimental Results 
  
 After a set of operator behavior predictions for both the base and complex 
scenarios were documented and provided to the International HRA Empirical Study 
administrative team, the actual simulator log data was reviewed to determine the 
accuracy of the ADS-IDAC predictions.  Although the simulator log data provides a 
wealth of information about the behavior of nuclear plant systems and operator 
control inputs, it lacks qualitative data that could be used to better calibrate and 
validate the model.  For example, the simulator log data contains a detailed time 
history of plant thermal-hydraulic parameters, alarms, and control inputs.  However, 
it is difficult to determine when operators commenced a procedure or held a crew 
briefing or meeting, and one can never be certain of crew motivations for behaviors.  
This information must be inferred from the more objective and quantitative log file 
data.  Despite this limitation, the blind prediction process used for this study provided 
a number of valuable insights about the modeling requirements needed to accurately 





10.3.4.1 General Analysis Approach for Experiment Results 
 
  
 Similar to the data analysis approach utilized during the calibration process 
(see Section 9.2.1), the simulator log data for the LOFW scenarios was reviewed to 
identify key benchmark points that could be traced back to explicit procedure steps.   
These benchmarks were then used to determine crew timing variability and areas 
where crews deviated from procedural requirements.  Based on a comparison between 
the governing Halden emergency operating procedures and the log data files, the 
following benchmark points were identified:  
 Alarm Actuation: Low Main Feed Pump Suction Pressure. The main feed 
pumps automatically trip when a low suction pressure condition occurs.  
Therefore, this alarm is defines the initiating loss of feedwater condition for 
both the base and complex scenarios.     
 
 Alarm Actuation: Reactor Trip Breaker Open.  This alarm is actuated when 
either the crew initiates a manual reactor trip or an automatic reactor trip is 
activated due to low SG water level.  By reviewing the time difference 
between actuation of the main feed pump suction and the reactor trip alarm, 
the associated SG water levels, and operator control inputs; it is possible to 
determine if the reactor trip was manually or automatically generated. 
 
 Alarm Actuation: Low Flow – Reactor Coolant Pumps 1-3.  This alarm is 
activated when the operators stop each loop reactor coolant pump.  Step 3 of 
procedure FR-H.1 directs the crew to stop all reactor coolant pumps.  
Therefore, this alarm provides an indication of when each crew performs this 
procedure step. 
 
 Component Status: Opening of  RCV227VP (Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray) or 
RCP052VP, RCP051VP, RCP050VP (Pressurizer PORVs).  In order to block 
the actuation of the low pressurizer pressure safety injection safety feature, it 
is necessary for the operators to depressurize the RCS to a pressure below the 
blocking permissive setpoint.  Step 7.a. of FR-H-1 specifies two methods to 
accomplish this depressurization – use of the auxiliary spray system or 
opening of a pressurizer PORV (the normal spray system cannot be used since 
the reactor coolant pumps are stopped in step 3 of FR-H.1).  This action is 
only performed if the crew believes it will be possible to align a low pressure 





 Alarm Actuation: Low Reactor Coolant Pressure Safety Injection Blocked.  
This alarm is activated when the operators intentionally block actuation of the 
low pressurizer pressure emergency core cooling safety feature.  The 
operators can only block this feature if reactor pressure has first been reduced 
below the permissive setpoint.  Procedure FR-H.1, step 7.b directs the crew to 
perform this action. 
 
 Alarm Actuation: High Steam Flow Safety Injection Blocked.  This alarm is 
activated when the operators intentionally block actuation of the high steam 
flow emergency core cooling safety feature. The operators can only block this 
feature if certain permissive conditions have been met.  Procedure FR-H.1, 
step 7.b directs the crew to perform this action. 
 
 Parameter Value: Wide Range SG Level in 2 SGs < 12%.  As specified in 
caution preceding step 2 of FR-H.1 and explicitly required by FR-H.1, step 9, 
the operators are directed to initiate feed and bleed cooling when the wide 
range level in at least two SGs decreases below 12%.  For the base case, all 
SG wide range level instruments are accurate and this condition can be 
directly determined.  For the complex case, the SG A and C wide range level 
indicators were biased high and this condition is inferred based on the level in 
SG B (there is a presumption that the level in all SGs decreases at 
approximately the same rate). 
 
 Alarm Actuation: Manual Safety Injection Actuated.  In order to establish feed 
and bleed decay heat removal, step 10 of FR-H.1 directs the operators to 
actuate a manual safety injection.  This action will activate the manual safety 
injection alarm.  The time delay reaching the entry condition for feed and 
bleed cooling (two SGs less than 12% wide range level) and activation of this 
alarm provides an indication of the operators situational assessment and 
whether the crew delays in performing this required action. 
 
 Component Status: Pressurizer PORV Valves Opened (RCP052VP, 
RCP051VP, RCP050VP).  Step 15 of  FR-H.1 directs the operators to open all 
available pressurizer PORVs.  This step completes alignment of the feed and 
bleed decay heat removal path. 
 
These benchmark points, and any intervening operator actions, can be mapped for 
each crew to determine specific timing and areas of human performance variability.  
In addition to determining the timing of these key benchmarks, the behavior of key 




and pressurizer water level) was plotted for each crew to determine both the plant 
context for operator actions and if any unanticipated actions were performed. 
 
 
10.3.4.2  LOFW Base Case Scenario Comparison to Predictions 
  
 
 For the relatively straightforward base scenario, it was determined that several 
predicted behaviors were observed during the Halden experiments.  For example, 
manual action to perform an early reactor trip, certain timing variabilities, and early 
transition to feed and bleed cooling were both predicted and observed for the base 
scenario.  However, it was determined that the ADS-IDAC predictions did not 
adequately capture all the plant behavior and timing variability among the Halden 
experiment crews.  For example, Figure 52 provides a comparison between Halden 
 






























Figure 52 - PZR Pressure Response (Base - Crew N) 
 
 
Crew N and a comparable ADS-IDAC predictive simulation run.  Although certain 
aspects of the scenario are similar between the two cases (e.g., time to trip reactor 




is significantly different.  For this crew, the transition to feed and bleed cooling was 
based on reaching the procedural requirement of at least two SGs with a wide range 
level less than 12%.  The same transition criterion was used for the ADS-IDAC 
prediction.  However, as shown in Figure 53, there is a significant calibration 
difference between the wide range level indicator for the FRESH simulator and 
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Figure 53 - SG Water Level Response (Base - Crew N) 
 
 
in the ADS-IDAC model.  Consequently, even though both sequences follow similar 
behavior rules, the actual transition time to feed and bleed cooling is dramatically 
different due to the ADS-IDAC model reaching a 12% wide range level condition 
approximately ten minutes before the FRESH simulator.  Additionally, the pressurizer 
pressure decrease for the Halden crew following initiation of feed and bleed appears 
to stop at approximately 2000 psi.  Upon consultation with Halden Reactor Project 
staff, it was determined the pressure behavior was due to an additional equipment 
failure that was included in the experimental scenario but not initially provided to the 




approximately 2000 psi, the pressurizer PORV failed closed resulting in loss of the 
bleed flow path.   
  
 The combined impact of the time to perform an early reactor trip and the time 
required to stop the reactor coolant pumps was also investigated.  Tripping the reactor 
early in the accident reduces water loss from the SGs and maximizes the availability 
water inventory for decay heat removal.  Tripping the reactor coolant pumps 
eliminates a significant heat input into the reactor plant and increases the time that 
heat removal via the SGs can be used to maintain core cooling.  An evaluation of the 
Halden data indicated that strong relationship between reactor trip time and available 
time until feed and bleed cooling had to be initiated (Figure 54).  Crews that initiated 
feed and bleed prior to reaching the 12% wide range SG level criterion were excluded 
from this analysis.  Based on this data analysis, tripping the reactor eight seconds  
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earlier increases the time until feed and bled must be initiated by approximately eight 
minutes.  Although the influence of reactor coolant pump trip time is less strong, 
tripping the pumps ten minutes later reduces the available time until feed and bleed 
by roughly five minutes.  These general trends are consistent with those calculated by 
the ADS-IDAC model.  This gives rise to the interesting conclusion that a crew who 
can quickly diagnosis the accident and expeditiously perform the initial procedure 
steps can substantially increase the time available until feed and bleed cooling must 
be initiated.  This serves to underscore one of the chief benefits of a dynamic 
simulation model in that the influence of prior operator actions and contextual factors 
are explicitly considered within the model.   
 
 Because of the nature of the base scenario, only procedure hold #1 (i.e., prior 
to start of the procedure FR-H.1) was relevant to this case.  Based on an analysis of 
the crew data and timing, a revised timing distribution was determined (Table 20).   








Minimum time (μ) 350 350 
Scaling Parameter (α) 200 376 
Shape Factor (β) 1.75 0.901 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 









The revised timing distribution show a reasonable and statistically significant fit to a 
Weibull distribution (Figure 55).  The main difference between these two 




variability than the timing assumed for the initial ADS-IDAC analysis.  Based on the 
revised distribution parameters, if five timing branches were generated, the nominal 
branching times would be 382 seconds, 471 seconds, 603 seconds, 820 seconds, and 
1440 seconds.  It is important to realize that when ADS-IDAC is run, the actual 
branching times may not show good agreement with observed behaviors due to the 
available resolution of the branching times.  For example, the branching time of 820 
seconds does not match any crew timing particularly well.  Therefore, the decision 
about how many timing branches to include is a tradeoff between the calculational 























































    μ = 350 seconds
    α = 376 seconds
    β = 0.901
● - Crew Data
♦ - Branching Time
 
Figure 55 - LOFW Base Case Briefing Hold #1 Timing 
 
 
It was initially believed that there might be significant timing variability in the delay 
between reaching the wide range SG level criteria that required initiation of feed and 
bleed and cooling and the actuation of the high pressure injection system.  Briefing 
Hold #3 in FR-H.1 (see Section 10.3.2) was intended to model this timing variability.  




high pressure injection by more than one minute once two or more wide range SG 
level indicators reached the 12% transition criteria.  The delay time for most crews 
was less than 30 seconds; though the longest crew took approximately three minutes.  
Therefore, it was concluded that variability in the time delay between reaching 
conditions requiring initiation of feed and bleed cooling and the execution of operator 
actions to align high pressure injection was not a significant source of crew-to-crew 
variability for this scenario.  
 
 In reviewing the base scenario data, an unexpected source of crew-to-crew 
variability was identified.  It was originally felt that there would be a minimal delay  
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Figure 56 - Pressurizer Pressure Response (Base - Crew F) 
 
 
between initiating high pressure injection for feed and bleed cooling and alignment of 
the pressurizer PORV bleed path.  However, substantial delays between the initiation 
of high pressure injection and alignment of the PORV bleed path were observed for 
several crews.  As shown in Figure 56, this delay resulted in multiple pressurizer 




the code safety relief setpoint.  There were several other unexpected crew behaviors 
noted during the base case scenario, including a non-proceduralized action to close 
the main steam isolation valves.   
 
It is not clear how a number of modeling assumptions for the nuclear plant 
model may affect the comparison between the Halden data and ADS-IDAC.  For 
example, the ADS-IDAC model assumed that the condenser steam dump system 
remained available for a short time following loss of condensate pump flow.  
Additionally, since main feedwater pumps are large rotating pieces of equipment with 
substantial inertia, they may provide some continued feedwater flow following loss of 
condensate as they coast down.  Because the detailed modeling assumptions used in 
the FRESH simulator were not available, these factors represent a source of model 
uncertainty for the ADS-IDAC analysis.   
 
 
10.3.4.3  LOFW Complex Case Scenario Comparison to Predictions 
 
 
 During the complex case scenarios, Briefing Holds #1 (before the start of FR-
H.1) and Briefing Hold #2 (before reactor coolant system depressurization in Step 
7.a) were determined to be relevant to the data comparison.  Briefing hold #3 was 
originally envisioned to be used prior to initiation of feed and bleed to represent a 
delay between the crew’s decision to initiate this mode of decay heat removal and the 
actual execution of the required actions.  Although it is likely that crews exhibited 
some level of variance in the time taken to initiate feed and bleed cooling, there is 




timing behavior.  The crew data analysis for the timing of briefing holds #1 and #2 is 
summarized in Table 12.  Similar to the results for the base case scenario, the initial 














Minimum time (μ) 350 350 140 140 
Scaling Parameter (α) 200 531 200 408 
Shape Factor (β) 1.75 1.25 1.75 1.19 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test Statistic (K-S) 
- 0.185 - 0.104 
Base 
Scenario 
Critical K-S Value 
(0.05 significance) 
- 0.361 - 0.361 
 
timing parameter used in the ADS-IDAC analysis underestimated both the time 
delays and the variance among the crews.  The revised timing distributions for both 
briefing holds show a reasonable and statistically significant fit to a Weibull 
























































    μ = 350 seconds
    α = 531 seconds
    β = 1.25
● - Crew Data
♦ - Branching Time
 



























































    μ = 140 seconds
    α = 408 seconds
    β = 1.19
● - Crew Data
♦ - Branching Time
 
Figure 58 - LOFW Complex Case Briefing Hold #2 Timing 
 
 
 A significant modeling issue was identified in reviewing the complex scenario 
crew data.  Specifically, procedure FR-H.1 specifies that the auxiliary spray system 
should be used to reduce RCS pressure in Step 7.a.  When the ADS-IDAC model was 
created, it was initially believed that the pressurizer PORV could be used to fulfill the 
same function as the auxiliary spray valve.  Therefore, no auxiliary spray system 
model was initially included in the ADS-IDAC nuclear plant model.  However, in 
reviewing the FRESH simulator data, use of the auxiliary spray system generates a 
significantly different plant response than use of the PORV.  As shown in Figure 59, 
the pressure response for the auxiliary spray valve is considerably slower than that for 
the pressurizer PORV.  Additionally, the addition of coolant via the auxiliary spray 
system tends to increase pressurizer water level while the use of the pressurizer 




































Figure 59 - Pressurizer Pressure Response (Complex - Crew M) 
 
not included in the ADS-IDAC model, the predicted plant response will not 
accurately match observed behavior.   
 
Another operator behavior that was not anticipated is operator action to 
maintain pressurizer pressure below the P11 permissive setpoint.  Allowing pressure 
to increase above this setpoint would eliminate the block placed on the low pressure.   
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safety injection actuation during step 7.b of FR-H.1. Although this action is not 
explicitly covered by the procedures, Figure 60 shows Crew L taking action to 
proactively maintain pressure below the reset setpoint.   
 
Some crews also encountered difficulty decreasing RCS pressure below the 
P11 permissive setpoint (approximately 2000 psi) when attempting to block the low 
RCS pressure safety injection actuation signal.  The FRESH simulator includes a 
design feature that automatically shuts the pressurizer PORVs when pressure 
decreases below 2000 psi.  Although this feature can be readily defeated by the crews 
during the complex scenario, some crews (e.g., Crew F) appeared to experience 
difficulty in doing so (see Figure 61).  Because the ADS-IDAC plant model does not 
include this feature, it was not possible to anticipate this behavior.   
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Figure 61 - Pressurizer Pressure Response (Complex - Crew F) 
 
 
A final modeling issue involved the restoration of feed water flow to the SGs 




The ADS-IDAC model aligned the condensate pumps to the SGs when the 
appropriate pressure condition was met (see Figure 62).  However, none of the 
Halden simulator crews aligned feedwater flow to the SGs even when the requisite 
conditions were met.  One possible explanation is that cold feeding a hot SG can 
result in damage to the steam generator and place a significant thermal transient on 
the reactor coolant system.  It is possible that the Halden crews delayed initiation of 
feedwater flow due to their perceived decision responsibility during the scenario.  
Once feed and bleed cooling is established, there is adequate heat removal from the 
reactor core and it is not necessary to immediately initiate cold feeding from the 
condensate system.  Although feed and bleed cooling is not a desirable form of decay  
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Figure 62 - SG Wide range Level Response (Complex - Crew M) 
 
 
heat removal, the associated plant conditions may reduce the pressure on the crew to 






10.3.4.4  Summary of Predicted and Observed Operator Behavior  
 
  
 A summary table of the predicted and observed operator behavior for the base 
and complex scenarios is provided in Appendix H, “LOFW Scenario: Crew 
Performance Summary.”   A number of key predicted performance issues were 
observed during the actual simulator exercises, including initiation of an early manual 
reactor trip, failure to trip the reactor coolant pumps in a timely manner12, timing 
variabilities for key actions during the loss of heat sink procedure, failure to block 
certain safety injection actuation signals, and failure to establish an effective bleed 
path through the pressurizer PORVs.  Despite this success, the ADS-IDAC model 
lacked several key features that were observed during the experiments.  In general, 
these issues fell into the following categories: 
 Timing calibration issues – A nominal timing distribution was used for all 
procedure holds in FR-H.1.  Because there was very little data available to 
develop a more informed estimate for timing variability, the distribution 
parameters did not have a rigorous basis.  In comparison with observed data, 
the assumed distributions underestimated both the average time required to 
execute the procedure and the variance between crews.  
 Plant thermal-hydraulic model issues – A number of thermal-hydraulic 
modeling issues were identified during the initial comparison effort. Most 
significant among these issues are the failure to include the auxiliary spray 
                                                 
12 Although several crews significantly delayed tripping the reactor coolant pumps during the LOFW 
scenarios, it was determined that these delays were due to delays in initiating procedure FR-H.1 rather 
than skipping the associated steps in procedure FR-H.1.  Although ADS-IDAC was useful in 
identifying that time required to trip reactor coolant pumps could represent a significant source of crew 




system in the thermal-hydraulic model and differences in the calibration of the 
wide range SG water level instrumentation.  
 Procedure modeling – The observed crew performance data indicates that a 
number of procedure steps were performed in parallel (e.g., in several cases 
depressurization of the RCS continued after the safety injection P11 
permissive was reached) and some of the crews did not perform certain 
recovery actions during the complex scenario.  Although it is difficult to 
identify the reasons and motivations for these behaviors, it is possible that 
crews evaluated the time constraints and determined that there was 
insufficient time to effectively perform the requested actions. 
Section 10.4 discusses the recalibration effort that was used to upgrade ADS-IDAC in 
order to better reproduce the results observed during the LOFW simulator exercises.
  
10.4 Recalibration of ADS-IDAC Model 
  
The initial comparison between ADS-IDAC predictions and observed crew 
behaviors for the Halden LOFW scenarios showed that the ADS-IDAC approach is 
capable of predicting a number of contextually driven human errors.  In particular, the 
crew variability associated with the execution of an early reactor trip and the failure 
to block certain automatic safety feature actuation signals were both predicted by the 
ADS-IDAC information driven model and observed during the empirical study.  In 
addition, it was determined that variations in the action thresholds utilized by the 




be readily examined with the ADS-IDAC model.  However, as noted in Section 
10.3.4.4, a number of limitations in the ADS-IDAC model were also identified.  
These issues fell into three broad categories – errors or over-simplifications in the 
ADS-IDAC nuclear plant thermal-hydraulic plant model, the somewhat inflexible 
procedure-following flow path initially used in ADS-IDAC to model the loss of heat 
sink procedure FR-H.1, and the lack of a number of important skill- and rule-based 
behaviors utilized by the crews during the scenario.  In order to both improve the 
content of the ADS-IDAC operator knowledge base and ensure that the model is 
capable of realistically representing actual crew performance, the model was 
recalibrated based on the operating experience gained from the Halden empirical 
study.  After the recalibration effort was completed, a final set of ADS-IDAC 
simulation runs was performed to verify that the model was capable of accurately 
reproducing actual crew behaviors using a minimal set of branching rules. 
 
10.4.1 Thermal-Hydraulic and Operator Model Modifications 
 
Several thermal-hydraulic, procedure, and operator modeling issues were 
identified during the initial comparison of ADS-IDAC predictions to observed 
operator behaviors.  In order to resolve these issues, a number of changes were made 
to the RELAP nuclear plant model improve the alignment between the ADS-IDAC 
nuclear plant model and the Halden FRESH nuclear plant simulator.  These plant 
model revisions included a reduction in the ADS-IDAC plant initial power level and 




an auxiliary spray valve for use as an alternate method to reduce pressurizer pressure, 
and adjustment of modeling assumptions pertaining to the post trip availability of the 
condenser steam dump system during the base case scenario.  The following specific 
issues were addressed in the ADS-IDAC plant model in order to better reproduce the 
results obtained in the FRESH simulator facility: 
 
 Reactor Power Level 
The ADS-IDAC reference plant has a rated full power level of 2660 MW.  This 
corresponds to a full power steam flow of approximately 3230 lbm/sec.  In 
contrast, the full power steam flow for the FRESH simulator is approximately 
3150 lbm/sec, or roughly 2.5% lower.  Assuming that the design of the ADS-
IDAC and FRESH SGs are similar, the higher power level in the ADS-IDAC 
model results in a quicker depletion of SG water inventory prior to the reactor trip 
and a higher decay heat generation rate after reactor trip.  Both of these effects 
would cause the ADS-IDAC model to reach the SG wide range level transition 
criteria of 12% level before the FRESH simulator, assuming all other factors were 
similar.   To address this issue, the initial power level of the ADS-IDAC model 
was reduced from approximately 100% power to 97% power.  This brought the 
initial total steam flow for the ADS-IDAC plant model down to roughly 3155 
lbm/sec, or within less than 0.2% of the FRESH simulator steam flow.  In 
addition to the power reduction in the ADS-IDAC model, the decay heat 
generation rate was also slightly reduced to provide better agreement with the 





 SG Wide Range Level Instrument Scaling 
Following the reduction in initial power level for the ADS-IDAC plant model, the 
agreement between SG wide range level response between ADS-IDAC and the 
FRESH facility was slightly improved but still relatively poor.  The wide range 
steam generator level for the ADS-IDAC RELAP plant model is calculated using 
Equation 13:   




















In these equations, ρg(TCAL) and ρf(TCAL) refer to the steam vapor and liquid 
density at the SG level calibration temperature TCAL; g is the gravitational 
constant, and hUpperTap and hLowerTap are the relative heights of the upper and lower 
instrument taps into the SG, and pUpperTap and pLowerTap are the pressure conditions 
at the respective instrument tap.  The calculation of SG water level requires 
knowledge of two plant specific parameters, namely the selected calibration 
temperature for the SG level instrument and the relative heights of the upper and 
lower instrument taps.  Unfortunately, this detailed level of plant information was 









































Figure 63 - Calibration of ADS-IDAC SG Wide Range Level 
 
was adjusted to bring the ADS-IDAC wide range steam generator level into closer 
agreement with the FRESH simulator (see Figure 63).  The net effect of this 
adjustment was equivalent to changing the instrument calibration temperature 
from 800 psia (corresponding to the normal full power SG pressure) to 
approximately 1000 psia (which is consistent with the normal hot shutdown SG 
pressure).  Additionally, a lag filter was added to the RELAP level calculation to 
improve the stability of the instrument.  
 
 Auxiliary Spray 
The auxiliary spray system is used to reduce pressurizer pressure when the normal 
pressurizer spray system is unavailable.  The driving force for the normal spray 
system is provided by the reactor coolant pumps.  When the reactor coolant 
pumps are stopped (as required by FR-H.1), there is no longer a sufficient 




pressurizer.  The auxiliary spray system directs flow from the chemical and 
volume control system (which is used to control pressurizer water level), into the 
pressurizer spray nozzle to reduce RCS pressure.  During FR-H.1, the auxiliary 
spray system is the preferred means for pressure reduction.  When the loss of heat 
sink procedure was initially modeled in ADS-IDAC, the analyst felt that the 
additional realism provided by building an auxiliary spray system model was not 
worth the level of effort required.  Therefore, all RCS pressure reductions in the 
ADS-IDAC model were made with the pressurizer PORV valve.  It is now clear 
that this approach was inadequate since the plant response to using the auxiliary 
spray valve is substantially different from the response obtained by using the 
PORV.  Most importantly, opening the PORV bleeds reactor coolant from the 
plant, reducing pressurizer level, while the use of the auxiliary spray system adds 
coolant to the RCS and increases pressurizer water level.  Also, the rate of 
pressure reduction with the spray valve is significantly slower than with use of the 
PORV.  Consequently, the ADS-IDAC model failed to reproduce important 
features of the nuclear plant response during procedure FR-H.1.  To remedy this 
situation, an auxiliary spray valve model was added to the ADS-IDAC plant.  
This experience served to underscore the importance of ensuring that the nuclear 
plant model in ADS-IDAC is as realistic as possible. 
 
 Condenser Availability Following Loss of Condensate Pumps 
The normal means to remove decay heat following a reactor trip is through use of 




directly into the main turbine condenser.  The condenser is designed to operate at 
sub-atmospheric pressure conditions (i.e., under a vacuum) and steam dump flow 
will be isolated if condenser pressure becomes elevated.  The flow from the 
condensate pumps supports a number of functions needed to maintain main 
condenser steam dumping availability, including cooling for air ejector heat 
exchanges and hotwell level control.  Although the condenser vacuum can be 
maintained without condensate pump flow for a short period of time (the main 
heat removal function is provided by a separate circulating water system), vacuum 
will eventually be lost due to the build up of non-condensables or loss of hotwell 
level control.  The availability of the condenser steam dump system following 
loss of condensate flow is significant for the LOFW base scenario since loss of 
the condenser for decay heat removal limits the options available to the operators.  
Because the ADS-IDAC thermal-hydraulic plant model does not have a detailed 
model of the main condenser, the loss of condenser vacuum following a 
condensate pump trip was initially simulated by blocking condenser steam dump 
capability 120 seconds after loss of condensate pump flow.  However, in 
reviewing the results of the Halden simulator exercises, it appeared that the 
condenser remained available for a substantial period of time following loss of the 
condensate pumps.  For better consistency with the results from the Halden 
simulator exercises, this time period for condenser availability following loss of 
the condensate pumps was increased to 3000 seconds for certain sequences.  This 





 Failure of Pressurizer PORV Bleed Path 
During the base scenario, the Halden crews experienced an additional failure in 
that the pressurizer PORV’s bleed flowpath isolated once RCS pressure dropped 
below approximately 2000 psi.  This condition required the operators to 
depressurize at least one SG in order to align a low pressure source of makeup 
water (e.g., firemain water).  This condition was not originally included in the 
ADS-IDAC mode, but was easily added through the use of a conditional hardware 
failure branching event. 
 
There are several differences between the ADS-IDAC plant model and the 
FRESH simulator that were not reconciled.  A key plant difference is that the ADS-
IDAC plant model includes non-return check valves on each SG main steam line 
while the FRESH simulator does not.  The non-return valves prevent one SG from 
back feeding into the other two via the main steam system.  The main effect of this 
plant difference is that opening a single SG atmospheric dump valve on the FRESH 
simulator permits steam flow from each steam generator to be vented to atmosphere, 
somewhat simplifying the SG cooldown and depressurization process.  In the ADS-
IDAC model, the non-return check valves block steam flow from the other SGs even 
if all the MSIVs are open.  Additionally, some of the automatic protective functions 
differ between the plants. For example, the ADS-IDAC model does not include a 
safety feature actuation signal on high differential pressure between the SGs while the 
FRESH simulator does include this feature.  These differences can limit the ability of 




behaviors when these features are important.  For example, one crew during the 
Halden empirical study actuated the emergency core cooling system during SG 
depressurization due to a high differential pressure between SGs.  This inadvertent 
action served to accomplish a key feature of FR-H.1, namely alignment of high 
pressure feed flow to the reactor coolant system.  However, this feature is not 
included in the design for the ADS-IDAC reference plant and thus could neither be 
predicted nor simulated.  This serves to underscore the need to accurately represent 
the real plant model when using a simulation tool such as ADS-IDAC to predict 
operator behaviors (or at least appreciate the limitations of such an approach). 
 
In addition to nuclear plant modeling changes, a number of issues regarding the 
implementation of the loss of heat sink procedure (FR-H.1) were also noted during 
the comparisons with the Halden crews.  Most notably, the Halden crews appeared to 
perform a number of actions in parallel.  For example, during the complex scenario, 
step 7.a of FR-H.1 directs the operators to reduce RCS pressure below approximately 
2000 psia and then block certain safety feature actuation signals per step 7.b.  It was 
initially assumed that crews would terminate the depressurization of the RCS shortly 
after achieving the required RCS pressure condition needed to block the low pressure 
safety injection actuation signal.  However, some crews continued depressurization of 
the RCS for a substantial period of time after completing the actions of FR-H.1 Step 
7.b.  In some cases, the crews continued forward in the procedure with additional 
actions, such as depressurization of the SGs, with RCS depressurization still in 




which low pressure condensate could be used to supply makeup flow.  These issues 
indicate that crews exhibited significant variations in their interpretation of key 
procedure steps, often leading to different plant states and situational contexts.  In 
order to reproduce these types of behaviors, the following revisions were made to the 
ADS-IDAC loss of heat sink procedure model: 
 
 Additional Watchdog Timer 
In order to permit the modeling of time dependent actions within ADS-IDAC, the 
model includes “watchdog timers” that can be set and read by the operators.  
These timers are useful for initiating actions or behaviors that are executed after a 
fixed time delay, such as initiating certain actions within a fixed time after 
commencing a procedure or switching to an alternate means to accomplish a 
function after a predetermined interval.  For example, in the original ADS-IDAC 
FR-H.1 model, a watchdog timer was used during the complex scenarios to 
initiate the transition to feed and bleed cooling since the SG wide range level 
instruments could not be used due to biasing factors applied to two of the 
indictors.  The timer was initialized when FR-H.1 was started and periodically 
checked as the operator progressed through the procedure.  When the timer 
reached a threshold value, the operator initiated action to establish feed and bleed 
cooling.  In reviewing the Halden crew data, it was noted that during the complex 
scenario several crews attempted to depressurize the RCS using auxiliary spray, 
but then switched to the pressurizer PORV after a time delay.  This switching of 




depressurization using the auxiliary spray valve was either too slow or ineffective.  
In order to model this type of behavior, an additional watchdog timer was added 
to the ADS-IDAC model that triggers a switch to the pressurizer PORV if the 
auxiliary spray system does not effectively lead to the desired plant conditions 
before the timer expires.    
 
 Time Availability for Performing Key Actions 
Some crews during the complex scenario appeared to skip procedure actions 
associated with depressurization of the RCS or the SGs.  This may have occurred 
if the crew believed that insufficient time was available to execute the required 
action.  Under these circumstances, a crew may elect to maintain stable plant 
conditions and initiate feed and bleed cooling to ensure adequate decay heat 
removal prior to attempting further recovery actions.  This behavior is a form of 
step-skipping behavior in that the crew elects to deviate from a procedure 
objective in order to achieve a goal considered to be more relevant to the 
perceived situational context.  Although a future version of ADS-IDAC may 
include sufficient modeling features to handle this type of procedure step 
skipping, the current version lacks this capability.  Therefore, in order to model 
this crew behavior, the procedure was modified to verify the remaining time of 
the watchdog timer used to trigger the transition to feed and bleed initiation.  If 
the remaining time was less than a preset threshold, the associated action was 




that characterizes the willingness of the crew to initiate a fairly complex recovery 
action with limited time. 
 
 Blocking Cold Feed of the Steam Generators 
It was determined that none of the Halden crews initiated cold feeding of the 
steam generators during the complex scenario, even when plant conditions would 
support such an action.  Since one of the main objectives of FR-H.1 is to reduce 
SG pressure below the condensate pump discharge pressure so that the condensate 
system can be used as an alternate source of SG makeup water, this observation 
was somewhat surprising.  However, cold feeding a steam generator has the 
potential to damage plant equipment and may lead to a significant transient on the 
reactor plant.  Consequently, the crews may have felt that the decision to initiate 
cold feeding was beyond their level of responsibility or should only be done in 
consultation with more senior plant management staff.  Given that the 
establishment of stable feed and bleed cooling provides adequate core cooling, 
initiation of cold feeding does not necessarily need to be done in a rapid manner. 
In order to model this behavior in ADS-IDAC, a crew preference to delay cold 
feeding a SG was added to the operator knowledge base.  If this preference is 






 Establishing the Pressurizer  PORV Relief Path 
During the base scenario, a plant equipment failure that was not initially described 
in the empirical study description was used during the actual crew experiments.  
Specifically, once the operators aligned a bleed path by opening one or more 
pressurizer PORV, and the RCS pressure decreased below approximately 2000 
psi, the PORV bleed path would isolate.  Once the bleed path isolated, the 
operator would be unable to reopen the valves.  This condition was not included 
in the initial ADS-IDAC procedure model since this failure was not anticipated.  
However, in this situation, FR-H.1 step 16 directs the operators to depressurize at 
least one SG in order to align a source of low pressure makeup water.  In order to 
better match Halden crew performance with ADS-IDAC, the appropriate steps to 
depressurize the SGs were added to the procedure model to support these actions.  
It was noted that several crews had significant delays in aligning the pressurizer 
PORV bleed path following initiation of high pressure coolant injection.  
Although the time delay between initiation of injection flow and opening the 
PORV valves was only approximately two to three minutes for most crews, 
several crews experienced delay of more than five to ten minutes.  This behavior 
was easily captured in the ADS-IDAC model by increasing the time required to 
open the pressurizer PORVs. 
The revised FR-H.1 procedure model based on these enhancements is shown in 
Figure 64.  The changes to the procedure model relative to the initial version (Figure 




model for FR-H.1 improves the capability of ADS-IDAC to reproduce observed 
operator behaviors. 
  
Summary of ADS-IDAC Model Recalibration 
In summary, the final recalibration focus area involved the development of 
additional mental beliefs to enhance the operator knowledge base in ADS-IDAC.  
The creation of new mental beliefs was largely driven by the desire to better model 
observed operator behaviors during the execution of FR-H.1.  These behaviors 
include skipping of certain procedure sections, blocking the addition of cold 
feedwater to the SGs, performing certain actions in parallel, and taking actions to 
protect plant equipment or maintain key plant parameters within a specified control 
band.   Specifically, the following mental beliefs were developed: 
 
 Equipment Protection - A mental belief to activate a rule-based action to trip all 
reactor coolant pumps when a loss of subcooling margin occurs following 
initiation of emergency core cooling.    
 
 Crew Preferences - A mental belief to characterize the crew’s preference for 
alignment of a cold feedwater source to a hot and dry steam generator.  Based on 
a review of the Halden data, even when crews had established the required plant 
conditions to align the condensate system to provide SG makeup, this action was 
not performed.  Therefore, the decision to delay initiation cold feeding to the SGs 









RCS and/or SG depressurization during the complex case were also modeled with 
mental beliefs. 
 
 Performance of Parallel Actions – During the complex scenario, it was noted that 
some crews performed some FR-H.1 steps in parallel.  For example, crews 
continued the RCS depressurization directed by step 7.a even after the desired 
safety feature blocking signals had been actuated in step 7.b.  Furthermore, some 
crews initiated the SG depressurization directed by step 7.c without first 
terminating the RCS depressurization initiated in step 7.a.  To model these types 
of parallel procedural actions, additional mental beliefs to shut the auxiliary spray 
valve, secure SG depressurization, and stop the reactor coolant pumps were added 
to the operators’ skill- and rule-based action queue.  The time delay for 
performing each of these actions was established to better represent actual crew 
behavior.  Using this model, the ADS-IDAC crew could then continue the 
execution of procedure FR-H.1 while executing a previous procedure step in 
parallel.   
  
 Maintaining Plant Parameters Within a Control Band – During the complex 
scenario, an inadvertent safety injection would lead to a main feedwater system 
automatic isolation and further complicate plant recovery.  Therefore, it is 
important to avoid inadvertent actuation of a safety injection during 
depressurization of the SGs.  Consequently, step 7.b. of FR-H.1 directs the 




below the blocking permissive setpoint of approximately 2000 psi.  Because of 
the design of the blocking control system, if RCS pressure increases above 2000 
psi, the safety injection signals are unblocked.  Although not explicitly stated in 
the procedure, once a crew successfully blocks these signals, RCS pressure must 
be maintained below the permissive setpoint.  In order to model this behavior, a 
mental belief was added to the operator knowledge base to use the auxiliary spray 
system as needed to maintain pressure below the permissive setpoint once the 
safety injection signals were blocked.   
 
Once these modeling changes were added to the operator knowledge base and nuclear 
plant model, ADS-IDAC was run to determine if the actual crew behaviors observed 
during the Halden exercises could be reproduced.  Although this does not serve to 
validate the predictive capability of the ADS-IDAC model, it provided useful 
information about the modeling capabilities of ADS-IDAC and the feasibility of 
using a simulation approach to predict operator behavior.  Additionally, this effort 
served to significantly extend the scope and level of detail of the operator knowledge 
base.  The results of the final comparison effort are discussed in Section 10.4.2. 
 
10.4.2 Final Comparison to HAMMLAB Experimental Results 
 
 In order to verify that the modeling improvements successfully reproduced  
the actual observed crew behaviors during the Halden LOFW scenarios, a final set of 




objective of these runs were twofold: first to verify that the enhanced ADS-IDAC 
plant model and knowledge base adequately reflected actual crew performance, and 
second to ensure that the range of crew-to-crew variability observed during the 
experiments could be reproduced with a minimal set of branching rules. 
 
10.4.2.1  LOFW Base Case – Final Comparison 
  
The main source of observed crew-to-crew variability for the base case scenario 
involved the decision to trip the reactor early (i.e., prior to automatic reactor trip) and 
the timing of key operator actions such as tripping the reactor coolant pumps and 
opening the pressurizer PORV bleed path.  It was determined that seven branching 
rules were adequate to represent the range of crew-to-crew variations observed during 
the base case scenario.  The specific branching rules involve the following elements: 
 
 Early detection of the loss of feedwater condition leading to a manual reactor trip.  
The early manual reactor trip was initiated by activation of a mental belief 
associated with the occurrence of a loss of feedwater event.  Two branches were 
used to represent crew variability (either the crew recognized the loss of 
feedwater early and manually tripped the reactor, or the reactor was automatically 
tripped due to low SG water level). 
 
 The delay time between initiation of procedure FR-H.1 and initiation of feed and 
bleed cooling.  As discussed in Section 10.3.2, a watch dog timer is used to force 




bleed initiation threshold for all fourteen base case crews could be modeled with 
four watchdog timer branches.  Three branches represent an early transition to 
feed and bleed, while the fourth timing branch is set sufficiently high to permit 
wide range SG level to drive the crew transition. 
 
 The time delay between trip of the reactor and stopping of the reactor coolant 
pumps (Briefing Hold #1).  It was determined that generating five timing 
branches on briefing hold #1 were sufficient to cover crew variability. 
 
 The time delay between initiation of high pressure injection for feed and bleed 
cooling and opening of the pressurizer PORV.  Three timing branches for opening 
of the PORV adequately represented crew variability for the base case. 
 
 For those crews that recognized the occurrence of the loss of feedwater event and 
initiated a pre-emptive manual reactor trip, the time to execute a manual reactor 
trip was included as a branching point. Two timing branches were sufficient to 
represent crew-to-crew variability. 
 
 The time delay between reaching the SG wide range level condition requiring 
initiation of feed and bleed cooling and initiation of high pressure injection.  For 





 The time to initiation of depressurization of a SG once it was determined that the 
PORV bleed path was blocked.  This was adequately modeled with two timing 
branches. 
 
The failure to trip all three reactor coolant pumps relatively early in the scenario by 
one crew (Crew L) during the base case scenario was handled through the use of a 
conditional run where the tripping of the loop 1 reactor coolant pump was blocked 
during execution of FR-H.1 Step 3.  Although ADS-IDAC has the capability to 
explicitly model the tripping of only two pumps, a significant number of sequences 
must generated to obtain the proper combination of tripped and untripped pumps.  To 
avoid sequence explosion, a conditional run was used to avoid the generation of 
excessive branch sequences.  Although this approach adequately models the plant 
response observed for Crew L (see Figure 85 and Figure 86 in Appendix I), it does 
not realistically model actual crew behavior.  Based on additional feedback from the 
Halden Reactor Project staff, it was learned that this crew tripped two reactor coolant 
pumps prior to starting FR-H.1 to minimize heat input to the RCS.  Although it took 
the crew a significant amount of time to transfer to procedure FR-H.1, they tripped 
the third pump in accordance with procedure direction.  Therefore, the crew did not 
actually skip or miss the step in FR-H.1.  However, this crew behavior could be 
captured within ADS-IDAC through the creation of an additional rule-based action to 
trip two reactor coolant pumps when a loss of secondary heat sink condition is 
perceived and the assignment of a long delay time for initiating FR-H.1.  Because the 




highlights the need to augment quantitative experiment data with qualitative 
observations. 
 
 Ideally, a single ADS-IDAC simulation run could be used to exercise these 
seven branching rules and generate specific sequences that correspond to each of the 
Halden crews.  Unfortunately, even with this relatively small number of branching 
rules, more than one thousand separate sequence branches would need to be 
generated.  Because the underlying plant thermal-hydraulic model runs just slightly 
faster than real time (one hour of simulated time takes just slightly less than one hour 
of actual time), generating the dynamic event tree for this case on a single computer 
could take in excess of 30 days.  Therefore, in order to make the generation of the 
dynamic event tree manageable in a reasonable amount of time, a series of 
conditional runs, each exercising only three or four branching events with all other 
conditions held to a nominal condition, were performed.  This allowed efficient 
generation of sequences representing each of the Halden crews using the above 
branching rules without wasting computation effort on sequences that were not 
observed.  The results of these conditional runs are provided in Appendix I.  The 
agreement between the ADS-IDAC generated sequences using the above branching 
rules and the actual observed crew behaviors was reasonable, capturing most major 





10.4.2.2 LOFW Complex Case – Final Comparison 
 
 
 The complex case scenarios involved a significantly greater amount of crew-
to-crew variability than the base case.  This is not unexpected since the complex case 
required a greater number of operator actions in order to partially depressurize the 
RCS, block safety injection actuation signals, and attempt to depressurize at least one 
SG to align low pressure feedwater makeup capability.   As in the base case, the main 
source of crew-to-crew variability was the timing of key operator actions.  For the 
complex case, these key actions involved tripping the reactor coolant pumps (Briefing 
Hold #1), initiation of RCS depressurization (Briefing Hold #2), transition to feed and 
bleed cooling, opening of the pressurizer PORV to establish a bleed path, and 
initiation of SG depressurization.  However, in addition to timing variability, there 
were also several examples of control input variabilities observed in the Halden crews 
during the complex scenarios.  In particular, crews exhibited variability in the control 
of both the steam dump control system and operation of the auxiliary spray and 
pressurizer PORV valves during RCS depressurization.  In general, ten branching 
rules captured the major sources of crew-to-crew variability in the complex scenario.  
The specific branching rules included the following elements: 
 
 The delay time between initiation of procedure FR-H.1 and initiation of feed and 
bleed cooling.  As discussed in Section 10.3.2, a watchdog timer is used to force 
an early transition to feed and bleed cooling.  It was determined that the feed and 
bleed initiation threshold for all fourteen base case crews could be adequately 




biasing of the wide range SG level indicators resulted in the watchdog timer being 
the sole means to initiate the transition to feed and bleed cooling.  The quickest 
transition from start of FR-H.1 to initiation of feed and bleed cooling was 
approximately five minutes while the longest was more fifty minutes.  Most crews 
fell in the range of 25 to 45 minutes. 
 
 The time delay between trip of the reactor and stopping of the reactor coolant 
pumps (Briefing Hold #1).  It was determined that generating five timing 
branches on Briefing Hold #1 were sufficient to cover crew variability. 
 
 The time delay between tripping of the reactor coolant pumps and initiation of 
RCS depressurization in accordance with step 7 of FR-H.1 (Briefing Hold #2).  It 
was determined that generating five timing branches on Briefing Hold #2 were 
sufficient to cover crew variability. 
 
 The amount of time the crew used the auxiliary spray valve to depressurize the 
RCS prior to switching to the pressurizer PORV to complete the depressurization 
(Watchdog Timer #2).  Eight crews exclusively used the auxiliary spray valve to 
depressurize the RCS, one crew used only the pressurizer PORV to depressurize, 
and three crews switched from the auxiliary spray valve to the PORV after a time 
delay.  One crew did not appear to attempt any means to depressurize the RCS.  




watchdog timer #2 – a nominal value and a value that would force an early 
transition. 
 
 For the crews that utilized the auxiliary spray valve to depressurize RCS, there 
was some variability in the rate of depressurization established by the crew.  
Three control settings were used to model this variability – a nominal control 
setting, a reduced control setting, and a closed setting (to model the one crew that 
did not use auxiliary spray). 
 
 When the crews resorted to use of the pressurizer PORV to depressurize the RCS 
during step 7 of FR-H.1, they appeared to use a more restrictive pressure 
threshold to terminate the RCS pressure decrease than when the auxiliary spray 
valve was used.  This may have been motivated by the relatively rapid pressure 
decrease associated with use of the PORV and the desire to avoid an inadvertent 
safety injection actuation.  To model this behavior in ADS-IDAC, the procedure 
expectation that initiates closure of the PORV was adjusted to approximately 
2100 psi rather than below the P11 permissive setpoint (less than 2000 psia). 
 
 Once a crew reduced RCS pressure below the P11 permissive setpoint, the low 
pressure safety injection signal could be blocked.  However, if pressure increased 
above the P11 permissive, the safety injection signal would automatically unblock 
and re-enable the safety injection.  During the LOFW scenario, the tendency is for 




SGs, RCS pressure could increase above the P11 permissive.  Consequently, some 
crews operated the auxiliary spray valve to maintain RCS pressure below the P11 
setpoint.  This was modeled by generating a binary branching event on a mental 
belief that activated a goal to keep RCS pressure below the permissive setpoint. 
 
 The time delay between initiation of high pressure injection for feed and bleed 
cooling and opening of the pressurizer PORV.  Three timing branches for opening 
of the PORV adequately represented crew variability for the complex case. 
 
 Control input for the steam dump valve during SG depressurization (i.e., the rate 
of SG depressurization) and the time delay in initiating depressurization.  
Variations included nominal, slow, and fast depressurization. 
 
 The time delay between initiation of high pressure injection for feed and bleed 
cooling and opening of the pressurizer PORV.  Since the majority crews had a 
minimal time delay between initiation of high pressure injection and opening of 
the PORV, only two branching events were used to model this variability – a 
nominal condition and a long delay of approximately 10 minutes. 
 
Because of the number of branching rules and the associated number of sequences 
generated by each rule, it was not possible to reproduce all crew behaviors with a 
single ADS-IDAC simulation run.  Similar to what was done during the final base 




rules, were run to model each Halden crew.  This allowed the branching rules to be 
fully exercised without the generation of an excessive number of branching rule 
permutations and the associated sequence explosion. The results of these conditional 
runs are provided in Appendix J.  The agreement between the ADS-IDAC generated 
sequences using the above branching rules and the actual observed behaviors was 
reasonable following recalibration. 
 
10.5 Validation Conclusions 
  
Although the initial set of ADS-IDAC predictions for the LOFW scenario 
highlighted a number of limitations of the model, the recalibration effort resulted in 
significant improvement to the ADS-IDAC plant model and operator knowledge 
base.  This experience has demonstrated that ADS-IDAC simulation code provides a 
flexible framework for data collection and analysis.  In particular, the pace and timing 
of procedures, interpretation of procedure steps, and execution of non-proceduralized 
actions can all be captured within the ADS-IDAC knowledge base framework.  More 
importantly, these changes can be incorporated into ADS-IDAC without changing the 
underlying computer code.  This provides a level of confidence that the ADS-IDAC 
modeling structure is robust and adaptable. 
 
The final post-calibration comparisons between the ADS-IDAC results and 
observed behaviors during the Halden exercises illustrate that ADS-IDAC is capable 
of realistically modeling both nuclear plant response and operator behaviors.  This 




hydraulic plant model accurately represents the physical plant system and includes all 







11.1 General Conclusions 
  
As a result of this research project, the capabilities of the ADS-IDAC 
simulation model have been dramatically improved.  Improvements include an 
increased capability to realistically represent operator knowledge, skills, and 
problem-solving styles, and implementation of dynamic performance influencing 
factors which reinforce the man-machine feedback loop and strengthen the transient 
modeling capabilities of ADS-IDAC.  Complex operator mental models of plant 
behavior that guide crew actions can now be represented within the ADS-IDAC 
mental belief framework.  Branching rules can now be created to simulate slow or 
fast procedure execution speed, skipping of procedure steps, reliance on memorized 
information, activation of mental beliefs, variations in control inputs, and equipment 
failures.  The implementation of a plant functional decomposition and diagnostic 
engine strengthened the ability to model knowledge-based actions and other cognitive 
feature such as procedure step-skipping.  From this study, the following has been 
learned: 
 A relatively small number of branching rules are capable of capturing a wide 
spectrum of crew-to-crew variabilities.  Therefore, real operator decisions and 
behaviors can be efficiently modeled within the ADS-IDAC framework. 
 Compared to traditional static risk assessment methods, ADS-IDAC can 




determining the effect of operator behaviors on plant thermal hydraulic 
parameters.  This shifts the analysis from an assessment of isolated operator 
actions to a more holistic assessment of the control room situational context 
and the integrated impact of a spectrum of possible operator actions on the 
reactor plant.  
 Because model-based HRA techniques such as ADS-IDAC attempt to capture 
underlying cognitive processes that drive crew behaviors, these models 
provide an efficient framework for capturing actual operator performance data 
such as timing of operator actions, mental models, and decision-making 
activities. 
Taken together, these factors improve the ability of ADS-IDAC to model complex 
crew behaviors and bring the state-of-the-art in human reliability assessment closer to 
predicting well-intentioned but deleterious knowledge-based actions that can lead to 
significant accident events.  
11.1.1 Implementation of the IDAC Cognitive Model 
  
This research effort has resulted in significant improvements in the 
implementation of the IDAC model within a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment 
environment.  This project has enhanced the modeling of each cognitive phase of the 
IDAC model in addition to improving the modeling of the operator’s mental state 
through implementation of static and dynamic performance influencing factors.  In 
particular, the development of a practical plant functional decomposition has linked 




information-driven framework.  The functional decomposition represents an 
operator’s mental model of the nuclear power plant by linking each plant control, 
indicator, and alarm to the function it serves.  By connecting the plant functional 
decomposition to the diagnostic engine, the operator’s situational assessment can be 
used to influence information processing and action execution.  This has dramatically 
improved the realism of the control panel scanning model by driving the information 
collection process to the areas of highest perceived need.  Furthermore, by connecting 
the relevance of potential actions to the operator’s dynamic assessment of the plant 
status, a greater level of realism can be applied to modeling errors of omission with 
the procedure step-skipping module.  Collectively these factors have enhanced the 
ability of the ADS-IDAC approach to incorporate the influence of information 
processing and contextual factors into the prediction of human error events. 
11.1.2 Crew Variability Modeling and Predictive Capability 
 
 A basic assumption of the ADS-IDAC approach to human reliability analysis 
is that crew deviations from normative/expected behavior highlight potential human 
error events.  By better understanding the factors that cause deviations leading to a 
degraded plant state, the prediction of error events can be improved.  A key advantage 
of a dynamic simulation approach is that the impact of crew deviations on the plant 
state can be explicitly determined and fed back to the operator.  This further enhances 
the rich contextual information available with this modeling approach.  ADS-IDAC 
now has enhanced capabilities to model crew-to-crew variabilities arising from 




branching rule set can be used to represent a diverse spectrum of potential operator 
actions, it is also essential that realistic operator behaviors can be modeled with a 
minimal number of branching rules.  If an excessive number of branching options 
were required to accurately represent observed crew behavior, the computational 
challenge associated with sequence explosion would reduce the effectiveness of 
ADS-IDAC as an analysis tool.  Fortunately, the calibration and validation effort of 
this study demonstrated that a relatively small number of branching options can 
adequately represent a wide range of crew-to-crew variability. 
 
11.1.4 Data Collection and Management 
  
 A significant challenge for all human reliability analysis methods is the 
collection and analysis of human performance data which is often not available in a 
form that can be readily adapted to many HRA approaches.  The ADS-IDAC 
knowledge base addresses this challenge by providing a flexible and expandable 
framework for data collection.  As demonstrated in this project, data obtained from 
observations of actual control room operators, such as timing of actions and 
interpretation of procedural requirements, can be readily adapted to the knowledge 
base framework.  An additional strength of ADS-IDAC is that mental models used by 
the operators to diagnose and predict plant system responses and drive the decision-





11.2 Future Work 
  
Although this project successfully demonstrated the feasibility of using a 
dynamic simulation-based approach to human reliability analysis, it also highlighted 
numerous areas where the method could be improved.  In general, future development 
efforts should concentrate on continued enhancement of the IDAC model 
implementation and validation.  Additionally, improved methodologies for integrating 
the ADS-IDAC approach into a coherent framework for the prediction of human error 
events should be developed.  Specific areas for future work include cognitive model 
enhancements, improved modeling of the control room crew environment, improved 
dependency modeling through the automated generation of branching events, 
improved accident sequence probability quantification, development of importance 
measures to better communicate analysis results, capability for modeling post-core 
damage scenarios, and additional validation.   
 
11.2.1 Cognitive Model Enhancements 
 
Although this research project has improved the implementation of the 
operator cognitive model, particularly through the development of the functional 
decomposition and diagnostic module, further work needs to be done.  The current 
method of accomplishing information filtration is largely by shifting the operator’s 
attention focus through the use of the control panel scanning model.  The information 
biasing filters are statically assigned prior to a simulation run without any additional 




Further development could improve the information filtering process through a more 
direct linkage to the operator’s situational assessment.  This linkage could improve 
the filtering process by connecting passively and actively gathered information to the 
salience of the information for the operator (similar to how the procedure step-
skipping model handles the salience of actions involving a target component).  
Another needed enhancement is better handling of dependencies.  For example, the 
current step-skipping model treats every action as independent.  This can result in the 
generation of excessive numbers of branching events when a set of similar actions 
might be skipped by the operator.  For example, when a procedure step directs the 
crew to trip all reactor coolant pumps, each pump is treated independently.  In reality, 
it is highly likely that the operator would either successfully trip all the pumps or not 
trip any pumps.  Less likely would be various permutations of tripping only one or 
two pumps.  In order to better handle these types of situations, a dependency model 
that includes consideration of recent actions (and recently skipped actions) could be 
developed.  A stronger dependency modeling would provide a more realistic 
simulation capability and reduce computational burden by focusing effort on most 
probable scenarios.  Related to this concept of improving the grouping of related 
actions, the procedure following model could be improved to handle a hybrid 
procedure-following/knowledge-based problem solving strategy.  This would permit 
the modeling of crew behaviors to skip entire sections of a procedure that were 
deemed to be non-relevant and jump to either a procedural or knowledge based action 
that more directly address a perceived plant need. Finally, the cognitive model could 




condition and procedure step-skipping based on the operator’s perceived information 
and mental state.  This would further enhance the model’s level of realism and 
improve the computational efficiency of ADS-IDAC by reducing the need to perform 
multiple simulation runs to explore variations in threshold preferences. 
 
11.2.2 Crew Information Sharing and Resource Management 
  
Although ADS-IDAC is currently based on a crew model framework, the 
operators (a decision-maker and an action-taker) operate in a relatively rigid 
environment.  Additionally, there is only limited sharing of information among the 
crew members.  An improved model would enhance communication and allow more 
sharing of perceived information.  Additionally, the crew model would be more 
realistic with additional crew members such as another action taker (to model a 
second reactor operator) and a consultant (to model a shift technical advisor).  The 
enhanced crew model would also allow ADS-IDAC to be used to explore issues 
associated with operator task allocation, resolution of differences in perceived 
information among crew members, and additional recovery potential when additional 
operator resources are available. 
 
11.2.3 Automated Branch Generation 
  
The current version of ADS-IDAC requires the analyst to pre-designate a set 




is not known by the analyst, but the scope of event tree is clearly limited by the 
analyst.  If an adequate range of branching options is not selected, important crew 
deviations and human error events may be missed.  For example, static performance 
influencing factors such as goal and strategy selection tendencies, thresholds for 
diagnosing accident conditions, and handling of memorized information are pre-
designated before simulation.  Similarly, the analyst must decide on the number of 
timing branches that will be generated during the simulation and the specific 
branching probabilities for each knowledge-based mental belief.  Because of 
computational limitations, it is not currently possible to explore every possible 
combination of each branching event.  Therefore, the analyst must limit the scope of 
the analysis by selecting a limited set of branching rules.  This process could be 
improved if a higher tier of executive control rules could be implemented that would 
dynamically assess the need to generate branching events during a simulation.  For 
example, contextual factors that lead to large crew-to-crew variations could be 
associated with the generation of a large number of performance related branching 
rules.  Conversely, contextual factors that lead to relatively consistent crew 
performance would be associated with limited branch generation.  In this manner, 
ADS-IDAC could drive the dynamic event tree toward more interesting scenarios 
without wasting computational effort on scenarios unlikely to identify potential 




11.2.4 Improved Accident Sequence Probability Quantification 
 
 Although certain stochastic behaviors, such as the timing of operator actions, 
are rigorously modeled in the current version of ADS-IDAC, the probabilistic 
quantification of accident sequences was not an objective of this work.  Instead, this 
research focused on qualitative modeling of operator behaviors.  To the extent 
possible, placeholders have been left throughout the simulation model to support 
future quantification capabilities, but the probabilistic models within ADS-IDAC 
require further development and validation. 
  
11.2.5 Post Processing and Communication of Analysis Results 
 
 Dynamic probabilistic analysis methods generate significant amounts of data.  
In addition to information that is common to most risk assessment methods such as 
hardware failures, operator actions, and system end states, a dynamic simulation 
model also generates large amounts of rich contextual information such as the time 
history of plant parameters, alarm histories, and factors that influence the decision-
making process.  At the present time, methods to produce importance measures and 
other simplified means to communicate analysis results are not well developed.  
Consequently, a future work should address the need for dynamic probabilistic risk 
assessment importance measures and improved methods to illustrate and 




11.2.6 Severe Accident Capability 
  
 Severe accidents refer to scenarios that result in a core damage event.  The 
current thermal-hydraulic engine for ADS-IDAC, RELAP5, is not capable of 
modeling core damage progression and fuel melting.  This places a significant 
limitation on the model for assessing the radiation release and public health 
consequences arising from a human error event.  Future work could focus on 
improving the plant modeling capability of ADS-IDAC by linking the analysis tool to 
a thermal-hydraulic engine capable of modeling core damage scenarios such as the  
MELCOR code (similar to the approach used by ADAPT-MELCOR and MC-DET).  
Another option would be to link ADS-IDAC to a code suite such as SCDAP/RELAP 
which would preserve the existing RELAP plant model while adding capability to 
simulate fuel heat up and oxidation, fuel melting, and core relocation.    
 
11.2.7 Further Model Validation 
  
The current research study has only performed an extremely limited review 
and validation of the ADS-IDAC model.  An important area for future work is the 
continued validation of the ADS-IDAC model, including the development of an 
acceptable approach to verify the quantification of performance influencing factors.  
Additionally, there are many areas of the current model where simplified estimations 
and judgment were used to provide needed data.  For example, a simplified screening 
approach was used to populate the relationship data used to link perceived symptoms 




based on an informed estimation rather than a true expert elicitation process.  The 
current research effort was focused on demonstrating the feasibility of a realistic 
ADS-IDAC modeling approach to human error prediction.  Since this study has 
successfully demonstrated the feasibility of a dynamic simulation approach for human 
performance modeling, future work should include refinement and validation of data 
that support the underlying cognitive model.  It should also be noted the ADS-IDAC 
has only been exercised for two accident scenarios, a steam generator tube rupture 
and a loss of feedwater event.  Further validation studies could focus on expanding 
the portfolio of analyzed events to provide a higher level of confidence that ADS-
IDAC can handle a wide array of accidents.   Finally, thermal-hydraulic models of 
additional plant types (e.g., different types of pressurized water reactors, boiling 
water reactors, and new and advanced reactor designs) should be developed to further 
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Appendix A provides a summary table of the diagnostic matrix used for the decision-
making process.  Four event categories are included in the matrix: normal operating 
events (including control system failures), anticipated operational occurrences, design 
basis accidents, and functional imbalances.  Ten symptom categories are provided – 
these are parameters that would either normally be periodically monitored by the 
operators or provide a high degree of diagnosticity for abnormal events.  The matrix 
shows a summary mapping of each event to the related symptoms.  For the purposes 
of this project, three relationship categories were used: (1) primary symptoms which 
are strongly associated with the event of interest and have the highest relationship 
value; (2) secondary symptoms which are typically associated with feedback 
mechanisms caused by primary symptoms and have a mid-range relationship value; 
and (3) tertiary symptoms which are considered less likely to appear or may be 
masked by the operation of automatic control systems.
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Changing Steam Demand Normal  T S T T  T P   
Controller Failure - PZR Water Level Normal    P T      
Controller Failure - RCS Pressure Normal     P      
Controller Failure - RCS Temperature Normal  T P S T      
Controller Failure - SG Water Level Normal       P  S  
Normal Steady-State Operation Normal   P  P      
Leak – MF System AOO       S  P  
Leak – MS System AOO       T P   
Leak – RCS AOO    P S      
Load Rejection AOO  T S T T  S P  S 
Loss of Feedwater Flow AOO   T    P  P  
Loss of RCS Flow AOO      P     
MS Isolation Valve Closure AOO  T S T T  S P  S 
RCS Overfill AOO    P S      
Reactor Trip AOO  P P S T  T T   
ATWS - Loss of Load Accident  T S T T   P  S 
Loss of Coolant Accident Accident P   P P      
MF System Line Break Accident P  S    P  P  
MS System Line Break Accident P T S T T  T P  P 
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident    P S  T  P  
Energy Imbalance - PZR Imbalance     P      
Energy Imbalance - RCS Imbalance   P        
Energy Imbalance - SG Imbalance          P 
Mass Imbalance - RCS Imbalance    P       
Mass Imbalance - SG Imbalance         P  
P: Primary effects; S: Secondary effects; T: Tertiary effects. 
 











Appendix B provides a comprehensive listing of all indicators, controls, and alarms 
on the ADS-IDAC control panel for a three-loop pressurized water reactor.  The 
control panel is arranged into the following categories: parameter indicators, 
component states (associated with logical flags in the RELAP model), controller input 
devices (including simple binary state controllers and variable controllers), and 
alarms (associated with parameter values and component states).  The specific format 
used for this input is described in Appendix K, the ADS-IDAC input manual. 
 






Time     CV_002 Value    20.0 0.0 
Watchdog_Timer_1   CV_015 Value    20.0 0.0  
Watchdog_Timer_2   CV_016 Value    20.0 0.0  
Core_Power    CV_100 Value    20.0 0.0  
SUR     CV_491 Value    20.0 1.0  
RATE_Core_Power   CV_100 Value    20.0 0.0  
del_k    CV_490 Value    20.0 0.0  
Loop_A_Tcold  HV_216 Liquid_Temperature  20.0 0.0 
Loop_B_Tcold  HV_316 Liquid_Temperature  20.0 0.0 
Loop_C_Tcold  HV_416 Liquid_Temperature  20.0 0.0 
Loop_A_Tave   CV_101 Value    20.0 0.0  
Loop_B_Tave   CV_102 Value    20.0 0.0  
Loop_C_Tave   CV_103 Value    20.0 0.0 
Loop_A_Thot   HV_204 Liquid_Temperature  20.0 0.0 
Loop_B_Thot   HV_304 Liquid_Temperature  20.0 0.0 
Loop_C_Thot   HV_405 Liquid_Temperature  20.0 0.0 
Loop_A_Delta_T   CV_121 Value    20.0 0.0  
Loop_B_Delta_T   CV_131 Value    20.0 0.0 
Loop_C_Delta_T   CV_141 Value    20.0 0.0 
Tave-Tref    CV_480 Value    20.0 0.0  
PZR_Pressure   HV_340 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
RATE_PZR_Pressure  HV_340 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
Loop_A_Pressure   HV_218 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
Loop_B_Pressure   HV_318 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
Loop_C_Pressure   HV_418 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
Min_Sub_Cooling   CV_303 Value    20.0 0.0 
HTMode_Max    CV_977 Value    20.0 0.0  
Tclad_Max    CV_978 Value    20.0 0.0 
PZR_Level    CV_202 Value    20.0 0.0  
RATE_PZR_Level   CV_202 Value    20.0 0.0  
Rx_Vessel_Level   CV_395 Value    20.0 0.0  
Makeup_Flow   HJ_972 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
ECCS_Flow   CV_984 Value    20.0 0.0 
LPI_Loop_A    HJ_943 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
LPI_Loop_B    HJ_944 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
LPI_Loop_C    HJ_945 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
LPI_HDR_Pressure   HV_933 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
HPI_Loop_A    HJ_963 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
HPI_Loop_B    HJ_964 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
HPI_Loop_C    HJ_965 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
HPI_HDR_Pressure   HV_953 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
ACC_A_Level   CV_390 Value    20.0 0.0  
ACC_B_Level   CV_391 Value    20.0 0.0  
ACC_C_Level   CV_392 Value    20.0 0.0  
ACC_A_Pressure   HV_911 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
ACC_B_Pressure   HV_912 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
ACC_C_Pressure   HV_913 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
SG_A_NR_Level   CV_506 Value    20.0 0.0  
SG_B_NR_Level   CV_606 Value    20.0 0.0  
SG_C_NR_Level   CV_706 Value    20.0 0.0  
RATE_SG_A_NR_Level CV_506 Value    20.0 0.0  
RATE_SG_B_NR_Level  CV_606 Value    20.0 0.0  
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RATE_SG_C_NR_Level  CV_706 Value    20.0 0.0  
SG_A_WR_Level   CV_503 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_B_WR_Level   CV_603 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_C_WR_Level   CV_703 Value   20.0 0.0  
Collapsed_SG_A_WR_Level CV_535 Value   20.0 0.0  
Collapsed_SG_B_WR_Level CV_635 Value   20.0 0.0  
Collapsed_SG_C_WR_Level CV_735 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_A_Pressure   HV_550 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
SG_B_Pressure   HV_650 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
SG_C_Pressure   HV_750 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
RATE_SG_A_Pressure  HV_550 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
RATE_SG_B_Pressure  HV_650 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
RATE_SG_C_Pressure  HV_750 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
Stm_HDR_Pressure   HV_802 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
RATE_Stm_HDR_Pressure HV_802 Pressure    20.0 0.0 
SG_A_FW_Flow   HJ_527 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
SG_B_FW_Flow   HJ_627 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
SG_C_FW_Flow   HJ_727 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
RATE_SG_A_FW_Flow  HJ_527 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
RATE_SG_B_FW_Flow  HJ_627 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
RATE_SG_C_FW_Flow  HJ_727 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
SG_A_MS_Flow   HJ_282 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
SG_B_MS_Flow   HJ_382 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
SG_C_MS_Flow   HJ_482 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
RATE_SG_A_MS_Flow  HJ_282 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
RATE_SG_B_MS_Flow  HJ_382 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
RATE_SG_C_MS_Flow  HJ_482 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
Turb_MS_Flow   HJ_804 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
Turb_Gov_Vlv_Pos   CV_924 Value   20.0 0.0 
Stm_Power    CV_477 Value   20.0 0.0  
Stm_Dump_Flow   HJ_808 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
Stm_Dump_VPI  CV_895 Value   20.0 0.0  
CST_Level    CV_519 Value   20.0 0.0  
Turb_Pressure   CV_939 Value   20.0 0.0  
RATE_Loop_A_Tave  CV_101 Value   20.0 0.0  
RATE_Loop_B_Tave  CV_102 Value   20.0 0.0  
RATE_Loop_C_Tave  CV_103 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_Level_Setpoint  CV_510 Value   20.0 0.0  
PZR_Level_Setpoint  CV_188 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_A_PORV_Setpoint  CV_842 Value   20.0 0.0 
SG_B_PORV_Setpoint  CV_843 Value   20.0 0.0 
SG_C_PORV_Setpoint  CV_844 Value   20.0 0.0 
PZR_PORV_VPI   CV_589 Value   20.0 0.0  
PZR_Spray_Vlv_VPI  CV_590 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_A_TDAFW_VPI   CV_371 Value   20.0 0.0 
SG_A_MDAFW_VPI   CV_372 Value   20.0 0.0 
SG_B_TDAFW_VPI   CV_373 Value   20.0 0.0 
SG_B_MDAFW_VPI   CV_374 Value   20.0 0.0 
SG_C_TDAFW_VPI   CV_375 Value   20.0 0.0 
SG_C_MDAFW_VPI   CV_376 Value   20.0 0.0 
SG_A_FWRV_VPI   CV_586 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_B_FWRV_VPI   CV_587 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_C_FWRV_VPI  CV_588 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_A_MFIV_VPI  CV_580 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_B_MFIV_VPI   CV_581 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_C_MFIV_VPI   CV_582 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_A_MSIV_VPI   CV_583 Value   20.0 0.0  
 
Appendix B 388 
 
SG_B_MSIV_VPI   CV_584 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_C_MSIV_VPI   CV_585 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_A_Stm_Press_Rate  CV_563 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_B_Stm_Press_Rate  CV_567 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_C_Stm_Press_Rate  CV_571 Value   20.0 0.0  
Containment_Pressure  CV_995 Value   20.0 0.0  
Total_AFW_Flow   CV_305 Value   20.0 0.0  
Total_MFW_Flow   CV_306 Value   20.0 0.0  
MFW_Pump_A_Speed   CV_861 Value   20.0 0.0  
MFW_Pump_B_Speed   CV_864 Value   20.0 0.0  
MFP_Recirculation_Flow  HJ_868 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0 
Cond_Pump_Disch_Press  HV_854 Pressure    20.0 0.0  
Median_Tave   CV_114 Value   20.0 0.0  
RATE_Median_Tave   CV_114 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_A_PORV_VPI   CV_591 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_B_PORV_VPI   CV_592 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_C_PORV_VPI   CV_593 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_A_Level_Deviation  CV_011 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_B_Level_Deviation  CV_012 Value   20.0 0.0  
SG_C_Level_Deviation  CV_013 Value   20.0 0.0  
SGTR_Pressure   CV_946 Value   20.0 0.0  
SGTR_Temp_Target   CV_947 Value   20.0 0.0  
SGTR_A_BRK_Flow   HJ_209 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0 
SGTR_B_BRK_Flow   HJ_309 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
SGTR_C_BRK_Flow   HJ_409 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0 
Air_Ejector_Radiation  CV_682 Value   20.0 0.0  
PORV_Flow    HJ_344 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0 
Aux_Spay_Flow   HJ_331 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0 
MSLB_BRK_Flow   HJ_820 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  
LOCA_BRK_Flow   HJ_995 Mass_Flow_Rate   20.0 0.0  





Reactor_Trip     LT_1698 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Safety_Injection    LT_1669 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Turbine_Trip     LT_1602 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Turbine_Runback    LT_1679 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5 
Main_Steam_Isolation  LT_1663 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Block_Main_Steam_Isolation VT_0616 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Block_Low_Press_SI    LT_1561 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Permissive_P-11_PZR_Press  VT_0671 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Main_Feed_Pump_A_Trip  LT_1628 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5 
Main_Feed_Pump_B_Trip  LT_1629 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5 
MFP_Low_Suction_Pressure  VT_0529 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Main_Feed_Pump_Trip  LT_1630 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Condenser_Low_Vacuum LT_1744 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Hi_PWR_Reactor_Trip  VT_0503 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
OTDT_Reactor_Trip   VT_0507 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
OPDT_Reactor_Trip   VT_0508 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Lo_RCS_Flow_Rx_Trip  VT_0509 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Lo_SG_Pressure_SI   LT_1665 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Lo_PZR_Pressure_SI   VT_0522 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Hi_Cont_Pressure   VT_0572 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
TDAFP_Auto_Start   LT_1634 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
MDAFP_Auto_Start   LT_1637 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
MF_MS_Mismatch_Rx_Trip  LT_1684 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
LoLo_SG_Level_Rx_Trip  VT_0539 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
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Lo_Pressure_Rx_Trip  VT_0521 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
CVCS_Letdown_Isolation  LT_1507 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5 
Hi_Pressure_Rx_Trip  VT_0520 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Hi_PZR_Level_Rx_Trip  VT_0519 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
HiHi_Cont_Pressure   VT_0568 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
TDAFP_On    LT_1636 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
A_MDAFP_On    LT_1642 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
B_MDAFP_On    LT_1646 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
A_HPI_Pump_On   LT_1737 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
B_HPI_Pump_On   LT_1739 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
A_LPI_Pump_On   LT_1732 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
B_LPI_Pump_On   LT_1735 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Hi_Neg_SG_Pressure_Rate  VT_0653 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
PZR_Prop_Htrs_On   VT_0465 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
PZR_Backup_Htrs_On   VT_0466 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
PZR_PORV_Open   VT_0655 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Spray_Vlv_A_Open   VT_0656 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Spray_Vlv_B_Open   VT_0657 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Steam_Dump_Vlv_Open  VT_0658 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
SG_A_Safety_Open   VT_0659 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
SG_B_Safety_Open   VT_0660 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
SG_C_Safety_Open   VT_0661 Trip_Time 20.0 ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
SG_A_PORV_Man   VT_0472 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
SG_B_PORV_Man   VT_0473 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
SG_C_PORV_Man   VT_0474 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
RCP_A_Tripped   LT_1745 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
RCP_B_Tripped   LT_1746 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
RCP_C_Tripped   LT_1747 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Rods_Out    VT_0642 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
Rods_In    VT_0643 Trip_Time 20.0 OFF GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_Scram    VT_0901 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_Turb_Trip   VT_0902 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_Safety_Injection  VT_0903 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_MSIV_Trip   VT_0904 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_MDAFP_On   VT_0905 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_TDAFP_On   VT_0906 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_HPI_On    VT_0907 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_LPI_On    VT_0908 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_GOAL_Depressurize_SGA VT_0909 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_SGTR_SG_A   VT_0910 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_SGTR_SG_B   VT_0911 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_SGTR_SG_C   VT_0912 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_SG_A_Faulted   VT_0914 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_SG_B_Faulted   VT_0915 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_SG_C_Faulted   VT_0916 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5 
FLAG_SG_Makeup_via_MFW  VT_0920 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_GOAL_Cool_Down_RCS  VT_0921 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_GOAL_Depressurize_RCS VT_0922 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
FLAG_GOAL_Reduce_Power  VT_0923 Trip_Time 1.0  ON  GREATER_THEN_ON 1.0E-5  
 
Controls_Panel_Fine_Adjust 29 
X_PZR_Spray_Valve   IC_804 1.0  1.0 0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_PZR_PORV     IC_805 1.0  0.33 0.0  -1.0  0.035 
X_SG_A_Atmos_PORV   IC_806 1.0  1.0  0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_SG_B_Atmos_PORV   IC_807 1.0  1.0  0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_SG_C_Atmos_PORV   IC_808 1.0  1.0  0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_SG_A_FWRV    IC_809 1.0  1.0  0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_SG_B_FWRV    IC_810 1.0  1.0  0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_SG_C_FWRV    IC_811 1.0  1.0  0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_Stm_Dump     IC_834 1.0  1.0  0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_SG_A_MDAFW_Throttle   IC_841 1.0  1.0  0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_SG_B_MDAFW_Throttle   IC_842 1.0  1.0  0.0  -1.0  0.0  
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X_SG_C_MDAFW_Throttle   IC_843 1.0  1.0   0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_SG_A_TDAFW_Throttle   IC_838 1.0  1.0   0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_SG_B_TDAFW_Throttle   IC_839 1.0  1.0   0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_SG_C_TDAFW_Throttle   IC_840 1.0  1.0   0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_LPI_Loop_A_Throttle   IC_844 1.0  1.0   0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_LPI_Loop_B_Throttle   IC_845 1.0  1.0   0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_LPI_Loop_C_Throttle   IC_846 1.0  1.0   0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_HPI_Loop_A_Throttle   IC_847 1.0  1.0   0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_HPI_Loop_B_Throttle   IC_848 1.0  1.0   0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_HPI_Loop_C_Throttle   IC_849 1.0  1.0   0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_SG_A_PORV_Setpoint   IC_867 1.0  1050. 0.0  1050. 500.0 
X_SG_B_PORV_Setpoint   IC_868 1.0  1050. 0.0  1050. 1050.0 
X_SG_C_PORV_Setpoint   IC_869 1.0  1050. 0.0  1050. 1050.0 
X_Stm_Dump_Pressure_Setpoint IC_870 1.0  1020. 0.0  1020. 1020.0 
X_PZR_Level_Setpoint   IC_873 1.0  -1.0  0.22 -1.0  0.22 
X_PZR_Aux_Spray_Valve   IC_875 1.0  1.0   0.0  -1.0  0.0  
X_Watchdog_Timer_1   IC_913 1.0  9999. 0.0  -1.0  0.0 
X_Watchdog_Timer_2   IC_924 1.0  9999. 0.0  -1.0  0.0 
 
Control_Panel_Controller 67 
X_MFP_Trip     IC_801 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_SCRAM     IC_802 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 OFF  
X_Turb_Trip    IC_803 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON  
X_Turb_Runback    IC_863 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON 
X_SG_A_FWIV    IC_812 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON  
X_SG_B_FWIV    IC_813 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON  
X_SG_C_FWIV    IC_814 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON  
X_SG_A_MSIV    IC_815 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON  
X_SG_B_MSIV    IC_816 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON  
X_SG_C_MSIV    IC_817 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON  
X_SIAS     IC_818 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 OFF  
X_SI_BLK_A     IC_819 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_SI_BLK_B     IC_820 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_RCP_A     IC_821 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_RCP_B     IC_822 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_RCP_C     IC_823 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_LPI_Pump_A    IC_824 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_LPI_Pump_B    IC_825 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_HPI_Pump_A    IC_826 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_HPI_Pump_B    IC_827 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_MD_AFW_Pump_A    IC_828 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 OFF  
X_MD_AFW_Pump_B    IC_829 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 OFF  
X_TD_AFW_Pump    IC_830 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 OFF  
X_LOOP     IC_831 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_MF_Pump_A    IC_832 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 OFF  
X_MF_Pump_B    IC_833 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 OFF 
X_LOCA     IC_835 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_SGTR_SG_A    IC_836 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_MSLB     IC_837 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_ACC_A_Outlet_Valve   IC_850 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON  
X_ACC_B_Outlet_Valve   IC_851 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON  
X_ACC_C_Outlet_Valve   IC_852 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON  
X_Increase_Turbine_Load  IC_853 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_Decrease_Turbine_Load  IC_854 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_Control_Rods_In   IC_855 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_Control_Rods_Out   IC_856 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_SG_B_MSLB    IC_857 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
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X_SGTR_SG_B    IC_858 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_SGTR_SG_C    IC_859 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_Block_MSIV_Trip   IC_860 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 OFF  
X_Block_Low_Press_SI   IC_874 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 OFF  
X_PZR_Heaters    IC_861 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 OFF  
X_SI_Reset     IC_862 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON 
X_Letdown     IC_864 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON 
X_Isolate_Charging   IC_865 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON 
X_Emergency_Borate   IC_866 1.0 1.0  0.0 -1.0 ON 
X_Steam_Auxiliaries   IC_871 1.0 1.0  0.0  1.0 ON 
X_Condensate_Pump_Trip   IC_872 1.0 1.0  0.0  1.0 ON 
X_FLAG_Scram    IC_901 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_Turbine_Trip   IC_902 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_Safety_Injection  IC_903 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_MSIV_Trip    IC_904 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_MDAFP_On    IC_905 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_TDAFP_On    IC_906 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_HPI_On    IC_907 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_LPI_On    IC_908 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_GOAL_Depressurize_SGA  IC_909 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_SGTR_A    IC_910 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_SGTR_B    IC_911 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_SGTR_C    IC_912 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_SG_A_Faulted   IC_914 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_SG_B_Faulted   IC_915 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_SG_C_Faulted   IC_916 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_SG_Makeup_via_MFW  IC_920 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON 
X_FLAG_GOAL_Cool_Down_RCS  IC_921 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON 
X_FLAG_GOAL_Depressurize_RCS  IC_922 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON  
X_FLAG_GOAL_Reduce_Power  IC_923 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 ON 
 
Alarm_for_Parameter_State 37 
A_SG_A_Lo_Level   SG_A_NR_Level   0.5 20.0 LT 0.25  
A_SG_B_Lo_Level   SG_B_NR_Level   0.5 20.0 LT 0.25  
A_SG_C_Lo_Level   SG_C_NR_Level   0.5 20.0 LT 0.25  
A_SG_A_LoLo_Level  SG_A_NR_Level   0.5 20.0 LT 0.12  
A_SG_B_LoLo_Level  SG_B_NR_Level   0.5 20.0 LT 0.12  
A_SG_C_LoLo_Level  SG_C_NR_Level   0.5 20.0 LT 0.12  
A_SG_A_Hi_Level   SG_A_NR_Level   0.5 20.0 GT 0.5  
A_SG_B_Hi_Level   SG_B_NR_Level   0.5 20.0 GT 0.5  
A_SG_C_Hi_Level   SG_C_NR_Level   0.5 20.0 GT 0.5  
A_SG_A_HiHi_Level  SG_A_NR_Level   0.5 20.0 GT 0.75  
A_SG_B_HiHi_Level  SG_B_NR_Level   0.5 20.0 GT 0.75  
A_SG_C_HiHi_Level  SG_C_NR_Level   0.5 20.0 GT 0.75  
A_SG_A_Lo_Pressure  SG_A_Pressure   0.5 20.0 LT 600.0  
A_SG_B_Lo_Pressure  SG_B_Pressure   0.5 20.0 LT 600.0  
A_SG_C_Lo_Pressure  SG_C_Pressure   0.5 20.0 LT 600.0  
A_SG_A_Hi_Pressure  SG_A_Pressure   0.5 20.0 GT 980.0  
A_SG_B_Hi_Pressure  SG_B_Pressure   0.5 20.0 GT 980.0  
A_SG_C_Hi_Pressure  SG_C_Pressure   0.5 20.0 GT 980.0  
A_PZR_Pressure_Lo_Dev  PZR_Pressure   0.5 20.0 LT 2185.0  
A_PZR_Pressure_Hi_Dev  PZR_Pressure   0.5 20.0 GT 2285.0  
A_PZR_Lo_Pressure  PZR_Pressure   0.5 20.0 LT 2100.0  
A_PZR_Hi_Pressure  PZR_Pressure   0.5 20.0 GT 2300.0  
A_PZR_Lo_Level   PZR_Level    0.5 20.0 LT 0.14  
A_PZR_Hi_Level   PZR_Level    0.5 20.0 GT 0.92  
A_Tave_Hi_Dev   Tave-Tref    0.5 20.0 GT 1.0  
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A_Tave_Lo_Dev   Tave-Tref    0.5 20.0 LT -1.0  
A_ACC_A_Lo_Level   ACC_A_Level   0.5 20.0 LT 70.0  
A_ACC_A_LoLo_Level  ACC_A_Level   0.5 20.0 LT 10.0  
A_ACC_A_Lo_Pressure  ACC_A_Pressure   0.5 20.0 LT 600.0  
A_ACC_B_Lo_Level   ACC_B_Level   0.5 20.0 LT 70.0  
A_ACC_B_LoLo_Level  ACC_B_Level   0.5 20.0 LT 10.0  
A_ACC_B_Lo_Pressure  ACC_B_Pressure   0.5 20.0 LT 600.0  
A_ACC_C_Lo_Level   ACC_C_Level   0.5 20.0 LT 70.0  
A_ACC_C_LoLo_Level  ACC_C_Level   0.5 20.0 LT 10.0  
A_ACC_C_Lo_Pressure  ACC_C_Pressure   0.5 20.0 LT 600.0  
A_Air_Ejector_Radiation Air_Ejector_Radiation  0.5 20.0 GT 10.0  
A_ENDSEQ_Parameter  Core_Power    0.5 20.0 LT 0.001  
   
Alarm_for_Component_State 34 
A_Reactor_Trip    Reactor_Trip         0.5 1.0 ON  
A_Safety_Injection   Safety_Injection      0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Turbine_Trip    Turbine_Trip      0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Turbine_Runback   Turbine_Runback      0.5 20.0 ON  
A_RCP_A_Tripped     RCP_A_Tripped     0.5 20.0 ON 
A_RCP_B_Tripped     RCP_B_Tripped      0.5 20.0 ON 
A_RCP_C_Tripped     RCP_C_Tripped     0.5 20.0 ON 
A_Main_Feedwater_Pump_Trip  Main_Feed_Pump_Trip        0.5 20.0 ON 
A_Main_Feed_Pump_A_Trip   Main_Feed_Pump_A_Trip      0.5 20.0 ON 
A_Main_Feed_Pump_B_Trip   Main_Feed_Pump_B_Trip     0.5 20.0 ON 
A_MFP_Low_Suction_Pressure MFP_Low_Suction_Pressure   0.5 20.0 ON 
A_Condenser_Low_Vacuum   Condenser_Low_Vacuum     0.5 20.0 ON 
A_Main_Steam_Isolation   Main_Steam_Isolation     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Hi_Power_Reactor_Trip  Hi_PWR_Reactor_Trip     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_OTDT_Reactor_Trip   OTDT_Reactor_Trip     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_OPDT_Reactor_Trip   OPDT_Reactor_Trip     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Lo_RCS_Flow_Reactor_Trip  Lo_RCS_Flow_Rx_Trip     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Lo_SG_Pressure_SI   Lo_SG_Pressure_SI     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Lo_PZR_Pressure_SI   Lo_PZR_Pressure_SI     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Block_Low_Press_SI   Block_Low_Press_SI     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Permissive_P-11_PZR_Press  Permissive_P-11_PZR_Press  0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Hi_Cont_Pressure   Hi_Cont_Pressure      0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Hi_PZR_Level_Reactor_Trip  Hi_PZR_Level_Rx_Trip     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Hi_Pressure_Reactor_Trip  Hi_Pressure_Rx_Trip    0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Lo_Pressure_Reactor_Trip  Lo_Pressure_Rx_Trip     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_LoLo_SG_Level_Reactor_Trip  LoLo_SG_Level_Rx_Trip     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_MF_MS_Mismatch_Reactor_Trip MF_MS_Mismatch_Rx_Trip     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_HiHi_Cont_Pressure   HiHi_Cont_Pressure     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_CVCS_Letdown_Isolation  CVCS_Letdown_Isolation     0.5 20.0 ON  
A_Rods_Out     Rods_Out       0.5 20.0 ON 
A_Rods_In     Rods_In       0.5 20.0 ON 
A_ENDSEQ_Component   FLAG_Scram       0.5 20.0 ON  
A_TDAFP_Auto_Start   TDAFP_Auto_Start      0.5 20.0 ON 
A_MDAFP_Auto_Start   MDAFP_Auto_Start      0.5 20.0 ON 
 
Alarm_for_Difference_Between_two_Values 16 
A_SG_A_MF_Flow_Lo    SG_A_MS_Flow      0.5 20.0 SG_A_FW_Flow  350.0  
A_SG_B_MF_Flow_Lo    SG_B_MS_Flow       0.5 20.0 SG_B_FW_Flow  350.0  
A_SG_C_MF_Flow_Lo    SG_C_MS_Flow       0.5 20.0 SG_C_FW_Flow  350.0  
A_SG_A_MF_Flow_Hi    SG_A_FW_Flow       0.5 20.0 SG_A_MS_Flow  350.0  
A_SG_B_MF_Flow_Hi    SG_B_FW_Flow       0.5 20.0 SG_B_MS_Flow  350.0  
A_SG_C_MF_Flow_Hi    SG_C_FW_Flow       0.5 20.0 SG_C_MS_Flow  350.0  
A_SG_A_Level_Lo_Dev  SG_Level_Setpoint  0.5 20.0 SG_A_NR_Level 0.05  
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A_SG_B_Level_Lo_Dev  SG_Level_Setpoint  0.5 20.0 SG_B_NR_Level 0.05  
A_SG_C_Level_Lo_Dev  SG_Level_Setpoint  0.5 20.0 SG_C_NR_Level 0.05 
A_SG_A_Level_Hi_Dev  SG_A_NR_Level 0.5 20.0 SG_Level_Setpoint  0.05  
A_SG_B_Level_Hi_Dev  SG_B_NR_Level 0.5 20.0 SG_Level_Setpoint  0.05  
A_SG_C_Level_Hi_Dev  SG_C_NR_Level 0.5 20.0 SG_Level_Setpoint  0.05  
A_PZR_Level_Lo_Dev   PZR_Level_Setpoint 0.5 20.0 PZR_Level   0.05  
A_PZR_Level_Hi_Dev   PZR_Level     0.5 20.0 PZR_Level_Setpoint 0.05  
A_SGTR_Pressure_OK   SGTR_Pressure 0.5 20.0 PZR_Pressure     0.0  
A_SGTR_Temp_OK       SGTR_Temp_Target   0.5 20.0 Median_Tave 0.0 
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Appendix C provides a listing of the system decomposition used in the current ADS-
IDAC three loop pressurized water reactor model.  The system decomposition 
associates every control panel item with the specific functions the item supports.  A 
simple three digit code is used to identify system functions – the first digit refers to 
the high level function (mass, energy, or momentum flow), the second digit is a 
system designator, and the third digit provides trending information.  The three digit 
code is used to relate each control panel item to the specific imbalance diagnosis 
referenced in the diagnosis matrix (see Appendix A).  Therefore, the noun name for 
the functions provided in Appendix C must match a functional diagnosis name in the 
diagnosis matrix. The specific format used for this input is described in Appendix K, 
the ADS-IDAC input manual. 
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"Functional Decomposition: 
   Function Type (First Digit) 
      1 - Mass Imbalance 
      2 - Energy Imbalance 
      3 - Momentum Imbalance 
   System Type (Second Digit) 
      1 - Reactor Coolant System 
      2 - Pressurizer 
      3 - Steam Generator A 
      4 - Steam Generator B 
      5 - Steam Generator C 
      6 - Secondary System (Turbine, Condenser) 
      8 - Containment 
   Imbalance Trend (Third Digit) 
      1 - Decrease 
      2 - Increase 
   Special Codes 
     900 - Not Applicable" 
 
Number_of_Functional_Items 31 
Mass_Imbalance_RCS_Low  111 
Mass_Imbalance_PZR_Low  121  
Mass_Imbalance_SG_A_Low  131 
Mass_Imbalance_SG_B_Low  141 
Mass_Imbalance_SG_C_Low  151 
Mass_Imbalance_Secondary_Low 161 
Mass_Imbalance_Containment_Low 181 
Energy_Imbalance_RCS_Low  211 
Energy_Imbalance_PZR_Low  221 
Energy_Imbalance_SG_A_Low  231 
Energy_Imbalance_SG_B_Low  241 




Mass_Imbalance_RCS_High  112 
Mass_Imbalance_PZR_High  122  
Mass_Imbalance_SG_A_High  132 
Mass_Imbalance_SG_B_High  142 
Mass_Imbalance_SG_C_High  152 
Mass_Imbalance_Secondary_High 162 
Mass_Imbalance_Containment_High 182 
Energy_Imbalance_RCS_High  212 
Energy_Imbalance_PZR_High  222 
Energy_Imbalance_SG_A_High  232 
Energy_Imbalance_SG_B_High  242 




Not_Applicable                   900 
 
Control_Panel_Decomposition 
Time    900 999 
Watchdog_Timer_1  900 999 
Watchdog_Timer_2  900 999 
PZR_Level   111 112 121 122 999 
PZR_Level_Setpoint  111 112 121 122 999 
RATE_PZR_Level   111 112 121 122 999 
X_PZR_Level_Setpoint    111 112 121 122 999 
Rx_Vessel_Level   111 212 999 
Makeup_Flow    111 112 121 122 999 
ECCS_Flow   111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
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LPI_Loop_A   111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
LPI_Loop_B     111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
LPI_Loop_C    111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
LPI_HDR_Pressure  111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
HPI_Loop_A     111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
HPI_Loop_B      111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
HPI_Loop_C         111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
HPI_HDR_Pressure  111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
ACC_A_Level   111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
ACC_B_Level     111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
ACC_C_Level    111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
ACC_A_Pressure    111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
ACC_B_Pressure   111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
ACC_C_Pressure   111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
PZR_Pressure   121 122 211 212 221 222 999 
PORV_Flow         121 122 221 222 999 
Aux_Spay_Flow    121 122 221 222 999 
RATE_PZR_Pressure  121 122 211 212 221 222 999 
Loop_A_Pressure   211 212 221 222 999 
Loop_B_Pressure   211 212 221 222 999 
Loop_C_Pressure   211 212 221 222 999 
RCP_A_Tripped   221 222 311 312 999 
RCP_B_Tripped    221 222 311 312 999 
RCP_C_Tripped   221 222 311 312 999 
SG_A_NR_Level   131 132 999 
SG_B_NR_Level   141 142 999 
SG_C_NR_Level   151 152 999 
SG_Level_Setpoint  131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
RATE_SG_A_NR_Level  131 132 999 
RATE_SG_B_NR_Level  141 142 999 
RATE_SG_C_NR_Level  151 152 999 
SG_A_WR_Level   131 132 999 
SG_B_WR_Level   141 142 999 
SG_C_WR_Level   151 152 999 
Collapsed_SG_A_WR_Level  131 132 999 
Collapsed_SG_B_WR_Level  141 142 999 
Collapsed_SG_C_WR_Level  151 152 999 
SG_A_Level_Deviation  131 132 999 
SG_B_Level_Deviation    141 142 999 
SG_C_Level_Deviation  151 152 999 
SG_A_Pressure     231 232 999 
SG_B_Pressure     241 242 999 
SG_C_Pressure     251 252 999 
SG_A_PORV_Setpoint     231 232 999 
SG_B_PORV_Setpoint     241 242 999 
SG_C_PORV_Setpoint    251 252 999 
Hi_Neg_SG_Pressure_Rate  231 241 251 261 999 
SG_A_Stm_Press_Rate  231 232 261 262 999 
SG_B_Stm_Press_Rate  241 242 261 262 999 
SG_C_Stm_Press_Rate  251 252 261 262 999 
RATE_SG_A_Pressure     231 232 261 262 999 
RATE_SG_B_Pressure   241 242 261 262     999 
RATE_SG_C_Pressure     251 252 261 262 999 
Stm_HDR_Pressure       261 262 999 
RATE_Stm_HDR_Pressure    261 262 999 
SG_A_FW_Flow   131 132 999 
SG_B_FW_Flow   141 142 999 
SG_C_FW_Flow   151 152 999 
Total_AFW_Flow   131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
Total_MFW_Flow   131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
MFW_Pump_A_Speed  131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
MFW_Pump_B_Speed  131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
MFP_Recirculation_Flow  131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
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Cond_Pump_Disch_Press  131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
RATE_SG_A_FW_Flow  131 132 999 
RATE_SG_B_FW_Flow  141 142 999 
RATE_SG_C_FW_Flow  151 152 999 
SG_A_MS_Flow   131 132 231 232 999 
SG_B_MS_Flow   141 142 241 242 999 
SG_C_MS_Flow   151 152 251 252 999 
RATE_SG_A_MS_Flow  131 132 231 232 999 
RATE_SG_B_MS_Flow  141 142 241 242 999 
RATE_SG_C_MS_Flow  151 152 251 252 999 
Turb_MS_Flow      211 212 261 262     999 
Turb_Gov_Vlv_Pos  211 212 261 262 999 
Stm_Power         211 212 261 262 999 
Stm_Dump_Flow        211 212 261 262 999 
Stm_Dump_VPI           211 212 261 262 999 
Stm_Dump_Pressure_Mode  211 212 261 262 999 
X_SG_A_PORV_Setpoint  131 132 231 232 999    
X_SG_B_PORV_Setpoint   141 142 241 242 999    
X_SG_C_PORV_Setpoint     151 152 251 252 999    
X_Stm_Dump_Pressure_Setpoint 211 212 261 262 999   
Condenser_Low_Vacuum   211 212 261 262 999  
A_Condenser_Low_Vacuum   211 212 261 262 999  
CST_Level       161 162 999 
Turb_Pressure     261 262 999 
Core_Power   211 212 999 
SUR               211 212 999 
RATE_Core_Power   211 212 999 
del_k             211 212 999 
Loop_A_Tcold   211 212 999 
Loop_B_Tcold   211 212 999  
Loop_C_Tcold   211 212 999 
Loop_A_Thot   211 212 999 
Loop_B_Thot   211 212 999  
Loop_C_Thot   211 212 999 
Loop_A_Tave   211 212 999 
Loop_B_Tave   211 212 999  
Loop_C_Tave   211 212 999 
Loop_A_Delta_T    211 212 311 312 999 
Loop_B_Delta_T     211 212 311 312 999 
Loop_C_Delta_T     211 212 311 312 999 
Median_Tave   211 212 999 
RATE_Median_Tave  211 212 999 
RATE_Loop_A_Tave  211 212 999 
RATE_Loop_B_Tave  211 212 999 
RATE_Loop_C_Tave  211 212 999 
Tave-Tref                211 212 261 262 999 
Min_Sub_Cooling          211 212 221 222 999 
HTMode_Max               211 212 221 222 311 312 999        
Tclad_Max                211 212 221 222 311 312 999      
PZR_PORV_VPI    121 122 221 222 999 
PZR_Spray_Vlv_VPI   121 122 221 222 999 
SG_A_TDAFW_VPI   131 132 999 
SG_B_TDAFW_VPI   141 142 999 
SG_C_TDAFW_VPI   151 152 999 
SG_A_MDAFW_VPI   131 132 999 
SG_B_MDAFW_VPI   141 142 999 
SG_C_MDAFW_VPI   151 152 999 
SG_A_FWRV_VPI    131 132 999 
SG_B_FWRV_VPI     141 142 999 
SG_C_FWRV_VPI     151 152 999 
SG_A_MFIV_VPI    131 132 999 
SG_B_MFIV_VPI     141 142 999 
SG_C_MFIV_VPI    151 152 999 
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SG_A_MSIV_VPI     131 132 231 232 999 
SG_B_MSIV_VPI    141 142 241 242 999 
SG_C_MSIV_VPI     151 152 251 252 999 
SG_A_PORV_VPI   131 132 231 232 999 
SG_B_PORV_VPI   141 142 241 242 999 
SG_C_PORV_VPI    151 152 251 252 999 
PZR_Prop_Htrs_On    221 222 999 
PZR_Backup_Htrs_On  221 222 999  
PZR_PORV_Open    121 122 221 222 999 
Spray_Vlv_A_Open    221 222 999 
Spray_Vlv_B_Open    221 222 999 
SG_A_Safety_Open    131 132 231 232 999 
SG_B_Safety_Open    141 142 241 242 999 
SG_C_Safety_Open   151 152 251 252 999 
SG_A_PORV_Man    131 132 231 232 999 
SG_B_PORV_Man    141 142 241 242 999 
SG_C_PORV_Man    151 152 251 252 999 
SGTR_Pressure       221 221 231 232 241 242 251 252 999 
SGTR_Temp_Target    211 212 231 232 241 242 251 252 999 
SGTR_A_BRK_Flow   111 112 131 132 999 
SGTR_B_BRK_Flow   111 112 141 142 999 
SGTR_C_BRK_Flow   111 112 151 152 999 
Air_Ejector_Radiation    111 121 132 142 152 999 
MSLB_BRK_Flow   131 141 151 161 261 211 212 999 
LOCA_BRK_Flow     111 112 121 122 182 282 999 
SG_B_BRK_Flow   141 241 211 212 182 282 999 
Steam_Dump_Vlv_Open  211 212 261 262 999   
Containment_Pressure  181 182 281 282 999 
X_RCP_A       311 312 999 
X_RCP_B           311 312 999 
X_RCP_C           311 312     999 
X_MFP_Trip   131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
X_MF_Pump_A   131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
X_MF_Pump_B       131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
X_Condensate_Pump_Trip  131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
X_MD_AFW_Pump_A   131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
X_MD_AFW_Pump_B   131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
X_TD_AFW_Pump   131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
X_SCRAM          211 212 999 
X_Control_Rods_In        211 212 999 
X_Control_Rods_Out       211 212 999 
X_LOOP            211 212 261 262 999 
X_SIAS         111 112 121 122 182 211 212 282 999 
X_SI_BLK_A     111 112 121 122 182 211 212 282 999 
X_SI_BLK_B     111 112 121 122 182 211 212 282 999 
X_SI_Reset     111 112 121 122 182 211 212 282 999 
X_Letdown         111 112 121 122 999 
X_Isolate_Charging        111 112 121 122 999 
X_Emergency_Borate        211 212 999 
X_LOCA            111 121 999 
X_SGTR_SG_A       111 121 132 999 
X_SGTR_SG_B       111 121 142 999 
X_SGTR_SG_C       111 121 152 999 
X_MSLB            211 212 261 262 999 
X_Turb_Trip       211 212 261 262 999 
X_Turb_Runback    211 212 261 262 999 
X_Stm_Dump        211 212 261 262 999 
X_PZR_Spray_Valve  221 222 999 
X_PZR_Aux_Spray_Valve   221 222 999 
X_PZR_PORV   111 112 121 122 221 222 999 
X_PZR_Heaters   221 222 999 
X_LPI_Pump_A         111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_LPI_Pump_B       111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
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X_LPI_Loop_A_Throttle        111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_LPI_Loop_B_Throttle        111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_LPI_Loop_C_Throttle         111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_HPI_Pump_A          111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_HPI_Pump_B        111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_HPI_Loop_A_Throttle    111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_HPI_Loop_B_Throttle    111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_HPI_Loop_C_Throttle    111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_ACC_A_Outlet_Valve         111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_ACC_B_Outlet_Valve         111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_ACC_C_Outlet_Valve          111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_SG_A_Atmos_PORV        131 132 231 232     999 
X_SG_B_Atmos_PORV        141 142 241 242 999 
X_SG_C_Atmos_PORV        151 152 251 252 999 
X_SG_A_FWRV        131 132     999 
X_SG_B_FWRV        141 142     999 
X_SG_C_FWRV        151 152     999 
X_SG_A_TDAFW_Throttle       131 132 999 
X_SG_B_TDAFW_Throttle       141 142 999 
X_SG_C_TDAFW_Throttle       151 152 999 
X_SG_A_MDAFW_Throttle       131 132 999 
X_SG_B_MDAFW_Throttle       141 142 999 
X_SG_C_MDAFW_Throttle       151 152 999 
X_SG_A_FWIV        131 132 999 
X_SG_B_FWIV        141 142 999 
X_SG_C_FWIV        151 152 999 
X_SG_A_MSIV        131 132 231 232 999 
X_SG_B_MSIV        141 142 241 242 999 
X_SG_C_MSIV        151 152 251 252 999 
X_Block_MSIV_Trip  231 241 251 261 999 
X_Increase_Turbine_Load  211 212 261 262 999 
X_Decrease_Turbine_Load  211 212 261 262 999 
X_Steam_Auxiliaries  211 212 261 262 999 
X_SG_B_MSLB        231 241 251 261 182 282 999 
X_FLAG_Scram     211 212 999              
X_FLAG_Turbine_Trip  261 262 999        
X_FLAG_Safety_Injection  111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_FLAG_MSIV_Trip    231 232 241 242 251 252 261 262 999 
X_FLAG_MDAFP_On     131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
X_FLAG_TDAFP_On     131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
X_FLAG_HPI_On            111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_FLAG_LPI_On            111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
X_FLAG_GOAL_Depressurize_SGA  131 132 231 232     999 
X_FLAG_SGTR_A            111 121 132 999 
X_FLAG_SGTR_B            111 121 142 999 
X_FLAG_SGTR_C   111 121 152 999 
X_FLAG_SG_A_Faulted  131 231 999 
X_FLAG_SG_B_Faulted  141 241 999 
X_FLAG_SG_C_Faulted  151 251 999 
X_FLAG_SG_Makeup_via_MFW        131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
X_FLAG_GOAL_Cool_Down_RCS      900 999 
X_FLAG_GOAL_Depressurize_RCS    900 999 
X_FLAG_GOAL_Reduce_Power  900 999 
X_Watchdog_Timer_1  900 999 
X_Watchdog_Timer_2  900 999 
FLAG_Scram      211 212 999 
FLAG_Turb_Trip           261 262 999 
FLAG_Safety_Injection  111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
FLAG_MSIV_Trip    231 241 251 261 999 
FLAG_MDAFP_On   131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
FLAG_TDAFP_On       131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
FLAG_HPI_On              111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
FLAG_LPI_On          111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
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FLAG_GOAL_Depressurize_SGA    131 132 231 232     999 
FLAG_SGTR_SG_A        111 121 132 999 
FLAG_SGTR_SG_B      111 121 132 999 
FLAG_SGTR_SG_C    111 121 132 999 
FLAG_SG_A_Faulted  131 231 999 
FLAG_SG_B_Faulted  141 241 999 
FLAG_SG_C_Faulted  151 251 999 
FLAG_SG_Makeup_via_MFW          131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
FLAG_GOAL_Cool_Down_RCS      900 999 
FLAG_GOAL_Depressurize_RCS    900 999 
FLAG_GOAL_Reduce_Power  900 999 
Safety_Injection         111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
Reactor_Trip      211 212 999 
Rods_Out          211 212 999 
Rods_In           211 212 999 
Turbine_Trip      211 212 261 262 999 
Turbine_Runback   211 212 261 262 999 
Main_Steam_Isolation     231 241 251 261 999 
Block_Main_Steam_Isolation    231 241 251 261 999 
Main_Feed_Pump_A_Trip     131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
Main_Feed_Pump_B_Trip     131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
Main_Feed_Pump_Trip      131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
MFP_Low_Suction_Pressure 131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
Hi_PWR_Reactor_Trip      211 212 999 
OTDT_Reactor_Trip        211 212 221 999 
OPDT_Reactor_Trip        211 212 221 999 
Lo_RCS_Flow_Rx_Trip      311 999 
Lo_SG_Pressure_SI        231 241 251 261 999 
Lo_PZR_Pressure_SI       111 112 121 122 211 212 999  
Block_Low_Press_SI      111 112 121 122 211 212 999  
X_Block_Low_Press_SI     111 112 121 122 211 212 999  
Block_Low_Press_SI       111 112 121 122 211 212 999   
Permissive_P-11_PZR_Press   111 112 121 122 211 212 999    
A_Block_Low_Press_SI      111 112 121 122 211 212 999    
A_Permissive_P-11_PZR_Press  111 112 121 122 211 212 999    
Hi_Cont_Pressure         182 282 999 
HiHi_Cont_Pressure       182 282 999 
CVCS_Letdown_Isolation   111 112 121 122 999 
TDAFP_Auto_Start    131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
MDAFP_Auto_Start  131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
MF_MS_Mismatch_Rx_Trip   131 141 151 211 212 999 
LoLo_SG_Level_Rx_Trip   131 141 151 211 212 999 
Lo_Pressure_Rx_Trip   211 212 221 999 
Hi_Pressure_Rx_Trip   211 212 222 999 
Hi_PZR_Level_Rx_Trip  122 211 212 999 
TDAFP_On   131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
A_MDAFP_On   131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
B_MDAFP_On    131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
A_HPI_Pump_On    111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
B_HPI_Pump_On    111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
A_LPI_Pump_On    111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
B_LPI_Pump_On     111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
A_Safety_Injection       111 112 121 122 211 212 999 
A_Reactor_Trip           211 212 999 
A_Turbine_Trip      211 212 261 262 999 
A_Turbine_Runback        211 212 261 262 999 
A_RCP_A_Tripped   221 222 311 312 999 
A_RCP_B_Tripped    221 222 311 312 999 
A_RCP_C_Tripped   221 222 311 312 999 
A_TDAFP_Auto_Start  131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
A_MDAFP_Auto_Start  131 132 141 142 151 152 211 212 999 
A_Main_Feedwater_Pump_Trip      131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
A_Main_Feed_Pump_A_Trip     131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
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A_Main_Feed_Pump_B_Trip     131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
A_MFP_Low_Suction_Pressure 131 132 141 142 151 152 999 
A_Main_Steam_Isolation    231 241 251 261 999 
A_OTDT_Reactor_Trip        211 212 221 999 
A_OPDT_Reactor_Trip        211 212     221 999 
A_Lo_RCS_Flow_Reactor_Trip      311 999 
A_Lo_SG_Pressure_SI        231 241 251 261 999 
A_Lo_PZR_Pressure_SI       111 112 121 122 211 212 999    
A_Hi_Power_Reactor_Trip    211 212 999 
A_Hi_Cont_Pressure       182 282 999 
A_HiHi_Cont_Pressure            182 282 999 
A_CVCS_Letdown_Isolation        111 112 121 122 999 
A_MF_MS_Mismatch_Reactor_Trip  131 141 151 211 212 999  
A_LoLo_SG_Level_Reactor_Trip  131 141 151 211 212 999 
A_Lo_Pressure_Reactor_Trip  211 212 221 999 
A_Hi_Pressure_Reactor_Trip  211 212 222 999 
A_Hi_PZR_Level_Reactor_Trip 122 211 212 999 
A_Rods_Out                211 212 999 
A_Rods_In                 211 212     999 
A_SG_A_Level_Lo_Dev      131 999 
A_SG_B_Level_Lo_Dev       141 999 
A_SG_C_Level_Lo_Dev       151 999 
A_SG_A_Lo_Level           131 999 
A_SG_B_Lo_Level           141 999     
A_SG_C_Lo_Level           151 999 
A_SG_A_LoLo_Level         131 999 
A_SG_B_LoLo_Level         141 999 
A_SG_C_LoLo_Level         151 999 
A_SG_A_Level_Hi_Dev       132 999 
A_SG_B_Level_Hi_Dev       142 999 
A_SG_C_Level_Hi_Dev       152 999 
A_SG_A_Hi_Level           132 999 
A_SG_B_Hi_Level           142 999 
A_SG_C_Hi_Level           152 999 
A_SG_A_HiHi_Level         132 999 
A_SG_B_HiHi_Level         142 999 
A_SG_C_HiHi_Level         152 999 
A_SG_A_MF_Flow_Lo         131 999 
A_SG_B_MF_Flow_Lo         141 999 
A_SG_C_MF_Flow_Lo         151 999 
A_SG_A_MF_Flow_Hi         132 999 
A_SG_B_MF_Flow_Hi         142 999 
A_SG_C_MF_Flow_Hi         152 999 
A_SG_A_Lo_Pressure        231 999 
A_SG_B_Lo_Pressure        241 999 
A_SG_C_Lo_Pressure        251 999 
A_SG_A_Hi_Pressure        232 999 
A_SG_B_Hi_Pressure        242 999 
A_SG_C_Hi_Pressure        252 999 
A_PZR_Lo_Pressure         211 221 999 
A_PZR_Hi_Pressure         212 222 999 
A_PZR_Pressure_Hi_Dev   212 222 999 
A_PZR_Pressure_Lo_Dev     211 221 999 
A_PZR_Lo_Level            111 121 999 
A_PZR_Level_Lo_Dev        111 121 999  
A_PZR_Hi_Level            112 122 999 
A_PZR_Level_Hi_Dev        112 122 999  
A_Tave_Hi_Dev             212 999 
A_Tave_Lo_Dev             211 999 
A_ACC_A_Lo_Level          111 121 211 212 999   
A_ACC_A_LoLo_Level          111 121 211 212 999   
A_ACC_A_Lo_Pressure          111 121 211 212 999  
A_ACC_B_Lo_Level             111 121 211 212 999  
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A_ACC_B_LoLo_Level             111 121 211 212 999  
A_ACC_B_Lo_Pressure            111 121 211 212 999   
A_ACC_C_Lo_Level                111 121 211 212 999  
A_ACC_C_LoLo_Level             111 121 211 212 999  
A_ACC_C_Lo_Pressure             111 121 211 212 999  
A_SGTR_Pressure_OK  221 222 231 232 241 242 251 252 999 
A_SGTR_Temp_OK      211 212 231 232 241 242 251 252 999 
A_Air_Ejector_Radiation   111 121 132 142 152 999 
A_ENDSEQ_Parameter  900 999 
A_ENDSEQ_Component  900 999 
A_ENDSEQ_Main_Steam_Isolation  900 999 
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Appendix D provides a representative listing of operator mental beliefs used in the 
current ADS-IDAC three loop pressurized water reactor model.  Mental beliefs 
support three primary functions in ADS-IDAC: (1) provide symptom confidence 
levels for use in the diagnostic module, (2) activate simple skill- or rule-based 
actions, and (3) provide the building blocks for more complex mental models of plant 
behavior.  Each mental belief includes prerequisite conditions (e.g., the parameter, 
component, alarm, mental belief and procedure states that are required to activate the 
belief), activation parameters (i.e., the probability that the belief is activated when the 
prerequisite conditions are met), timing parameters that establish the activation time 
and reset time for the belief, and the skill- or rule-based actions associated with the 
belief.  The listing in the Appendix is not complete – the ADS-IDAC model includes 
approximately 90 mental beliefs for both the Decision-Maker and the Action-Taker. 
The specific format used for this input is described in Appendix K, the ADS-IDAC 
input manual. 
 







activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  3600.0 1.0 1.0 
Number_of_expected_alarm_state  1 
A_Hi_Cont_Pressure       3022 
Number_of_expected_component_state 0 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value 0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  3600.0 1.0 1.0 
Number_of_expected_alarm_state  1 
A_Hi_Power_Reactor_Trip  3022 
Number_of_expected_component_state  0 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value  2 
SUR   3007 0.2 0.0 
RATE_Core_Power 3007 0.5 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  3600.0 1.0 1.0  
Number_of_expected_alarm_state  0 
Number_of_expected_component_state  0 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value  2 
SUR   3009 -0.2 0.0 
RATE_Core_Power 3009 -0.5 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  3600.0 1.0 1.0  
Number_of_expected_alarm_state  1 
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A_Tave_Hi_Dev  3022 
Number_of_expected_component_state  0 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value  2 
Tave-Tref  3007 2.0 0.0 
RATE_Median_Tave 3007 1.5 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  




Tave-Tref  3032 -0.5 0.5 
RATE_Median_Tave 3032 -0.5 0.5 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  3600.0 1.0 1.0  
Number_of_expected_alarm_state 1 
A_Tave_Lo_Dev  3022 
Number_of_expected_component_state 0 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value 2 
Tave-Tref  3009 -2.0 0.0 
RATE_Median_Tave 3009 -1.5 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  3600.0 1.0 1.0  
Number_of_expected_alarm_state 2 
A_PZR_Level_Hi_Dev 3022  
A_PZR_Hi_Level  3022 
Number_of_expected_component_state 0 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value 1 
RATE_PZR_Level 3007 0.01 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
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Number_of_procedure_activity       0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  3600.0 1.0 1.0  
Number_of_expected_alarm_state 2 
A_PZR_Level_Lo_Dev  3022 
A_PZR_Lo_Level  3022 
Number_of_expected_component_state 0 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value 1 
RATE_PZR_Level 3009 -0.01 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 
None  None 
  
9 RCS_Pressure_Increase  
activation_probability 0.0 
branch_probability 0.0 
activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  





RATE_PZR_Pressure 3007 25.0 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  3600.0 1.0 1.0  
Number_of_expected_alarm_state  0 
Number_of_expected_component_state 0 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value 1 
RATE_PZR_Pressure 3032 -5.0 5.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  3600.0 1.0 1.0  
 






RATE_PZR_Pressure 3009 -25.0 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 






activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  3600.0 1.0 1.0  
Number_of_expected_alarm_state 2 
A_SG_A_Level_Hi_Dev  3022 
A_SG_A_Hi_Level  3022 
Number_of_expected_component_state 0 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value 2 
RATE_SG_A_NR_Level 3007 0.01 0.0 
SG_A_Level_Deviation    3007  2.0   0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  






RATE_SG_A_NR_Level 3009 -0.1 0.0 
SG_A_Level_Deviation    3009  -1.0  0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 0.0  100.0 1.5  




SG_A_NR_Level  3009 0.10 0.0 
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SG_B_NR_Level  3009 0.10 0.0 
SG_C_NR_Level  3009 0.10 0.0 
Total_AFW_Flow   3009 55.1 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             1 
Monitor_Critical_Safety_Functions 3021 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 1 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  





PZR_Level 3009 0.1 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  1 







activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  





Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  1 







activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  3600.0 1.0 1.0 
Number_of_expected_alarm_state 2 




RATE_PZR_Level 3009 -0.01 0.0 
RATE_PZR_Pressure 3009 -15.0 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
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Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  10000.0 1.0 1.0 
Number_of_expected_alarm_state 1 
A_Air_Ejector_Radiation  3022 
Number_of_expected_component_state 0 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value 0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 







activation_delay_time 0.0 1.0 1.0  




Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             3 
Reactor_Coolant_System_Leak  3021 
High_Secondary_Radiation  3021 
SG_Uncontrolled_Level_Increase 3021 







activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  





Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 







activation_delay_time 0.0 1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  10.0 1.0 1.0 
Number_of_expected_alarm_state 0 
 




Tave-Tref  3032 -1.5  1.5 
PZR_Pressure 3032 2200.0 2300.0 
PZR_Level  3032 0.40  0.55 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 








activation_delay_time 0.0 1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time 10000.0 1.0 1.0  




PZR_Level 3009 0.12 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control          0 
Number_of_mental_belief                 1 
Reactor_Tripped  3045 







activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  





Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             1 
Reactor_Coolant_System_Leak 3021 







activation_delay_time 0.0 1.0 1.0  




Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             1 
SG_Uncontrolled_Level_Increase 3021 
Number_of_procedure_activity  1 
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activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  
reset_delay_time  5000.0 1.0 1.0 
Number_of_expected_alarm_state 1 
A_SG_A_Hi_Level  3022 
Number_of_expected_component_state 0 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value 3 
RATE_SG_A_NR_Level 3007 0.02 0.0 
SG_A_Level_Deviation 3007 2.0 0.0 
SG_A_FW_Flow   3009 15.0 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 








activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  




Number_of_manipulative_control      0 











activation_delay_time 100.0  1.0 1.0  




Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             2 
Reactor_Coolant_System_Leak 3021 
Reactor_Tripped   3045 












activation_delay_time 100.0  1.0 1.0  




Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             3 
SG_A_Uncontrolled_Level_Increase  3021 
Possible_SG_Tube_Rupture   3021 
Emergency_Operating_Procedures_Initiated 3045 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 1 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  




Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  7 
E_0_CSF 3126 
E_1  3126 
E_2  3126 










activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 2.0  







Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             1 
ECCS_Injection_With_Loss_of_Subcooling_Margin 3021 
Number_of_procedure_activity  1 
FRG_H.1_Immediate_Feed 3126 
Mental_procedure_priority 1 
MPBG_Stop_RCPS  Step_1 
 






activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  




ECCS_Flow  3007 10.0    0.0 
Min_Sub_Cooling   3009  10.0    0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 




















































Appendix E provides a sample sequence event printout for the first 500 seconds of an 
uncomplicated reactor trip scenario.  The operators establish a goal of maintaining 
normal operation using the wait and monitor strategy at approximately 60 seconds.  A 
reactor trip initiating event is actuated at approximately 180 seconds.  The operators 
then transition to the maintaining global safety margin goal at approximately 250 
seconds (the troubleshooting goal is set to be bypassed).  This goal shift then activates 
the follow-procedure strategy and results in the operators initiating emergency 
operating procedure E-0 at 252 seconds. Because the trip was uncomplicated, the 
operators transition to supplemental procedure ES-0.1 at 281 seconds to complete the 
stabilization of plant conditions.  Of particular note is the rich narrative detail 
provided by the summary report including detailed procedure step actions and 
expectation evaluation, activation of mental beliefs, and crew communication.
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********************************************* 
*** Event Hightlights for Sequence 0 *** 
********************************************* 
61.0627 GOAL: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Goal: GNOP 
62.0704 STRATEGY: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Strategy: SWM 
180.975 HWReliability: Sender: PLANT; Receiver: PLANT; Component Reactor_Trip; Status: Fail; X_SCRAM  
181.479 2 branches are generated 
181.982 HWReliability: Sender: PLANT; Receiver: PLANT; Component Reactor_Trip; Status: Success; X_Stm_Dump 
181.982 New Alarm:  Actuation A_Tave_Hi_Dev 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_Reactor_Trip 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_Turbine_Trip 
182.485 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Reactor_Tripped; Status: SUCCEED 
  Mental Belief: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Belief: Reactor_Tripped; Status: SUCCEED 
182.988 Info_gather_mode: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OATconditional_use_of_memorized_info_if_available 
  Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Alarm_Hi_Tave_Deviation; Status: SUCCEED 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_A_MF_Flow_Hi 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_B_MF_Flow_Hi 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_C_MF_Flow_Hi 
183.489 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Alarm_Reactor_Trip; Status: SUCCEED 
183.991 GOAL: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Goal: GNOP 
  Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_High_Tave_Deviation;  Step_1 
184.492 AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Tave-Tref 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_PZR_Pressure_Lo_Dev 
185.495 AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Median_Tave 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_PZR_Level_Hi_Dev 
186.498 AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: RATE_Median_Tave 
186.999 New Alarm:  Actuation A_PZR_Lo_Pressure 
187.499 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Alarm_Low_Pressurizer_Pressure; Status: SUCCEED 
188.000 New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_A_Level_Lo_Dev 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_B_Level_Lo_Dev 
188.501 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_PZR_Low_Pressure;  Step_1 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_C_Level_Lo_Dev 
189.001 AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: PZR_Pressure 
190.002 AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: RATE_PZR_Pressure 
191.003 New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_A_Lo_Level 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_B_Lo_Level 
191.503 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Alarm_SG_A_Low_Level; Status: SUCCEED 
  Mental Belief: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Belief: Alarm_SG_A_Low_Level; Status: SUCCEED 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_C_Lo_Level 
192.003 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Alarm_SG_B_Low_Level; Status: SUCCEED 
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  Mental Belief: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Belief: Alarm_SG_B_Low_Level; Status: SUCCEED 
192.503 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Alarm_SG_C_Low_Level; Status: SUCCEED 
  Mental Belief: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Belief: Alarm_SG_C_Low_Level; Status: SUCCEED 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_A_LoLo_Level 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_B_LoLo_Level 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_LoLo_SG_Level_Reactor_Trip 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_TDAFP_Auto_Start 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_MDAFP_Auto_Start 
193.032 Mental Belief: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Belief: Alarm_MDAFP_Auto_Start; Status: SUCCEED 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_C_LoLo_Level 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_C_Hi_Pressure 
193.561 Mental Belief: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Belief: Alarm_TDAFP_Auto_Start; Status: SUCCEED 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_A_Hi_Pressure 
  New Alarm:  Actuation A_SG_B_Hi_Pressure 
194.091 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_SG_A_Lo_Level;  Step_1 
  Procedure: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_SG_B_Lo_Level;  Step_1 
194.62  AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: SG_A_NR_Level 
  AddScannedParameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_B_NR_Level 
195.12  New Alarm:  Clear A_PZR_Level_Hi_Dev 
195.62  AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: SG_A_WR_Level 
196.12  Procedure: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_SG_C_Lo_Level;  Step_1 
196.62  AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: RATE_SG_A_NR_Level 
 AddScannedParameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_C_NR_Level 
198.121 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_SG_B_Lo_Level;  Step_1 
  Procedure: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_SG_A_Lo_Level;  Step_1 
198.621 AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: SG_B_NR_Level 
  AddScannedParameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_A_NR_Level 
199.622 AddScannedParameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_A_WR_Level 
  New Alarm:  Clear A_SG_C_MF_Flow_Hi 
200.122 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_SG_C_Lo_Level;  Step_1 
  New Alarm:  Clear A_SG_A_MF_Flow_Hi 
  New Alarm:  Clear A_SG_B_MF_Flow_Hi 
200.622 AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: SG_C_NR_Level 
  AddScannedParameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: RATE_SG_A_NR_Level 
214.624 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_Reactor_Trip;  Step_1 
215.124 AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Core_Power 
  AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: SUR 
  AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Total_AFW_Flow 
242.272 GOAL: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Goal: GTS - GOAL BYPASSED 
243.301 GOAL: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Goal: GMON 
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244.36  GOAL: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Goal: GMON 
  Info_gather_mode: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODMconditional_use_of_memorized_info_if_available 
245.419 GOAL: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Goal: GMGSM 
246.478 GOAL: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Goal: GMGSM 
  STRATEGY: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Strategy: SFP 
247.537 STRATEGY: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Strategy: SFI 
251.772 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: E_0;  Step_1 
252.301 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Emergency_Operating_Procedures_Initiated;  
Status: SUCCEED 
252.83  Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Uncomplicated_Trip_Recovery;  
Status: SUCCEED 
253.889 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify A_Reactor_Trip ; Verify_Reactor_Trip 
254.419 Alarm: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM Alarm: A_Reactor_Trip; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: ON;  
Observed State: ON;Use of Memorized Info 
255.477 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: SUR; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: <= -0.3;  
Observed value: -0.6140919539; Use of memorized info 
257.595 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: E_0;  Step_2 
258.654 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify A_Turbine_Trip ; Verify_Turbine_Trip 
259.183 Alarm: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM Alarm: A_Turbine_Trip; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: ON;  
Observed State: ON;Use of Memorized Info 
261.301 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: E_0;  Step_3 
261.83  Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: E_0;  Step_4.1 
262.889 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify A_Safety_Injection ; 
Check_Safety_Injection_Status 
263.947 Alarm: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT Alarm: A_Lo_SG_Pressure_SI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: NONE 
265.006 Alarm: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT Alarm: A_Lo_SG_Pressure_SI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: NONE 
266.065 Alarm: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM Alarm: A_Lo_SG_Pressure_SI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: OFF 
266.594 Alarm: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM Alarm: A_Lo_SG_Pressure_SI; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: OFF 
268.182 Alarm: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT Alarm: A_Hi_Cont_Pressure; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: NONE 
269.241 Alarm: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT Alarm: A_Hi_Cont_Pressure; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: NONE 
270.3  Alarm: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM Alarm: A_Hi_Cont_Pressure; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: OFF 
270.829 Alarm: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM Alarm: A_Hi_Cont_Pressure; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: OFF 
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272.417 Alarm: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT Alarm: A_Lo_PZR_Pressure_SI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: NONE 
273.476 Alarm: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT Alarm: A_Lo_PZR_Pressure_SI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: NONE 
274.535 Alarm: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM Alarm: A_Lo_PZR_Pressure_SI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: OFF 
275.064 Alarm: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM Alarm: A_Lo_PZR_Pressure_SI; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: OFF 
276.652 Component: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT; Component: Safety_Injection; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF; 
Observed State: NONE 
277.711 Component: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Component: Safety_Injection; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF; 
Observed State: NONE 
278.77  Component: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM; Component: Safety_Injection; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF; 
Observed State: OFF 
279.299 Component: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Component: Safety_Injection; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: OFF; 
Observed State: OFF 
286.181 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: ES_0.1;  Step_1.1 
286.71  Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Monitor_Critical_Safety_Functions; Status: SUCCEED 
287.239 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Uncomplicated_Trip_Recovery; Status: SUCCEED 
291.474 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify Median_Tave ; 
 Check_Reactor_Coolant_System_Temperature Steady_or_trending_to_no-load_Tave 
292.003 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Median_Tave; Status: FAILED; Exp State:  
BETWEEN 546. and 548.; Observed value: 550.421549344; Use of memorized info 
293.591 Procedure: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_MDAFP_Start;  Step_1 
294.121 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Action: WAITING: Verify A_MDAFP_On ; 
Motor_Driven_Aux_Feed_Pump_Auto_Start 
294.65  Component: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Component: A_MDAFP_On; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: NONE 
295.179 Mental Belief: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Belief: Align_A_MDAFP_Flow_Path; Status: SUCCEED 
295.709 Component: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Component: A_MDAFP_On; Status: FAILED; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: ON 
297.297 Procedure: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_MDAFP_Start;  Step_2 
297.826 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Action: WAITING: Verify B_MDAFP_On ; 
Motor_Driven_Aux_Feed_Pump_Auto_Start 
298.356 Component: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Component: B_MDAFP_On; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: NONE 
298.885 Component: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Component: B_MDAFP_On; Status: FAILED; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: ON 
305.237 Procedure: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Procedure: MPBG_NONE;  Step_1 
305.766 AddScannedParameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: PZR_Level 
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306.825 Procedure: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_TDAFP_Start;  Step_1 
307.354 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Action: WAITING: Verify TDAFP_On ; 
Turbine_Driven_Aux_Feed_Pump_Auto_Start 
307.884 Component: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Component: TDAFP_On; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: NONE 
308.413 Mental Belief: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Belief: Align_TDAFP_Flow_Path; Status: SUCCEED 
308.942 Component: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Component: TDAFP_On; Status: FAILED; Exp State: OFF;  
Observed State: ON 
311.06  New Alarm:  Clear A_Tave_Hi_Dev 
315.294 Procedure: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Procedure: MPBG_NONE;  Step_1 
316.353 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: ES_0.1;  Step_1.2 
320.588 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify Median_Tave ;  
  Check_Reactor_Coolant_System_Temperature - Check_for_Low_Taverage 
321.117 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Uncomplicated_Trip_Recovery; Status: SUCCEED 
321.646 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Median_Tave; Status: FAILED; Exp State: <= 546.; 
Observed value: 548.111563553; Use of memorized info 
323.234 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: ES_0.1;  Step_1.4 
327.469 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify Median_Tave ; 
Check_Reactor_Coolant_System_Temperature:_High_Tavg_-_Ensure_steam_dump_system_in_automatic 
327.998 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Median_Tave; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: > 548.; 
Observed value: 548.111563553; Use of memorized info 
329.057 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: RATE_Median_Tave; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: <= -1.; 
Observed value: -2.26966371983; Use of memorized info 
331.174 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: ES_0.1;  Step_2.1 
335.409 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify Median_Tave ; Check_Feed_Water_Status 
335.938 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Median_Tave; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: <= 554.; 
Observed value: 548.111563553; Use of memorized info 
338.055 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: ES_0.1;  Step_2.2 
342.29  ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify SG_A_FWRV_VPI ;  
Check_Feed_Water_Status_-_Isolate_Main_FWRVs 
343.348 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_A_FWRV_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 1.e-003; 
Observed value: -999. 
  Procedure: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Procedure: MPBG_Align_MDAFP_Valves;  Step_1 
347.583 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: SG_A_FWRV_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 1.e-003; 
Observed value: -999. 
348.641 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: SG_A_FWRV_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 1.e-003; 
Observed value: 0. 
349.171 Mental Belief: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Belief: MDAFP_Flowpath_Aligned; Status: SUCCEED 
351.288 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Action: X_SG_A_MDAFW_Throttle ; Intended_Receiver:PLANT; 
Control_value:1. ; Align_MDAFP_Flowpath 
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352.346 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Uncomplicated_Trip_Recovery; Status: SUCCEED 
353.405 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: SG_A_MDAFW_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: >= 0.99; 
Observed value: -999. 
353.934 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_A_MDAFW_VPI; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: >= 0.99; 
Observed value: 1. 
357.639 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Action: X_SG_B_MDAFW_Throttle ; Intended_Receiver:PLANT; 
Control_value:1. ; Align_MDAFP_Flowpath 
359.757 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: SG_B_MDAFW_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: >= 0.99; 
Observed value: -999. 
360.286 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_B_MDAFW_VPI; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: >= 0.99; 
Observed value: 1. 
363.991 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Action: X_SG_C_MDAFW_Throttle ; Intended_Receiver:PLANT; 
Control_value:1. ; Align_MDAFP_Flowpath 
366.108 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: SG_C_MDAFW_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: >= 0.99; 
Observed value: -999. 
366.637 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_C_MDAFW_VPI; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: >= 0.99; 
Observed value: 1. 
369.284 Procedure: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Procedure: MPBG_Align_TDAFP_Valves;  Step_1 
369.813 Mental Belief: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Belief: TDAFP_Flowpath_Aligned; Status: SUCCEED 
371.93  ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Action: X_SG_A_TDAFW_Throttle ; Intended_Receiver:PLANT; 
Control_value:1. ; Align_TDAFP_Flowpath 
374.047 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: SG_A_TDAFW_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: >= 0.99; 
Observed value: -999. 
374.577 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_A_TDAFW_VPI; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: >= 0.99; 
Observed value: 1. 
378.282 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Action: X_SG_B_TDAFW_Throttle ; Intended_Receiver:PLANT; 
Control_value:1. ; Align_TDAFP_Flowpath 
380.399 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: SG_B_TDAFW_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: >= 0.99; 
Observed value: -999. 
380.928 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_B_TDAFW_VPI; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: >= 0.99; 
Observed value: 1. 
383.575 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Uncomplicated_Trip_Recovery; Status: SUCCEED 
384.633 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Action: X_SG_C_TDAFW_Throttle ; Intended_Receiver:PLANT; 
Control_value:1. ; Align_TDAFP_Flowpath 
386.75  Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: SG_C_TDAFW_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: >= 0.99; 
Observed value: -999. 
387.28  Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_C_TDAFW_VPI; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: >= 0.99; 
Observed value: 1. 
389.926 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: SG_A_FWRV_VPI; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: <= 1.e-003; 
Observed value: 0. 
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395.748 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify SG_B_FWRV_VPI ;  
Check_Feed_Water_Status_-_Isolate_Main_FWRVs 
396.807 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_B_FWRV_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 1.e-003; 
Observed value: -999. 
401.041 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: SG_B_FWRV_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 1.e-003; 
Observed value: -999. 
402.1  Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: SG_B_FWRV_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 1.e-003; 
Observed value: 0. 
402.629 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: SG_B_FWRV_VPI; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: <= 1.e-003; 
Observed value: 0. 
408.451 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify SG_C_FWRV_VPI ;  
Check_Feed_Water_Status_-_Isolate_Main_FWRVs 
409.51  Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: SG_C_FWRV_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 1.e-003; 
Observed value: -999. 
411.097 New Alarm:  Actuation A_PZR_Level_Lo_Dev 
413.744 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: SG_C_FWRV_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 1.e-003; 
Observed value: -999. 
414.802 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: SG_C_FWRV_VPI; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 1.e-003; 
Observed value: 0. 
415.332 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Uncomplicated_Trip_Recovery; Status: SUCCEED 
415.861 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: SG_C_FWRV_VPI; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: <= 1.e-003; 
Observed value: 0. 
417.978 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: ES_0.1;  Step_2.3 
422.212 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify Total_AFW_Flow ;  
Check_Feed_Water_Status_-_Total_Feed_Water_Flow 
422.742 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Total_AFW_Flow; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: >= 55.1; 
Observed value: 175.81093442; Use of memorized info 
424.859 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: ES_0.1;  Step_3 
425.388 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: ES_0.1;  Step_4.1a 
429.622 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify PZR_Level ; Check_Pressuizer_Level_Control 
430.681 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: PZR_Level; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 0.12;  
Observed value: -999. 
434.915 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: PZR_Level; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 0.12; 
Observed value: -999. 
435.974 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: PZR_Level; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 0.12;  
Observed value: 0.169598380742 
436.503 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: PZR_Level; Status: FAILED; Exp State: <= 0.12;  
Observed value: 0.169598380742 
438.091 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: ES_0.1;  Step_4.2 
442.325 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify Makeup_Flow ;  
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Check_Pressuizer_Level_Control_-_Verify_CVCS_in_Service 
442.854 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: PZR_Level; Status: FAILED; Exp State: >= 0.23;  
Observed value: 0.169598380742; Use of memorized info 
445.501 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT; Action: X_Letdown ; Intended_Receiver:OAT; Control_value:1. ; 
Check_Pressuizer_Level_Control_-_Verify_CVCS_in_Service 
449.735 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Action: X_Letdown ; Intended_Receiver:PLANT; Control_value:1. ; 
Check_Pressuizer_Level_Control_-_Verify_CVCS_in_Service 
450.793 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM; Action: X_Letdown ; Intended_Receiver:ODM; Control_value:1. ; 
Check_Pressuizer_Level_Control_-_Verify_CVCS_in_Service 
451.323 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Uncomplicated_Trip_Recovery; Status: SUCCEED 
452.91  ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT; Action: X_Letdown ; Intended_Receiver:OAT; Control_value:-1. ; 
Check_Pressuizer_Level_Control_-_Verify_CVCS_in_Service 
457.145 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Action: X_Letdown ; Intended_Receiver:PLANT; Control_value:-1. ; 
Check_Pressuizer_Level_Control_-_Verify_CVCS_in_Service 
458.203 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM; Action: X_Letdown ; Intended_Receiver:ODM; Control_value:-1. ; 
Check_Pressuizer_Level_Control_-_Verify_CVCS_in_Service 
459.262 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: Makeup_Flow; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: >= 0.;  
Observed value: -999. 
463.496 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: Makeup_Flow; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: >= 0.; 
Observed value: -999. 
464.555 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Makeup_Flow; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: >= 0.;  
Observed value: 1.94864565366 
465.084 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Makeup_Flow; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: >= 0.;  
Observed value: 1.94864565366 
467.73  ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT; Action: X_PZR_Level_Setpoint ; Intended_Receiver:OAT; 
Control_value:0.22 ; Check_Pressuizer_Level_Control_-_Verify_CVCS_in_Service 
471.964 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Action: X_PZR_Level_Setpoint ; Intended_Receiver:PLANT; 
Control_value:0.22 ; Check_Pressuizer_Level_Control_-_Verify_CVCS_in_Service 
473.023 ACTION: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM; Action: X_PZR_Level_Setpoint ; Intended_Receiver:ODM; 
Control_value:0.22 ; Check_Pressuizer_Level_Control_-_Verify_CVCS_in_Service 
474.081 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: PZR_Level_Setpoint; Status: ACTIVE;  
Exp State: BETWEEN 0.21 and 0.23; Observed value: -999. 
477.786 New Alarm:  Actuation A_Tave_Lo_Dev 
478.316 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: PZR_Level_Setpoint; Status: ACTIVE;  
Exp State: BETWEEN 0.21 and 0.23; Observed value: -999. 
479.374 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: PZR_Level_Setpoint; Status: ACTIVE;  
Exp State: BETWEEN 0.21 and 0.23; Observed value: 0.22 
479.903 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Alarm_Lo_Tave_Deviation; Status: SUCCEED 
480.433 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: PZR_Level_Setpoint; Status: SUCCEED;  
Exp State: BETWEEN 0.21 and 0.23; Observed value: 0.22 
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480.962 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_Low_Tave_Deviation;  Step_1 
481.491 AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Tave-Tref 
482.55  Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Uncomplicated_Trip_Recovery; Status: SUCCEED 
483.079 AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: Median_Tave 
483.608 New Alarm:  Clear A_SG_B_Hi_Pressure 
484.138 AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: RATE_Median_Tave 
484.667 New Alarm:  Clear A_SG_A_Hi_Pressure 
487.313 Mental Belief: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Belief: Alarm_Low_Pressurizer_Pressure; Status: SUCCEED 
487.843 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: ES_0.1;  Step_4.3 
488.372 Procedure: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Procedure: MPBG_ARP_PZR_Low_Pressure;  Step_1 
488.901 AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: PZR_Pressure 
489.96  AddScannedParameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: RATE_PZR_Pressure 
492.077 New Alarm:  Clear A_SG_C_Hi_Pressure 
495.252 ACTION: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Action: WAITING: Verify PZR_Level ;  
Check_Pressuizer_Level_Control_-_Maintain_Lpzr_at_22% 
496.311 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: OAT; Parameter: PZR_Level; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 0.21;  
Observed value: -999. 
500.545 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: PLANT; Parameter: PZR_Level; Status: ACTIVE;  
Exp State: <= 0.21; Observed value: -999. 
501.604 Parameter: Sender: OAT; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: PZR_Level; Status: ACTIVE; Exp State: <= 0.21;  
Observed value: 0.155612294108 
502.133 Parameter: Sender: ODM; Receiver: ODM; Parameter: PZR_Level; Status: SUCCEED; Exp State: <= 0.21; 
Observed value: 0.155612294108 
 
 



















Appendix F provides a listing of the knowledge-based actions included in the three 
loop pressurized water reactor ADS-IDAC model.  These knowledge-based actions 
are sufficient to guide a non-proceduralized operator response to a steam generator 
tube rupture and a loss of reactor coolant accident event.  Individual actions are 
activated when the operator perceives a deficiency in a system function associated 
with mass, energy, or momentum control.  The specific format used for this input is 










reset_delay_time  100.0 1.0 1.0 




action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 1 




action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 1 




action_type  3074 
control_input 1.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 3 
PZR_Level  3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3009 0.10  0.0 3003 
PZR_Pressure 3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3009 2150.0 0.0 3003 
Safety_Injection 3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3023 3045 
 
 




action_type  3074 
control_input 1.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 2 
A_HPI_Pump_On 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3023 3003 




action_type  3074 
control_input 1.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 2 
B_HPI_Pump_On 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3023 3045 





reset_delay_time  200.0  1.0 1.0 




action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 3 
A_HPI_Pump_On 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3022 3003 
Min_Sub_Cooling 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3007 10.0 0.0 3045 
PZR_Level  3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3007 0.20 0.0 3045 
 





action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 3 
B_HPI_Pump_On 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3022 3045 
Min_Sub_Cooling 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3007 10.0 0.0 3045 





reset_delay_time  200.0  1.0 1.0 




action_type  3074 
control_input 1.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 2 
Mental_Belief  Possible_SG_Tube_Rupture  3021 3003 




action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 2 
Mental_Belief  Possible_SG_Tube_Rupture 3021 3003 
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action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 1 





reset_delay_time  200.0  1.0 1.0 




action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 1 





action_type  3074 
control_input 1.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 3 
PZR_Level  3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3009 0.10 0.0 3002 
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Min_Sub_Cooling 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3009 10.0 0.0 3003 
PZR_Pressure 3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3009 1900.0 0.0 3003 




action_type  3074 
control_input 1.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 2 
A_HPI_Pump_On 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3023 3003 
PZR_Level  3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3009 0.10 0.0 3002 





action_type  3074 
control_input 1.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 2 
B_HPI_Pump_On 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3023 3045 
PZR_Level  3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3009 0.10 0.0 3002 





action_type  3139 
control_input SG_A_Pressure  
lower_limit  400.0 
upper_limit  1025.0 
number_of_prerequisites 5 
Mental_Belief  Possible_SG_Tube_Rupture 3021 3045 
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Min_Sub_Cooling  3002 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3009 30.0 0.0 3045 
FLAG_SGTR_SG_A  3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3023 3045 
SG_A_PORV_Setpoint  3002 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3007 1000.0 0.0 3045 




action_type  3139 
control_input SG_B_Pressure  
lower_limit  400.0 
upper_limit  1025.0 
number_of_prerequisites 5 
Mental_Belief  Possible_SG_Tube_Rupture 3021 3045 
Min_Sub_Cooling  3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3009 30.0 0.0 3045 
FLAG_SGTR_SG_B  3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3023 3045 
SG_B_PORV_Setpoint  3002 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3007 1000.0 0.0 3045 




action_type  3139 
control_input SG_C_Pressure  
lower_limit  400.0 
upper_limit  1025.0 
number_of_prerequisites 5 
Mental_Belief  Possible_SG_Tube_Rupture 3021 3045 
Min_Sub_Cooling  3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3009 30.0 0.0 3045 
FLAG_SGTR_SG_C  3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3023 3045 
SG_C_PORV_Setpoint  3002 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3007 1000.0 0.0 3045 





action_type  3112 
control_input -25.0 
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lower_limit  400.0 
upper_limit  1025.0 
number_of_prerequisites 4 
SG_A_PORV_VPI  3002 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3009 0.5 0.0 3045 
Mental_Belief  Possible_SG_Tube_Rupture 3021 3045 
Min_Sub_Cooling  3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3009 20.0 0.0 3045 




action_type  3112 
control_input -25.0 
lower_limit  400.0 
upper_limit  1025.0 
number_of_prerequisites 4 
SG_B_PORV_VPI  3002 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3009 0.5 0.0 3045 
Mental_Belief  Possible_SG_Tube_Rupture 3021 3045 
Min_Sub_Cooling  3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3009 20.0 0.0 3045 




action_type  3112 
control_input -25.0 
lower_limit  400.0 
upper_limit  1025.0 
number_of_prerequisites 4 
SG_C_PORV_VPI 3002 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3009 0.5 0.0 3045 
Mental_Belief Possible_SG_Tube_Rupture 3021 3045 
Min_Sub_Cooling 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3009 20.0 0.0 3045 





reset_delay_time  200.0  1.0 1.0 
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action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 3 
Mental_Belief  Goal_Reduce_RCS_Temperature 3045 3045 
SG_A_PORV_VPI  3002 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3007 0.001  0.0 3045 




action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 3 
Mental_Belief  Goal_Reduce_RCS_Temperature 3045 3045 
SG_B_PORV_VPI  3002 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3007 0.001  0.0 3045 




action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 3 
Mental_Belief  Goal_Reduce_RCS_Temperature 3045 3045 
SG_C_PORV_VPI  3002 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3007 0.001  0.0 3045 
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Appendix G provides a summary of the branching events that were predicted to be 
relevant to the Halden Empirical HRA Study Loss of Feedwater scenarios.  For each 
predicted branching event, the associated source of crew-to-crew variability is 
described in addition to the impact that the crew action would have on the nuclear 
plant.  These branching events were identified without knowledge of the actual crew 
performance during the experimental study.  Appendix H provides a comparison of 
these predicted events and the actual observed operator behaviors.
 


















conditions.  Crew 
operating philosophy.   
An early manual reactor trip 
preserves a greater secondary water 
inventory in the steam generators 
compared to an automatic reactor 
trip on low SG water level.  Because 
the feed and bleed initiation criteria 
is based on SG water level, a greater 
inventory increases the time 
available until feed and bleed must 
be initiated.  









conditions.  The EOPs 
prompt the operators to 
verify the adequacy of 
the secondary heat sink 
(ES-0.1, Step 6).  
However, the operators 
may detect the low 
auxiliary feedwater 
flow condition before 
this step through self-
initiated control panel 
monitoring activities.   
Early detection of a low auxiliary 
feedwater flow condition results in 
an earlier transition to FRG H.1, 
reduces the time until the RCPs are 
tripped, and minimizes the 








Crew ability to shift to 
a new high level goal 
and implement a new 
procedure 
A shorter transition time to FRG H.1 
results in an earlier transition to 
FRG H.1 reduces the time until the 
RCPs are tripped and minimizes the 
likelihood of a late initiation of feed 
and bleed. 
FRG H.1, 




speed and crew 
communication 
tendencies 
Briefing Hold 1 occurs just prior to 
FRG H.1 Step 1.  Because the 
Briefing Hold 1 time must elapse 
before the FRG H.1 actions can be 
initiated, a longer hold time delays 
tripping of the reactor coolant 
pumps (and reduces the time 
available for initiation of feed and 
bleed). 
Skip FRG H.1, 






tendency.  Knowledge 
and recognition of the 
importance of early 
tripping of the RCPs 
Tripping the reactor coolant pumps 
minimizes the reactor coolant 
system heat addition rate.  This, in 
turn, minimizes the steaming rate 
from the SGs and increases the time 
available until feed and bleed must 
be initiated.   
 



















implementation of the 
SG level transition 
criteria for feed and 
bleed initiation 
For the Base case scenarios, the 
watchdog timer is used to force an 
early transition to feed and bleed 
(i.e., the operators initiate feed and 
bleed when the watchdog timer 
expires, regardless of SG wide range 
level).  Because all SG wide level 
instruments are functional in the 
Base case, feed and bleed will also 
be initiated when two SG wide 
range indicators reach 12% 
(regardless of the watchdog timer 
setting). 
 
During the complex case scenarios, 
two of the three wide range SG level 
instruments are stuck at a value 
above the feed and bleed transition 
criteria.  Consequently, the 
procedural requirement for feed and 
bleed initiation based on SG level 
will never be satisfied.  The 
watchdog timer is used to trigger the 
transition to feed and bleed (i.e., the 
operators initiate feed and bleed 
when the watchdog timer expires, 
regardless of  the actual or perceived 
SG wide range level). 
FRG H.1, 
Briefing Hold 2 
Complex Procedure execution 
speed and crew 
communication 
tendencies (e.g., 
conduct of crew 
meetings) 
Briefing Hold 2 occurs just prior to 
FRG H.1 Step 7.   Because the 
Briefing Hold 2 time must elapse 
before actions to align the 
condensate system can be initiated, a 
longer hold time delays the start of 
secondary depressurization.  
Delaying the start of 
depressurization reduces the time 
available to restore feed from the 







in FRG H.1 Step 
7.a 
Complex Variability in selecting 
target values for 
dynamic parameters.   
Too high of a target value may 
result in the inability to block the 
low pressure safety injection signal.  
Too low of a target value can result 
in an inadvertent safety injection if 
pressure is reduced below the low 
reactor coolant system pressure 
safety injection setpoint. 
 















Complex Procedural adherence 
tendency.  Knowledge 





while attempting main 
feedwater recovery 
The failure to block these safety 
actuation signals may result in an 
inadvertent emergency core cooling 
actuation during subsequent 
recovery steps.  This would result in 
an automatic isolation of the main 
feedwater system and further 




(FRG H.1, Step 
7.c) 
Complex Variability in choosing 
between the competing 
goals of minimizing the 
time required to 
depressurize the 
secondary and avoiding 
an excessive 
depressurization rate.   
An excessive depressurization time 
delays the recovery of feed water 
from the condensate system.  An 
excessive depressurization rate 
causes control difficulties and can 
result in either an inadvertent safety 
injection (due to low reactor coolant 
system pressure) or a main steam 
isolation signal. 
FRG H.1, 




speed and crew 
communication 
tendencies. 
Briefing Hold 3 occurs just prior to 
FRG H.1 Step 10.  Because Briefing 
Hold 3 must elapse before feed and 
bleed core cooling can be initiated, a 
longer hold time delays the 
transition from steam generator heat 
removal to feed and bleed.  If the 
hold time is excessive, secondary 
SG inventory may be fully depleted 




Bleed Path (FRG 




tendency.  Resolution 
of conflicting goals of 
minimizing loss of 
reactor coolant 
inventory and ensuring 
sufficient core cooling.  
Variation in control 
input. 
In order to adequately cool the 
reactor core, the reactor coolant 
bleed mass flow rate through the 
pressurizer PORV valves must 
exceed the core boil off rate.  The 
failure to open all available 
pressurizer PORV valves limits the 
bleed mass flow rate and could 














Appendix H provides a comparison of the crew-to-crew variations predicted with the 
ADS-IDAC model and the actual observed crew behaviors from the Halden FRESH 
simulator exercises.   For each predicted branching event, a comparison to the crew 
data for the base and complex scenarios is made to determine if the behavior was 
actually observed. 
 





Observed During Base 
Scenario 
Observed During Complex 
Scenario? 
Comments 
Early vs. Late Reactor Trip 
Yes 
 
Ten  of  fourteen crews manually 
tripped the reactor early.  Only 
four crews (I, J, K, and L) 




Based on a review of the data, it is 
likely that three crews tripped the 
reactor early (B, D, and E) while the 
remaining crews delayed action and 
received an automatic reactor trip. 
 
The reversal in predominance of manual tripping 
between the base and complex scenarios would 
indicate that the scenario structure influenced the 
decision to trip early.  Because condensate flow 
remained available during the complex scenario, it is 
possible crews attempted to recover main feed rather 
than shutting the plant down.  In the base case, the 
complete loss of condensate flow would make 
restoration of feed highly unlikely before a reactor 
trip was automatically generated – in this case the 
operators may have better anticipated the inevitable 
consequences of the event 
Early vs. Late Detection of 
Low Auxiliary Feedwater 
Condition 
Unknown Unknown 
Although it is likely that crews exhibited variance in 
their detection time for the loss of AFW condition, 
there is insufficient information in the simulator log 
data to support an assessment for this behavior.  
Time Required to Transition 
from ES-0.1 to FRG H.1 
Unknown Unknown 
Although it is likely that crews exhibited variance in 
the time required to transition from ES-0.1 to FR-
H.1, there is insufficient information in the simulator 
log data to support an assessment for this behavior. 
FRG H.1, Briefing Hold #1 Yes Yes 
Due to the inability to explicitly determine the crew 
timing for detection of the loss of AFW condition 
and the transition to FR-H.1, all timing variability 
for initiating FR-H.1 was lumped into Briefing Hold 
#1.  Despite predicting this as a source of crew-to-
crew variability, the initial prediction underestimated 
both the length of this hold point and the variance 
among crews. 
 




Observed During Base 
Scenario 
Observed During Complex 
Scenario? 
Comments 
Skip FRG H.1, Step 3.0 




However, Crew L tripped two  
reactor coolant pumps prior to 
starting FR-H.1 to minimize heat 
input to the RCS. The crew took 
a relatively long time to transfer 
to procedure FR-H.1 but did trip 
the third reactor coolant pump as 
directed by the procedure 
(approximately 13 minutes 
later).  Although the actual crew 
behavior is different from that 
predicted by ADS-IDAC, the 




However, Crew B took a relatively 
long time to transfer to FR-H.1 and 
initiated emergency core cooling 
prior to starting procedure FR-H.1.  
Although this crew did not actually 
skip the FR-H.1 step to trip reactor 
coolant pumps, the net impact on the 
plant was similar to a crew that 
transitioned to FR-H.1 in a more 
timely manner but failed to trip the 
reactor coolant pumps in accordance 
with the procedure.  
The background document for the loss of secondary 
heat sink recovery guideline assumes a best estimate 
prediction that operators would trip the reactor 
coolant pumps within five minutes of the reactor 
trip.  In both the base and complex scenario, no crew 
stopped the reactor coolant pumps within this time 
frame.  The quickest time to stop the pumps was 
approximately six minutes (Crew N, Base case).  
Curiously, Crew N was among the slowest crews to 
trip the reactor coolant pumps during the complex 
case by delaying this action for approximately 24 
minutes. The average time was roughly 10 minutes 
in the base case and 13 minutes for the complex 
case.   
Time Based Transition to 




Three crews initiated feed bleed 
prior to reaching the required SG 
water level criteria.  Crews B, E, 
F, and H all initiated feed and 
bleed with wide range SG water 
levels significantly above 12%. 
See Comment 
For the base case, the watchdog timer was used to 
force an early transition to feed and bleed decay heat 
removal. For the complex case, the watchdog timer 
forced the transition to feed and bleed (since the 
requirement of at least two SGs less than 12% level 
could not be met due to instrument biasing).  
Although crews may not have explicitly based the 
transition to feed and bleed decay heat removal 
based on time criterion, this approach was useful for 
modeling the crew timing variability in initiating 
feed and bleed cooling. 
 




Observed During Base 
Scenario 
Observed During Complex 
Scenario? 
Comments 
FRG H.1, Briefing Hold #2 Not Applicable Yes 
Briefing Hold #2 (prior to RCS depressurization in 
Step 7 of FR-H.1) is not applicable to the base case 
since the condensate system was unavailable.  
Timing variability for this was observed during the 
complex case.  Despite predicting this as a source of 
crew-to-crew variability, the initial prediction 
underestimated both the length of this hold point and 
the variance among crews. 
Target pressure value 
during reactor coolant 
system depressurization in 
FRG H.1 Step 7.a 
Not Observed Not Observed 
Although no crew inadvertently initiated a safety 
injection during RCS depressurization per step 7.a of 
FR-H.1,  
 




Observed During Base 
Scenario 
Observed During Complex 
Scenario? 
Comments 
Failure to block safety 
injection actuation signals 




Several crews failed to block the low 
pressure and/or high steam flow 
safety injection actuation as required 
by procedure.  Crews A, E, and H 
failed to reduce pressure below the 
P11 permissive setpoint and were 
apparently unable to reset either of 
the safety injection blocks.  Crews B, 
C, and G activated the P11 
permissive during the scenario, but 
failed to block either the  low 
pressure or high steam flow safety 
injection.  Crews D and K 
successfully blocked the high steam 
flow signal, but failed to block the 
low pressure safety injection signal.  
In summary, of the fourteen crews, 
only six (crews F, I, J, L, M, and N) 
appear to have properly executed 
procedure steps 7.a and 7.b. 
Although failure to properly perform this step could 
lead to an inadvertent safety actuation later in the 
procedure, no crew appears to have inadvertently 
actuated safety injection due to the failure to perform 
this step action.  Only one crew appeared to actuate 
an inadvertent safety injection (Crew F), but this was 
due to a high differential steam generator condition 
rather than a high steam flow. 
Secondary cooldown rate 
(FRG H.1, Step 7.c) 
Not Applicable 
Not Specifically Observed, though 
Crew F triggered an automatic safety 
injection actuation during 
depressurization due to developing a 
high differential pressure between 
SGs.  This condition is 
approximately equivalent to the 
predicted branching event for the 
ADS-IDAC model. 
This branching event highlights a difference between 
the FRESH simulator and the ADS-IDAC plant 
model.  The FRESH simulator includes a high 
differential SG pressure safety injection when the 
difference between the pressure in two or more SGs 
exceeds roughly 100 psi.  The reference plant model 
for ADS-IDAC does not include this trip – instead 
the safety injection signal is based on a high rate of 
depressurization.  In this scenario, the activation of 
the high differential safety injection actuation is 
roughly equivalent to  
 




Observed During Base 
Scenario 
Observed During Complex 
Scenario? 
Comments 
FRG H.1, Briefing Hold #3 Unknown Unknown 
Although it is likely that crews exhibited variance in 
the time taken to initiate feed and bleed cooling, 
there is insufficient information in the simulator log 
data to support an assessment for this behavior.  Of 
particular note is the longer than anticipated delay in 
establishing a PORV bleed path once high pressure 
injection flow was initiated. 
Insufficient Bleed PORV 




Two crews (D and F) had 
significant delays between 
initiation of high pressure 
injection and opening of a 
PORV bleed path.  The average 
delay between injection and 
opening a bleed path was 
roughly 2-3 minutes.  Crew D 
had a 5 minute delay while crew 
F had a 7 minute delay 
Partially 
 
Of the 7 crews that successfully 
aligned a PORV bleed path, two 
crews (B and F) had an excessive 
delay between initiation of injection 
flow and opening of a bleed path.  
For the crews that established feed 
and bleed, the average delay between 
injection and opening a bleed path 
was roughly 5 minutes.  Crew B had 
a 14 minute delay while crew F had a 
7 minute delay.  It should be noted 
that Crew F inadvertently actuated 
the feeding due to developing a high 
differential pressure between the SGs 
during secondary depressurization 
Although no crew used only one or two pressurizer 
PORVs for feed and bleed, several crews exhibited 
extremely long delay times between initiation of 
high pressure injection and opening of the 
pressurizer PORVs.  This condition could be 
interpreted as the failure to align an adequate bleed 
path from the RCS. It should also be noted that a 
scenario complication for the base case that was not 
included in the original scenario description resulted 
in the PORV fails to fail closed once RCS pressure 















Appendix I provides a series of graphs that compare the performance of control room 
crews at the Halden FRESH simulator facility during the base case loss of feedwater 
event to the results of the re-calibrated ADS-IDAC model.  Although the ADS-IDAC 
results were obtained after the loss of feedwater empirical study data was reviewed 
and the ADS-IDAC knowledge base adjusted, this comparison demonstrates that the 
model is capable of representing a wide range of crew-to-crew variabilities with a 
relatively small number of branching events. 
 




























































Figure 66 - Crew A (Base LOFW) SG A Wide Range Water Level 
 
 




























































Figure 68 - Crew B (Base LOFW) SG A Wide Range Water Level 
 
 




























































Figure 70 - Crew C (Base LOFW) SG A Wide Range Water Level 
 




























































Figure 72 - Crew D (Base LOFW) SG A Wide Range Water Level 
 




























































Figure 74 - Crew E (Base LOFW) SG A Wide Range Water Level 
 
 



























































Figure 76 - Crew F (Base LOFW) SG A Wide Range Water Level 
 




























































Figure 78 - Crew G (Base LOFW) SG A Wide Range Water Level 
 
 



























































Figure 80 - Crew H (Base LOFW) SG A Wide Range Water Level 
 
 



























































Figure 82 - Crew J (Base LOFW) SG A Wide Range Water Level 
 
 




























































Note: Wide Range SG A 
Level shown for Crew K and 
SG B Level shown for Crew I
 
Figure 84 – Crews K & I (Base LOFW) SG A Wide Range Water Level 
 
 




























































Figure 86 - Crew L (Base LOFW) SG A Wide Range Water Level 
 
 




























































Figure 88 - Crew M (Base LOFW) SG A Wide Range Water Level 
 
 













































































Appendix J provides a series of graphs that compare the performance of control room 
crews at the Halden FRESH simulator facility during the complex case loss of 
feedwater event to the results of the re-calibrated ADS-IDAC model.  Although the 
ADS-IDAC results were obtained after the loss of feedwater empirical study data was 
reviewed and the ADS-IDAC knowledge base adjusted, this comparison demonstrates 
that the model is capable of representing a wide range of crew-to-crew variabilities 
with a relatively small number of branching events. 
 


























































Figure 92 - Crew A (Complex LOFW) SG B Wide Range Water Level 
 
 

























































Figure 94 - Crew B (Complex LOFW) SG B Wide Range Water Level 
 
 

























































Figure 96 - Crew C (Complex LOFW) SG B Wide Range Water Level 
 
 

























































Figure 98 - Crew D (Complex LOFW) SG B Wide Range Water Level 
 
 






















































































































Figure 102 - Crew F (Complex LOFW) SG B Wide Range Water Level 
 
 

























































Figure 104 - Crew G (Complex LOFW) SG B Wide Range Water Level 
 
 

























































Figure 106 - Crew H (Complex LOFW) SG B Wide Range Water Level 
 
 


























































Figure 108 - Crew I (Complex LOFW) SG B Wide Range Water Level 
 
 


























































Figure 110 - Crew J (Complex LOFW) SG B Wide Range Water Level 
 
 

























































Figure 112 - Crew K (Complex LOFW) SG B Wide Range Water Level 
 
 

























































Figure 114 - Crew L (Complex LOFW) SG B Wide Range Water Level 
 
 

























































Figure 116 - Crew M (Complex LOFW) SG B Wide Range Water Level 
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Appendix K contains the ADS-IDAC input manual.  The input manual is intended to 
assist the analyst in developing the necessary information to execute the ADS-IDAC 
simulation code.  The manual includes an overview of the program architecture 
(including detailed flowcharts for the implementation of each major phase of the 
IDAC model); general modeling guidance for developing an appropriate thermal-
hydraulic nuclear plant model and identifying potential branching events; and detailed 
descriptions of each of the input files needed to run the code.
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Section 1:  Introduction




 ADS-IDAC Overview 
 
Situational context and event dynamics are important considerations when assessing 
the potential for human errors.  Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment methods can 
improve the prediction of human error events by providing rich contextual 
information and an explicit consideration of feedback arising from man-machine 
interactions.  The Accident Dynamics Simulator paired with the Information, 
Decision, and Action in a Crew context cognitive model (ADS-IDAC) is a 
computational tool intended to support human reliability assessment within a dynamic 
simulation environment.  A major goal of the ADS-IDAC project is the prediction of 
situational contexts that might lead to human error events, particularly knowledge 
driven errors of commission.  The ADS-IDAC environment couples a thermal-
hydraulic model with an operations crew cognitive model to permit the dynamic 
simulation of operator performance during nuclear power plant accidents.  ADS-
IDAC generates a discrete dynamic event tree using simple branching rules to model 
variations in crew responses.  A significant advantage of the ADS-IDAC approach is 
the ability to directly assess the impact of operator actions on key plant parameters 
and more realistically determine the safety significance of human errors.   
 
The ADS-IDAC simulation code is still under development and model development, 
verification, and validation activities are ongoing.  Although extensive debugging 
activities have been completed and error checking mechanisms have been added to 
the code, unexpected errors may still occur.  Following the guidelines and instructions 
provided in this manual should minimize the likelihood of performance issues, but the 
user is urged to independently verify the results obtained from the code. 
 
 Input Manual Description 
 
This manual is intended to provide the analyst with a reference manual for using the 
ADS-IDAC simulation code.  Although a general overview of major modeling 
elements contained in the ADS-IDAC code is included in this manual, this 
information should not be considered to replace the detailed information contained in 
other sources (see Section 4: Reference List for additional information).  The Input 
Manual is organized into four main sections: 
 
Section 1: Introduction- Provides a general overview of ADS-IDAC modeling 
elements, including flowcharts for key processes and general user guidance. 
 
Section 2: General Modeling Guidance- Provides guidance for the modeling 
potential error events and sources of crew-to-crew variability and development of 
a RELAP reactor plant model suitable for use with the ADS-IDAC code. 
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Section 3: ADS-IDAC File Structure - Provides a general overview of the data 
files that support execution of ADS-IDAC and a detailed description of the code 
output files. 
 
Section 4: Input File Format - Provides detailed guidance on the content and 
format of the input files needed to run ADS-IDAC. 
 
Section 5: Term Conversions – The current architecture of the ADS-IDAC 
source code utilizes a set of integer variables to identify key data attributes.  For 
example, the source uses the integer variable VODM to designate the Decision 
Making Operator (e.g., a senior reactor operator).  A term conversion table 
establishes the relationship between the variable name and the integer value (e.g., 
VODM = 3043).  This allows key data descriptors to be represented by an integer 
variable which requires less computer memory while still permitting meaningful 
variable names.  A complete listing of the integer term conversions is contained in 
this section. 
 
Section 6: References:  Provides a comprehensive reference list.  Background 
information and detailed models relating to the ADS-IDAC code can be found in 
the listed references. 
 
 Input Manual Naming Conventions 
 
To improve the consistency and readability of this manual, several notation and 
naming conventions are used to identify variables, input files, and crew members: 
 
 words in bold italics generally refer to input variables.  Section 3 of this 
manual provides a description of the required format and recommended values 
for input variables. 
 
 words surrounded by quotation marks (“”) generally refer to input file names.  
Section 3 provides a detailed description of all input files required to execute 
ADS-IDAC. 
 
 words surrounded in straight brackets ([]) generally refer to optional or 
conditional parameters in the associated input file.  These variables may not 
be needed depending on the content of the input file.  The input file 
descriptions provided in Section 3 provides additional detail for handling 
these situations. 
 
 ADS-IDAC currently models two crew members – a Decision Maker 
(representing a Shift Supervisor/Senior Reactor Operator) and an Action 
Taker (representing a Reactor Operator).  Input files are associated with the 
Decision Maker and include the acronym “ODM” in file name, while files 
associated with the Action Taker include the acronym “OAT” (e.g., 
“KB_ODM_Event_Matrix.txt” and “KB_OAT_Event_Matrix.txt”).   
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 Input files associated with the operator knowledge base include the prefix 
“KB_” in the file name.  Input files describing the content of procedure steps 
include the prefix “ZProcedure_”. 
 
 For consistency with customary probabilistic risk assessment practice, 
controls that can be manipulated by the operators include the prefix “X_”.  
Alarm names are generally given the prefix “A_”.  Although this convention 
is not mandatory, it improves the readability of the input files. 
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These simplified process flowcharts are intended to provide a high level overview of the 
ADS-IDAC simulation program.  Each flowchart consists of a high level block diagram 
followed by a detailed description of the processes associated with each block.  In 
general, the flowcharts are intended to show the sequencing and context of the main 
simulation process steps.  Process steps that rely on information contained in ADS-IDAC 




ADS-IDAC Process Overview 
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Follow Written Procedure Strategy Implementation 
Knowledge-Based Reasoning Strategy Implementation 
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ADS-IDAC Process Overview 
 
Figure 1, "ADS-IDAC Process Overview" 
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ADS-IDAC Process Overview Flowchart 
 
Block 1 (Initialize RELAP Model and Read ADS-IDAC Input Data): This step 
initializes both the RELAP program and reads the ADS-IDAC input deck.  The location 
of the RELAP input deck and the ADS-IDAC input files are specified in the ZiniADS.txt 
input file.  This step includes several input file consistency checks including the presence 
of required input files, completeness of the system decomposition file 
(KB_OAT(ODM)_System_Decomposition.txt), and consistency in procedure step file 
names.  However, due to the limited input file verification performed in the current code 
version, the user should be aware that successful execution of ADS-IDAC initialization 
does not necessarily indicate error free input.  The user should refer to the log file err 
messages.txt to determine if errors have occurred during input file processing. 
 
Block 2 (Initialize ADS-IDAC for Initial Accident Sequence): Initializes ADS-IDAC 
to begin the initial accident sequence (Sequence 0).  Because a RELAP input deck error 
will result in immediate termination of the RELAP code, generation of the error message 
“all sequences simulated” during this step generally indicates an input deck error.  Input 
deck errors can be identified by executing the RELAP code in standalone mode (i.e., 
outside the ADS_IDAC environment) and examining the resultant output file to identify 
syntax or formatting errors.  The user should also refer to the log file err messages.txt to 
determine if other errors occurred during input file processing. 
 
Block 3 (Initialize Counter):  The ADS-IDAC scheduler provides supervisory control 
over the execution of the RELAP thermal hydraulic model.  Consequently, execution of 
the ADS-IDAC code is controlled with two main time step parameters: (1) the internal 
RELAP5 time step, and (2) the ADS-IDAC time step.  The RELAP5 time step (which 
must be equal to or less than the ADS-IDAC time step) establishes the incremental time 
step used in the reactor plant model thermal hydraulic calculation and is specified by 
Cards 200-299 in the RELAP input deck.  The ADS-IDAC time step establishes the 
incremental time step used by the ADS-IDAC scheduler module.  Each ADS-IDAC time 
step, the scheduler pauses the execution of the RELAP5 thermal hydraulic code in order 
to update operator model data, activate hardware failures and initiating events, and 
manipulate controls.  Between these ADS-IDAC scheduler time step pauses, RELAP5 
runs without interruption using the time step control specified in the RELAP input deck.   
 
Block 4 (Run One RELAP Time Step): The RELAP5 thermal hydraulic model runs for 
one time step.  The time step is established by the parameters provided in input deck 
cards 200-299. 
 
Block 5 (Advance RELAP Counter): The accumulated time counter for RELAP5 
execution is advanced by one time step. 
 
Block 6 (Pause RELAP Run?): The accumulated time counter for RELAP5 is compared 
to the ADS-IDAC time step to determine if the RELAP5 code should be paused.  If the 
accumulated time is less than the ADS-IDAC time step, another RELAP time step is 
executed, the counter is updated, and the comparison is reperformed.  This process is 
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repeated until the accumulated RELAP execution time exceeds the specified ADS-IDAC 
time step. 
 
The default value for the ADS-IDAC time step is 0.5 seconds.  However, the time step 
value may be changed by adjusting line 1505 of Fortran module dtstep.f.  This line reads: 
  
if((timehy - timesno) .ge. ADS-IDAC_time_step) then 
 
In addition, line 205 in the module CommandControlCenter.cpp must be set to the same 
time step value: 
this->reduceRemainingTime(ADS-IDAC_time_step) 
 
This ensures that the ADS-IDAC scheduler time step remains synchronized with the 
RELAP5. 
 
Block 7 (Check and Actuate Initiating Events):  The ADS-IDAC scheduler checks if 
any initiating events (specified in the Initiating_Event.txt input file) need to be activated.  
  
Block 8 (Update Control Panel):  All indicators listed in the ControlPanel.txt are 
updated based on the current RELAP thermal hydraulic data.  It should be noted that 
simply updating control panel indicators does not automatically update the operator’s 
perception of the plant state.  The operator must first perceive and memorize information 
from the control panel in order to use the updated information. 
 
Block 9 (Check and Activate Component Failures):  The ADS-IDAC scheduler checks 
if any hardware reliability failures (specified in the SystemReliability.txt input file) need 
to be activated. 
 
Block 10 (Execute Control Panel Actions):  The ADS-IDAC scheduler checks if any 
control manipulation are awaiting execution.  If there control manipulation have been 
activated, new control values are passed to the RELAP thermal hydraulic code through 
the interactive controls specified  in the ControlPanel.txt and the RELAP5_channels.txt 
input files. 
 
Block 11 (Process Information – Decision Maker):  See the “Information Processing” 
flowchart for a description of this step.  
 
Block 12 (Process Information – Action Taker):  See the “Information Processing” 
flowchart for a description of this step.  
 
Block 13 (Decision-Making Process – Decision Maker):  See the “Decision-Making 
Process (Decision Maker)” flowchart for a description of this step. 
 
Block 14 (Decision-Making Process – Action Taker):  See the “Decision-Making 
Process (Action Taker)” flowchart for a description of this step. 
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Block 15 (Were Two or More New Branches Generated?):  In ADS-IDAC, a branch 
is generated every time an event occurs.  Events include changes in alarm states, 
hardware actuations or failures, control manipulations, operator decisions, and 
performance of procedure step activities.  If two or more branches of the same branch 
type are generated during a time step, a new sequence path may be generated.  In order to 
generate a new sequence, the following conditions must be met: 
 
 The branches must be associated with one of the following branch types: (1) 
hardware reliability events, or (2) an operator related events associated with an 
action, procedure step expectation, goal, strategy, mental belief or information 
gathering. 
 
 Two or more branches of the same branch type must be generated during the time 
step. 
 
When a new sequence is generated, the events associated with each branch are partitioned 
among the new sequences.  For example, if the Decision Maker generated two goal 
branches during a time step, the first goal branch is applied to one sequence and the 
second goal branch is applied to the other sequence.  In the current version of ADS-
IDAC, it is not possible to generate multiple sequences for more than one operator related 
branch type at a time.  For this reason, the generation of operator related branch types is 
constrained to ensure that only one operator branch type can be generated during a time 
step (e.g., an operator is precluded from generating a goal and an action branch type 
during the same time step).  When multiple branch event result in the generation of a new 
sequence, the ADS-IDAC scheduler will save the current operator crew and plant state 
information and queue the new sequence for later simulation. 
 
Certain branch types such as changes in alarm states will not generate new sequences 
regardless of how many branches are activated during the time step.  Furthermore, two or 
more branches of different branch types will not generate a new sequence (e.g., activation 
of a new goal branch for the Decision Maker and a new strategy branch for the Action 
Taker).  In these cases, the events associated with each branch are applied to the current 
event sequence. 
  
Block 16 (Queue New Accident Sequences for Later Simulation):  When a new 
sequence is identified, the ADS-IDAC scheduler saves all information related to the 
current plant and operator states by either copying the information to computer memory 
(console version) or writing the information to the computer hard disk (multiple 
processor version).  Information related to placement of the new sequence within the 
simulation Discrete Dynamic Event Tree is also saved (e.g., identity of parent sequence 
branch, number of new sequences generated, and events to be partitioned among the new 
sequences).  New sequences are then placed in a holding queue to await later simulation. 
 
Block 17 (Current Accident Sequence Complete?):  The purpose of this step is to 
determine if any termination criteria have been met by the current sequence.  In general, 
four criteria can be used to terminate a sequence: (1) the simulation time has reached the 
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sequence the truncation time specified in the ZCtrlPar.txt input file, (2) the sequence 
executed the procedure non-response exit condition “VSTOP”, (3) the sequence reached 
the probability cutoff value specified in the ZCtrlPar.txt input file, or (4) an alarm 
condition with the name prefix “A_ENDSEQ” has been actuated.  A sequence ca also be 
terminated by a RELAP thermal hydraulic error condition.  However, a thermal hydraulic 
error precludes restart of a new sequence and therefore terminates the entire simulation.  
 
Block 18 (Have All Accident Sequences Been Run?):  Checks to determine if there are 
sequences waiting in the simulation queue.  If all sequences have been simulated, the 
simulation ends. 
 
Block 19 (Initialize ADS-IDAC to Restart with a New Accident Sequence):  Based on 
information stored when a new sequence is generated (Block 16), the ADS-IDAC re-
initializes the operator and plant models to restart a queued sequence.   This includes re-
initialization of the RELAP5 thermal hydraulic model back to the point when the new 
sequence was initially generated. 
 
Block 20 (Simulation Done):  Once all sequences have been simulated, the ADS-IDAC 
scheduler writes all pertinent simulation data to data output text files.  The ADS-IDAC 
output includes the following files: 
 
ES File Folder 
 ES_summary.txt – Summarizes all sequences associated with the simulation.  
For each sequence, the sequence length, probability, and termination criteria 
are specified. 
 Scenario info.txt – Provides a detailed description of all sequences, including 
all branching points and associated events. 
 
KPS File Folder 
KPSFolder_folder_number – The key parameter state (KPS) output is arranged 
into individual file folders.  ADS-IDAC limits the number of individual files 
within an output folder to less than 1000 files.  Therefore, if more than 1000 
output files are generated by a simulation, additional KPSFolders are created to 
store the data.  The first 1000 output files are stored in KPSFolder_0, the seconds 
1000 files are stored in KPSFolder_1, and so on.  For each sequence, the 
following output files are created:   
 ZDIA_sequence_number.txt – For each operator, provides the output from 
the diagnostic engine.  Output consists of a time history of the diagnosis event 
confidence level for each operator. 
 ZKPS_sequence_number.txt – Provides a time history of all indicators 
specified in the ControlPanel.txt input file. 
 ZPIF_sequence_number.txt – For each operator, provides a time history of 
the dynamic PIF values for system criticality, time constrained loading, and 
information loading. 
 
PE File Folder 
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PEFolder_folder_number – The pivotal event (PE) output is arranged into 
individual file folders.  A sequence consists of a series of connected PE nodes.  
Similar to the KPS file folder, ADS-IDAC limits the number of individual files 
within an output folder to less than 1000 files.  Therefore, if more than 1000 
output files are generated by a simulation, additional PEFolders are created to 
store the data.  The first 1000 output files are stored in PEFolder_0, the seconds 
1000 files are stored in PEFolder_1, and so on.  The collection of PENode data 
files provides sufficient information to reconstruct the DDET for the simulation.  
For each PE node, the following output file is created: 
 ZPENODE_node_number.txt – Specifies the type of branch event, the time of 
the event, and the sequence number associated with the PE node.   
  
These output files can be imported into a third party program such as MS Excel for data 
analysis and visualization.     
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Figure 2, "Information Processing" 
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Information Processing Flow Chart – Description 
 
Block 1 (Start Information Processing):  The IDAC cognitive model consists of three 
main activities: information processing, decision-making, and action execution.  
Information processing is the cognitive activity in this process.  In the ADS-IDAC model, 
the operator can only act upon perceived information.  Therefore, raw information from 
the reactor plant model must first be gathered and memorized before the data can be used 
to support decision making.  ADS-IDAC includes two information processing filters: (1) 
the control panel scanning queue, and the (2) bias factors.  These filters are described in 
more detail in the KB_OAT(ODM)_Scanned_Parameters.txt and KB_OAT(ODM) 
_Bias_Factors.txt sections.  
 
Block 2 (Retrieve Data from Communication Board):  The ADS-IDAC employs 
central communication clearinghouse “blackboard” architecture for handling all 
information interchange.  Communication items can be posted to the central blackboard 
by all members of the control room crew and the reactor plant.  Each communication 
packet includes data identifying the sender, intended recipient, type of communication, 
and the content of the message.   Each time step, the control room operators and the 
reactor plant scans the communication blackboard to identify their messages.  For 
example, the reactor plant might post the actuation of an alarm to the blackboard with all 
operators identified as intended recipients.  Similarly, when the reactor operator attempts 
to open a valve or start a pump, a message for the reactor plant is posted to the 
blackboard.  Because the blackboard serves as a centralized dispatcher of all information 
exchange, it provides a convenient location for assessing the average information load for 
each operator. 
 
Block 3 (Is Data Related to a Paused Activity):  Initiation of certain operator activities 
cause the decision-making process to be temporarily suspended until the activity is 
completed.  For example, if the Decision Maker requests the Action Taker to read a plant 
indicator, the Decision Maker will not proceed with further decision-making activities 
until the plant indicator status has been reported.  This temporary suspension provides 
two important features: (1) it allows better modeling of the time required to execute 
certain operator actions, and (2) it allows better synchronization and coordination of crew 
activities.  Decision-making activities are suspended by setting either of two operator 
“pause activity” Boolean flags to “true”.  One pause flag suspends decision-making 
activities associated with execution of memorized mental procedures while the other 
pause flag suspends all other operator activities (e.g., execution of written procedures, 
knowledge based actions, or  goal and strategy selection).  The appropriate pause flag is 
set to “true” whenever the operator begins an activity that is either associated with a time 
delay or requires crew coordination.  When the operator receives a communication packet 
indicating that the activity associated with the pause is completed, the appropriate “pause 
activity” flag is set to false to enable the decision-making process.  To support the control 
of pause activities, each communication packet includes data identifying if the 
communication is associated with a pause activity and, if applicable, the appropriate 
pause activity flag. 
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Block 4 (Clear Appropriate Pause Flags):  If a received communication packet is 
associated with a pause activity, the operator’s appropriate pause activity flag is set to 
“false” to enable the operator’s decision-making process. 
 
Block 5 (Identify the Data Sender/Originator):  Communication packets can originate 
from three different sources: (1) internal communication from the operator 
himself/herself, (2) external crew communication from other operators, and (3) reactor 
plant status information from the control panel.  The source of the communication 
establishes how further information processing is handled.  
 
Block 6 (Internal Communications):  Internal communication is used to transfer 
information related to cognitive decisions within the operator’s own memory.  For 
example, decisions about goals, strategies, and mental beliefs are only communicated 
internally within the operator.  
 
Block 7 (Identify Type of Data):  Internal communication is associated with four 
possible data types: goals, strategies, mental beliefs, or procedure steps.  Each 
communication packet includes information that identifies the data type.  
 
Block 8 (Goal Related Information):  The information is related to a high level operator 
goal. Four possible goals are currently implemented in ADS-IDAC: (1) normal operation, 
(2) troubleshooting, (3) monitoring abnormal conditions, and (4) maintain global safety 
margin.  When the current goal is changed, an internal communication packet is 
generated to update the goal in the operator’s memory.    
 
Block 9 (Update Goal):  The operator updates perceived information memory to match 
the new goal.  The high level operator goal impacts strategy selection during the 
decision-making process.  Depending on the branching options selected for the 
simulation, a new goal may either be implemented or bypassed.  If the goal is bypassed, 
the updating process is omitted and the new goal has no effect. 
 
Block 10 (Mental Belief Related Information):  The information is related to a mental 
belief.  When an operator mental belief is activated (see 
KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt), a communication packet is generated to 
add the mental belief to the operator’s perceived information memory.  Mental beliefs 
perform two main functions: (1) activation of associated mental procedures, and (2) 
prerequisite conditions for other mental beliefs.  Similar to goals, branching options can 
be set for mental beliefs to either permit perception of the belief or to bypass the belief.  
If the mental belief is bypassed, the operator will not perceive the new mental belief. 
 
Block 11 (Does Mental Belief Reference a Procedure):  If the mental belief is 
associated with a memorized mental procedure, the associated mental procedure needs to 
be added to the operator’s procedure queue. 
 
Block 12 (Add Mental Procedure to Queue):  Each operator maintains a memorized 
mental procedure queue to store mental procedures that are waiting to be executed.  The 
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procedure name, step number, priority level, and timing parameters are added to the 
mental queue during this step. During the decision-making process, the operator checks 
for the queue to determine if mental procedures are awaiting execution.  If a queued 
mental procedure is found, a procedure related communication packet (see Blocks 13 and 
14) is generated to activate the procedure.  Once the procedure is activated, the operator 
will execute the associated actions. 
 
Block 13 (Procedure Related Information):  The information is related to a procedure.  
Proceduralized actions are initiated by the generation of a communication packet 
identifying the procedure name and step number of the desired action.  Two types of 
procedures can be used in ADS-IDAC - a memorized mental procedure (generally 
associated with skill based memorized actions) or a conventional written procedure (e.g., 
emergency operating procedure).   When a procedure related communication packet is 
generated, the associated procedure is activated. If an earlier active procedure was still in 
progress, the earlier procedure is placed in a “paused” status (i.e., the most recently 
activated procedure takes precedence).   
 
Block 14 (Activate):   The procedure is placed in an active status1.  This enables the 
operator to begin implementation of the procedure actions during the decision-making 
process. 
 
Block 15 (Update Hard Wired Diagnoses):  Activation conditions for mental beliefs 
can include other mental beliefs and procedure status.  Therefore, each mental belief in 
the operator knowledge base is updated based on the perceived mental belief and 
procedure information.  See KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt for additional 
information. 
 
Block 16 (Strategy Related Information):  The information is related to a problem 
solving strategy.  ADS-IDAC utilizes four strategies: wait and monitor; knowledge-base 
reasoning (Decision Maker only); follow written procedures (Decision Maker only), and 
follow instruction (Action Taker only).  A strategy related communication packet is 
generated when the operator changes the current strategy.  The strategy is selected during 
the decision-making process and is influenced by the crew’s high level goals. 
 
Block 17 (Update Strategy):  The operator updates perceived information memory to 
match the new strategy.  The current strategy establishes the problem solving methods 
used by the crew.   
 
Block 18 (Ordered Activity from Decision Maker):  In the ADS-IDAC crew model, 
Only the Action Taker is permitted to manipulate reactor plant controls.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
1 Procedures can be placed in any of four possible status categories: 
NONE – the procedure is inactive and awaiting execution 
ACTIVE – the procedure is in progress 
PAUSE – the procedure was previously activated but was temporarily suspended 
INTERRUPTED – the procedure has been permanently suspended 
DONE – the procedure has been completed. 
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during execution of either a mental or written procedure, the Decision Maker requests the 
Action Taker to provide any required control panel information (unless use of memorized 
information is enabled and the Decision Maker has a valid memory of the required 
information).  Therefore, if (1) the communication packet is associated with a control 
panel parameter, component state, alarm, or action; (2) the sender is the Decision Maker, 
and (3) the recipient is the Action Taker; the communication is associated with an 
ordered action.   This step applies only to the Action Taker and is not applicable for the 
Decision Maker 
 
Block 19 (Add Ordered Activity to Queue):  If the Action Taker has received an 
ordered action form the Decision Maker, the requested action is placed in an ordered 
action queue.  . During the decision-making process, the Action Taker checks for queued 
ordered actions that have not been initiated.  If an ordered action is found, the Action 
Taker will interact with the reactor plant to either perform the requested action or obtain 
the needed information. 
 
Block 20 (Information From Reactor Plant):  When an operator executes interactions 
with the control panel, a communication packet is sent to the reactor plant. Control panel 
interactions include control manipulations (e.g., opening a valve, stopping a pump), 
checking plant parameters, and verification of component or alarm states.  Upon receipt 
of the communication packet, reactor plant executes the interaction and sends a 
communication packet back to the operator to confirm completion of the requested action 
or provide requested plant data. 
 
Block 21 (Identify Type of Information):  The reactor plant control panel can send four 
types of information: action confirmation, component states, parameter values 
(indicators), and alarms.  The reactor plant can initiate communications related to alarms 
(e.g., actuation of reactor trip alarm), but other information types are generated as a result 
of an operator control panel interaction.  Communication packets initiated by the control 
panel provide two key functions: (1) the time taken by real operators to perform control 
panels action can be modeled by adjusting the timing of control panel communication, 
and (2) the communication packet provides a controlled conduit for sending plant data to 
a specific operator. 
 
Block 22 (Action Related Information):  After the control panel executes a control 
manipulation, a communication packet is sent back to the operator who initiated the 
request to confirm that the action has been completed. 
 
Block 23 (Component State Information):  The communication packet provides the 
operator with requested component state information. 
 
Block 24 (Indicator Information):  The communication packet provides the operator 
with requested parameter value information.  The parameter value may be subsequently 
adjusted by a bias factor (see Block 25). 
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Block 25 (Apply Bias Factor):  If bias factors are identified (see 
KB_OAT(ODM)_Bias_Factors.txt), the parameter value is adjusted appropriately.  The 
operator will perceive the biased indicator value rather than the value initially provided 
by the reactor plant control panel.  The use of bias factors allows the code user to model 
certain types of indicator failures. 
 
Block 26 (Alarm Information):  The communication packet provides the operator with 
either requested parameter value information or new alarms.  New alarms are self 
initiated by the control panel and include both the actuation and clearance of alarm 
conditions. 
 
Block 27 (Update Hard Wired Diagnoses): Activation conditions for mental beliefs can 
include other control manipulations, alarms, component states, and parameter values.  
Therefore, each mental belief in the operator knowledge base is updated based on the 
perceived information.  See KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt for additional 
information. 
 
Block 28 (Was Information From Reactor Plant Associated With an Ordered 
Activity?):  The ordered action queue is checked to determine if the perceived 
information is associated with an activity ordered by the Decision Maker.  This step is 
only applicable to the Action Taker. 
 
Block 29 (Send Ordered Activity Confirmation to Decision Maker):  A 
communication packet is sent from the Taker to the Decision Maker to confirm 
completion of an ordered action.  When the Decision Maker initiates an ordered action, 
further decision-making processing is paused until the Decision Maker receives 
confirmation that the action has been completed. 
 
Block 30 (Proceed to Decision-Making Process):  After information processing is 
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Decision-Making Process (Action Taker) 
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Decision-Making Process (Action Taker) 
 
Block 1 (Start Decision-Making Process): The decision-making process immediately 
follows information processing.  During the decision-making process, the operator 
evaluates the current goal and strategy, identifies actions and other activities in 
accordance with the selected problem-solving strategy, and implements memorized 
mental procedures.   
 
Block 2 (Abnormal Signal Detected?):  An abnormal signal indicates a condition that is 
incompatible with continued power operation.  Either of two conditions are used to 
identify an abnormal signal: (1) activation of the “Reactor_Tripped” mental belief (See 
KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt for additional information), or (2) the fuzzy 
logic diagnostic engine accident relationship value exceeding a preset threshold (see 
Action_Taker.txt and KB_OAT_Event_Matrix.txt for more information on the 
diagnostic engine).  Detection of an abnormal condition also shifts the control room crew 
into an accident response mode that can lead (depending on the operator preferences and 
tendencies selected in the Action_Taker.txt and Decision_Maker.txt input files) to 
implementation of the emergency operating procedures. 
 
Block 3 (Interrupt Low Priority Mental Procedures):  Because certain memorized 
mental procedures are incompatible with a post-trip reactor plant condition, certain low 
priority mental procedures are permanently suspended once an abnormal condition is 
detected.  For example, a mental procedure intended to reduce turbine load is no longer 
appropriate once the reactor and turbine have tripped.  The interruption of low priority 
procedures can occur only once during a simulation – once an abnormal signal has been 
detected, newly identified low priority mental procedures can be added to the operator 
queue and implemented.  The low priority procedure threshold is established in the 
Action_Taker.txt input file.  The priority level for a mental procedure is included in the 
mental belief input data in the KB_OAT_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt input file (lower 
priority values indicate higher priority procedures).   
 
Block 4 (Pause Activity Flag Active?):  The operator pause activity flags synchronize 
crew actions and control the pacing of operator activities.  Each operator has two separate 
Boolean pause activity flags – one associated with mental procedures and another 
associated with all other operator activities.  Because each operator is capable of 
performing only one activity at a time, the pause flags prevent overloading the operator 
with multiple activities.  An active pause activity flag (i.e., flag to “true”), indicates that 
the operator is already performing an activity.  Therefore, further decision-making 
activities are bypassed.   
 
Block 5 (Ordered Activity in Queue?):  If the Action Taker has been assigned an 
ordered activity by the Decision Maker, execution of memorized mental procedures is 
bypassed.  This allows actions ordered by the Decision Maker to take priority over 
memorized actions that are self-identified by the Action Taker. 
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Block 6 (Mental Procedure in Queue?):  If there are no waiting ordered activities, the 
mental procedure queue is checked to determine if any mental procedures are waiting to 
be executed.  Due to limitations in the ADS-IDAC procedure modeling process, it is not 
possible for two or more operators to simultaneously perform the same procedure step.  
Therefore, a check is also made during this step to ensure that the Decision Maker is not 
performing the same mental procedure.  If a waiting mental procedure exists (and is not 
being performed by a different operator), execution of the mental procedure takes priority 
over other decision-making activities such as goal and strategy selection.   
 
Block 7 (Perform Mental Procedure Step):  The operator executes the mental 
procedure actions. 
 
Block 8 (New Branch Generated?):  Some procedure actions require the operator to 
interact with the reactor plant or coordinate with other crew members.  Typical examples 
of these tasks include checking the status of plant equipment, manipulating a control, or 
verifying a parameter value.  Because these tasks require some amount of time to 
complete, further operator decision-making process is suspended until the task is 
complete.  Within the ADS-IDAC, the generation of these tasks is accomplished by 
creating a new branch event.  A branch represents a discrete event or information chunk 
created during a simulation sequence.  Branch generation in this context should be 
distinguished from the creation of branches in a discrete dynamic event tree (DDET).  
Most branches do not cause multiple accident sequences to be generated.  However, 
when two or more branches of the same type are generated in a single time step, ADS 
splits the current sequence path into two or more separate paths.  The splitting of a 
sequence into two or more sequence paths corresponds to the generation of a DDET 
branching event.  
 
Block 9 (Activate Pause Activity Flag):  If a new branch is generated, the appropriate 
operator pause activity flag is activated (i.e., set to “true”).  Further operator decision-
making is suspended until the pause activity flag is reset during later information 
processing.  This allows ADS-IDAC to model the time required to perform tasks and 
activities and prevents overloading the operator with multiple simultaneous tasks.   
 
Block 10 (Evaluate Goal):  Evaluate appropriateness of current high level operator goal.  
During this step, the Action Taker’s high level goal is compared to the Decision Maker’s 
high level goal.  If the two goals do not match, the Action Taker’s goal is updated to 
match the Decision Maker’s goal. 
 
Block 11 (New Goal Selected?):  If the result of the goal evaluation process indicates 
that the operator’s current goal must be changed, further decision-making is suspended 
and the high level goal is updated.   
 
Block 12 (Evaluate Strategy):  Evaluate appropriateness of current problem solving 
strategy.  See Strategy Selection Process (Action Taker) flowchart. 
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Block 13 (New Strategy Selected?): If the result of the strategy evaluation process 
indicates that the operator’s current strategy must be changed, further decision-making is 
suspended and the problem solving strategy is updated. 
 
Block 14 (Ordered Activity in Queue?):  The ordered action queue is checked to 
identify activities previously ordered by the Decision Maker that are awaiting execution.  
If an ordered action is found, the Action Taker performs the action.  The ordered action 
queue is a first in-first out queue (i.e. the oldest ordered action is performed first). 
 
Block 15 (End Decision-Making Process):  End of decision-making process. 
 
Block 16 (Activate Pause Activity Flag):  If the high level goal will be updated, a new 
branch is generated for the goal and the operator pause activity flag is activated to 
prevent further decision-making activities.  When the new goal is perceived during 
subsequent information processing, the pause activity flag is cleared and decision-making 
activities resume.  
Block 17 (Activate Pause Activity Flag):  If the problem solving strategy will be 
updated, a new branch is generated for the strategy and the operator pause activity flag is 
activated to prevent further decision-making activities.  When the new strategy is 
perceived during subsequent information processing, the pause activity flag is cleared and 
decision-making activities resume. 
 
Block 18 (Perform Ordered Activity):  If a previously ordered activity is found, the 
Action Taker performs the requested action.   
 
Block 19 (New Branch Generated?):  The execution of certain ordered actions will 
require the generation of a new branch.  For example, actions associated with a time 
delay or that require interaction with the control panel or another operator will require 
that a new branch is generated. 
 
Block 20 (Activate Pause Activity Flag):  If the ordered activity results in the 
generation of a new branch, the operator pause activity flag is activated to prevent further 
decision-making activities.  When the operator receives confirmation from the reactor 
plant control panel that the ordered action has been completed during a subsequent 
information processing, the pause activity flag is cleared and decision-making activities 
resume. 
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Decision-Making Process (Decision Maker) 
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Decision-Making Process (Decision Maker) 
 
Block 1 (Start Decision-Making Process):  The decision-making process immediately 
follows information processing.  During the decision-making process, the operator 
evaluates the current goal and strategy, identifies actions and other activities in 
accordance with the selected problem-solving strategy, and implements memorized 
mental procedures. 
 
Block 2 (Abnormal Signal Detected?): An abnormal signal indicates a condition that is 
incompatible with continued power operation.  Either of two conditions are used to 
identify an abnormal signal: (1) activation of the “Reactor_Tripped” mental belief (See 
KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt for additional information), or (2) the fuzzy 
logic diagnostic engine accident relationship value exceeding a preset threshold (see 
Action_Taker.txt and KB_OAT_Event_Matrix.txt for more information on the 
diagnostic engine).  Detection of an abnormal condition also shifts the control room crew 
into an accident response mode that can lead (depending on the operator preferences and 
tendencies selected in the Action_Taker.txt and Decision_Maker.txt input files) to 
implementation of the emergency operating procedures. 
 
Block 3 (Interrupt Low Priority Mental Procedures): Because certain memorized 
mental procedures are incompatible with a post-trip reactor plant condition, certain low 
priority mental procedures are permanently suspended once an abnormal condition is 
detected.  For example, a mental procedure intended to reduce turbine load is no longer 
appropriate once the reactor and turbine have tripped.  The interruption of low priority 
procedures can occur only once during a simulation – once an abnormal signal has been 
detected, newly identified low priority mental procedures can be added to the operator 
queue and implemented.  The low priority procedure threshold is established in the 
Decision_Maker.txt input file.  The priority level for a mental procedure is included in 
the mental belief input data in the KB_ODM_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt input file (lower 
priority values indicate higher priority procedures). 
 
Block 4 (Pause Activity Flag Activated?): The operator pause activity flags 
synchronize crew actions and control the pacing of operator activities.  Each operator has 
two separate Boolean pause activity flags – one associated with mental procedures and 
another associated with all other operator activities.  Because each operator is capable of 
performing only one activity at a time, the pause flags prevent overloading the operator 
with multiple activities.  An active pause activity flag (i.e., flag to “true”), indicates that 
the operator is already performing an activity.  Therefore, further decision-making 
activities are bypassed. 
 
Block 5 (Mental Procedure in Queue?): If there are no waiting ordered activities, the 
mental procedure queue is checked to determine if any mental procedures are waiting to 
be executed.  Due to limitations in the ADS-IDAC procedure modeling process, it is not 
possible for two or more operators to simultaneously perform the same procedure step.  
Therefore, a check is also made during this step to ensure that the Action Taker is not 
performing the same mental procedure.  If a waiting mental procedure exists (and is not 
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being performed by a different operator), execution of the procedure takes priority over 
other decision-making activities such as goal and strategy selection. 
 
Block 6 (Perform Mental Procedure Step): The operator executes the mental procedure 
actions. 
 
Block 7 (New Branch Generated?): Some procedure actions require the operator to 
interact with the reactor plant or coordinate with other crew members.  Typical examples 
of these tasks include checking the status of plant equipment, manipulating a control, or 
verifying a parameter value.  Because these tasks require some amount of time to 
complete, further operator decision-making process is suspended until the task is 
complete.  Within the ADS-IDAC, the generation of these tasks is accomplished by 
creating a new branch event.  A branch represents a discrete event or information chunk 
created during a simulation sequence.  Branch generation in this context should be 
distinguished from the creation of branches in a discrete dynamic event tree (DDET).  
Most branches do not cause multiple accident sequences to be generated.  However, 
when two or more branches of the same type are generated in a single time step, ADS 
splits the current sequence path into two or more separate paths.  The splitting of a 
sequence into two or more sequence paths corresponds to the generation of a DDET 
branching event.  
 
Block 8 (Activate Pause Activity Flag): If a new branch is generated, the appropriate 
operator pause activity flag is activated (i.e., set to “true”).  Further operator decision-
making is suspended until the pause activity flag is reset during later information 
processing.  This allows ADS-IDAC to model the time required to perform tasks and 
activities and prevents overloading the operator with multiple simultaneous tasks.   
 
Block 9 (Evaluate Goal): Evaluate appropriateness of current high level operator goal.  
See Goal Selection Process Flowchart (Decision Maker). 
 
Block 10 (New Goal Selected?): If the result of the goal evaluation process indicates that 
the operator’s current goal must be changed, further decision-making is suspended and 
the high level goal is updated.   
 
Block 11 (Activate Pause Activity Flag): If the high level goal will be updated, a new 
branch is generated for the goal and the operator pause activity flag is activated to 
prevent further decision-making activities.  When the new goal is perceived during 
subsequent information processing, the pause activity flag is cleared and decision-making 
activities resume.  
 
Block 12 (Evaluate Strategy): Evaluate appropriateness of current problem solving 
strategy.  See Strategy Selection Process (Decision Maker) flowchart. 
 
Block 13 (New Strategy Selected?): If the result of the strategy evaluation process 
indicates that the operator’s current strategy must be changed, further decision-making is 
suspended and the problem solving strategy is updated. 
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Block 14 (Activate Pause Activity Flag): If the problem solving strategy will be 
updated, a new branch is generated for the strategy and the operator pause activity flag is 
activated to prevent further decision-making activities.  When the new strategy is 
perceived during subsequent information processing, the pause activity flag is cleared and 
decision-making activities resume. 
 
Block 15 (Action Taker Busy?):  In order execute the results of further decision-making 
activities, it is likely that that the Decision Maker will need to issue orders to the Action 
Taker.  To prevent overloading the Action Taker, a check is made to determine if the 
Action Taker is busy.  If the Action Taker has a queued mental procedure waiting to be 
executed or has any pause activity flag activity flag activated (indicating that another 
activity is already in progress), the Action Taker is presumed to be busy and further 
Decision Maker decision-making activities is bypassed. 
 
Block 16 (Current Strategy?):  Depending on the Decision Maker’s current problem 
solving strategy, the decision-making process follows three possible paths.  If the current 
strategy is “Follow Written Procedure”, the Decision Maker proceeds to block 17, 
“Follow Procedure”.  If the current strategy is “Knowledge-Based Reasoning”, the 
operator proceeds to block 19.  If the strategy is “Wait & Monitor” the operator bypasses 
further decision-making activities (this path is not shown on the flowchart). 
 
Block 17 (Follow Written Procedure Strategy):  The Decision Maker implements the 
follow procedure strategy (see the Procedure Following flowchart). 
 
Block 18 (New Branch Generated?):  Certain procedure following actions require 
either (1) interaction with another operator or the reactor plant control panel, or (2) are 
associated with a time delay.  In these cases, a new branch is generated to temporarily 
suspend further decision-making until the action can be completed. 
 
Block 19 (Knowledge-Based Reasoning Strategy):  The Decision Maker implements 
the Knowledge-Based Reasoning strategy (see the Knowledge-Based Action Execution 
flowchart). 
 
Block 20 (New Branch Generated?):  Certain knowledge-based reasoning actions 
require either (1) interaction with another operator or the reactor plant control panel, or 
(2) are associated with a time delay.  In these cases, a new branch is generated to 
temporarily suspend further decision-making until the action can be completed. 
 
Block 21 (Activate Pause Activity Flag):  When a new branch is generated, the pause 
activity flag is activated to temporarily suspend further decision-making activities until 
the associated activity is completed. 
 
Block 22 (End Decision-Making Process):  End of decision-making process.
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Goal Selection Process (Decision Maker) 
 
Figure 5, "Goal Selection Process (Decision Maker)"
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Decision Maker2 Goal Selection Flowchart Description 
 
During each simulation time-step, the operators re-evaluate their high level goal.  The 
goal evaluation and selection process includes the following main activities: 
 
Block 1 (Start):   Small errors in the nuclear plant model RELAP input deck initial 
conditions may cause minor plant transients that are not indicative of an actual abnormal 
condition.  These transient conditions may actuate spurious alarms or other abnormal 
indications, but usually decay within the first several minutes of a simulation run.  To 
prevent these artificial perturbations from influencing operator decision-making, 
Operator goal selection is blocked for an predetermined “dead time” after the start of the 
simulation to permit the RELAP thermal-hydraulic model to reach a steady-state 
condition. 
 
Block 2 (Normal Operation Mental Belief):  The operator knowledge base includes a 
“Normal Operation” mental belief that describes of the plant parameters associated with a 
normal full power operating condition.  Although this description can be customized to 
reflect variabilities in operator knowledge, a typical normal operating condition 
description for a pressurized water reactor might include the following elements:  
 Reactor Coolant System Temperature 
 Reactor Coolant System Pressure 
 Pressurizer Level 
 Steam Generator Water Levels 
The analyst should specify the expected values (and trends if applicable) for these  
parameters during normal plant operating conditions.  Additionally, the analyst can adjust 
a threshold parameter that establishes how many of the specified conditions must be met 
in order for the operator to conclude that the plant is in a normal operating state.   If a 
sufficient number of specified conditions are satisfied, the operator will initiate (or 
maintain) a mental belief that the plant is in normal operation. 
 
Block 3 (Goal: Normal Operation):  If the operator has a current mental belief that the 
plant is in a normal operating state, the goal state will be set to “Normal Operation”.  A 
goal of normal operation drives the following operator behaviors:  
 Passive information gathering 
 Control Panel Scanning 
 Rule-Based Memorized Actions 
Knowledge based problem solving and procedure following strategies are blocked when 
the goal is normal operation.   
 
Block 4 (Enable Troubleshooting):   The operator profile includes a static performance 
influencing factor that reflects the operators tendency to delay initiation of the emergency 
operating procedures in order to troubleshoot the perceived abnormal condition.  The 
enable troubleshooting PIF can be set in the range on 0.0 – 1.0 to reflect operator 
                                                 
2 A goal selection process flowchart is provided for the Decision Maker only.  The Action Taker Goal 
Selection process ensures that the Action Taker mirrors the Decision Maker’s goal.  Therefore, the Action 
Taker only compares their goal to the Decision Maker goal and initiates a goal update when needed. 
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behavior.  A value of 0.0 blocks troubleshooting activities while a value of 1.0 enables 
troubleshooting behavior and blocks activation of the “Monitoring” goal state.  For 
intermediate values between 0.0 and 1.0, a branching point is generated to allow 
simulation of either option.  The branching probability is equal to the enable 
troubleshooting PIF factor.  
 
Block 5 (Monitoring Goal):  The Monitoring goal is entered when the operator 
perceives that the plant is no longer in a normal operating state but a specific abnormal 
condition has not been detected.  The Monitoring goal serves two main functions: (1) 
enable later activation of the Maintain Global Safety Margin goal, and (2) permit the 
operator perform active and passive information gathering activities in order to diagnosis 
the abnormal condition.  Should plant parameters return to normal values, the operator 
may return to the Normal Operation goal. 
 
Block 6 (Abnormal Condition Detected):  Based on perceived information, the 
operator’s fuzzy logic diagnostic engine generates a spectrum of possible abnormal and 
emergency conditions that might have occurred.   When the membership values 
calculated by the fuzzy logic diagnosis process exceed a predetermined threshold (set in 
the operator profile), the operator concludes that an abnormal condition has occurred.  In 
addition to the diagnostic engine output, detection of a reactor trip condition will also 
activate an abnormal condition operator belief.  
 
Block 7 (Goal: Troubleshooting):   Activation of the troubleshooting goal enables the 
reasoning based “Knowledge-base Problem Solving” strategy.   Should the reactor plant 
return to a normal operating state, the operator may return to the Normal Operation goal.  
Once the operator activates the Troubleshooting goal, the fuzzy logic diagnostic engine 
will no longer influence operator behavior.   The only conditions that will cause a 
transition from the Troubleshooting goal are: (1) the restoration of normal plant 
operation, or (2) a reactor shutdown. 
 
Block 8 (Enable Procedure Usage):  The operator profile includes a static PIF factor 
that reflects the operator’s tendency to transition from the knowledge-based reasoning 
troubleshooting strategy to the written procedure following strategy.   The enable 
procedure usage PIF factor ranges from 0.0 to 1.0.  If the PIF factor is set to 0.0, the 
transition to procedure following is blocked and the operator will continue 
implementation of the troubleshooting strategy.  If the factor is set to 1.0, once the 
operator perceives that the reactor has tripped, the troubleshooting strategy will be 
abandoned in favor of following written procedures.  For intermediate PIF values 
between 0.0 and 1.0, a branching point is generated to allow simulation of either option.  
The branching probability is equal to the enable troubleshooting PIF factor. 
 
Block 9 (Goal: Maintain Global Safety Margin): Activation of the Maintain Global 
Safety Margin goal blocks further implementation of knowledge-based action (if the 
Troubleshooting goal had been active) and allows execution of the “Follow Written 
Procedure” problem solving strategy.  Once the Maintain Global Safety Margin goal is 
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activated, transitions to other goal states are prohibited (i.e., the operator may not return 
to either the Normal Operation, Monitoring, or Troubleshooting goals). 
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Strategy Selection Process (Action Taker) 
 
The Action Taker uses only two strategies: (1) Wait and Monitor, and (2) Follow 
Instruction.  The Wait & Monitor strategy is an information gathering problem solving 
approach intended to improve the operator’s situational assessment.  The Follow 
Instruction strategy is activated when the Action Taker has received (or is expected to 
receive) an action order from the Decision Maker. 
 
Block 1 (Start Strategy Selection Process):  The strategy selection process executed 
each time the operator performs the decision-making step.  The objective of strategy 
selection is to identify an appropriate problem solving strategy based on the operator’s 
high level goal and preferences.  
 
Block 2 (Is Goal Normal Operation or Monitoring?):  Is the goal to maintain normal 
operation or to monitor an off-normal situation?  
 
Block 3 (Wait and Monitor Strategy):  Activate the “Wait and Monitor” problem 
solving strategy.  This strategy involves passive information gathering and, if applicable, 
the execution of mental procedures. 
 
Block 4 (Is Goal Troubleshooting?):  Is the current high level goal to troubleshoot an 
abnormal condition?  The troubleshooting strategy can be used to either return the plant 
to normal power operation (if troubleshooting actions correct the cause of the deviation 
from normal operation) or mitigate an accident condition.  During troubleshooting 
activities, the Decision Maker uses a knowledge-based reasoning strategy to identify 
appropriate actions.  Because the knowledge-based reasoning strategy will likely result in 
ordered actions, the Action Taker will transition to the “Follow Instruction” strategy. 
 
Block 5 (Is There a Waiting Ordered Activity?):  If the Decision Maker has 
implemented a mental procedure, an ordered activity may have been issued to the Action 
Taker.  In order for the Action Taker to perform the ordered action, the Action Taker 
strategy must be “Follow Instruction”.  Therefore, if an ordered activity exists, the Action 
Taker will transition to the “Follow Instruction” strategy. 
 
Block 6 (Follow Instruction Strategy):  Activate the “Follow Instruction” strategy.  
This will enable the Action Taker to implement any ordered activity that has been 
directed by the Decision Maker. 
 
Block 7 (Decision Maker Using Follow Procedure Strategy?):  Determine if the 
Decision Maker has activated the “Follow Procedure” strategy.  This strategy is activated 
by either of two possible conditions: (1) activation of the “Maintain Global Safety 
Margin” goal, or (2) implementation of written procedure by the Decision Maker. 
Because the follow procedure strategy will likely result in ordered actions, the Action 
Taker will transition to the “Follow Instruction” strategy. 
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Block 8 (Is Goal Maintain Global Safety Margin?):  Is the current goal to “Maintain 
Global Safety Margin”? If so, the Decision Maker will implement the “Follow 
Procedure” strategy.  In anticipation of the transition to procedure following, the Action 
Taker will implement the “Follow Instruction” strategy and await ordered activities.   
 
Block 9 (Invalid Option):  If the strategy selection process reaches Block 9, an error has 
occurred (e.g., the current goal does not match an allowed option).  In this case, no 
strategy transition is permitted.  The strategy selection process is repeated during the next 
decision-making processing for the operator. 
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Strategy Selection Process (Decision Maker) 
 
The Decision Maker can choose from three possible problem solving strategies: (1) Wait 
and Monitor, (2) Knowledge-Based Reasoning, and (3) Follow Procedures.  The Wait 
and Monitor strategy is an information gathering problem solving approach intended to 
improve the operator’s situational assessment.  When using the Knowledge-Based 
Reasoning strategy, the operator initiates actions intended to address functional 
deficiencies identified through a diagnostic process.  The Follow Procedure strategy 
involves the implementation of written procedures (e.g., abnormal or emergency 
operating procedures).  To ensure that crew actions are coordinated, an order of 
precedence for problem solving strategies has been developed.  The following rules guide 
the transition between operator problem solving strategies:  
 
 The “Wait and Monitor” strategy has the lowest order of precedence and is only 
activated if no other problem solving strategy is active. 
 
 The “Knowledge-Based Reasoning” and the “Follow Written Procedure” strategies 
are mutually exclusive and cannot be activated simultaneously. 
 
 The implementation of high priority “Instinctive Response” strategy actions will 
interrupt all other strategies.  Lower priority instinctive response actions may 
interrupt other strategies depending on the crew’s high level goal and the individual 
operator profile.  Once the instinctive response actions are complete, the operator will 
return to the previous strategy. 
 
 
Block 1 (Start Strategy Selection Process): The strategy selection process executed 
each time the operator performs the decision-making step.  The objective of strategy 
selection is to identify an appropriate problem solving strategy based on the operator’s 
high level goal and preferences.  
 
Block 2 (Is There a Queued Mental Procedure?): Check the operator’s queue list of 
mental procedures awaiting execution.  If any procedure is ready to execute, the 
instinctive response strategy is activated.   
 
Block 3 (Instinctive Response Strategy): Execute the instinctive response strategy in 
order to follow a skill- or rule-based action.  The instinctive response strategy will take 
precedence over all other problem solving strategies. 
 
Block 4 (Is a Procedure Ready for Execution?):  Because a memorized mental 
procedure can  initiate the emergency operating procedures, if the Decision Maker has a 
queued written procedure awaiting execution, a transition “Follow Written Procedure” 
strategy is enabled.  For example, a mental memorized procedure might cause the 
operator to trip the reactor and initiate the emergency procedures.  This strategy transition 
criterion will enable the operator to initiate the emergency procedures prior to selection 
of the “Maintain Global Safety Margin” goal. 
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Block 5 (Is Goal Maintain Global Safety Margin?): Is the current goal to “Maintain 
Global Safety Margin”? If so, the Decision Maker will implement the “Follow 
Procedure” strategy to implement the written emergency operating procedures.   
 
Block 6 (Follow Procedure Strategy):  Activation of the “Follow Written Procedure” 
strategy enables the Decision Maker to initiate the emergency operating procedures.  See 
the Procedure Following Flowchart for additional information. 
 
Block 7 (Is Goal Normal Operation or Monitoring?):  If the Decision Maker’s high 
level goal is either to maintain normal operation or monitoring an abnormal condition, the 
Wait and Monitor problem solving strategy will be activated. 
 
Block 8 (Wait and Monitor Strategy):  Activation of the Wait and Monitor strategy 
enables passive information gathering (e.g., perception of alarms), active information 
gathering from control panel scanning, and the performance of memorized mental 
procedures. 
 
Block 9 (Is Goal Troubleshooting?): Is the current high level goal to troubleshoot an 
abnormal condition?  The troubleshooting strategy can be used to either return the plant 
to normal power operation (if troubleshooting actions correct the cause of the deviation 
from normal operation) or mitigate an accident condition.  During troubleshooting 
activities, the Decision Maker uses a knowledge-based reasoning strategy to identify 
appropriate actions.  
 
Block 10 (Knowledge Based Reasoning Strategy):  Activation of the Knowledge-Based 
Reasoning strategy enables the Decision Maker to identify mitigative actions based on 
the operator’s current situational assessment.  Specifically, diagnoses are linked to a set 
of potential actions by the KB_ODM_Diagnosis_Actions.txt, 
KB_ODM_Event_Matrix.txt, and the KB_ODM_System_Decomposition input files.  
See the Knowledge-Based Action Execution flowchart for additional information. 
 
Block 11 (Invalid Option): If the strategy selection process reaches Block 9, an error has 
occurred (e.g., the current goal does not match an allowed option).  In this case, no 
strategy transition is permitted.  The strategy selection process is repeated during the next 
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Procedure Following Flowchart 
 
Block 1 (Start Follow Procedure Strategy):  The procedure following process is 
activated when the Decision Maker selects the “Follow Procedure” strategy.  A similar 
process is also followed when any operator performs a memorized mental procedure.   
Procedure following is a structured problem solving strategy and it is necessary to ensure 
that basic rules for step sequencing are followed.   Step sequencing is controlled by two 
separate tracking systems in ADS-IDAC: (1) a procedure status queue in each operator’s 
memory used to track which procedure steps are active, paused, completed, or 
interrupted, and (2) a detailed procedure step check-off list used to execute each step 
element.  Although each operator maintains a procedure status queue, only one detailed 
procedure step check-off list is kept.  To prevent the crew members from interfering with 
each other’s step sequencing, only one operator is allowed to access the detailed 
procedure step check-off at a time (i.e., only one operator may perform a procedure step 
at a time).  If two operators attempt to perform the same step at the same time, the second 
operator (and any subsequent operators) is blocked from accessing the procedure step 
until the first operator has completed the procedure step and the detailed procedure step 
check-off list is reset. 
 
Block 2 (Active Procedure in Memory?):  Determine if the operator has an active 
procedure step in the memorized procedure status queue.  Four categories are used to 
track the status of queued procedure steps: 
 
 None (VNONE) – the procedure step has not been performed 
 Active (VACTIVE) – the procedure step is in progress 
 Paused (VPAUSE) – the procedure step has been temporarily suspended to permit 
execution of a higher priority procedure step 
 Interrupted (VINTERRUPT) – the procedure step has been permanently 
suspended 
 Completed (VDONE) – the procedure step has been completed.  Note that simply 
completing the step does not imply that the actions have been satisfactorily 
executed.  Equipment failures, information filtering or biasing, or the omission of 
step elements (step skipping) could result in the failure of a procedure step to 
accomplish its stated objectives. 
 
The highest priority queued steps are those steps that are currently in progress (i.e., active 
steps).  If the operator has more than one procedure step in an active status in their 
procedure queue, the last active procedure step in the queue list is selected (i.e., last in, 
first out queue). 
 
Block 3 (Paused Procedure in Memory?):  If there is not an active procedure step in the 
operator’s queue list, a search is conducted for any paused (VPAUSE) procedure steps.  
If the operator has more than one procedure step in an paused status in their procedure 
queue, the last paused procedure step in the queue list is selected (i.e., last in, first out 
queue). 
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Block 4 (Has Entry Procedure Been Executed?):  For plants using symptom-based 
procedures, the operators are generally directed to a single emergency procedure entry 
point (e.g., the E-0 Reactor Trip emergency procedure for a Westinghouse plant).   ADS-
IDAC assumes that this single procedure entry point is the first procedure step listed in 
the Procedures.txt input file (see Section 3).  If the operator has not yet performed the 
entry procedure step (VNONE status), the entry procedure step will be added to the 
memorized queue. 
 
Block 5 (End):  If the operator’s procedure queue list contains no active or paused 
procedures and the entry procedure step has already been performed, further procedure 
following activities are terminated.  Terminating procedure following in this manner does 
not preclude reactivation of the strategy if a new procedure step is added to the operator’s 
procedure queue list. 
 
Block 6 (Activate Procedure):  If not done already, the procedure step status is activated 
in the operator’s queue list (i.e., the procedure status is set to VACTIVE). 
 
Block 7 (Is There an Active Substep?):  The detailed procedure step check-off list for 
the in progress procedure step is searched to determine if there is either an active substep 
or a substep that has not been performed.   Each procedure substep defines a discrete 
action, expectation, contingency action triple.  A procedure step consists of one or more 
substep triples and a reference to the next procedure step to be performed (if applicable).  
Three status tracking categories are used for procedure substeps: 
 
 None (VNONE) – the substep has not been performed 
 Active (VACTIVE) – the substep is in progress 
 Completed (VSUCCEED) – the substep has been completed.  Note that simply 
completing the step does not imply that the actions have been satisfactorily 
executed.  Equipment failures, information filtering or biasing, or the omission of 
step elements (step skipping) could result in the failure of a procedure step to 
accomplish its stated objectives. 
 
A substeps that either have not yet been performed (VNONE) or are in progress 
(VACTIVE) are considered to be active substeps.  If all procedure substeps have been 
completed, the operator will proceed to the next procedure step.   
 
Block 8 (Has Substep Action Been Completed?):  Substep actions consist of a single 
interaction with the reactor plant control panel.  Examples of substep actions include 
opening a valve, starting a pump, or actuating a control switch.  If the substep had not 
been performed (VNONE status), the action is executed and the substep status is updated 
to active (VACTIVE). 
 
Block 9 (Have Action Expectations Been Evaluated?):  If the substep status is active 
(implying that the substep action has been completed), the status of the procedure step 
expectations is verified.   Procedure step expectations include any parameter, alarm, 
mental belief, or component status verifications that are performed to determine if the 
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substep actions had the anticipated effect.  For example, after starting a pump, the 
operator may verify that the pump is running and that the flow rate is above a minimum 
threshold value.  The status of expectations classified using four categories: 
 
 None (VNONE) – the substep expectations have not been evaluated 
 Active (VACTIVE) – the substep expectation verification is in progress.  Since 
expectations can consist of multiple elements combined with Boolean operators, it 
may be necessary for the operator to verify more than one expectation element to 
completely assess the expectation status. 
 Succeed (VSUCCEED) – the substep expectations have been evaluated and are 
met. 
 Failure (VFAILURE) – the substep expectations have been evaluated and have 
not been met. 
   
The substep expectations will be evaluated if the expectations have not been evaluated 
(VNONE) or if the expectation status is active (VACTIVE).  A status of either “succeed” 
(VSUCCEED) or “failure” (VFIALED) indicates that the expectations have been fully 
evaluated.  If the substep does not have any expectations, the entire substep is marked as 
completed. 
 
Block 10 (Have Expectations Been Met?):  If the substep expectations have been met 
(VSUCCEED status), or if there are no expectations associated with the substep action, 
the substep is updated to a completed status (VSUCCEED). 
 
Block 11 (Get Next Procedure Step Name): If all procedure step substeps have been 
completed, the operator will update the status of the current procedure step as completed 
in the memorized queue list, reset the detailed procedure step check-off list, and obtain 
the next procedure step name.  The next procedure step is often the next sequential step in 
the procedure (i.e., E-0 Step 1 references E-0 Step 2 as the next procedure step). 
 
Block 12 (Is Next Procedure Valid?): A verification check is made to ensure that the 
next procedure step is a valid procedure step.  In order for the step to be considered valid, 
it must be listed in the Procedures.txt input file and an associated 
ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt input file must exist.  If a procedure step is 
determined to be invalid, an error message is generated in the “error messages.txt” 
output file. 
 
Block 13 (Activate Next Procedure in Memory):  If the reference to the next procedure 
step is valid, the next step is added to the operator’s procedure queue list and placed in an 
active status.   
 
Block 14 (End):  If the next procedure step is not a valid step or is identified as 
“NONE”, the procedure following process is terminated.  Terminating procedure 
following in this manner does not preclude reactivation of the strategy if a new procedure 
step is added to the operator’s procedure queue list. 
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Block 15 (Check for Timing or Control Value Branches):  Prior to performing a 
substep action, a check is made to determine if any timing or control value branch options 
have been specified for the action.  These branching options are identified in the 
ProcedureActionTimeBranches.txt and ProcedureControlValueBranches.txt input files 
(see Section 3). 
 
Block 16 (Skip Substep Action?):  Prior to performing any substep action, the 
probability of skipping the step is dynamically calculated.  If the skip step probability 
exceeds the threshold specified in the ActionTaker.txt or DecisionMaker.txt input files, 
two branches will be generated – one where the action is performed and another where 
the entire substep is skipped.   
 
Block 17 (Mark Action as Completed):  If a substep action is to be skipped, the action 
is not performed and the entire substep is marked as completed (VSUCCEED).  In this 
case, the operator will not evaluate the substep expectations nor perform the contingency 
action. 
 
Block 18 (Execute Substep Action): If the substep action is to be executed (not 
skipped), the action is performed. 
 
Block 19 (Evaluate Expectations):  If the substep action has been performed, a check is 
made to determine if the substep expectations have been evaluated (Block 9).  The 
operator will obtain the necessary data from the reactor plant in order to determine the 
status of the substep expectations.    
 
Block 20 (Check for Timing or Control Value Branches):  Prior to performing a 
substep contingency action (also called a non-response action), a check is made to 
determine if any timing or control value branch options have been specified for the 
contingency action.  These branching options are identified in the 
ProcedureActionTimeBranches.txt and ProcedureControlValueBranches.txt input files 
(see Section 3). 
 
Block 21 (Skip Non-response Action?):  Prior to performing any substep contingency 
action, the probability of skipping the step is dynamically calculated.  If the skip step 
probability exceeds the threshold specified in the ActionTaker.txt or DecisionMaker.txt 
input files, two branches will be generated – one where the action is performed and 
another where the entire substep is skipped. 
 
Block 22 (Mark Non-response Action as Complete):  If a substep contingency action is 
to be skipped, the contingency action and the entire substep are marked as completed 
(VSUCCEED).   
 
Block 23 (Execute Non-response Action): If the substep contingency action is to be 
executed (not skipped), the action is performed. 
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Block 24 (Mark Substep as Completed):  At this point, the substep action has been 
completed (or skipped), the expectations have been evaluated (if applicable), and the 
contingency actions has been performed (or skipped).  The all substep activities have 
been performed and the status is updated to completed (VSUCCEED). 
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Knowledge-Based Action Execution 
 
Figure 9, "Knowledge-Based Action Execution" 
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Knowledge-Based Action Execution 
 
Block 1 (Start Knowledge-Based Actions):  The knowledge-based action execution 
process is activated when the Decision Maker selects the “Troubleshooting” problem 
solving strategy.  The overall objective of the knowledge-based action execution process 
is to select appropriate actions based on the operator’s situational assessment.  The 
situational assessment is a diagnostic process intended to identify functional degradations 
in reactor plant thermal hydraulic processes.   For example, during a loss of coolant 
accident, an operator may perceive functional degradations associated with maintenance 
of reactor coolant inventory and core energy removal.  These functional degradations are 
called “Imbalance Events” because they generally are associated with mass, energy, or 
momentum imbalances in the main reactor plant systems.  The 
KB_ODM_Diagnosis_Actions.txt links each imbalance event to a set of potential actions.  
The operator selects an appropriate action based on two factors: (1) the relative priority of 
the action and (2) the status of the prerequisites associated with the action. 
 
Block 2 (Select Highest Priority Imbalance Event Diagnosis):  A search of all 
diagnosis events categorized as “Imbalance” events listed in the 
KB_ODM_Event_Matrix.txt is conducted to identify the imbalance event with the 
highest confidence level.  The highest priority event is selected as the primary driver for 
selecting a knowledge-based action. 
 
Block 3 (Diagnosis Found?):  The confidence level of the highest priority imbalance 
event is must exceed the minimum cutoff level set in the DaignosisActionUnit.cpp class 
definition3.  The default value for the minimum confidence level is 0.5.  If the highest 
priority imbalance event diagnosis does not exceed this value, no knowledge based 
actions will be performed and the knowledge-based action execution process will be 
terminated.  Terminating the knowledge-based action process in this manner does not 
preclude future performance of a knowledge-based action should new information 
increase the confidence level in an imbalance diagnosis above the minimum threshold 
value.  
 
Block 4 (Is Diagnosis Blocked?):  Each imbalance diagnosis listed in the 
KB_ODM_Diagnosis_Actions.txt input file includes a reset delay time.  The reset delay 
time is intended to prevent the highest priority imbalance diagnosis from monopolizing 
the operator’s attention and preventing the operators from addressing lower priority 
events.  After the operator selects an imbalance event action group, future re-activation of 
the same imbalance event is blocked until the reset time expires.  By adjusting the length 
of the reset delay time, the analyst can control the distribution of crew resources to higher 
and lower priority imbalance events.  If the reset delay time is inhibiting the highest 
                                                 
3 The minimum confidence level threshold can be changed within the ADS-IDAC program by revising the 
value of the “highest_confidence” variable in the 
DiagnosisActionModule::getPtrToHighPriorityDiagnosisActionUnit() class description.  The default value 
of this variable is currently set to 0.5.  This variable will be moved to an appropriate input file during a 
future ADS-IDAC revision. 
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priority imbalance diagnosis, the process returns to Block 3 to find the next highest 
priority diagnosis.  This process repeats until either: (1) the highest priority unblocked 
imbalance event is found, or (2) the confidence level of no unblocked imbalance event 
exceeds the minimum threshold in Block 3. 
 
Block 5 (Select Next Highest Priority Diagnosis):  If the highest priority diagnosis is 
blocked because the reset time has not expired, the operator will attempt to select the next 
highest priority diagnosis.   
 
Block 6 (Reset Event Diagnosis Blocking Timer):  The reset delay timer for the 
selected high priority imbalance diagnosis is reset.  The imbalance diagnosis is blocked 
from further activation until the reset timer expires. 
 
Block 7 (Select Highest Priority Action for Current Diagnosis):   Each imbalance 
event can be associated with one or more possible actions (see the 
KB_ODM_Diagnosis_Actions.txt input file description in Section 3).  Actions are 
assigned a priority level and may be associated with one or more prerequisites.  During 
this step, all actions associated with the imbalance event are reviewed and the action with 
the highest priority is selected.  If two or more actions are tied for the highest priority 
level, the action listed first in the KB_ODM_Diagnosis_Actions.txt is selected. 
 
Block 8 (Action Found?):  If an imbalance event is not associated with any knowledge-
based actions no action for the imbalance event can be executed and further knowledge-
based action activities are terminated.  However, if during the next ADS-DAC time step, 
the reset time delay for this imbalance event allows a different high priority imbalance 
event diagnosis to be identified, an appropriate knowledge-based action might be found. 
 
Block 9 (Is Control at Limit?):  Some actions may be associated with physical limits 
that either preclude execution of the action or make execution of the action unnecessary.  
For example, once a control valve is fully opened, executing an action to open the valve 
would have no impact on the reactor plant.  Similarly, once the reactor is tripped, 
executing an action to trip the reactor again is redundant and not necessary.  Therefore, 
knowledge based actions are checked to verify that the action is capable of changing the 
state of the reactor plant.  If the action would not result in a change in state (e.g., the 
action had already been implemented), the action is at the control limit and will not be 
executed.  In this case, an alternate (and potentially lower priority action) would be 
selected in block 10. 
 
Block 10 (Select Next Highest Priority Action):  This block is entered if: (1) execution 
of the action would not change the reactor plant state, or (2) the associated prerequisite 
conditions are not met.  In these cases, an alternate (and perhaps lower priority action) is 
selected for further evaluation. 
 
Block 11 (Evaluate Action Prerequisites):  Each knowledge-based action can be 
associated with a set of prerequisites conditions.  All prerequisites must be met before the 
action can be performed.  
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Block 12 (Are Prerequisites Met?):  If the specified action prerequisites are not met, the 
associated action cannot be performed.  An alternate (and perhaps lower priority) action 
will be selected in Block 10. 
 
Block 13 (Execute Action):  The selected knowledge-based action is executed. 
 
 




1. Input File Format 
 
ADS-IDAC requires the user to provide an extensive amount of information 
related to reactor plant systems, operator knowledge and skills, and crew 
preferences and tendencies.  The ADS-IDAC user provides this information in a 
collection of input files.  Section 3, “Input File Format,” of this manual provides a 
detailed discussion of the input files required to run the ADS-IDAC code.  For 
each input file, a discussion of the purpose, file format, description of input 
options, and an input file sample are provided.  In order to standardize the 
discussion of the input files, the following conventions are used: 
 
 variable types:  In general, input data can be any of three possible data types: 
double, integer, or string.  “Double” refers to real valued numbers (e.g., 3.14), 
“integer” refers to an integer number (e.g., 1, 0, -12), and “string” refers to a 
word comprised of character elements (e.g., “Reactor_Trip”).  Although the 
current version of ADS-IDAC contains some error checking mechanisms, the  
 
 bold-italicized words:  Generally, input variables that must be provided by the 
analyst are denoted by the use of bold italics.    The detailed input description 
for each input file provides the data type (integer, double, string), the 
allowable data range, and other data options. 
 
 Quotation Marks (“”): Quotation marks are used to identify input file names 
(e.g., “ControlPanel.txt”). 
 
 conditional input:  Certain input data quantities depend on the specific set of 
options selected by the code user.  For example, ADS-IDAC allows the 
control room crew to use several different methods to interact with reactor 
plant components (see General Note 5, “Operator Control Inputs”).  
Depending on the selected control option, the data input requirements can 
change.  For clarity, these conditional inputs are enclosed in brackets (“[ ]”), 
and should only be provided when the associated input option has been 
selected. 
 
 multiple data entries:  Often, an input file can include multiple entries for 
similar data types.  For example, the input file that describes the reactor plant 
control panel (ControlPanel.txt) allows the user to enter multiple alarms, 
controls, and indicators.  However, the input file descriptions in Section 3 
typically provide only a representative input example.  Where multiple data 
entries are permitted, the three lines following the representative example are 
annotated with only a dot (“.”) to indicate the option for multiple data entries. 
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2. Input Strings 
 
When string variable are entered in ADS-IDAC input text files, they must be 
entered without any spaces.  The underbar character (_) may be used when it is 
necessary to separate words.  For example, the string Reactor Trip should be 
entered as Reactor_Trip.  Because ADS-IDAC expects the input files to follow a 
consistent formatting convention, this convention prevents a two word string from 
being misinterpreted as two separate input quantities.  The one exception to this 
rule is if the string is enclosed with quotation marks.  The detailed file format 
descriptions provided in this manual describe the allowable string format for each 
input file. 
 
3. Integer Codes 
 
In order to make certain integer variable values more meaningful within the ADS-
IDAC coding, a catalog of integer codes has been developed.  These codes cover 
commonly used integer variable values and are often easier to work with than 
string values.   For example, the integer variable that stores the current operator 
problem solving strategy can be set to represent any of several possible strategies 
such as “Follow Written Procedure”, “Knowledge-Based Reasoning”, or “Wait 
and Monitor”.   Because use of an integer value is more efficient from both a 
program execution speed and memory storage perspective, each of the possible 
strategies is assigned a unique integer code number.  To make the ADS-IDAC 
source code more readable, the assigned code numbers are stored in a series of 
variables described in the TermConversion.h C++ header file (located within the 
ADSSource directory).  To illustrate this concept, the following codes are 







Wait and Monitor VSWM 3054 








In general, the name for all coded variables begins with the letter “V”.  The 
remainder of the variable name is either a descriptive noun name or acronym for 
the quantity being represented.  Using this coding scheme, the ADS-IDAC 
programmer can work with the more descriptive variable name while still gaining 
the computational advantages of using a single integer quantity to represent a 
string value.  Unfortunately, several input files currently require the user to enter 
the variable integer value for a quantity rather than the more descriptive variable 
                                                 
4 The Knowledge-Based Reasoning had previously been called “Inductive/Deductive Reasoning”.  
Therefore, the variable name VSIDR has been used for this strategy. 
General Notes  September 20, 2009 K-49
name.  Consequently, the user needs to be aware of this coding scheme.  When 
this convention is used in an input file, the input description identifies the 
allowable integer values. 
 





Two main types of procedures are used in ADS-IDAC: (1) written procedures, 
and (2) memorized mental procedures.  Written procedures represent formal 
proceduralized guidance contained in normal, abnormal, and emergency operating 
procedures.  Memorized mental procedures represent the skill- and rule-based 
actions routinely used by the operators that do not require formal procedure 
guidance.  The filename for all ADS-IDAC procedure input files use the prefix 
“ZProcedure_”.   Mental procedures are distinguished from written procedures by 
the prefix “ZProcedure_MPBG_”5.   
 
Generally, a written procedure is continued until the procedure is completed. 
However, the procedure flow may be interrupted by procedure transfers (which 
direct the crew to a different procedure), activation of a mental belief that 
activates a memorized mental procedure, or abandonment of the “Follow Written 
Procedure” strategy.  Two types of procedure transfers can be modeled: (1) a 
permanent procedure transfer and (2) a temporary transfer to an auxiliary 
procedure followed by resumption of the initial procedure.  An example of a 
permanent procedure transfer is the transfer from a general reactor trip procedure 
to a more specific emergency procedure (e.g., transfer from the Westinghouse E-0 
to E-3 procedures during a steam generator tube rupture event).  A temporary 
procedure transfer is used when the crew temporarily interrupts an active written 
procedure to follow a functional recovery guideline to address a degraded 
condition.  When a permanent transfer is executed, the original procedure is 
terminated and will not be reactivated when the new procedure is completed.  
When a temporary transfer is executed, the original procedure will be 
recommenced at the step where it was interrupted when the new procedure is 
completed.  ADS-IDAC executes a temporary procedure transfer when the new 
procedure is either a mental procedure or has the prefix “ZProcedure_FRG_” 
(indicating the new procedure represents a functional recovery guideline). 
 
For additional flexibility, the crew may be directed to transition to a written 
procedure from a memorized mental procedure.  This may be the case following a 
manual reactor trip, where the crew scrams the reactor and initiates a general 
reactor trip emergency procedure (such as E-0).  Because only the Decision 
Maker is permitted to direct the performance of a written procedure, ADS-IDAC 
                                                 
5 The acronym “MPBG” for mental procedures can be interpreted as “Mental Procedure – Belief 
Generated”.  These procedures are generally initiated by the activation of a mental belief contained in the 
KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt input file. 
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places restrictions on the types of procedure transitions available to each operator.  
The Action Taker may initiate a memorized mental procedure and transition to 
other mental procedures, but may not initiate or transition to a written procedure.  
The Decision Maker may initiate and transition between all procedure types. 
 
5. Operator Control Inputs 
 
ADS-IDAC provides four possible control inputs for each component that can be 
operated by the control room crew: 
 
1) changing the component operating mode (e.g., automatic vs. manual mode),  
2) setting a specific control value for a component (e.g., throttling control valve 
to 50% open),  
3) incrementing the control setting of a component (e.g., throttling open a control 
valve by an additional 10%), and  
4) setting a control value based on a perceived parameter (e.g., setting the steam 
dump target pressure equal to the perceived main steam header pressure).   
 
These capabilities provide sufficient flexibility to realistically model all 
significant operator interactions with the plant model.  The details of 
implementing each of these control inputs are provided in Section 3 of this 
manual. 
 
6. Input File Consistency 
 
Certain ADS-IDAC input files contain cross references to items described in other 
input files.  For example, an input file for a procedure step may contain a cross 
reference to an indicator or a control described in the control panel input file.  To 
avoid errors during input file processing or program execution, it is important to 
ensure that any cross referenced data in the input files are internally consistent.  
The input file formatting guidance included in Section 3 highlights areas where 
data is cross referenced across multiple input files.  Prior to running the ADS-
IDAC, all input files should be reviewed to verify the consistency of data 
references.  To facilitate this consistency review, the following input data files 
should be checked: 
 
Control Panel Information 
 
□ Control panel indicators, controls, and alarms included in the 
ControlPanel.txt input file should refer to valid control_volume_names, 
control_junction_names, variable_trip_names, logical_trip_names, 
interactive_control_names, and control_variable_names in the 
RELAP5_channels.txt input file 
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□ References to plant controls (e.g., valves, pumps, actuators) contained in the 
following input files should match a valid  control_name  in the 
ControlPanel.txt input file: 
 
 procedure step descriptions 
(ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt) 
 control value branching options 
(ProcedureControlValueBranches.txt) 
 action time branching options (ProcedureActionTimeBranches.txt) 
 conditional component failure events (SystemReliability.txt) 
 knowledge-based actions (KB_OAT(ODM)_Diagnosis_Actions.txt) 
 system decomposition (KB_OAT(ODM)_System_Decomposition) 
 initiating events (Initiating_Event.txt) 
 
□ References to plant parameters, component states, and alarms contained in the 
following input files should match a valid parameter_name, 
component_name, or alarm_name in the ControlPanel.txt input file: 
 
 procedure step descriptions 
(ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt) 
 action time branching options (ProcedureActionTimeBranches.txt) 
 conditional component failure events (SystemReliability.txt) 
 knowledge-based action prerequisites 
(KB_OAT(ODM)_Diagnosis_Actions.txt) 
 system decomposition (KB_OAT(ODM)_System_Decomposition) 
 mental belief prerequisites 
(KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt) 
 failed or biased instruments  (KB_OAT(ODM)_Bias_Factors.txt) 
 periodically scanned indicators 
(KB_OAT(ODM)_Scanned_Parameters.txt) 
 time constrained parameters 
(KB_OAT(ODM)_Time_Constrained_Input.txt) 
 critical safety parameters (KB_OAT(ODM)_Safety_Parameters.txt) 
 
Operator Knowledge Base 
 
□ Key plant functions described in the operator system decomposition input file 
(KB_OAT(ODM)_System_Decomposition) should be included in the event 
diagnosis matrix (KB_OAT(ODM)_Event_Matrix.txt ).   
 
□ Each symptom referenced in the event diagnosis matrix 
(KB_OAT(ODM)_Event_Matrix.txt) should be associated with a mental 
belief in the KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt input file. 
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□ Any mental belief which is used as a prerequisite condition for another mental 





□ All procedure steps listed in the Procedures.txt  should be associated with a 
unique procedure step input file 
(ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt)  
 
□ Procedure names references in mental beliefs 
(KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt) should refer to a valid 
procedure name (ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt) 
 
□ The following branching option files should refer to valid procedure names 
(ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt): 
 
 control value branching options (ProcedureControlValueBranches.txt) 
 action time branching options (ProcedureActionTimeBranches.txt) 
 
□ Mental procedure branching options specified in the 
MentalProcedureActivationTimeBranches.txt input file must reference a 
valid mental belief in the KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt input 
file. 
 
The failure to ensure consistency between input files may result in unusual or 
unexpected errors during input processing or program execution.  Although ADS-
IDAC contains many input data checking features, the user should not rely on 
these program checks to ensure validity of the input data files. 
 
7. Branch Generation 
 
Some procedure actions require the operator to interact with the reactor plant or 
coordinate with other crew members.  Typical examples of these tasks include 
checking the status of plant equipment, manipulating a control, or verifying a 
parameter value.  Because these tasks require some amount of time to complete, 
further operator decision-making process is suspended until the task is complete.  
Within the ADS-IDAC, the generation of these tasks is accomplished by creating 
a new branch event.  A branch represents a discrete event or information chunk 
created during a simulation sequence.  Branch generation in this context should be 
distinguished from the creation of branches in a discrete dynamic event tree 
(DDET).  Most branches do not cause multiple accident sequences to be 
generated.  However, when two or more branches of the same type are generated 
in a single time step, ADS-IDAC splits the current sequence path into two or 
more separate paths.  The splitting of a sequence into two or more sequence paths 
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corresponds to the generation of a DDET branching event.  Branching rules are 
used to generate DDET branching events during an ADS-IDAC simulation. 
 
8. Controlling Branch Generation With Branching Rules  
 
Branching rules can be constructed to reflect variations in plant hardware and 
crew responses to plant events.  ADS-IDAC provides the capability to generate 
branching points for the following system and operator performance attributes 
during a simulation: 
 Use of memorized information – Use of this branching rule generates two 
branches: one where the operator will use previously perceived information (if 
available) and another where the operator will always obtain recent 
information from the control panel.  The use of memorized information can 
increase the action execution speed of the operator but may result in the use of 
outdated information. 
 Troubleshooting probability – Use of this branching rule generates two 
branches: one where the operator will attempt to use knowledge-based actions 
to mitigate the accident event and another where the operator will 
immediately implement the emergency operating procedures when an 
abnormal condition is detected.  Use of knowledge-based actions can result in 
more efficient accident mitigation but might result in inappropriate actions if 
the operator’s situational assessment is incorrect. 
 Procedure use probability – This branching rule provides a simulation control 
function to switch the operator from a knowledge-based mitigation strategy (if 
enabled) to the procedure following strategy.   
 Mental belief branch probability – Use of this branching rule generates two 
branches when the necessary prerequisite conditions for a mental belief are 
met: one where the mental belief is activated, memorized, and used to 
implement the associated mental procedure and a second branch where the 
mental belief remains inactivated.   
 Mental procedure activation time – Following activation of a mental belief, 
the operator will implement the associated mental procedure (if one is 
specified) after the activation time delay has elapsed.  To model the 
uncertainty associated with this parameter, the mental procedure activation 
time is represented by a three parameter Weibull probability distribution.  This 
branching rule allows the analyst to generate two or more branches, each of 
which represents a sample taken over a different partition of the activation 
time probability distribution.   
 Equipment failure and recovery – The current ADS-IDAC component 
reliability module models only demand failures (e.g., failure to start).   This 
branching rule generates failure and success branches when component 
operation is demanded.  If the operator attempts to restart failed equipment, 
branches representing component recovery and permanent failure are 
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generated.  Thus, each equipment failure event can result in three outcomes: 
(1) the equipment does not fail, (2) the equipment initially fails but is later 
recovered, and (3) the equipment fails and is unrecoverable. 
 Procedure step skipping – When an operator executes either a mental or 
written procedure step, either the step actions or contingency actions can be 
skipped.  When stepping skip is activated, two branches are generated when 
procedure actions are executed: one branch where the action is performed and 
another branch where the action is omitted. 
 Action control value branches – For procedure step actions associated with a 
quantitative control input (e.g., opening a throttle valve to 10% open), two or 
more branches can be generated to explore the effect of variations in the 
control input. 
 Action time branches – Every operator action is associated with a specific 
action execution time.  To model the uncertainty associated with this 
parameter, the action time is represented by a three parameter Weibull 
probability distribution.  This branching rule allows the analyst to generate 
two or more branches, each of which represents a sample taken over a 
different partition of the action time probability distribution.   
By appropriately combining these branching rules, a wide spectrum of possible 
plant and operator states can be simulated. 
 
9. Terminating Sequences 
 
In order to achieve complete scenario coverage using dynamic probabilistic risk 
assessment methods, it is necessary to explore a large number of accident 
sequences.  However, simulating a large number of sequences often requires a 
significant amount of computational power and time.  Therefore, uninteresting 
sequences are often terminated or truncated.  ADS-IDAC provides several 
methods to terminate or truncate accident sequences.  Truncation methods are 
based on sequence elapsed time, sequence probability, or conditional events.  The 
following truncation methods are available in ADS-IDAC: 
 
 Sequence Truncation Time:  This option allows the user to set a maximum 
simulation time limit for each sequence.  The time limit is set in the 
ZCtrlPar.txt input file.  It is important that the RELAP time control cards 
(Card2 200-299) set a maximum simulation time at equal to or greater than 
the sequence truncation time (or the RELAP code will terminate the sequence 
early)    
 
 Sequence Probability:  This option terminates a sequence when the sequence 
probability is less than the cutoff value specific in the ZCtrlPar.txt input file. 
 
 Procedure Non Response Exit:  This option allows the user to terminate a 
sequence if a set of procedure step expectations are not met.  This option is 
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activated by specifying the keyword “VSTOP” in the non_response_action 
type field in the appropriate ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt 
input file.  When this option is used, if the operator determines that the 
associated procedure step expectations are not met, the sequence will 
terminate.   
 
 Alarm Activation: This option terminates the sequence if an alarm with the 
prefix “A_ENDSEQ” is actuated.  The user specifies the alarm name and the 
actuation conditions in the ControlPanel.txt input file 
 
10. Running ADS-IDAC 
 
The ADS-IDAC code can be run from either a compiled executable file or from 
the Microsoft Visual C++ Developer Studio6.  In either case, the ZiniADS.txt 
must be located in the same directory as either the executable version of ADS-
IDAC or the main project file for the Fortran and C++ code.  The ZiniADS.txt file 
provides the location of RELAP thermal hydraulic plant model input deck and the 




ADS-IDAC can be run using either SI units or British Units.  Changes between 
the base units must be made from within the Microsoft Visual C++ Developer 
Studio.  There are currently no provisions to change base units from the input 
files.  In order to toggle between SI and British units, the following line must be 
revised in the schedule.cpp class file:   
 
R5PAR_mp_SI_UNIT = false; 
 
If R5PAR_mp_SI_UNIT  is set to “false”, the base unit is set to British (e.g., psi, 
F, lbm/sec).  If R5PAR_mp_SI_UNIT is set to true, the base unit is SI (e.g., Pa, 
K, kg/sec). 
 
 Time Step 
 
There are two time steps of interest to the user when running ADS-IDAC: the 
RELAP thermal hydraulic model time step and the ADS-IDAC time step.  The 
RELAP time step is set by lines 200-299 in the RELAP input deck.  To avoid 
early termination of a simulation run, the maximum RELAP time should be set to 
a value greater than the truncation time set in ZCtrlPar.txt.  The ADS-IDAC time 
step is set to a default value of 0.5 seconds, but can be adjusted manually from 
within the Microsoft Visual C++ Developer environment.  In order to adjust the 
ADS-IDAC time step, the following changes must be made: 
                                                 
6 ADS-IDAC is written in two main programming languages – Fortran and C++.  The RELPA thermal 
hydraulic code and related interface infrastructure is written in Fortran while the remainder of the ADS-
IDAC code is written in C++.  
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 Modify Fortran module dtstep.f by changing the ADS-IDAC_time_step to the 
desired value (this code line is located at approximately line 1505).  The 
default value for ADS-IDAC_time_step is 0.5 seconds. 
  
if((timehy - timesno) .ge. ADS-IDAC_time_step) then 
 
 Modify C++ module CommandControlCenter.cpp to the same time step 




These changes ensure that the ADS-IDAC scheduler time step remains 
synchronized with the RELAP5 thermal hydraulic model. 
 
Error Log File 
 
ADS-IDAC generates an error log file if any error or warning is generated during 
a simulation run.  Following a simulation run, the user should determine if the 
error log file err messages.txt was placed in the ADS-IDAC main directory.  
Some errors will cause termination of the simulation, while others are less severe 
and simply alert the user to an unexpected condition. 
 
 



















Section 2: Modeling Guidance 
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Guidance for Modeling Crew Variability 
 
 
1. Modeling Crew-to-Crew Variability 
 
Even when subject to similar personnel selection, training, and administrative 
requirements, nuclear plant control room operators can exhibit significant crew-to-
crew variability during non-routine events.  A strength of the ADS-IDAC simulation 
approach is the ability to systematically model the sources of variability.  In general, 
ADS-IDAC captures crew variability within three main categories: procedure 
adherence and implementation, crew knowledge and experience, and individual 
preferences and tendencies.  ADS-IDAC allows the analyst to create branching events 
to address each of these areas of variability.   
 
2. General Guidance 
 
The initial step in addressing operator variability is to gather information pertaining to 
crew behavior.  The following information should be collected: 
 
 Written Procedures:  All procedures associated with the event(s) to be analyzed 
should be collected.  In addition procedures associated with plant operation, 
administrative procedures that guide crew decision-making should also be 
reviewed.  Typically, plant administrative procedures will address factors such as 
communication, the general conduct of operations, self-checking behavior, 
activities considered to “skill-of-the-craft” that do not require written instructions, 
and guidelines for procedural adherence. 
 
 Training Materials:  Operators form mental models about plant behavior as a 
result of their training and experience.  Training materials, including lesson plans, 
simplified plant drawings, and simulator training scenarios should be reviewed to 
identify key mental models and diagnostic processes employed by the operators.  
In particular, training materials might include “rules of thumb” or other non-
proceduralized shortcuts that operators may use as an aid to operation. 
 
 Operating Experience: Review plant operating experience associated with the 
event(s) to be analyzed to identify actions taken by actual control room crews.  
Identify instances when crews have performed unexpected or non-proceduralized 
actions or developed a mental model of the plant that differed from the actual 
plant conditions.  Potential sources of operating experience include NRC 
inspection reports, generic communications, licensee event reports, and NUREG 
reports. 
 
 Expert Elicitation:  Consult operations experts (e.g., training instructors, 
inspectors) to identify areas where crews might have difficulty in responding to an 
accident event. 
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3. Specific Guidance 
 
i. Identify potential sources of crew-to-crew variability.  Review operations 
procedures, operator training, and crew preferences and tendencies using the 
following guidelines: 
 
a) Operating Procedures 
 
1) Review procedures and identify major control actuations (stop/start 
significant pumps, open/shut major valves, control manipulations 
(initiate/stop depressurizations, cool downs).   
 
 These actions often delineate major phases in the emergency procedures – 
crews may hold a briefing prior to initiating significant plant actions.  The 
conduct of briefings and meetings can be addressed by the inclusion of 
procedure hold points with action time branching rules. 
 
 Identify possible operator control manipulation variations.  In particular, 
focus on control manipulations where the operators may use too little or 
too much control input (e.g., opening valve more or less than desired).  
Variations in control inputs can be modeled with appropriate control value 
branching events. 
 
2) Identify ambiguous criteria in procedure steps by searching for key words 
such as “increasing,” “steady,” “decreasing,” and “stable”.  These keywords 
highlight steps where crews may exhibit variability in interpreting 
procedural criteria.  For example, crews may use different threshold criteria 
for judging acceptability.  Further, the criteria may depend on the situational 
context and depend on the crew’s knowledge and experience.  For example, 
a crew might conclude that a decreasing trend in pressure actually indicates 
a stable condition if the cause of the decrease is well understood and a direct 
result of operator actions.   Crew variability associated with interpretation of 
potentially ambiguous criteria can be modeled with several conditional 
simulation runs to explore a range of threshold values. 
 
3) Assess the main objective of each procedure step.  While some procedure 
steps may support the main procedure objectives, other steps may be 
associated with supporting activities that may have a lower salience or 
priority for the operators.  For example, actuation of safety injection 
following a loss of coolant accident would be expected to have a greater 
relevance to the assessed situation than shutdown of a feedwater heater.   
Therefore, steps that are more directly linked to the main procedure 
objectives would be expected to have a lower likelihood of being skipped.    
However, some steps that do not appear to be directly linked to the 
procedure objectives may improve the efficiency of the procedure, establish 
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prerequisite conditions that support later actions, or delay the onset of core 
damage.  Examples of such actions include: 
 
 Tripping the reactor coolant pumps following a loss of secondary 
heat sink.  This action reduces heat input to the reactor coolant 
system but does not directly support the main procedure objective to 
recover feedwater flow to the steam generators.  Consequently, the 
action has a safety impact (reduced time available for recovery) but 
may not be salient to the operators. 
 
 Blocking automatic safety injection actuation signals prior to an 
intentional cooldown or depressurization to prevent an unnecessary 
safety system actuation.  The failure to block an actuation signal 
under these circumstances can unnecessarily delay mitigative 
actions, but may not have a high degree of relevance to the operators 
during the accident. 
 
The analyst can categorize procedure step objectives by setting the step_type 
variable in the ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt input file (see 
Section 3).  
 
4) Identify all steps that require that require continuous monitoring by the 
operator such as continuous action steps or fold out page actions.  These 
steps often require the operator to monitor the state of a targeted plant 
parameter and initiate an action or procedure transfer if a critical threshold is 
passed.  If the operator fails to monitor the target parameter at regular 
intervals, initiation of the required actions could be delayed.  The operator’s 
tendency to periodically monitor the target parameter is established in the 
ActionTaker.txt, DecisionMaker.txt, and the 
KB_OAT(ODM)_Scanned_Paramter.txt input files.  Performance 
variabilities in the initiation of actions directed by continuous action steps or 
fold out page steps can be captured with appropriate mental beliefs in the 
KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt input file.  
 
5) Identify procedure steps that refer to components that have failed during the 
accident scenario.  These steps may trigger the operator to initiate recovery 
or compensatory actions.  These actions can be modeled with appropriate 
mental beliefs in the KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt input file.  
 
b) Mental Beliefs and Memorized Actions 
 
1) Based on operator training and experience, identify mental beliefs that the 
crew is likely to reach during the scenario.  Examples might include 
“uncontrolled steam generator level increase” for a tube rupture scenario or 
“faulted steam generator” for a main steam line break.  These mental beliefs 
represent the crew’s situational assessment and their underlying mental 
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models.  Crew variability might arise from the failure to reach appropriate 
belief states, delays in acting on beliefs, or setting a higher or lower 
evidence threshold for a belief.  These factors can be included in the 
KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt input file 
 
2) For the specific scenario, identify actions that the crew might take to 
increase the time available until an automatic safety feature is actuated.  
Examples include maximizing reactor coolant system makeup during a 
primary system leak or reducing steam loads during a partial loss of 
feedwater.  These actions often represent non-proceduralized actions arising 
from the operator’s training and experience.  These actions can be activated 
by appropriate mental beliefs in the  modeled by with mental beliefs in the 
KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt input file and described in by a 
mental procedure step 
(ZProcedure_MPBG_procedure_name_step_name.txt)   
 
3) Identify conditions under which crews might manually activate safety 
systems.  These conditions can be captured by mental beliefs which lead the 
crew to perform the manual action.  For example, a control room might 
initiate a safety injection when pressurizer level is low.  
 
4) Identify potential control system failures that provide symptoms similar to 
the actual accident condition.  Operators could potentially confuse an 
accident event with a minor control system failure and activities to address 
the misdiagnosed failure may distract the crew from addressing the accident.  
The KB_OAT(ODM)_Event_Matrix.txt input file should include a wide 
spectrum of simple failures, abnormal conditions, and emergency events to 
more realistically represent the crew’s diagnostic behavior. 
 
c) Crew Preferences and Tendencies 
 
1) Assess the tendency of crews to rely on previously memorized information 
rather than use of recent information obtained directly from the control 
panel indicators.  The use of memorized information can reduce activity 
execution time but may result in the use of outdated and incorrect 
information.  The crew tendency toward the use of memorized information 
can be set in the ActionTaker.txt and the DecisonMaker.txt input files. 
 
2) Assess the crew tendency to procedural adherence.  Procedural steps in 
ADS-IDAC have three main components: (1) initial action activity, (2) 
expectations associated with the initial action activity, and (3) a non-
response action that is executed if the action expectations are not met.  The 
operator may skip either the initial action activity or the non-response action 
(evaluation of the action expectations cannot be skipped).  The probability 
of skipping the initial action or non-response action is dynamically 
calculated based upon the baseline skip probability for the step component 
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(specified in the procedure step input file), the type of procedure being 
followed, the step objectives, the relevance of the action to the operator’s 
situational assessment, and certain PIFs.  If the calculated skip probability 
for the initial action activity exceeds a preset threshold, the procedure step is 
skipped by the crew (an alternate branch is also generated where the step is 
performed).  The skip step threshold can be set in the ActionTaker.txt and 
the DecisonMaker.txt input files to represent a crew’s tendency to follow 
written procedures. 
 
3) Determine the crew’s threshold level for concluding that an accident has 
occurred.  Based on accumulated evidence, the ADS-IDAC diagnosis engine 
calculates a value representing the potential for the observed information 
being related to an accident condition.  When this calculated value exceeds a 
preset threshold, the crew will transition to the emergency operating 
procedures and shutdown the reactor.  Crew’s may exhibit variability in 
their tendency to delay initiation of the emergency procedures (perhaps to 
allow other mitigative actions to work) or require strong evidence prior to 
initiating a shutdown.  This variability can be captured in the 
ActionTaker.txt and the DecisonMaker.txt input files. 
 
4) Tendency to rely on knowledge-based troubleshooting rather than written 
procedures.  Operating crews may attempt to address an emergency 
condition through the use of actions based on their knowledge and 
experience rather than through written procedures.  ADS-IDAC includes 
options in the ActionTaker.txt and the DecisonMaker.txt input files to allow 
the analyst to specify the crew’s tendency to use knowledge-based reasoning 
approaches to problem solving rather than written procedures. 
 
5) Identify factors that influence the procedure execution speed for the crews.  
Depending on certain organizational factors, familiarity with the procedures, 
and experience crews might have significant variability in their procedure 
execution speed.  Variations in execution speed can be modeled in ADS-
IDAC with the use of procedure hold points.  Potential hold points include 
the start of a new procedure (including transfers between procedures) or 
prior to accomplishment of a major procedural action (such as cooldown, 
depressurization, initiation of safety injection, etc).  The analyst can 
introduce a “dummy” procedure step to provide a suitable time delay to 
accommodate variations in execution speed.  Branching options can also be 
exercised to simulate fast, slow, or nominal crews. 
 
Table 1, “Mapping Crew Variability to ADS-IDAC Branching Rules,” summarizes 
the potential sources of crew variability and the associated ADS-IDAC branching 
rules. 
 
ii. List all branching events that are applicable to analysis.  Branching events include 
the sources of crew-to-crew variability identified in the previous step and hardware 
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related events.  Hardware related events include initial failures, conditional failures, 
and potential operator recovery actions. 
 
iii. Define the specific parameter values that will be used to model branching events.  
Parameter values include: 
 
 Branching Probabilities – In general, the Beta Distribution is used to describe 
hardware failure and recovery probabilities.  Branching events associated with 
mental belief activation use point probability estimates.   The analysts is 
required to supply either the Beta Distribution parameter estimates (α and β) for 
hardware failures or a point estimate for mental belief activation probabilities.   
 
 Timing Parameters – The time required to perform procedure steps and certain 
decision-making activities are modeled with a three parameter Weibull 
distribution.  The time required to  exchange crew communications and 
transition between procedures is modeled with a point estimate.  
 
 Control Value Variability – Identify the control values and probability point 
estimates that will be used to model variations in control inputs 
 
 Timing Variability – Identify the procedure steps where action timing branches 
should be generated.  The number of branches that will be generated should also 
be determined.   
 
 Mental Belief Activation Time Variability – Identify the mental beliefs and 
number of associated branching events that will be used to model variabilities in 
initiating skill- and rule-based actions arising from mental beliefs.  
 
 Goal and Problem Solving Strategy Tendencies – Identify the crew tendencies 
for goal and problem solving selection.  These tendencies are represented by 
point probability estimates in the ActionTaker.txt and DecisonMaker.txt input 
files. 
 
A detailed description of the required parameter values is provided in Section 3.  
Table 2 provides a suggested format for summarizing the branching events that will 
be used for the analysis. 
 
iv. Define sequence end states.  There are two methods for terminating a sequence 
when a critical parameter exceeds a threshold value: (1) a “VSTOP” non-response 
procedure action, or (2) activation of a end sequence alarm (i.e., an alarm with a 
“A_ENDSEQ_”  prefix).  The analyst should identify the critical parameters and 
thresholds that are used to terminating a sequence.  For example, a fuel uncovery 
condition indicated by a low reactor vessel water level could be indicative of the 
onset of core damage.  
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v. Develop a simulation matrix that defines the detailed computer simulations that will 
be performed.  Due to the computer processing limitations, it is not currently 
practicable to run a single ADS-IDAC simulation capable of exercising all 
branching points.  The main difficulty is the exponential increase in accident 
sequences as the number of branches increases (a phenomenon known as sequence 
explosion).  As the number of sequences increases, the time to complete a 
simulation run can become prohibitive.  One method of overcoming this difficulty 
is through the performance of conditional runs where a reduced number of 
branching rules are activated and all other branching rules are suppressed.  If the 
combination of branching rules is selected with care, the analyst should be able to 
capture a wide range of potential crew behaviors with minimal processing effort.   
In general, the analyst should select a combination of three or four branching events 
that reflect high likelihood scenarios.  The simulation matrix should ensure that all 
significant branching rules are explored (i.e., each branching rule should be 
included in at least one simulation run).     
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Table 1, Mapping Crew Variability to ADS-IDAC Branching Rules 
Type of 
Variability 
Source of Crew-to-Crew  
Variability 
 
ADS-IDAC Branching Rule(s) 
Selection of component target 
control settings (e.g., throttle 
valve positions, manual controller 
set points) 
Action control value branching rule 
Time required to execute 
procedure actions 
Action time branching rule 
Recovery of failed equipment 
Equipment failure and recovery 
branching rule 
Omission or skipping of 
procedure steps 
Procedure step skipping branching 
rule.  Branching is enabled by the step 









Interpretation of potentially 
ambiguous procedure criteria 
(e.g.,, translation of qualitative 
descriptors such as “decreasing”, 
“increasing”, or steady” into 
context-specific quantitative 
criteria) 
No branching rule available.  
Conditional simulation runs can be run 
to examine the use of different 
quantitative thresholds for qualitative 
criteria.   
Training, experience, and 
diagnostic capabilities 
Mental belief branch probability 
branching rule.  The operator 
knowledge base should include a 
sufficient spectrum of mental beliefs to 
capture crew variabilities due to 





Time required to initiate 
automatic memorized actions 
Mental procedure activation time 
branching rule 
Selection of high level goals and 
problem solving strategies 
Troubleshooting probability and 
procedure use probability branching 
rules 
Tendency to rely on memorized 
information rather than control 
panel readings 
Use of memorized information 
branching rule 
Delays or breaks during procedure 
execution (e.g., crew briefings) 
Action time branching rule.  
Appropriate procedure hold steps must 
be incorporated into ADS-IDAC 







Tendency to manually perform 
anticipatory safety actions prior to 
automatic actions 
Mental belief branch probability 
branching rule.  The operator 
knowledge base must include 
appropriate mental belief to trigger the 
desired actions. 
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Table 2, Suggested Format for Summarizing Analysis Branching Rules 
 
The following Table summarizes the branching events for a hypothetical complete loss of 




















options: 0.0,  
0.5, or 1.0 
High 
Enables early reactor 
trip upon loss of 
main feed pumps.  
Branch probability of 
1.0 enables early 
trip, probability of 0.0 
blocks early trip, and 
intermediate value 














α = 100. 
β = 1.5 
 
Long, nominal, 




Sets time delay for 
initiation of FRG H.1 
(once entry 




with transition from 





Action Time Branches 
(3 Branches) 
Time Delay 
α = 200. 
β = 1.75 
 
Long, nominal, 




Delay time prior to 
initiation of FRG H.1.  
Represents crew 
briefing prior to 
initiation of FRG H.1 
actions  
SKIPRCP 
Skip FRG H.1 
Step 3 (trip 
reactor coolant 
pumps) 
Skip step threshold 
value, base step skip 
probability 
 
(2 Branches per 
pump: perform step 




1.0, 0.75 (skip) 
 
Base RCP Skip 
Probability: 
α = 400.0 
β = 10,000.0 
 
Low 
Failure to trip reactor 
coolant pumps will 
increase net RCS 
heat input.   
 
The RCPSkip base 
probability and the 
skip step threshold 
were increased to 
avoid the generation 
of an excessive 
number of skipped 
step branches. 
STMDUMP 








Value Branches for 





0.25 – Excessive 
0.10 – Nominal 





using the steam 
dump.  Excessive 
steam dump rate 
could actuate main 
steam isolation and 
delay recovery.  
Insufficient steam 
dump rate could 
delay recovery. 

























(3 branches are 
generated for each 
pump: initial success, 




 α = 1.0e5 
 β = 1.0 
Recovery 
 α = 1.0 






Failure of motor 
driven AFW pump 
A(B) following Rx 
Trip.  Low probability 
of recovery prevents 












(2 branches are 







 α = 1.0e5 
 β = 1.0 
Recovery 
 α = 1.0 






Initiating event is trip 
of main feedwater 
pumps.  The 
condensate pump 
head curve is 
modified in the 
RELAP input deck to 
model degradation.  
Low probability of 
recovery prevents 
recovery of pumps. 
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The current version of ADS-IDAC utilizes the RELAP5/MOD 3.2 computer code to 
provide a transient simulation of nuclear power plant operation.  The RELAP5 code can 
simulate a wide variety of accident initiators and provides the capability to model key 
safety systems, controls, and instruments.  Advantages of RELAP5 include its proven 
capabilities as a transient analysis tool and the availability of detailed power plant 
models.  However, due to the intrinsic limitations of the RELAP5 code, it is not currently 
possible to model core damage states and severe accident scenarios.  Consequently, ADS-
IDAC is currently limited to the analysis of scenarios up to the start of core damage.   
Adaption of ADS-IDAC to a more versatile thermal-hydraulic engine, such as the 
TRACE or MELCOR code, has been identified as a future research activity.  However, 
the inability of RELAP to adequately simulate core damage states is not a significant 
limitation since the ADS-IDAC crew model is not valid once a nuclear plant activates the 
emergency response facilities such as the technical support center (TSC) and offsite 
emergency facility (EOF).  Once the TSC and EOF are activate (within approximately 
one hour of the accident), the dynamics of crew decision making changes dramatically. 
 
The RELAP thermal hydraulic model provides two key functions for ADS-IDAC: (1) the 
dynamic and realistic representation of plant parameters, and (2) the ability to interact 
with the thermal hydraulic model by changing component or system operating states.  
Any parameter value that can be obtained from the RELAP code can be used within the 
ADS-IDAC environment.  The ADS-IDAC control panel links the operator model to the 
thermal hydraulic model.  It should also be noted that the operator cannot instantly use all 
information available on the control panel.  Similar to an actual control room crew, the 
information must first be perceived by the ADS-IDAC operator model before the 
information can be used.  The ADS-IDAC environment supports a variety of operator 
control inputs to the thermal hydraulic model including valve position changes, starting 
or stopping of pumps, safety system actuations, and control system setpoint changes.  
Four possible control modes can be used for each controllable component: (1) changing 
the component operating mode (e.g., automatic vs. manual mode), (2) setting a specific 
control value for a component (e.g., throttling control valve to 50% open), (3) 
incrementing the control setting of a component (e.g., throttling open a control valve by 
an additional 10%), and (4) setting a control value based on a perceived parameter (e.g., 
setting the steam dump target pressure equal to the perceived main steam header 
pressure).  These capabilities provide sufficient flexibility to realistically model all 
significant operator interactions with the plant model. 
 
The user must provide a description of the nuclear plant model (called an input deck) in 
order to execute the RELAP code.  The input deck is a text file that describes the 
arrangement of plant equipment; thermal-hydraulic initial conditions and boundary 
conditions; control and safety systems; and other features of the reactor plant.  Although 
many RELAP plant models have been previously developed to support safety analyses 
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and other regulatory uses, these input decks often require some modification in order to 
exploit the full capabilities of ADS-IDAC.  For example, a RELAP input deck supporting 
a regulatory safety analysis may conservatively omit certain plant components or features 
or only include modeling elements for a specific type of accident scenario.  In general, an 
existing RELAP plant model should be modified to include the following features. 
 
 Replacement of all conservative analysis assumptions with realistic best estimate 
parameters.  Typically, conservative values are used for trip setpoints, initial reactor 
power level, timing delays for automatic safety system actuations, and other key plant 
parameters.  Additionally, significant non-safety control systems and safety features 
that might not have been included in the RELAP model should be added.  
 Modification to safety system models to replace simple thermal hydraulic boundary 
conditions with a more realistic representation of system components.  Often, support 
and safety systems are simply modeled with a fixed mass flow rate boundary 
condition in RELAP.  These simplified system models should be modified to include 
redundant subsystems for multi-train systems, provisions for control of significant 
components such as key pumps and valves, and representation of critical support 
systems such as water supplies and electrical power.   
 Addition of systems and components that provide a significant portion of the 
mitigative functions provided by the abnormal and emergency operating procedures.  
The relevant procedures should be reviewed to identify equipment that should be 
included within the plant model. 
 Implementation of control interfaces for all interactive components to allow the ADS-
IDAC operator model to manipulate plant systems.  This includes the addition of a 
“manual” control mode for components that normally controlled by an automated 
system (e.g., feed water regulating valves or power operated relief valves). 
 Addition of modeling elements needed to represent initiating event conditions such as 
coolant or steam leakage paths and equipment failures.  
 
Although a detailed overview of the RELAP thermal hydraulic program is beyond the 
scope of this manual, the user is encouraged to review U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission technical report NUREG/CR- 5535, “RELAP5/MOD3 Code Manual.”  In 
particular, NUREG/CR-5535 Appendix A, “Input Requirements,” provides a 




The following specific guidelines should be used when modifying an existing RELAP 
plant model: 
 
1. Identify all controllable components and plant indicators that are already included in 
the original RELAP input deck.  Major controllable components generally include 
valves, pumps, heaters, and the reactor fuel.  Plant indicators that are normally 
present in existing RELAP plant models include: (1) significant inventory/level 
indicators (e.g., reactor vessel, steam generators, pressurizer, safety injection 
accumulators), (2) significant mass flow rates (e.g., steam flow, feedwater flow, 
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reactor coolant flow), (3) significant thermal-hydraulic parameters (reactor coolant 
system temperature and pressure, steam pressure), and (4) control systems (pressure 
or inventory control systems).  When available, a noding diagram for the plant model 
can be extremely useful for locating key plant components.   Because RELAP input 
decks are formatted as simple text files, it is also possible to locate many key plant 
features by searching the RELAP input deck for certain keywords.  In particular, the 
following keywords are often useful for finding major plant components in the 
RELAP input deck: 
 
TMDPVOL (Time Dependent Volume): Time dependent volumes are used to 
model a mass source or sink using a controlled pressure, temperature, and/or 
steam quality condition.  The mass flow rate into the TMDPVOL is adjusted 
accordingly.  This hydraulic component is often used to model exhaust volumes 
for relief valves or leakage paths or inexhaustible sources of water. 
 
TMDPJUN (Time Dependent Junction):  Time dependent junctions are used to 
model a mass source or sink using a controlled mass flow rate boundary 
condition.  The thermal-hydraulic conditions across the junction are adjusted 
accordingly.  These hydraulic components are often associated with safety 
injection system connections, makeup or letdown systems, or inventory control 
systems. 
 
ANNULUS (Annulus Hydraulic Component): The annulus hydraulic component 
is often used to model the reactor vessel or steam generator down comer volume.  
Water levels for these components are often measured in the annulus region. 
 
PRIZER (Pressurizer): The pressurizer component is used to model the 
pressurizer in a pressurized water reactor.  Significant control components such as 
the spray valves and relief valves are usually connected to the pressurizer 
hydraulic volume.  The pressurizer pressure and level are also significant control 
panel indicators.  
 
VALVE (Valve):  As the name suggests, the valve hydraulic component is used 
to model flow limiting devices.  Valve components are often used to control 
thermal hydraulic parameters or initiate accident conditions.  RELAP allows the 
user to select from a variety of valve types, including check valves, relief valves, 
and remotely operated valves.  The following key words are often useful in 
locating specific valve types: 
 
 TRPVLV (Trip valve):  Trip valves have only two operating states: fully 
open or fully closed.  Trip valves fully open when the associated logical or 
variable trip (specified in card CCC0301) is on, the valve is fully opened.  
The valve repositions immediately upon a change in state of the trip 
variable.  This component is often used to model system leaks or ruptures. 
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 MTRVLV (Motor valve):  Similar to the trip valve, motor valves have two 
normal operating states – fully open and fully closed.  However, two trip 
variables are specified in card CCC0301, an open trip and a closed trip.  A 
rate of valve position change is also specified in card CCC0301 to define 
that the time it takes for the valve to move from the fully open to fully 
closed position.  As such, the motor valve does not immediately 
reposition, but can be in an intermediate state for a finite length of time.  
This component type is typically used to model large isolation valves such 
as main steam stop valves, turbine trip valves, and feed water isolation 
valves. 
 
 SRVVLV (Servo valve):  a servo valve can be positioned fully closed, 
fully open, and any intermediate position.  The valve position is 
determined by the normalized flow area set by the control variable entered 
into card CCC0301.  Servo valves are typically used to model throttle 
valves and are often used as power operated relief valves or to control 
mass flow rates.  The pressurizer power operated relief valve, the steam 
generator atmospheric steam dump valves, and the feed water regulating 
valves are usually modeled with a servo valve hydraulic component.  
 
PUMP (Pump):  As the name suggests, the pump hydraulic component is used to 
model pump components.  Typically, this component type is only used for large 
pumps where coast down flow following a pump trip is significant.  Examples 
include reactor coolant pumps and feed water pumps.  Smaller pumps are usually 
modeled with time dependent hydraulic junctions that establish a mass flow rate 
based on the differential pressure across the junction.  Pump components may 
also include reference to a logical or variable trip that can initiate a pump 
countdown (card CCC0301). 
  
ACCUM (Accumulator): The accumulator hydraulic component is used to model 
a liquid/gas accumulator.  Typical applications include the passive safety injection 
accumulators in a pressurized water reactor.   
 
2. Identify all automatic control systems included in the original RELAP input deck.  
The RELAP plant model will usually include several automatic control systems to 
maintain key thermal hydraulic parameters at a predefined setpoint.  Typical 
examples include pressurizer level control, reactor coolant pressure control, feed 
water control, and steam pressure control systems.  In addition to improving the 
realism of the plant model, control systems enhance the ability of the thermal 
hydraulic model to reach a stable steady state condition.  In the absence of a control 
system, small errors in initializing the thermal hydraulic model (such as a mismatch 
between steam and feed water flow rates) can cause significant plant deviations over 
time.  Control systems mitigate these initialization errors and allow the model to 
achieve a stable equilibrium condition.  Control systems can be found in the 
20500000 card series in the input deck and are usually associated with either the 
FEEDCTL (feed water control) or PROP-INT (proportional integral control) 
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controller type.  The feed water control component is usually used to control reactor 
vessel or steam generator water level.  Most other control systems use a proportional-
integral controller to increase the capability to maintain a target parameter on the 
established set point.  Because control systems must eventually actuate a controllable 
component, control systems can also be identified by back-tracing the control variable 
for the associated component (e.g., the control variable associated with the pressurizer 
pressure control logic will be referenced in the servo valve description for the spray 
valve).  At a minimum, automatic control system should be provided for the 
following pressurized water reactor control functions: 
 
 Pressurizer pressure control (spray valves, power operated relief valve, and 
heaters) 
 Pressurizer level control (reactor coolant system makeup and letdown flow) 
 Steam generator level control (feedwater regulating valve) 
 Steam generator pressure control (atmospheric relief valves) 
 Steam header pressure control (condenser steam dump valves) 
 
Boiling water reactor models will have a similar set of control functions and actuating 
devices.  Once automatic control systems are located, several other key RELAP 
model features can usually be identified.  These include key thermal hydraulic 
parameters (such as reactor coolant system pressure or key water levels) and 
controller set points. 
 
3. Modify automatically controlled components to permit to permit the ability to 
manipulate equipment from the ADS-IDAC environment.  In general, nuclear plant 
automatic control systems allow the operators to take manual control of the final 
actuating device(s) or change the control set point.  In addition to allowing more 
realistic plant control, the manual control mode can also be used to simulate hardware 
failures and initiating events.   Ideally, three modes of operation should be provided 
for each automatic control system: 
 
i. fully automatic - the control system positions the final actuating device(s) to 
maintain target parameter at the nominal setpoint,  
ii. fully manual control - the operator positions the final actuating device(s), and  
iii. setpoint control - the control system positions the final actuating device(s) to 
maintain the target parameter at the user selected setpoint. 
 
To illustrate the general methodology for adapting an automatic control system in an 
existing RELAP input deck for use with ADS-IDAC, consider a feedwater control 
system for a pressurizer water reactor.  Based on the relative mismatch between main 
steam and feedwater flow rates and water level error (i.e., the difference between the 
actual steam generator water level and the level setpoint), the control system 
generates a normalized valve position for the feedwater regulating valve (FWRV).  
The FWRV controls the mass flow rate into the steam generator and is usually 
modeled using a servo valve hydraulic component or a time dependent junction.  The 
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following procedure should be used to adapt the existing control system for ADS-
IDAC: 
 
a) Set up an interactive control variable in the RELAP input deck to permit 
ADS-IDAC to pass FWRV control settings to the thermal-hydraulic model.  
Interactive control variables are specified in cards 800 – 999 of the RELAP 
input deck.   The following input deck card sets up the interactive variable 
“sgcfrv” in input deck card 810 with an initial value of -1.0: 
 
0000810   sgcfrv   -1.0   $ SG C feedwater reg valve 
 
b) Add a variable trip that will enable the control system to be toggled between 
automatic and manual mode.  One method of accomplishing this function is to 
enable the automatic control mode when the associated interactive variable is 
negative and use positive control variable values as the manual control setting.  
The following card sets up variable trip 475 as a toggle control between 
automatic and manual control modes (when the trip is true, the control system 
will be in automatic mode):   
 
20604750  sgcfrv  1000000000 gt  null   0    -0.01   n 
 
In this case, a threshold value of -0.01 is used to allow the use of 0.0 as a 
manual control input for the fully closed position.  The “n” specifies that the 
variable trip does not latch and can be reset as the simulation progresses. 
 
c) Adjust existing control system to add manual control capability.  Assuming 
that control variable card 725 was previously used as the output of the control 
system, the following additional cards allow either a manual or automatic 
control signal to be sent to the final actuating device: 
 
20572600 "sgcfwman" tripunit  1.0  0.0  1  3  0.0 1.0   
20572601   475 
20572700 "sgcfwaut"   sum     1.0  1.0  1  3  0.0 1.0 
20572701   1.0       -1.0     cntrlvar 726 
20572800  "sgcfw_mc"   mult    1.0  1.0  1  3  0.0 1.0   
20572801  cntrlvar  726         sgcfrv    1000000000 
20572900  "sgcfw_ac"   mult    1.0  1.0  1  3  0.0 1.0   
20572901  cntrlvar  727         cntrlvar 725 
20573000  "sgcfw_tc"   sum     1.0  1.0  1  3  0.0 1.0  
20573001  0.0   1.0  cntrlvar 728  1.0   cntrlvar 729 
 
The basic approach is to use a tripunit control variable to toggle between 
automatic and manual mode (cards 20572600 and 20572700).  Since the 
output from the tripunit function can be only 0.0 if the trip is false or 1.0 if the 
trip is true, variable control cards 20572600 and 20572700 are complimentary 
in that one is always equal to 1.0 and the other is equal to 0.0.  The manual 
control signal is calculated in control variable card 20572800 and is equal to 
0.0 if the control mode is in automatic or the value interactive variable sgcfrv 
if the control mode is manual.  Similarly, control variable 20572900 is the 
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automatic control signal and is equal to either 0.0 (if the control mode is in 
manual) or the automatic control signal from control variable 725 (if the 
control mode is in automatic).  Since only control variable 20572800 or 
20572900 can be non zero (i.e., at least of the control variables is equal to 
0.0), summing these two values together selects the appropriate control signal.  
The final value of control variable 730 is used to control the FWRV throttle 
position and is limited to the range 0.0 – 1.0 (0.0 is fully closed, 1.0 is fully 
open). 
 
d) Revise control variable input for final actuating device(s) to use the new 
control input.  Assuming that the FWRV was hydraulic component 500, card 
5000301 would be used to assign new control variable 730 for positioning 
control: 
 
5000301       730 
 
In a RELAP input deck, it is possible to enter multiple versions of the same 
card.  If more than one version of the same card number is present, RELAP 
uses the last card version listed in the input deck.  Therefore, the additional 
RELAP input deck coding can be placed at the end of the RELAP input deck 
to preserve the integrity of the original plant model (i.e., it is not necessary to 
delete or modify coding in the original RELAP deck since all revisions needed 
to support ADS-IDAC can be placed at the end of the input file). 
 
4. Add interactive controls.  Based on a review of available plant procedures, operator 
behavior rules, training materials, and other similar data sources, the analyst should 
determine what plant control functions should be included in the RELAP thermal-
hydraulic model.  In general, any plant component that provides a substantial 
mitigative function following an abnormal event or an accident should be controllable 
by ADS-IDAC.  ADS-IDAC controls these RELAP components using the interactive 
control variables specified in cards 800 – 999.  Three possible control modes are 
available in ADS-IDAC: (1) setpoint adjustment for automatic control systems (e.g., 
set steam dump setpoint to the perceived steam header pressure), (2) changing 
component states (e.g., run/stop), and (3) fine adjustments to a component control 
position (e.g., changing throttle valve position).  Fine adjustments can be based on an 
absolute control demand (e.g., position a control valve to the 50% open position) or a 
relative demand (e.g., open a control valve an additional 10% from the current 
position).  In order to utilize any of these control modes, appropriate interactive 
control variables must be specified in the RELAP input deck and cross referenced in 
the RELAP_channels.txt input file (see Section 3).  When specifying interactive 
variables, it is important to note that the second word of each card is the default value 
of the variable.  The default value should be set to the normal full power value for the 
plant (nominal setpoints, control systems in automatic, standby systems aligned for 
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Setpoint control allows ADS-IDAC to change the controlling setpoint used in a 
RELAP automatic control system.  In this example, interactive variable 801 
enables control of the steam generator atmospheric relief valve (with a default 
setpoint of 1040 psia) and  interactive variable 802 enables control of the 
condenser steam dump system setpoint (with a default setpoint of 1020 psia):  
 
0000801 sgcporvp 1040.0   
0000802 stmdumpp 1020.0 
 
The control system description for each of these control systems (card series 
205xxxx00) would also need to be modified to use the new interactive variables 
to determine the control signal for the final actuating device. 
 
Component Operating State 
 
Operating state control (called “Control_Panel_Controller” in the 
ControlPanel.txt input file), provides simple state control for components.  These 
controls generally apply to binary state components (e.g., on/off, open/closed).  In 
this example, interactive variable 803 enables control of the reactor trip function 
while variable 804 enables control of the turbine trip function: 
 
0000803 scram  -1.0    
0000804 turbtrip -1.0      
 
Assuming the control system is designed such that the trips are activated when the 
variable value is greater than 0.0, these variables are initialized to a value less 
than zero to place the trip functions in standby. 
 
Fine Adjustment Control 
 
Fine adjustment control (called “Control_Panel_Fine_Adjust” in the 
ControlPanel.txt input file) provides a continuous range of possible control 
settings for the associated component.  This type of interactive variable is usually 
used to throttle or regulating valves.  In this example, interactive variable 805 is 
used to control the pressurizer spray valve while variable 806 is used to control 
the pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV): 
 
0000805 spray  -1.0     
0000806 pzrporv -1.0    
 
Both the spray valve and the PORV serve as the final actuating device of a 
pressure control system and can be operated in either automatic or manual mode.  
The initial value of -1.0 initially places the control system in automatic operation.  
When the variable value is equal to or greater than 0.0, the control system is 
placed in manual and the valve is positioned to a stem position equivalent to the 
RELAP Modeling Issues  September 20, 2009 K-76
variable (e.g., a variable value of 0.5 positions the valve in manual mode to 50% 
open). 
 
Once appropriate interactive control variables are specified, the analyst must link 
these variables into the thermal-hydraulic model by appropriate references in control 
variable, hydraulic volume, or heat structure descriptions.. 
 
5. Improve overall plant level control for normal operation and abnormal conditions.  
The RELAP thermal hydraulic program is generally used to perform accident 
analyses for nuclear power plants.  Consequently, components, equipment, and 
systems normally used during power operation are often omitted or simplistically 
modeled in the input deck.  For example, if a turbine model is included, the turbine 
load could be set at a full power value with no means available to adjust turbine load.  
Similarly, existing RELAP models for non-safety control systems such as makeup 
and letdown functions may not provide a sufficient range of flexibility to model an 
adequate range of operator interactions.  Therefore, the analyst should review the 
RELAP input deck and identify any features that need to be added to provide 
sufficient capability to model operator behaviors that might occur during power 
operation.  Typical examples include:  
 
 turbine generator load control 
 non-safety related interlocks or protective features (e.g., turbine runback) 
 charging/letdown system operation 
 nuclear reactivity control systems (e.g., control rods, emergency boration) 
 condenser steam dump control 
 
6. Activate the nuclear reactor core point kinetics model.  RELAP provides the two 
main methods to control the reactor power level: (1) specifying a time dependent 
power level using either a control variable or tabular input vale, or (2) calculating 
reactor power level based on a point kinetics model.  When the first method is used, a 
constant (and conservative) power level is used prior to actuation of a reactor trip.  
Following a reactor trip, reactor power follows a time dependent decay curve.  
Although this method provides relatively straightforward means to control reactor 
power level, the effects of important feedback mechanisms such as reactor coolant 
temperature changes and control rod motion cannot be easily modeled.  Activation of 
the point kinetics RELAP option allows better modeling of reactivity feedback 
mechanisms and provides a more realistic model of the plant response following an 
accident or control input.  In order to use the point kinetics model, it is necessary to 
locate the nuclear fuel heat structures in the input deck.  Heat structure components 
are used to model heat sources and sinks and can be found in the 1CCCGXNN card 
series7.  The heat source data cards (1CCCG701 – 1CCCG799) specify how the 
power output of the nuclear core will be determined.  The heat output can be 
                                                 
7 The numbering scheme for heat structure components is interpreted as follows: CCC refers to the  heat 
structure number, G refers to the geometry number and is used to identify different types of heat structures 
(such as fuel pins and core barrel), X is the card type and NN is the card number within a card type. 
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determine from a general table (card series 202TTT00), a control variable (card series 
202CCC00), or from the point kinetics model.   
 
If the point kinetics model will be used, the analyst is required to provide core 
kinetics data in the 30000000 card series of the input deck.  Parameters such the 
temperature and density reactivity coefficients, core power shaping factors, scram 
reactivity worth, and delayed neutron lifetimes can be adjusted within the RELAP 
model.  In order to improve model realism and stability, it is also recommended that 
the following system functions be added to the RELAP model: 
 
 Control rod reactivity 
 Emergency boron addition 
 Safety injection boron addition 
 
Each of these systems can be added by creating a control system (205CCC000 card 
series) to represent the amount of reactivity added by system actuation8.  The control 
system can then be linked to the point kinetics model in cards 30000011 – 30000020 
(control variable reactivity feedback).  It is also recommended that a temperature 
control system be developed to automatically add or subtract control rod reactivity to 
maintain the  reactor coolant system at the programmed value.   
 
The analyst should be aware that activation of the point kinetics model can result in 
unexpected stability issues.  If problems are encountered, the analyst should reduce 
the maximum allowable RELAP time step (cards 201-299) or ensure that sufficient 
negative reactivity is added following a plant scram or safety injection actuation.  
Increasing the scram rod worth or post safety injection boration will reduce the 
potential for a core restart event (and the associated model instability) due to reactor 
coolant system cooldown.      
 
 
7. Enhance existing system models to provide realistic controls, alarms, and indicators.  
In general, front line safety systems are modeled in existing RELAP input decks 
using only a time dependent junction at each fluid injection point.  For example, the 
high pressure safety injection system for a three loop pressurized water reactor is 
usually modeled using only three time dependent junctions to provide injection flow 
to each reactor coolant loop (Figure 10).  Although this modeling is often sufficient 
for the purposes of a deterministic safety analysis, the simple model lacks the major 
control elements, alarm functions, and indications found in the actual plant system.  
In order to improve the realism of the model, it is necessary to modify the system 
models to add multiple trains, control valves, and piping elements. 
 
                                                 
8 Although RELAP is capable of modeling boron concentration, it is not recommended that this option be 
used within the ADS-IDAC environment.  The effects of boron concentration changes and control rod 
motion can readily be modeled with control variables.  
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Figure 10, "Typical RELAP Mitigating System Model" 
 
The modified system model includes separate subsystem trains for each injection 
pump and realistically models potentially hydraulic dependencies for loop injection 
flow (Figure 11).  The benefits of the modified system model include:  
 
 Capability to independently control of multiple injection pump trains (time 
dependent junctions A and B) and individual loop flows (loop servo control 
valves).   
 More realistic representation of actual pump head/flow characteristics since 
the improved model more closely matches the actual plant configuration 
 Improved modeling of injection flow dependencies between the reactor 
coolant loops.  Since the injection flow is supplied from a common header 
(the common hydraulic volume), the improved model does not decouple the 
loop injection to one loop from the other loops (e.g., high injection flow to 
loop 1 will decrease injection flow to loops 2 and 3). 
 
Figure 11, "Modified ADS-IDAC Mitigating System Model" 
 
It is recommended that the analyst review the system level modeling for all front line 
safety systems in the existing RELAP input deck (e.g., high pressure safety injection, 
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modeling approach is used, the safety system models should be revised to more 
closely approximate the actual configuration of the system.    
 
8. Add support system dependencies.  In general, RELAP plant models focus do not 
include detailed models for support systems such as electrical power, cooling water, 
or lubricating oil.  These support system dependencies can be modeled by adding 
appropriate trip variables for key components.  For example, a loss of offsite 
electrical power can be modeled by setting up an interactive and trip variable that can 
be used to toggle the availability state of offsite power.  The trip variable for loss of 
power can then be referenced in the trip logic for individual components that would 
normally be lost following a loss of power.  Typical components powered from 
offsite power include reactor coolant pumps, turbine-generator auxiliaries, and 
condenser circulating water.  A similar procedure can be used for other support 
systems such as cooling water or lubricating oil.  In this manner, support system 
dependencies can be simulated without the need for developing a detailed system 
model. 
 
9. Create derived or unique control panel indicators.  ADS-IDAC includes capabilities 
to build control panel indicators for basic thermal hydraulic parameters such as 
pressure, temperature, and flow.  However indicators that are derived from basic 
parameters (e.g., average reactor coolant temperature or subcooling margin) or that 
rely on unique parameters must be added directly into the RELAP input deck.  A 
sampling of the unique parameters can be obtained from the RELAP plant model 
include: 
 
 ACVLIQ - liquid volume in the referenced accumulator tank, standpipe, and 
surge line. 
 VLVSTEM - ratio of the current valve stem position to the fully open valve 
stem position for the referenced motor and servo valves 
 HTCHF – critical heat flux for the referenced heat structure. 
 HTCHFR - critical hat flux ratio for the reference heat structure. 
 HTMODE - heat transfer mode number (i.e., heat transfer regime in effect) 
for the referenced heat structure. 
 RKRECPER - reciprocal reactor period (inverse seconds) calculated from the 
point kinetics model. 
 RKTPOW - total reactor power calculated from the point kinetics model. 
 
These unique control panel indicators are used by setting up a control variable 
capable of reading the parameter of interest.  For example, if hydraulic component 
350 is a servo valve, the following control variable can be used to indicate the valve 
position: 
 
*ctlvar      name       type    factor   init   f c   min    max 
20541500   "vlv_pos"    mult      1.0     0.0   0 3   0.0    1.0 
*ctlvar    variable name  parameter no. 
20541501      vlvstem          350 
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This control variable could be added to the ADS-IDAC control panel by referencing 
control variable 415 in the ControlPanel.txt input file (see Section 3 for additional 
information on this input file).       
 
A similar process is used to calculate derived parameters for the ADS-IDAC control 
panel.  The analyst should aware that parameters obtained directly form the RELAP 
model will be in SI units.  Therefore, it will be necessary to adjust the control variable 
output if British parameter units will be used.  For example, the following control 
variables can be used to calculate the average fluid temperature of hydraulic volumes 
150, 250, and 350 in degrees Kelvin and Fahrenheit: 
 
*ctlvar      name       type    factor   init   f c   min    max 
20529000  "avgTempK"     sum    0.333    550.0  1 0  
*ctlvar    constant  scale   variable name  parameter no. 
20529001     0.0      1.0       tempf         150010000 
20529002              1.0       tempf         250010000 
20529003              1.0       tempf         350010000     
 
*ctlvar      name       type    factor   init   f c   min    max 
20529100  "avgTempF"     sum     1.0     530.0  1 0  
*ctlvar    constant  scale   variable name  parameter no. 
20529101   -459.7     1.8      cntrlvar         290 
 
Control variable 290 calculates the average of the fluid temperatures in the three 
hydraulic volumes.  Because the tempf function returns the fluid temperature in SI 
units, the output for control variable will be in degrees K.  Control variable 291 is 
used to convert the output from control variable 290 to degrees F.    
 
10. Expanded trips.  Trips are Boolean variables provide alarm functions, activate safety 
systems, and support control system operation.  RELAP provides two types of trip 
devices – variable trips and logical trips.  Variable trips change state when a target 
parameter exceeds a preset threshold.  Logical trips are used to combine two or more 
variable and logical trips to build a logical expression using Boolean operators.  
Although RELAP provides fixed number of variable and logical trips, the maximum 
number of available trip variables can be increased when an expanded trip option is 
selected.  When the default option is used (i.e., the expanded option is not used), 
variable trips must be specified in cards 401-599 and logical trips in cards 601-799.  
Therefore, the default option provides a maximum of 199 variable trips and 199 
logical trips.  Unfortunately, this number of trip variable might be insufficient to 
adequately model the reactor plant for use with ADS-IDAC.  If this occurs, the 
analyst should consider the use of the expanded trip option by entering the word 
“expanded” on input card 20600000.  The expanded option changes the variable trip 
card range to 20600010-20610000 and the logical trip range to 20610010-20620000.  
The expanded option increases the number of available variable and logical trips up 
to a maximum of 1000, each.  Transitioning the input deck from the default to 
expanded trip options will require that all existing trips be renumbered in expanded 
trip format: 
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 Add the following card to the RELAP input deck to activate the expanded 
option: 
 
  20600000 expanded 
 
 If the developers of the original RELAP deck entered trip variable card 
numbers using an eight digit format (e.g., trip 450 is entered in card 
00000450), the transition to an expanded format only requires that 
replacement of the first four digits of the card number with the three digit 
prefix “206” and the addition of a trailing zero.  For example: 
 
 
In this case, the designation of the variable trip remains the same under when 
expanded numbering is used.  When transitioning to expanded format, 
references to the variable trip number do not need to be revised elsewhere in 
the input deck (i.e., the default variable trip 450 is still trip 450 when the 
expanded option is chosen).  All variable trip cards (card numbers 401-599) 




 Modification of logical trips is more complicated because the trip number 
needs to be revised when the expanded option is selected.  Specifically, all 
expanded logical trips numbers must fall in the range 1001 – 2000.  Because 
the default option requires logical trips to be numbered from 601 – 799, the 
default trip numbers will no longer be valid logical trips under the expanded 
option.  The easiest way to transition logical trips is to add 1000 to the default 
logical trip number (i.e., logical trip 650 will become trip 1650 in the 
expanded format): 
 
Unfortunately, it will also be necessary to change every reference to the 
default logical trip throughout the RELAP input deck to reflect the new trip 
number.  Although a simple word search can be conducted to facilitate these 
modifications, the analyst should be aware of the following: 
 
 A three digit integer in the RELAP input deck can refer to either a 
control variable or a trip variable.  Only logical trip variables should 
be changed or unexpected errors will occur.  Therefore, the analyst 
00000650 
Default Card Number 
20616500 
Expanded  Card Number 
00000450 
Default Card Number 
20604500 
Expanded  Card Number 
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should carefully review the context that trip number is used to ensure 
that the correct variable type is being changed. 
 
 Trips can be referenced either by its integer trip number or by its 
complement.  Thus, if default logical trip 650 was used in the original 
input deck, the analyst should change all references to trip “650” to 
“1650” and all references to its complementary trip “-650” to “-1650”. 
 
The expanded option should provide a sufficient number of variable and logical trips 
to adequately represent even complex reactor plant models.   
 
11. Time step control.  The RELAP end time limit and time step is controlled by input 
cards 201-299.   The RELAP end time limit should be set to a value greater than the 
ADS-IDAC sequence truncation time to prevent RELAP from prematurely 
terminating the simulation.  The maximum time step should be set to the highest 
value that permits stable model behavior.  If the RELAP model runs slowly, the 
maximum time step can be increased or a different time step control option can be 
selected (e.g., implicit or nearly implicit time step control). 
 
 


















Section 3: ADS-IDAC File Structure 
ADS-IDAC File Structure  September 20, 2009 K-84
 
 










ADSIDACrew Directory – Contains ADS-IDAC C++ Source Code 
RELAP5 Directory – Contains RELAP Fortran Source Code 
ADSConsole2.exe – Executable version of ADS-IDAC 
relap_plant_model.i – RELAP plant model input deck 
err message.txt – error message log file 
ZiniADS.txt – ADS-IDAC initialization input file (see Section 3) 
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ADS-IDAC File Structure 
 
ADS-IDAC is supported by a relatively complex input file structure.  The various input 
files provide data associated with the nuclear plant model, operator knowledge bases, and 
program executive control (e.g., branching and sequence truncation rules) needed for 
code execution.  ADS-IDAC input files are described in detail in Section 4.  The results 
of an ADS-IDAC simulation are summarized in several output files.  These files provide 
data about nuclear plant thermal-hydraulic behavior, operator cognitive decision-making, 
and information required to reconstruct the dynamic event tree structure.  A narrative 
summary of each sequence is also provided.  The remainder of this section describes the 





Three general categories of output files are generated by ADS-IDAC: event sequence 
descriptions, key parameter data files, and branch information.  The output files are all 
written in plain text file format and can be imported into a third party program such as 
MS Excel for data analysis and visualization. The output files are located in the following 
file folders within the output file directory (see Figure 12): 
 
ES File Folder 
 
 ESFolder_folder_number:   The end state (ES) output is arranged into individual file 
folders.  ADS-IDAC limits the number of individual files within an output folder to 
less than 1000 files.  Therefore, if more than 1000 output files are generated by a 
simulation, additional ESFolders are created to store the data.  The first 1000 output 
files are stored in ESFolder_0, the seconds 1000 files are stored in ESFolder_1, and 
so on.  For each end state generated during the simulation, a unique 
ZESNode_endstate_number.txt file is placed in the appropriate ESFolder to provide 
a detailed description of the sequence end state. 
 
 ES_summary.txt – Summarizes all sequences associated with the simulation.  For 
each sequence, the sequence length, probability, and termination criteria are specified. 
 
 Procedure step.txt – Summarizes data associated with the ADS-IDAC procedure step 
skipping module.  Output data includes: 
i. Time 
ii. Operator 
iii. Procedure and step number 
iv. Action 
v. Relevance of action to operator’s situational assessment 
vi. Time Constraint Loading for the associated operator 
vii. Dynamic factors associated with step skipping model 
viii. Static factors associated with step skipping model 
ix. Probability of skipping associated step action (error of omission) 
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The ADS-IDAC step skipping model is described in Section 4, “Procedures.txt”. 
 
 Scan data.txt – Summarizes the data associated with the ADS-IDAC control panel 
scanning module.  Output data includes: 
i. Time 
ii. Operator 
iii. Size of the associated operator’s scan queue (i.e., the total number of control 
panel items scanned) 
iv. Contents of the operator’s scan queue (i.e., specific alarms, components, and 
parameters included in the control panel scan) 
The control panel scanning model is described in Section 4, 
“KB_AOT_Scanned_Parameters.txt”. 
 
 Scenario info.txt – Provides a detailed description of all sequences, including all 
branching points and associated events. 
 
KPS File Folder 
 
KPSFolder_folder_number:   The key parameter state (KPS) output is arranged into 
individual file folders.  ADS-IDAC limits the number of individual files within an output 
folder to less than 1000 files.  Therefore, if more than 1000 output files are generated by 
a simulation, additional KPSFolders are created to store the data.  The first 1000 output 
files are stored in KPSFolder_0, the seconds 1000 files are stored in KPSFolder_1, and so 
on.  For each sequence, the following output files are created:   
 
 ZDIA_sequence_number.txt – For each operator, provides the output from the 
diagnostic engine.  Output consists of a time history of the diagnosis event confidence 
level for each operator. 
 ZKPS_sequence_number.txt – Provides a time history of all indicators specified in 
the ControlPanel.txt input file. 
 ZPIF_sequence_number.txt – For each operator, provides a time history of the 
dynamic PIF values for system criticality, time constrained loading, and information 
loading. 
 
PE File Folder 
 
PEFolder_folder_number:  The pivotal event (PE) output is arranged into individual file 
folders.  A sequence consists of a series of connected PE nodes.  Similar to the KPS file 
folder, ADS-IDAC limits the number of individual files within an output folder to less 
than 1000 files.  Therefore, if more than 1000 output files are generated by a simulation, 
additional PEFolders are created to store the data.  The first 1000 output files are stored 
in PEFolder_0, the seconds 1000 files are stored in PEFolder_1, and so on.  The 
collection of PENode data files provides sufficient information to reconstruct the DDET 
for the simulation.  For each PE node, the following output file is created: 
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 ZPENODE_node_number.txt – Specifies the type of branch event, the time of the 
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The Action Taker fulfills the role of reactor operator within the nuclear plant control 
room environment.  All crew interactions with the reactor plant model are executed by 
the Action Taker through use of the appropriate control panel indicators, alarms, and 
controls.  The Action Taker generally follows the direction of the Decision Maker, but 
may independently execute certain skill-based memorized actions.  Typical self-directed 
Action Taker activities include control of auxiliary feed water following a reactor trip, 
initiation of reactor trip or safety injection signals during degraded plant conditions, and 
control panel monitoring in response to plant alarms.  Although the Action Taker 
decision-making processes include goal and strategy selection, these processes generally 
follow the direction of the Decision Maker (e.g., the Action Taker will set their high level 
goal equal to the Decision Maker’s goal).  These input files, in conjunction with the 
procedure step input files, constitute the knowledge base for the Action Taker.  The 






















The “ActionTaker.txt” input file is used to specify certain static behavior factors 
that shape operator behavior.  These factors are generally associated with operator 
tendencies to pursue certain goals and strategies, the use of perceived information, 
and the time required to perform activities.  This file also specifies several factors 
that influence the generation of branching events for step skipping and goal 
selection. 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
Action_Taker     number 
action_time_multiplier              time_multiplier 
confidence_level_for_acting_HWKB   minimum_confidence 
use_memorized_info                 
 information_branch_probability 
initial_scan_queue_limit  scan_queue_limit 
lower_info_load_threshold           info_lower_threshold 
upper_info_load_threshold           info_upper_threshold 
alarm_update_time    double_1 double_2
 double_3 
component_update_time   double_1 double_2
 double_3 
parameter_update_time   double_1 double_2
 double_3 
skip_action_threshold          skip_action_threshold 
skip_non_response_threshold         skip_non_response_threshold 
abnormal_signal_threshold     abnormal_threshold 
mental_proc_priority_threshold      priority_threshold 






3. Input Description 
 
number: Format: Integer.  Formally used to identify number of operator behavior 
factors included in input file.  This parameter is not used in current version of 
ADS-IDAC - enter a dummy integer value (e.g., “1”). 
 
time_multiplier: Format: Double.  Range:   > 0.0.  This parameter used to 
proportionally adjust the operator execution time for communication, action, and 
decision-making activities.  The action time multiplier is uniformly applied to all 
operator activities.  A factor of 2.0 doubles the activity execution time compared 
to the baseline time while a factor of 0.5 reduces the activity execution time by a 
factor of ½.  No dynamic event tree branches are generated by this parameter.   
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minimum_confidence: Format: Double.  Range: 0.0 – 1.0.   This parameter is not 
used in the current version of ADS-IDAC – enter a dummy double value (e.g., 
0.0).  The confidence level for activating operator hard wired diagnoses is 
specified in the HardwiredDiagnosis.txt input file within the operator knowledge 
base. 
 
information_branch_probability: Format: Double.  Range: 0.0 – 1.0.  This 
parameter establishes the branching probability for enabling the operator’s use of 
previously perceived (and memorized) plant data.  When the use of memorized 
information is enabled, the operator will use of memorized information (if 
available and current) to address data requirements of procedure expectations and 
knowledge-based action prerequisites.  When the use of memorized information is 
blocked, the operator will always obtain current information from the plant 
control panel.  The use of memorized information can reduce activity execution 
time but may result in the use of outdated and incorrect information.   For values 
greater than 0.999999, the use of memorized information is always enables.  For 
values less than 0.000001, the use of memorized information will always be 
blocked (i.e., the operator will always obtain recent information form the control 
panel when evaluating procedural expectations or knowledge-based action 
prerequisites).  Intermediate values will cause a branching point to be generated 
early in the simulation where one branch enables the use of memorized 
information (with the branching probability set to the input value) and a second 
branch blocks the use of memorized information (with the branching probability 
set to the complement of the input value).  Even when the use of memorized 
information is enabled, the operator may block the use of previously perceived 
information if it is not recent.  The criteria used to judge the recency of plant data 
is established in the alarm, component, and parameter update time input 
parameters. 
 
scan_queue_limit:  Format: Integer.  Range > 0.  This parameter sets the limit 
of the maximum number of parameters that may be placed in the operator’s scan 
queue.  The operator periodically updates the memorized values of parameters 
contained in the scan queue with recent information from the control panel.  A 
higher scan queue limit will allow the operator to monitor more parameters and 
obtain an improved situational assessment of the plant state.  Setting a lower scan 
queue limit reduces the number of parameters that can be periodically monitored 
and allows the analyst to simulate the operator’s information processing and short 
term memory limitations.  The actual scan queue limit is dynamically adjusted 
during the simulation and may be less than this input value due to the influence of 
certain performance influencing factors.  When the size of the scan queue exceeds 
the dynamic limit, low priority parameters are removed form the queue until the 
size limitation is met.  
 
info_lower_threshold: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  The lower and upper 
information load thresholds are used to calculate the value of the information load 
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performance influencing factor.   The information load PIF is based on the 
operator’s average information processing rate.  When the information processing 
rate is less than the lower threshold, the PIF value is set to 0.0.  When the average 
information processing rate is greater than the upper threshold, the PIF value is set 
to 10.0.  The PIF value for intermediate information processing rates is calculated 
from a linear interpolation between the lower and upper thresholds.  A higher PIF 
value represents a greater operator information load.  The information load 
threshold values can be adjusted to represent the operator’s information 
processing capability.  
 
 
Figure 15, "Information Load PIF" 
 
info_upper_threshold: Format: Integer.  Range > info_lower_threshold.  In 
conjunction with the lower information loading threshold and the operator’s 
average information processing rate, this parameter is used to calculate the 
information load PIF value.  See “info_lower_threshold” for additional 
information. 
 
“alarm_update_time”: Format: double, double, double.  Range: all values > 0.0.  
These parameters establish the recency criteria used by the operator when the use 
of memorized information is enabled.  A three parameter Weibull distribution is 
used to describe the probability distribution for the use of old alarm state 
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 (Equation 1) 
 
Where: 
   double_1 = u (minimum time), seconds 
   double_2 = α parameter 
double_3 = β parameter 
 
When the use of memorized information is enabled, the operator will check to 
determine if the alarm state required to evaluate a procedural expectation of 
knowledge-based action prerequisite has been previously perceived.  If the alarm 
state has been perceived, a Monte Carlo simulation is used to calculate an alarm 
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the alarm update time obtained from the Monte Carlo simulation, the operator will 
use the memorized information.  If the age of the perceived alarm state is greater 
than the alarm update time, the operator will obtain the current alarm state from 
the control panel.   This parameter can be used to prevent the operator for utilizing 
unacceptably old information. 
 
“component_update_time”: Format: double, double, double.  Range: all values 
> 0.0.  These parameters establish the recency criteria used by the operator when 
the use of memorized information is enabled.  A three parameter Weibull 
distribution is used to describe the probability distribution for the use of old 
component state information.  The Weibull distribution is given by equation (1).  
When the use of memorized information is enabled, the operator will check to 
determine if the component state required to evaluate a procedural expectation of 
knowledge-based action prerequisite has been perceived by the operator.  If the 
component state has been perceived, a Monte Carlo simulation is used to calculate 
a component state update time from equation (1).  If the age of the perceived 
alarm state is less than the component state update time obtained from the Monte 
Carlo simulation, the operator will use the memorized information.  If the age of 
the perceived component state is greater than the alarm update time, the operator 
will obtain the current component state from the control panel.   This parameter 
can be used to prevent the operator for utilizing unacceptably old information. 
 
“parameter_update_time”: Format: double, double, double.  Range: all values > 
0.0.  These parameters establish the recency criteria used by the operator when the 
use of memorized information is enabled.  A three parameter Weibull distribution 
is used to describe the probability distribution for the use of old parameter value 
information.  The Weibull distribution is given by equation (1).  When the use of 
memorized information is enabled, the operator will check to determine if the 
parameter required to evaluate a procedural expectation of knowledge-based 
action prerequisite has been perceived by the operator.  If the parameter has been 
perceived, a Monte Carlo simulation is used to calculate a parameter update time 
from equation (1).  If the age of the perceived parameter is less than the parameter 
update time obtained from the Monte Carlo simulation, the operator will use the 
memorized information.  If the age of the perceived parameter is greater than the 
parameter update time, the operator will obtain the current parameter value from 
the control panel.   This parameter can be used to prevent the operator for utilizing 
unacceptably old information. 
 
skip_action_threshold: Format: double.  Range: 0.0 – 1.0.  This skip action 
threshold sets the minimum probability for generating a branching point for 
skipping a procedural step.  Procedural steps in ADS-IDAC have three main 
components: (1) initial action activity, (2) expectations associated with the initial 
action activity, and (3) a non-response action that is executed if the action 
expectations are not met.  The operator may skip either the initial action activity 
or the non-response action (evaluation of the action expectations cannot be 
skipped).  The probability of skipping the initial action or non-response action is 
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dynamically calculated based upon the baseline skip probability for the step 
component (specified in the procedure step input file), the type of procedure being 
followed, the step objectives, the relevance of the action to the operator’s 
situational assessment, and certain PIFs.  If the calculated skip probability for the 
initial action activity exceeds the skip action threshold, a branching point with 
two branches is generated.  The procedure step initial action activity and 
associated expectation evaluation are skipped for skipped step branching path, 
while the step is executed on the complimentary branching path.   The branching 
probability for the step skipping branch is set equal to the calculated branch 
probability and the branch probability for execution of the step is equal to the 
complement of the skip probability.  If the calculated skip probability is less than 
the skip action threshold, the associated action is executed and no branching point 
is generated.  The analyst can reduce the excessive generation of procedure step 
skipping branches by setting the skip action threshold to a higher value.  Setting 
this parameter equal to 1.0 will prevent the operator from skipping procedural 
actions (i.e., all procedure initial action activities are executed). 
 
skip_non_response_threshold: Format: double.  Range: 0.0 – 1.0.  This skip 
non-response action threshold sets the minimum probability for generating a 
branching point for skipping a non-response action in a procedure step.  
Procedural steps in ADS-IDAC have three main components: (1) initial action 
activity, (2) expectations associated with the initial action activity, and (3) a non-
response action that is executed if the action expectations are not met.  The 
operator may skip either the initial action activity or the non-response action 
(evaluation of the action expectations cannot be skipped).  The probability of 
skipping the initial action or non-response action is dynamically calculated based 
upon the baseline skip probability for the step component (specified in the 
procedure step input file), the type of procedure being followed, the step 
objectives, the relevance of the action to the operator’s situational assessment, and 
certain PIFs.  If the calculated skip probability for the non-response action 
exceeds the skip non-response action threshold, a branching point with two 
branches is generated.  The procedure step non-response action is skipped (if the 
initial action activity expectations are not met) on the skipped step branching 
path, while the non-response action is executed on the complimentary branching 
path.   The branching probability for the non-response action skipping branch is 
set equal to the calculated branch probability and the branch probability for 
execution of the non-response action is equal to the complement of the skip 
probability.  If the calculated skip probability is less than the skip non-response 
action threshold, the associated non-response action is executed (if the initial 
action activity expectations are not met) and no branching point is generated.  The 
analyst can reduce the excessive generation of procedure step skipping branches 
by setting the skip non-response action threshold to a higher value.  Setting this 
parameter equal to 1.0 will prevent the operator from skipping non-response 
actions (i.e., all procedure initial action activities are executed). 
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abnormal_threshold: Format: double.  Range: 0.0 – 1.0.  This parameter 
establishes the diagnostic threshold for an abnormal condition.   The ADS-IDAC 
model includes a fuzzy logic diagnostic engine that supports the operator’s 
situational assessment of the plant state.  The parameters used in the diagnostic 
engine are described in the “KB_OAT(ODM)_Event_Matrix.txt” input file.  
Three major classes of plant events are included in the diagnostic process: (1) 
normal operating events, (2) anticipated operational occurrences, and (3) design 
basis accidents.  Based on the information perceived by the operator, the 
diagnostic engine calculates a membership value for each possible diagnostic 
event.  These membership values range from 0.0 to 1.0 and represent the degree 
of matching between the event symptoms and the symptoms that have been 
perceived by the operator.  Each time step, ADS-IDAC calculates the maximum 
membership value of all events within the anticipated operational occurrence and 
design basis event categories.  If this maximum membership value exceeds the 
abnormal signal threshold, the operator will conclude that an abnormal condition 
exists (depending on the current high level operator goal state).  The abnormal 
condition diagnosis is not reset once an abnormal condition has been detected.  
This parameter effectively establishes the operator’s sensitivity to detecting an 
abnormal event.  If the parameter is set to a high value, the operator will require 
more information to support an abnormal condition diagnosis.  A lower value 
reduces the information requirements for detecting an abnormal condition, but 
might result in the operator reaching a “false positive” conclusion for an abnormal 
event.  Following the diagnosis of an abnormal event, the operator will suspend 
the execution of all low priority mental procedures.  The diagnosis of an abnormal 
condition also influences the goal selection process.  
 
priority_threshold: Format: Integer. Range: > 0.  Following the identification 
of an abnormal condition (based on the abnormal signal threshold and diagnostic 
engine) or a reactor trip, the operator will suspend all low priority mental 
procedures.  The priority of a mental procedure is specified in the 
“HardWiredDiagnosis.txt” input file and is represented by an integer value of 1 or 
greater.  High priority procedures are associated with a low priority value (i.e., the 
highest priority procedures have a priority value of “1”).  Once an abnormal 
condition has been detected, the operator suspends the execution of all mental 
procedures will a lower priority level than the specified threshold value (i.e., 
procedures with a priority value higher than the threshold).  For example, if the 
priority threshold is set at 2, all mental procedures with a priority value of 3 or 
greater will be suspended.   The purpose of this parameter is to allow the operator 
to interrupt mental procedures that are no longer appropriate following a reactor 
trip or during an accident event.  Because the abnormal condition diagnosis is not 
reset, the suspension of low priority mental procedures can occur only once 
during an accident sequence.  Thus, low priority mental procedures that are 
activated following the initial diagnosis of a reactor trip9 or abnormal event are 
not automatically suspended and may be executed.  
                                                 
9 The diagnosis of a reactor trip is controlled by the activation of the mental belief “Reactor_Trip” in the 
HardWiredDiagnsois.txt input file.  
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communication_time: Format: double. Range: > 0.0.  Certain crew activities 
require coordination and communication between the control room operators.   
For example, only the Decision Maker can direct the performance of 
proceduralized actions and only the Action Taker can manipulate the control 
panel.  Therefore, the execution of a procedure step requires the Decision Maker 
to direct the Action Taker to perform the specified action followed by a report 
from the Action Taker to the Decision Maker that the action had been 
accomplished.  The time required to perform inter-crew communication is 
established by the nominal communication time parameter.  The parameter 
establishes the communication delay time (in seconds) and is controlled by the 
sender of the information.  
 
troubleshooting_branch_probability: Format: double.  Range: 0.0 – 1.0.  
The troubleshooting probability sets the branching probability for activating the 
troubleshooting goal.  If the value is greater than 0.999999, the operator will 
always activate the troubleshooting goal if the normal operation goal10 is no 
longer appropriate.  If the value is less than 0.000001, the operator will bypass the 
troubleshooting goal and always activate the monitoring goal when the normal 
operation goal is no longer appropriate.  For intermediate values, a branching 
point will be generated with two operator goal branches.  One branch will activate 
the troubleshooting goal with a branch probability equal to the troubleshooting 
probability.  The other branch will activate the monitoring goal with a 
complimentary branching probability.  When the troubleshooting goal is 
activated, the crew can implement knowledge-based actions to address the 
abnormal condition.  This parameter is currently implemented only for the 
Decision Maker.  A dummy value should be entered for the Action Taker. 
 
procedure_use_branch_probability: Format: double.  Range: 0.0 – 1.0.  The 
procedure use probability sets the branching probability for enabling a transition 
from the troubleshooting goal to the “maintain global safety” goal upon the 
identification of a reactor trip condition.  If this value is greater than 0.999999, the 
operator will always transition from the troubleshooting goal to the “maintain 
global safety” goal following the identification of a reactor trip condition.  If this 
value is less than 0.000001, the goal transition from troubleshooting to “maintain 
global safety” margin is blocked.  For intermediate values, a branching point will 
be generated with two operator goal branches.  One branch will activate the 
transition from the troubleshooting goal to the “maintain global safety margin” 
goal with a branch probability equal to the troubleshooting probability.  The other 
branch will block the transition to the “maintain global safety margin” goal.  
Effectively, this parameter allows the crew to transition from a knowledge-based 
approach to accident mitigation to a procedure following approach.  This 
parameter is currently implemented only for the Decision Maker.  A dummy 
value should be entered for the Action Taker. 
                                                 
10 The normal operation goal is activated when the mental belief “Normal_Operation” in the 
HardWiredDiagnosis.txt input is activated. 
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4. Sample Input 
 
Action_Taker 16 
action_time_multiplier              1.0 
confidence_level_for_acting_HWKB   0.80 
use_memorized_info                  0.0 
initial_scan_queue_limit  30 
lower_info_load_threshold           0.0 
upper_info_load_threshold           250.0 
alarm_update_time    100.0 1.0 1.0 
component_update_time   100.0 1.0 1.0 
parameter_update_time   100.0 1.0 1.0 
skip_action_threshold               1.0 
skip_non_response_threshold         1.0 
abnormal_signal_threshold     0.4 
mental_proc_priority_threshold      2 
nominal_communication_time          1.0 
troubleshooting_probability  0.0 
procedure_use_probability  0.5 
 







The purpose of the “KB_AOT_Bias_Factors.txt” is to allow the analyst to 
simulate failed control panel instrumentation.  In general, when an operator 
perceives the value of a plant indicator, the actual value of the parameter is 
obtained directly from the RELAP thermal-hydraulic model.  In order to simulate 
a failed indicator, it is necessary to apply a bias factor to the RELAP generated 
data in order to model an instrument failure.  Several indicator failure options are 
available, including additive errors, proportional errors, stuck instrumentation, 
and instruments that cannot read above or below a set threshold.  When a 
parameter is biased in this manner, the operator may use inaccurate data when 
assessing the procedure step expectations, knowledge-based action prerequisites, 
and activation criteria for hard wired mental beliefs. 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
Number_of_biased_parameters  number_parameters 






3. Input Description 
 
number_parameters:  Format: Integer.  Range > 0.  Parameter used to set the 
number of biased parameters that are included in the input file.  If the value is set 
to 0, the reminder of the input file is ignored.  If the value is greater than 0, an 
input data line (consisting of a string, double_1, integer, and double_2) must exist 
for each biased parameter.  For example, if the number of biased parameters is 
equal to five, at least five data input lines must be supplied or an error will be 
generated during input file processing.   
 
parameter_name – Format: string.  Contains the name of the parameter to be 
biased.  The parameter name must match a control panel parameter listed in the 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Spaces must not be used in the parameter_name 
(the underbar character “_” may be substituted for a space when needed). 
 
activation_time – Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the activation time 
for parameter bias factor.  If the simulation time is less than the activation time, 
the parameter is unbiased and the operator will perceive the actual parameter 
value when the component is read from the control panel.  If the simulation time 
is greater than the activation time, the parameter will be biased by the specified 
bias factor.  The activation time must be greater than or equal to 0.0. 
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option_code – Format: Integer.  Range: 3006, 3007, 3008, 3009, 3010, 3111, or 
3112. Specifies the type of parameter bias to be applied to the perceived data.  An 
integer code is used to specify the bias type.  The following biasing categories are 
currently supported: 
 
3006 (Integer code for “VGT”):  The perceived parameter value will 
always be greater than the value specified by the bias_factor.  If the actual 
parameter value is greater than the bias_factor, the actual parameter value 
will be perceived by the operator.  If the actual parameter value is less 
than the bias_factor, the operator will perceive the parameter as equal to 
the bias_factor.  This option can be used to model an indicator that will 
not read below a threshold value. 
 
3007 (Integer code for “VGE”):  The perceived parameter value will 
always be greater than or equal to the value specified by the bias_factor.  
If the actual parameter value is greater than or equal to the bias_factor, the 
actual parameter value will be perceived by the operator.  If the actual 
parameter value is less than the bias_factor, the operator will perceive the 
parameter as equal to the bias_factor.  This option has a similar effect as 
the “3006” option. 
 
3008 (Integer code for “VEQ”): The operator will always perceive the 
parameter as equal to the bias_factor.  This option can be used to model 
an indicator that is stuck at a constant value. 
 
3009 (Integer code for “VLE”): The perceived parameter value will 
always be less than or equal to the value specified by the bias_factor.  If 
the actual parameter value is less than or equal to the bias_factor, the 
actual parameter value will be perceived by the operator.  If the actual 
parameter value is greater than the bias_factor, the operator will perceive 
the parameter as equal to the bias_factor.  This option can be used to 
model an indicator that will not read above a threshold value.   
 
3010 (Integer code for “VLT”): The perceived parameter value will 
always be less than the value specified by the bias_factor.  If the actual 
parameter value is less than the bias_factor, the actual parameter value 
will be perceived by the operator.  If the actual parameter value is greater 
than the bias_factor, the operator will perceive the parameter as equal to 
the bias_factor. This option has a similar effect as the “3009” option.   
 
3111 (Integer code for “VPROPORTIONAL”):  The perceived parameter 
is equal to the actual parameter reading multiplied by the bias_factor.  For 
example, to model an indicator that consistently reads 10% too high, the 
bias_factor would be set to 1.10.  This option can be used to model an 
indicator that has a constant proportional error.  
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3112 (Integer code for “VADDITIVE”):  The perceived parameter value is 
equal to sum of the actual parameter value and the value of the 
bias_factor.  This option can be used to model an indicator that has a 
constant offset bias. 
 
bias_factor –  Format: Double.  Range: Consistent with indicator output.  
Specifies the bias factor that will be applied to the perceived parameter based on 
the bias option specified by the analyst.  The analyst should ensure that the bias 
factor value and units are consistent with the normal output range for the 
associated indicator.  
 
Input data lines are repeated until the bias factors for each desired parameter are 
specified. 
 




SG_A_WR_Level  0.0 3007  0.16 
SG_C_WR_Level  100.0 3112  0.15 
 
     _____________________ 
 
The above example specifies two types on bias factors.  In the case of the 
“SG_A_WR_Level” parameter, beginning at the start of the simulation (activation 
time equals 0.0 seconds), the SG A wide range level indicator will read no lower 
than 0.16 (16%).  Thus, when the parameter is greater than 0.16, the actual value 
will be perceived, but when the actual value is less than 0.16, the operator will 
perceive a value of 0.16.  For the case of “SG_C_WR_Level”, a constant bias 
offset of 0.15 is added to the actual parameter value when the simulation time 
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Diagnosis actions are used to implement the knowledge-based problem solving 
approach when the control room crew is implementing the “troubleshooting” 
goal.  Diagnostic actions are grouped within functional areas that are aligned with 
the imbalance events described in the “KB_OAT_Event_Matrix.txt” file.  
Because many possible actions may be available to address a specific imbalance 
event, each diagnosis action is assigned a priority level and a set of prerequisite 
conditions.  Diagnosis actions can only be implemented if the specified 
prerequisite conditions with higher priority actions are executed prior to low 
priority actions.  In the current version of ADS-IDAC, all knowledge-based 
actions are initiated by the Decision Maker; therefore the diagnosis action file for 
the Action Taker does not affect the simulation.  However, the ADS-IDAC has 
been written to allow for a later upgrade to implement Action Taker initiated 
knowledge-based actions.  Consequently, the input file 
“KB_OAT_Diagnosis_Actions.txt” must be included in the code input.  Until the 
initiation of knowledge-based actions is fully implemented for the Action Taker, 
it is recommended that no diagnoses actions by specified in this input file.  
Diagnosis actions have been fully implemented for the Decision Maker and may 
included in the “KB_ODM_Diagnosis_Actions.txt” input file. 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
number_of_diagnoses  number_of_diagnoses 
 
3. Input Description 
 
number_of_diagnoses: Format: Integer. Range: > 0.  This parameter specifies the 
number of diagnosis event categories used for knowledge-based actions.  This 
parameter must equal the actual number of symptoms entered in this file.  
Diagnosis actions have not been fully implemented for the Action Taker.  
Therefore, the input parameters in this file do not impact the simulation.  
However, an input error will be generated if this file is not present.  Therefore, for 
the Action Taker, it is recommended to set this parameter to 0.   
 
See “KB_ODM_Diagnosis_Actions.txt” for additional information on specifying 
knowledge-based diagnostic actions. 
 
4. Sample Input 
 
 number_of_diagnoses  0







The purpose of input file KB_OAT_Event_Matrix.txt is to specify the symptoms 
and events that are used to generate diagnostic results.  The input file consists of a 
listing of symptoms used to support event diagnosis and a relationship value 
matrix that provides the linkage between symptoms and events.  Four general 
types of event types are used in ADS_IDAC: normal operating events (“normal”), 
anticipated operational occurrences (“AOO”), design basis accidents (“DBA”), 
and mass, energy, or momentum flow imbalances (“Imbalance”).  Normal 
operating events refer to conditions normally experienced during power operation 
(e.g., load changes) and instrument failures.  Anticipated operational occurrences 
are abnormal events that are expected to occur during the life span of the facility 
but are not expected to cause fuel damage.  Design basis accidents are more 
serious events that are not normally expected to occur, but may result in some fuel 
damage.  Imbalance events are used to support knowledge-based problem solving 
by identifying high level plant functions that are not in an equilibrium state.  
Because the diagnostic engine uses a fuzzy logic inference approach, the 
relationship values that link symptoms and events should be viewed as set 
membership values rather than a strict confidence level or subjective probability.    
 










Number_of_Events  num_events 
event_name_1 type_1 value_11 value_12 ...
 value_1n 
event_name_2 type_2 value_21 value_22 ...
 value_2n 
.  .  .  .   . 
.  .  .  .   .  
.  .  .  .   . 
event_name_m type_m value_m1 value_m2 ...
 value_mn 
 
3. Input Description 
 
num_symptoms: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  This parameter specifies the 
number of event symptoms used in the fuzzy logic diagnostic engine.  This 
parameter must equal the actual number of symptoms entered in this file. 
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symptom_i: Format: String.  Range: not applicable.  This parameter specifies the 
symptom name used to support the diagnostic engine.  Enter only one symptom 
name per line and ensure the number of symptoms equals num_symptoms or an 
error will be generated during input file processing.  The symptom name must 
exactly match a mental belief entered into the “HardWired_Diagnosis.txt” input 
file.  The symptom name must not contain the space character (use the underbar 
character (“_”) rather than a space when needed). 
 
num_events:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.   This parameter specifies the number 
of events that are included in the diagnostic process.  This parameter must equal 
the number of event data rows entered in this input file.  Each event data row 
consists of the event name (event_i), the event type (type_i), and a set of 
relationship values (value_ij) that establishes the linkage between the event and 
each symptom.  Each event data row must include exactly num_symptoms 
relationship values. 
 
event_name_i:  Format: String.  Range: any.  This parameter specifies the event 
name.  Spaces must not be used (use the underbar character (“_”) rather than a 
space when needed.  For imbalance events, an event data row must be entered for 
each functional item included in the “KB_OAT_System_Decomposition.txt” 
input file or an error message might be generated during the simulation run. 
 
type_i:  Format: String. Range: Entry must be one of the following types: 
“Normal”, “AOO”, “DBA”, or “Imbalance”.  This parameter specifies the event 
category.   Only events included within the “AOO” or “DBA” event type are used 
by the operator to identify when an abnormal condition has occurred.  Imbalance 
events are used to support knowledge-based problem solving and are used to 
identify non-equilibrium conditions in mass, energy, or momentum flow. 
 
value_ij: Format: Double.  Range: 0.0 – 0.99.  This parameter provides the 
relationship for event_i and symptom_j.  A value of 0.0 indicates that the event 
and associated symptom are not related (i.e., the symptom and event occur 
independently).  An increasing value indicates an increasingly strong relationship 
between event_i and symptom_j.  In general, a higher relationship value indicates 
that operator has a greater level of confidence that the symptom would be 
observed given that the associated event has occurred.   
 
Because relationship values are intended to represent the operator’s mental model 
of plant behavior, numerical relationship values can be assigned using heuristic 
rules rather than formal thermal-hydraulic or probability analysis.  The following 
heuristic rules have been used to grouped event symptoms into the broad 
categories of primary, secondary, and tertiary symptoms: 
 
 Primary symptoms directly relate to the initiating event and are expected 
to be observed with a high degree of confidence;   
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 Secondary symptoms are the result of the primary symptoms and are 
normally expected to be observed, but with a lower degree of confidence 
than primary symptoms; and    
 Tertiary symptoms may arise due to the presence of primary or secondary 
symptoms but can be mitigated by either control system operation or 
thermal hydraulic feedback mechanisms.  Consequently, tertiary 
symptoms may not be observed and are assigned a low degree of 
confidence.  
  
Relationship values were assigned based on engineering judgment and the 
guidelines of Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Symptom-Event Relationship Values  ______________________________________________ 
Symptom Type  Relationship Value Range(1) ______________________________________________ 
   Primary   0.7 – 0.99 
       Secondary   0.4 – 0.7 
       Tertiary   0.1 – 0.4 _____________________________________________ 
(1) A higher value indicates a stronger relationship between 
 the symptom and event 
 











PZR_Level_Failure_(Low)  Normal 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.5
 0.0 
Reactor_Trip   AOO  0.9 0.6 0.5 0.4
 0.0 
LOCA_Inside_Contaiment  DBA  0.0 0.0 0.9 0.6
 0.0 






This sample input file identifies five symptoms that will be used by the diagnostic 
process (Power_Decrease, Tave_Decrease, Pressurizer_Level_Decrease, 
RCS_Pressure_Decrease, and SG_A_Steam_Flow_Increase).  Each of the 
symptoms should have a corresponding mental belief data entry (with an identical 
mental belief name) in the operators “KB_OAT_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt” file.  
Four events have been specified: (1) a pressurizer level control failure during 
normal operation (PZR_Level_Failure_(Low)), (2) a reactor trip condition 
(Reactor_Trip), (3) a loss of coolant design basis accident 
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(LOCA_Inside_Containment), and (4) and imbalance category event associated 
with a low energy condition in the pressurizer (Energy_Imbalance_PZR_Low).  
The relationships between symptoms and events can be better seen in Table 4.  In 
this case, the pressurizer level control failure is strongly associated with a 
decreasing pressurizer level decrease (0.9 relationship value) and less strongly 
associated with a decreasing RCS pressure (0.5 relationship value).  Similarly, the 
reactor trip event is strongly associated with a power decrease and less strongly 
linked to decreasing average temperature, decreasing pressurizer level, and 
decreasing RCS pressure.  In this example, none of the events are associated with 





















Failure 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 
Reactor 
Trip 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.0 
LOCA Inside 




0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 
Table 4: Sample Relationship Table 
 








The input file “KB_OAT_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt” establishes the mental 
beliefs that may be activated by the operator during the simulation.  Once a 
mental belief is activated, the operator may use the mental belief to initiate a 
mental (memorized) procedure, activate other mental beliefs, or for the evaluation 
of procedure step expectations and knowledge-based action prerequisites.  The 
ADS-IDAC code also utilizes the mental beliefs “Normal_Operation” and 
“Reactor_Tripped” (if they exist) for the goal selection process.  Mental beliefs 
are activated based on satisfying the specified prerequisite alarm state(s), 
component state(s), parameter state(s), control value state(s), mental belief 
state(s), and procedure activation(s).  The confidence level for a mental belief 
calculated from the ratio of satisfied prerequisite states to the total number of 
prerequisites specified for the mental belief.   
 
A mental belief is activated when the following conditions have been met: (1) the 
mental belief confidence is greater than the specified activation confidence, (2) 
mental belief activation is not blocked by the reset time delay, and (3) the mental 
belief has been enabled by specifying a branching probability greater than 
0.000001.  The hard wired diagnosis branch probability  controls the generation of 
a mental belief activation branch.  If the branch probability is less than 0.000001, 
the mental belief will not be activated.  If the branch probability is greater than 
0.999999, a single mental belief activation branch will be generated if the 
confidence level exceeds the activation threshold and activation is not blocked by 
the reset timer.  For intermediate branch probability values, two mental belief 
branches will be activated, one branch which enables mental belief activation and 
one branch that bypasses (blocks) mental belief activation.  Once a mental belief 
has been activated, the operator will initiate the associated mental procedure (if 
specified) after the activation time delay has elapsed.  The reset time delay blocks 
re-activation of the mental belief until the reset time has elapsed.  Once the reset 
time delay has elapsed, the mental belief (and the associated mental procedure) 
can be re-activated provided the required confidence level has been reached. 
 
A subset of mental beliefs is also used to support the fuzzy logic diagnosis engine.  
Each symptom included in the “KB_OAT_Event_Matrix.txt” input file must have 
a companion mental belief in the “KB_OAT_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt” input file 
with the same name (i.e., the event matrix symptom name is identical to a hard 
wired diagnosis mental belief name).  To avoid the generation of unnecessary 
branches associated with diagnosis symptoms, the branch probability for 
symptom related mental beliefs may be set to 0.0 and the activation confidence set 
to 1.0 (the diagnosis engine directly reads the mental belief confidence – no 
branch generation is necessary). 
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2. Input File Format 
 
Number_of_Hardwired_Diagnosis    number_of_items 
 
count  mental_belief_name 
activation_confidence   activation_confidence 
branch_probability   branch_probability 
activation_delay_time   double_1 double_2
 double_3  




alarm_name_1  alarm_state_1 
.    . 
.    . 
alarm_name_n  alarm_state_n 
 
Number_of_expected_component_state number_of_components 
component_name_1  component_state_1 
.    . 
.    . 
component_name_n  component_state_n 
 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value number_of_parameters 
parameter_name_1  logical_operator value_1 value_2 
.    .    .  . 
.    .    .  . 
parameter_name_n  logical_operator value_1 value_2 
 
Number_of_manipulative_control      number_of_controls 
control_name_1  minimum_control_value_1 
.    . 
.    . 
control_name_n  minimum_control_value_n 
 
Number_of_mental_belief             number_of_mental_beliefs 
mental_belief_name_1 mental_belief_state_1 
.    . 
.    . 
mental_belief_name_n mental_belief_state_n 
 
Number_of_procedure_activity  number_of_procedures 
procedure_name_1  procedure_state_1 
.    . 
.    . 
procedure_name_n  procedure_state_n 
 
Mental_procedure_priority  priority 











3. Input Description 
 
number_of_items:  Format: Integer. Range: > 0.  Specifies the number of mental 
beliefs described in the input file. 
 
count: Format: Integer.  Range > 0.  This parameter is not used by the ADS-
IDAC but is included for the convenience of the analyst to verify the number of 
mental beliefs specified by the number_of_items variable.  
 
mental_belief_name: Format: String. Range: any.  Descriptive name for the 
mental belief.  ADS-IDAC recognizes two special mental beliefs: 
“Normal_Operation” and “Reactor_Tripped”.  If these special mental beliefs are 
present, they are used to support the operator goal selection process and 
suspension of low priority mental procedures following a reactor shutdown.  
Spaces must not be used (use the underbar character (“_”) rather than a space 
when needed. 
 
activation_confidence: Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the minimum 
confidence level necessary to enable mental belief activation and branch 
generation.  The mental belief confidence is equal to the ratio of satisfied 
conditions to the total number of prerequisite conditions.  The activation 
confidence level influences the activation logic for the associated mental belief.  
By setting the activation confidence to a low value (e.g., 0.05), the mental belief 
can be activated when a small percentage of the prerequisite conditions are 
satisfied.  A high activation confidence level (e.g., 0.95) would require that all (or 
nearly all) of the prerequisite conditions are satisfied.  Therefore, the activation 
confidence level can be adjusted to shift mental belief activation from “or” gate 
logic to “and” gate logic.  Intermediate values of the activation confidence can be 
used to model “k of n” logic.  For example, if a mental belief has five prerequisite 
conditions and satisfying any three conditions is sufficient for activation, setting 
the activation confidence in the range of 0.4 < x < 0.8 would simulate 3 out 5 
logic.  
 
Setting the activation_confidence to 1.0 should be avoided since the numerical 
methods used to calculate the confidence level may preclude activation of the 
mental belief even if all prerequisite conditions are satisfied.  In practice, the 
calculated mental belief confidence is normally in the range of 0.0 to slightly less 
than 1.0 (a small bias value of 0.00001 is added to the total number of 
prerequisites to avoid a “division by zero” error if no prerequisite conditions are 
specified for the mental belief. 
 
branch_probability: Format: double. Range: 0.0 – 1.0.  This parameter sets the 
branching probability for activating the mental belief. If the value is greater than 
0.999999, a single branch will be generated to activate the mental belief provided 
the minimum confidence level is met and the reset time delay has not blocked 
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activation.  If the value is less than 0.000001, the operator will bypass/block 
mental belief activation and the associated mental procedure (if supplied) will not 
be initiated.  For intermediate values, a branching point will be generated with 
two mental belief branches.  One branch will activate the mental belief (and 
initiate the associated mental procedure if applicable) with a branch probability 
equal to the branch probability.  The other branch will bypass (block) mental 
belief activation with a complimentary branching probability.  A bypassed mental 
belief may become reactivated once the reset time delay has elapsed (provided the 
appropriate prerequisite conditions are met). 
 
“activation_delay_time”: Format: Double, Double, Double.  Range: all values > 
0.0.  These parameters establish the activation delay time for initiation of the 
associated mental procedure (if supplied).  Upon activation of a mental belief, the 
associated mental procedure will be added to the operator’s procedure queue.  
However, a mental procedure will not be initiated until the activation delay time 
has elapsed.  This parameter allows the analyst to separate (in time) the activation 
of the mental belief and the execution of the associated mental procedure.  A three 
parameter Weibull distribution is used to describe the probability distribution for 




















tF exp1)(   
 (Equation 2) 
 
Where: 
   double_1 = u (minimum time), seconds 
   double_2 = α parameter 
double_3 = β parameter 
 
Upon activation of a mental belief , a Monte Carlo simulation is used to calculate 
the mental procedure activation time delay using equation (2).  Once the 
activation time delay has elapsed, the mental procedure can be initiated by the 
operator. 
 
“reset_delay_time”: Format: Double, Double, Double.  Range: all values > 0.0.  
These parameters establish the reset time delay for a mental belief.  The purpose 
of the reset time delay is to allow the analyst to create mental beliefs that can be 
activated multiple times during a simulation run.  The reset time delay provides a 
dormancy time during which the mental belief cannot be reactivated (even if the 
necessary prerequisite conditions are met).  This provides more realistic control 
over certain repetitive operator actions such as control of auxiliary feed water 
flow rate.  Similar to the “activation_delay_time”, a three parameter Weibull 
distribution is used to describe the probability distribution for the use of old 
component state information.  The Weibull distribution is given by equation (2).  
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Mental Belief Prerequisite Conditions 
 
1. Alarm States 
 
number_of_alarms: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number of 
alarm state prerequisites for the associated mental belief.  If 
number_of_alarms is set to 0, no further alarm state data should be entered.  
If number_of_alarms is greater than or equal to 1, input data for each alarm 
(i.e., alarm_name and alarm_state)  must be supplied or an error will be 
generated during input file processing. 
 
alarm_name_i: Format: String.  Range: any.  Parameter identifies the alarm.  
The alarm_name must match an alarm specified in the “ControlPanel.txt” 
input file. 
 
alarm_state_i: Format: Integer.  Range: 3022, 3023.  Specifies the alarm 
activation state.  The alarm state should be specified as either 3022 (integer 
code “VON” for alarm activation) or 3023 (integer code “VOFF” for alarm 
cleared). 
 
2. Component States 
 
number_of_components:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number 
of component state prerequisites for the associated mental belief.  If 
number_of_ components is set to 0, no further component state data should 
be entered.  If number_of_ components is greater than or equal to 1, input 
data for each component (i.e., component_name and component_state)  must 
be supplied or an error will be generated during input file processing. 
 
component_name_i:  Format: String.  Range: any.  Parameter identifies the 
component.  The component_name must match a component specified in the 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file. 
 
component_state_i: Format: Integer.  Range: 3022, 3023.  Specifies the 
component activation state.  The component state should be specified as either 
3022 (integer code “VON” for component is activated) or 3023 (integer code 
“VOFF” for component stopped or off). 
 
3. Parameter States 
 
number_of_parameters: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number 
of parameter state prerequisites for the associated mental belief.  If 
number_of_parameters is set to 0, no further parameter state data should be 
entered.  If number_of_parameters is greater than or equal to 1, input data for 
each parameter state (i.e., parameter_name, logical_operator, value_1 and 
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value_2)  must be supplied or an error will be generated during input file 
processing. 
 
parameter_name_i: Format: String.  Range: any.  Identifies the control panel 
indicator associated with the prerequisite condition.  The parameter_name 
must match a parameter specified in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file. 
 
logical_operator: Format: Integer. Range: allowable values are 3006, 3007, 
3008, 3009, 3010, and 3032.  The logical_operator integer code value is used 
to specify the following conditions: 
 3006 (Integer code for “VGT”) - Condition satisfied when parameter > 
value_1 
 3007 (Integer code for “VGE”) - Condition satisfied when parameter > 
value_1 
 3008 (Integer code for “VEQ”) – Condition satisfied when parameter = 
value_1 
 3009 (Integer code for “VLE”) - Condition satisfied when parameter < 
value_1 
 3010 (Integer code for “VLT”) - Condition satisfied when parameter < 
value_1 
 3032 (Integer code for “VBETWEEN”) – Condition satisfied when  
value_1 < parameter < value_2 
 
value_1: Format: double.  Range: any.  Specifies the parameter threshold 
value for condition activation.  The entered value should be consistent with 
the indicator range.  For logical operator 3032 (“VBETWEEN”) value_1 must 
be the lower end of the threshold range. 
 
value_2: Format: double.  Range: any.  Although this parameter must always 
be entered, it is only used for logical operator 3032 (“VBETWEEN”).  For 
logical operator 3032 (“VBETWEEN”) value_2 must be the upper end of the 
threshold range.  For all other logical operators, a dummy value should be 
entered (e.g., “0.0”).  The entered value should be consistent with the 
indicator range. 
 
4. Control States 
 
number_of_controls: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number of 
control state prerequisites for the associated mental belief.  If number_of_ 
controls is set to 0, no further control state data should be entered.  If 
number_of_controls is greater than or equal to 1, input data for each control 
(i.e., control_name and minimum_control_value)  must be supplied or an 
error will be generated during input file processing. 
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control_name_i: Format: String.  Range: any.  Identifies the control panel 
controller associated with the prerequisite condition.  The control_name must 
match a controller specified in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file. 
 
minimum_control_value_i:  Format: Double.  Range: any.  Specifies the 
threshold control value necessary to satisfy the prerequisite condition.  When 
the specified controller is adjusted to a control value equal to or greater than 
the minimum_control_value, the prerequisite condition is satisfied. 
 
5. Mental Belief States 
 
number_of_mental_beliefs:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the 
number of mental belief state prerequisites for the associated mental belief.  If 
number_of_mental_beliefs is set to 0, no further mental belief state data 
should be entered.  If number_of_mental_beliefs is greater than or equal to 1, 
input data for each mental belief state (i.e., mental_belief_name and 
mental_belief_state)  must be supplied or an error will be generated during 
input file processing. 
 
mental_belief_name_i:  Format: String.  Range: any.  Identifies the mental 
belief associated with the prerequisite condition.  The mental_belief_name 
must match a mental belief entry in the “KB_OAT_HardWired.txt” input file. 
 
mental_belief_state_i:  Format: Integer. Range: allowable values are 3020, 
3021, and 3045.  The mental_belief_state is specified using the following 
integer code values:   
 3020 (integer code for “VFAILED”)  Mental belief is not active 
 3021 (integer code for “VSUCCEED”) Mental belief is active 
 3045 (integer code for “VNONE”)  No status information 
available 
      or mental belief not active 
 
6. Procedure States 
 
number_of_procedures:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number 
of procedure state prerequisites for the associated mental belief.  If 
number_of_procedures is set to 0, no further procedure state data should be 
entered.  If number_of_procedures is greater than or equal to 1, input data for 
each procedure state (i.e., procedure_name and procedure_state)  must be 
supplied or an error will be generated during input file processing. 
 
procedure_name_i:  Format: String.  Range: any.  Identifies the procedure 
name associated with the prerequisite condition.  The procedure_name must 
be consistent with a procedure listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file.   
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procedure_state_i:  Format: Integer. Range: allowable values are 3045, 3089, 
3097, 3126, and 3127.  The procedure_state is specified using the following 
integer code values:   
 3045 (integer code for “VNONE”)  No status information 
available 
 3089 (integer code for “VINTERRUPT”) Procedure abandoned   
 3097 (integer code for “VDONE”)   Procedure Complete 
 3126 (integer code for “VACTIVE”)  Procedure in use 
 3127 (integer code for “VPAUSE”)  Procedure temporarily 
suspended 
  
priority: Format: Integer.  Range: > 1.  Specifies the priority level of the 
associated mental procedure.  If no mental procedure is associated with the mental 
belief, a dummy integer value should be entered.  Lower priority numbers indicate 
a higher procedure priority.  The priority is used to select mental procedures to be 
performed (higher priority procedures are performed before lower priority 
procedures) and block continued performance of low priority procedures 
following detection of an abnormal condition (see the priority_threshold 
discussion in the “ActionTaker.txt” input file description). 
 
procedure_name: Format: String.  Range: any.  The procedure_name and 
step_name must be consistent with a procedure listed in the “Procedures.txt” 
input file.  All mental procedures should include the prefix “MPBG_” to denote 
the associated procedure as activated by a mental belief.  If no procedure is 
associated with the mental belief, the string “NONE” should be entered for the 
procedure_name. 
 
step_name: Format: String.  Range: any.  The procedure_name and step_name 
must be consistent with a procedure listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file.  If no 
procedure is associated with the mental belief, the string “NONE” should be 
entered for the step_name. 
 
4. Sample Input 
 





activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  




Tave-Tref  3007 1.0 0.0 
RATE_Loop_A_Tave 3007 1.0 0.0 
RATE_Loop_B_Tave 3007 1.0 0.0 
RATE_Loop_C_Tave 3007 1.0 0.0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Input File: “KB_OAT_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt” September 20, 2009 
 
K-117 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





activation_delay_time 50.0  20.0 2.0  
reset_delay_time  10000.0 1.0 1.0 
Number_of_expected_alarm_state 0 
Number_of_expected_component_state 1 
B_MDAFP_On   3022 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value 0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             1 
Align_A_MDAFP_Flow_Path  3045 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority  5 





activation_delay_time 30.0  20.0 2.0  
reset_delay_time  10000.0 1.0 1.0 
Number_of_expected_alarm_state 0 
Number_of_expected_component_state 1 
A_MDAFP_On   3022 
Number_of_expected_parameter_value 0 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief            1 
Align_B_MDAFP_Flow_Path  3045 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 1 





activation_delay_time 0.0 1.0 1.0  




Tave-Tref  3032 -1.5  1.5 
PZR_Pressure 3032 2200.0 2300.0 
PZR_Level  3032 0.40  0.55 
Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority  5 
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activation_delay_time 0.0  1.0 1.0  





Number_of_manipulative_control      0 
Number_of_mental_belief             0 
Number_of_procedure_activity  0 
Mental_procedure_priority 5 





The above example illustrates three categories of mental beliefs: (1) event 
symptom mental belief (“Tave_Increase”), (2) mental belief intended to activate a 
memorized procedure (“Align_A_MDAFP_Flow_Path” and 
“Align_B_MDAFP_Flow_Path”), and (3) use of the special ADS-IDAC 
recognized mental beliefs for normal operation and the reactor tripped plant state.  
These mental beliefs can be interpreted as follows: 
 
 Tave_Increase: No branches are generated by the mental belief since the 
purpose of this entry is only to support the diagnostic engine 
(branch_probability = 0.0).  Dummy values have been entered for the 
activation time delay, the reset time delay, and the activation confidence since 
these values will have no impact on the simulation (since no branch will be 
generated by the mental belief).  The mental belief confidence is based on four 
parameter values: (1) a reactor coolant system temperature deviation greater 
than or equal to 1.0 F, and (2) the rate of any loop average temperature greater 
than or equal to 1.0 F/minute.  Since four prerequisite conditions are specified, 
the mental belief confidence can be any of five possible states depending on 
how many prerequisite conditions are met  (e.g., 0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 
~1.0).  No mental procedure is associated with this mental belief. 
 
 Align_A_MDAFP_Flow_Path: A single branch will be generated when this 
mental belief is activated (branch_probabiltiy = 1.0).  The mental belief is 
activated when the confidence level exceeds an activation_confidence of 0.8.  
Because only two prerequisite conditions are specified (one component state 
and one mental belief), a mental belief confidence level of 0.8 can only be 
reached if both prerequisite conditions are met.  The prerequisite conditions 
allow the mental belief to be activated only if the operator perceives that the A 
train motor driven auxiliary feed water pump (A_MDAFP) is running and the 
operator has not activated the “Align_B_MDAFP_Flow_Path” mental belief 
(this condition prevents the associated mental procedure from being executed 
twice since both the “Align_A_MDAFP_Flow_Path” and 
“Align_B_MDAFP_Flow_Path” initiate the same mental procedure).   Once 
the mental belief is activated, the operator will initiate mental procedure 
“MPBG_Align_MDAFP_Valves Step_1” after the activation time delay 
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(approximately 30.0 seconds) has elapsed.  The reset time delay of at least 
10,000 seconds will preclude reactivation of the mental belief for any 
simulation lasting less than approximately 165 minutes. 
 
 Normal_Operation:  No branching is generated as a result of this mental belief 
since the branch_probability is set to 0.0.  Therefore, dummy values are 
entered for the activation time delay, the reset delay time, and the associated 
mental procedure since these parameters have no impact of the simulation 
execution.  However, the activation_confidence is used by ADS_IDAC in the 
goal selection process to diagnosis a normal operating state (Decision Maker 
only).  If the mental belief confidence level is greater than the 
activation_confidence (in this case, 0.8), the selection of a normal operating 
high level goal is enabled.  Three parameter states are used as the prerequisite 
conditions for this mental belief: (1) reactor coolant system temperature 
deviation, (2) pressurizer pressure, and (3)  pressurizer level.  Each of these 
parameter states is activated when the associated parameter falls between the 
bounds specified by value_1 and value_2.  Since only three prerequisites are 
specified and the activation probability is 0.8, all three conditions must be met 
to enable the normal operating goal. 
 
 Reactor_Tripped:  A single branch is generated when the “Reactor_Tripped” 
mental belief is activated (branch_probability is set equal to 1.0).  If the 
branch_probability were set to an intermediate value (e.g., 0.5), then two 
branches would be activated if the mental belief confidence exceeded the 
activation_confidence (set to 0.8 in this case).   The first branch would 
activate the mental belief while the second branch blocks the mental belief – 
in this manner the effect of the operator failing to activate the mental belief 
can be simulated.  In this example only a single alarm condition is needed to 
activate the mental belief (i.e., activation of the reactor trip alarm).  The reset 
probability is set to a high value (~165 minutes), effectively limiting the 
mental belief to a single activation during most simulation runs.  Although no 
mental procedure is associated with the “Reactor_Tripped” mental belief, the 
activation of this belief is recognized by the ADS-IDAC code and performed 
two key functions: (1) supports the goal selection process and (2) blocks 
further execution of low priority mental belief procedures. 
 
 








Maneuvering actions enable ADS-IDAC to model continuous control 
manipulations without the need to activate mental beliefs or related procedures.   
Maneuvering actions are activated by the execution of a procedure step with the 
an action name beginning with the prefix “MANEUVER_”.  A maneuvering 
action models a simple control system that actuates a single component to 
maintain a target parameter within a specified band.  For example, some plant 
emergency procedures require the operators to throttle emergency core cooling 
flow to maintain a specified sub-cooling margin in the reactor coolant system.  A 
maneuvering action could be created that controlled the positioning of an 
emergency core cooling throttle valve as needed to maintain sub-cooling margin 
within a target band.  Maneuvering actions allowed the ADS-IDAC operator 
model to exercise complex control manipulations without a significant amount of 
knowledge base development. 
 
As the sophistication of the ADS-IDAC knowledge base increased, it was no 
longer necessary to rely on maneuvering actions to exercise these types of control 
manipulations.  Instead, mental beliefs and mental procedures can now be used to 
exercise similar control outputs in a more realistic manner.  Specifically, mental 
beliefs can be constructed to allow the operator to control more than a single 
component or consider more than a one target parameter and control band.  
Additionally, maneuvering control actions bypass certain aspects of the 
information gathering and perception filtering processes – the use of mental 
beliefs and mental procedures does not bypass these cognitive processes.  
Consequently, the use of maneuvering actions in ADS-IDAC is no longer 
recommended.  Maneuvering action capabilities have been maintained as a legacy 
feature of ADS-IDAC, but use of this feature will not be described in this manual.  
Because some older ADS-IDAC project files may use maneuvering action 
capability, the program will attempt to read the 
“KB_OAT_Maneuvering_Action.txt” input file during program initiation.  For 
new project problems, the “KB_OAT_Maneuvering_Action.txt” input file must 
be included in the input directory, but it is recommended that no maneuvering 
actions be specified. 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
Number_of_operator_Maneuver_action  number_of_maneuvering_actions 
 
3. Input File Description 
 
number_of_maneuvering_actions: Format: Integer. Range: > 0.  Specifies the 
number of maneuvering actions described in the input file.  For new projects, it is 
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recommended that this parameter be set to 0 and no maneuvering actions be 
specified. 
 
4. Sample Input 
 




This example simply specifies that no maneuver actions are specified for the 
project – this is the recommended content of the 
“KB_OAT_Maneuvering_Actions.txt” input file. 
 
For legacy purposes only, the following example provides an example of a fully 
specified maneuvering action input file: 
 
Number_of_operator_Maneuver_action  1 
 
Maneuver_name    MANEUVER_Throttle_HPI_to_50_SCM 
Interactive_control_and_range   X_HPI   0.0    1.0 
Targeted_parameter_name    SCM_113 
LB_target_UB_of_the_parameter    45.0   50.0   55.0 
Targeted_parameter_rate_name    RATE_SCM_113 
Rate_boundary      -1.0    1.0 
Ratio_control_table_3_by_3 
Change_rate_less_than_LB    50.0   0.0    0.0 
Change_rate_in_between      25.0   0.0    -25.0 
Change_rate_greater_than_UB   0.0   0.0   -50.0 
Maneuver_time_interval     15.0 
Maneuver_total_duration     3600.0 
 







The purpose of the “KB_OAT_Safety_Parameter.txt” input file is to support 
calculation of the criticality of system condition performance influencing factor 
(PIF).  The criticality of system condition PIF represents the operator’s perception 
of the level of degradation of key safety functions.  This PIF is loosely based on 
the safety parameter display system used in U.S. nuclear plant control rooms. The 
value of the system criticality PIF corresponds to the aggregate deviation of key 
safety parameters from a nominal value.  This input file identifies the parameters 
used to calculate this PIF, the threshold limits associated with each parameter, and 
the weighting factors used to aggregate the parameter contributions.   Typical 
parameters used to calculate the system criticality PIF include reactor coolant 
system subcooling margin, wide range steam generator water levels, pressurizer 
water level, and reactor vessel water level.  The contribution from each identified 
parameter to the overall criticality of system condition PIF value is denoted as the 
parameter criticality (PIFParameter Criticality).  Given a set of high and low threshold 
limits, the parameter criticality corresponds to the magnitude of the parameter’s 






















Figure 16, "Parameter Criticality PIF" 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the parameter criticality considers both high and low 
deviations from the nominal safe state.  For example, a low level of reactor 
coolant system subcooling margin might indicate inadequate core cooling and an 
increased potential for core damage, while an excessive amount of subcooling 
might indicate an overcooling event and a potential pressurized thermal shock 
condition.  The overall criticality of system condition PIF value is based on a 
















 (Equation 3) 
The ωi value in Equation (3) is the weighting factor for parameter i.  A higher 
value of the system criticality PIF indicates a more adverse overall plant 
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condition.   Additionally, the rate of change of the PIF value provides an 
indication if the overall plant health is improving or worsening. 
 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
SPDS_Input  number_of_parameters  Time_Lapse  time_lapse 
SPDS_parameter_1 parameter_name_1  




SPDS_parameter_n parameter_name_n  
lo_lo_level_n lo_level_n hi_level_n hi_hi_level_n  
weighting_factor_n 
 
3. Input File Description 
 
number_of_parameters:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0. Specifies the number of 
procedure state prerequisites for the associated mental belief.  If 
number_of_parameters is set to 0, no further safety parameter data should be 
entered.  If number_of_parameters is greater than or equal to 1, input data for 
each safety parameter must be supplied or an error will be generated during input 
file processing. 
 
time_lapse: Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the time interval between 
safety parameter updates.  At each safety parameter update, the PIF value for each 
parameter is updated based on the operator’s perceived information.  If the 
operator has not perceived an updated value of the associated parameter since the 
last safety parameter update, the updated PIF value will be equal to the last value.  
For this reason, the time_lapse for safety parameter updates should not be set to a 
value less than the scanned parameter scan period (see 
“KB_OAT_Scanned_Parameter.txt”).  
 
SPDS_parameter:  Format: String.  Range: any.  Specifies a unique identifying 
name for the associated safety parameter.  It is recommended that the 
SPDS_parameter be set to the associated indicator name with the prefix “SPDS_” 
(i.e., SPDS_PZR_Level).  Spaces must not be used  - use the underbar character 
(“_”) rather than a space when needed. 
 
parameter_name:  Format: String.  Range: The parameter name must match a 
control panel parameter listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Specifies the 
control panel indicator that will be used to calculate the individual safety 
parameter PIF value.  Spaces must not be used - use the underbar character (“_”) 
rather than a space when needed. 
 
lo_lo_level:  Format: Double. Range: consistent with indicator output.  Specifies 
the lower low level limit for the safety parameter.  If the parameter value is less 
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than the lo_lo_level, the associated parameter PIF value is set equal to 10 (the 
maximum PIF value). 
 
lo_level:  Format: Double. Range: consistent with indicator output.  Specifies the 
upper low level limit for the safety parameter.  If the parameter value is between 
the lo_level and the hi_level, the associated PIF value is set to 0.  If the parameter 
value is between the lo_level and lo_lo_level, the PIF value is calculated from 
linear interpolation between the low level limits (see Figure 2). 
 
hi_level:  Format: Double. Range: consistent with indicator output.  Specifies the 
lower high level limit for the safety parameter. If the parameter value is between 
the lo_level and the hi_level, the associated PIF value is set to 0.  If the parameter 
value is between the hi_level and hi_hi_level, the PIF value is calculated from 
linear interpolation between the high level limits (see Figure 2). 
 
 
hi_hi_level:  Format: Double. Range: consistent with indicator output.  Specifies 
the upper high level limit for the safety parameter. If the parameter value is 
greater than the hi_hi_level, the associated parameter PIF value is set equal to 10 
(the maximum PIF value). 
 
weighting_factor:  Format: Double. Range: any (0.0 – 1.0 recommended).  
Specifies the individual weight for the associated safety parameter.  The overall 
criticality of system condition PIF is calculated from the normalized weighted 
sum of all the individual safety parameter contributions (see Equation 3).  
Because the normalization process means that only the relative ratio of the safety 
parameter weighting factors to each other is important, the analyst can use any 
meaningful weighting factor scaling.  Although this normalization process allows 
greater flexibility in assigning the weighting_factor, it is recommended that the 
weighting_factor be set between 0.0 and 1.0 to support easier interpretation of the 
file input     
 
4. Sample Input 
 
SPDS_Input  6  Time_Lapse  1.0 
SPDS_Min_Sub_Cooling Min_Sub_Cooling   
5.0 25.0 75.0 100.0  
1.0 
SPDS_SG_A_WR_Level SG_A_WR_Level 
0.10 0.60 0.85 0.99  
0.5  
SPDS_PZR_Level  PZR_Level 
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In the above example, three parameters are used to calculate the criticality of 
system condition PIF: (1) minimum reactor coolant system subcooling margin 
(Min_Sub_Cooling), (2) steam generator A wide range level (SG_A_WR_Level), 
and (30 pressurizer level (PZR_Level).  Based on the inputs, the nominal range 
for minimum subcooling is specified as 25.0 – 75.0 degrees F.  Similarly, the 
nominal range for SG A wide range level is 0.60 – 0.85 and the nominal range for 
the pressurizer level is 0.4 - 0.7.  Each safety parameter has been assigned a 
different weighting factor, with the subcooling margin identified as the dominant 
factor.  SG A wide range level has half the weight of subcooling margin and the 
weight of the pressurizer level is 25% less than subcooling margin.  The analyst 
can model an operator safety parameter priorities and unique knowledge base by 
adjusting these weighting factors. 
 
Assuming a subcooling margin of 10 F, a SG A wide range level of 0.05, and a 
pressurizer level of 0.55, the system criticality PIF value would be calculated as 
follows: 
 
PIFsubcooling  = 10.0 * (25.0 – 10.0)/(25.0 – 5.0) = 7.5 
PIFSG A WR Level  = 10.0  
PIFPZR Level  =   0.0 
 
PIFSystem Criticality  =  (1.0 * 7.5) + (0.5 * 10.0) + (0.75 * 0.0)/(1.0 + 0.5 + .75) 











In order for the operator to use information and plant data to support decision-
making activities, raw information obtained from the control panel must pass 
through the operator’s perception filters.  Two perception filters are currently 
modeled in ADS-IDAC: (1) a quantitative filter which limits and focuses the 
ability of the operator to scan information on the control panel, and (2) a biasing 
filter which can distort parameter readings obtained by the operator.  The biasing 
filter is described in the “KB_OAT_Bias_Factors.txt” section.  The quantitative 
filter models the information scanning process used by operators to monitor plant 
status.  In general, the control room operators frequently monitor a small subset of 
plant instrumentation.  Typical parameters might include reactor power, reactor 
coolant system pressure and temperature, and critical inventory levels.  When 
plant conditions degrade, the operators may add additional parameters to their 
scanning in response to procedural requirements or alarms.  The more parameters 
the operator is able to monitor, they should be able to make a more accurate 
assessment of plant status. However, the operator does not have an infinite 
capacity to monitor plant instrumentation – consequently, there are limits to how 
many items and operator can effectively monitor.  Additionally, external and 
internal factors (e.g., stress or time pressure) may force the operator to reduce the 
number of parameters monitored.   Consequently, operators may limit monitoring 
activities to a focused set of items that are considered to be most pertinent to the 
perceived plant state.   
 
Within the ADS-IDAC model, the focusing process is controlled by the operator’s 
control panel “scan queue”.  The scan queue contains a listing of parameters that 
the operator monitors on a frequent basis.  Scan queue parameters include 
instruments, alarms, and component states.  The number of items contained in the 
scan queue is limited by the individual capabilities of the operator, the amount of 
attention the operator can apply to information gathering, and the operator’s 
perception of the current plant state.  As the number of monitored items in the 
scan queue increases, the operator improves their ability to accurately assess and 
diagnosis the plant state.   
 
Two main factors determine which items are included in the operator’s scan 
queue: (1) the maximum size limit of the queue, and (2) the priority level of each 
item in the queue.  The maximum size of the scan queue (NScan Queue) is 
determined by Equation (4). 
 
  yCriticalitSystemLoadInfoBaselineQueueScan PIFPIFNN 21 11    (Equation 4) 
 
The constants NBaseline, γ1, and γ2 are set in each operator’s profile and serve to 
calibrate the model to the desired operator performance level.  NBaseline establishes 
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the maximum amount of information that can be contained in the scan queue 
while the γ factors ( 0 < γi < 0.1) set the sensitivity of the dynamic scan queue 
limit to the information load and system criticality PIFs. 
 
If the size of the scan queue exceeds NScan Queue, items are removed from the scan 
queue list until the size limitation is met.  Two main factors determine which 
items will be removed from the scan list: (1) the items relevance to the operator’s 
perceived plant state, and (2) the priority level of the item.  Each indicator, 
control, and alarm on the control panel is associated with a set of high level plant 
functions in the input file “KB_OAT_System_Decomposition.txt”.  These plant 
functions directly correspond to a unique functional imbalance described in the 
file “KB_OAT_Event_Matrix.txt”.  When the operator determines that a 
functional imbalance exists, any items that are associated with the imbalance (as 
described in the system decomposition file) are considered to be relevant to the 
perceived plant state.  When an item is assigned to the scan queue list, it is 
assigned an initial priority level (the priority level is equal to greater than 1, with 
1 denoting the highest priority).  As time progresses, an items priority level will 
decay if the item is not considered to be relevant to the perceived plant state.  
Thus, the priority level of relevant items will remain high, while the priority of 
non-relevant items will be gradually reduced.  If an item’s priority level is 
reduced below the priority limit, it will be removed from the scan queue.  
Furthermore, if the scan queue size exceeds the NScan Queue limit, low priority items 
will be removed until the list size is within the limit.   
 
The purpose of the “KB_OAT_Scanned_Parameter.txt” input file is to specify the 
parameters necessary for management of the operator scan queue.  Additionally, 
the analyst can designate an initial list of parameters, components, and alarms that 
are monitored by the operator at the beginning of the simulation.  This provides 
the means to model routine control panel scanning activities normally performed 
by the control room crew.   
 
2. Input File Format 
 
Scan_Period_(seconds)   scan_period 
Info_Load_Sensitivity   information_load_sensitivty 
System_Criticality_Sensitivty 
 system_criticality_sensitivity 
Priority_Decay_Time_(seconds)  priority_decay_time 
Priority_Limit    priority_limit 
Relevance_Limit    relevance_limit 
 
Number_of_Scanned_Parameters  number_of_parameters 
parameter_name_1    parameter_priority_1 
.      . 
parameter_name_n    parameter_priority_n 
 
Number_of_Scanned_Components  number_of_components 
component_name_1    component_priority_1 
.      . 
component_name_n    component_priority_n 
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Number_of_Scanned_Alarms  number_of_alarms 
alarm_name_1    alarm_priority_1 
.      . 
alarm_name_n    alarm_priority_n 
 
3. Input Description 
 
scan_period: Format:  Double. Range: > 0.0.  This parameter the specifies the 
time delay between control panel monitoring scans.  A lower value for 
scan_period will improve the operator’s plant state assessment making parameter 
updates more frequent.  However, more frequent control panel scanning increases 
the operator’s information load and may limit the number of parameters that can 
be monitored.  Longer scan periods will minimize the information load but may 
result in the operator relying on outdated information, particularly during rapidly 
evolving plant events. 
 
information_load_sensitivity:  Format: Double.  Range: 0.0 < x < 0.01.  This 
parameter specifies the sensitivity of the scan queue size limit to the operator’s 
information load (the γ1 factor in Equation 4).  Because the maximum information 
load PIF value is 10.0, this factor is limited to values no greater than 0.01.  The 
maximum size limit of the scan queue is set by parameter scan_queue_limit in 
the “ActionTaker.txt” input file. 
 
system_criticality_senstivity:  Format: Double.  Range: 0.0 < x < 0.01.  This 
parameter specifies the sensitivity of the scan queue size limit to the operator’s 
perceived criticality of the plant state (the γ2 factor in Equation 4).  Because the 
maximum criticality of system condition PIF value is 10.0, this factor is limited to 
values no greater than 0.01.  The maximum size limit of the scan queue is set by 
parameter scan_queue_limit in the “ActionTaker.txt” input file. 
 
priority_decay_time:  Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the length of 
the delay interval (in seconds) for successive reductions in scanned item priority.   
The priority level of items in the scan queue will decrease over time (if the item is 
not considered to be relevant to the operator).  When a scanned item’s priority 
level exceeds the priority_limit, the item will be removed from the scan queue 
list.  Therefore, the priority_decay_time  effectively controls how long a scanned 
item resides in the scan queue list.   
 
priority_limit: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  This factor specifies the lowest 
item priority level that can be maintained in the operator’s scan queue.  In ADS-
IDAC, high priority items are designated by lower priority values (i.e., the highest 
priority items have a priority level of 1).  As the priority of an item decreases, its 
priority level increases.  If the priority level of an item is greater than the 
priority_limit, it will be removed from the operator’s scan queue. 
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relevance_limit:  Format: Double.  Range: 0.0 < x < 1.0.  This parameter 
specifies the threshold value used by the operator model to determine if an 
imbalance event diagnosis is relevant.  Each item listed in the scan queue is linked 
to one or more associated imbalance events in the 
“KB_OAT_System_Decomposition.txt” input file.  If the maximum  imbalance 
event diagnostic score for the functions supported by the item is greater than the 
relevance_limit, the scanned item will be considered to be relevant to the 
operator.  If the scanned item is not relevant to the operator, the item’s priority 
level will be decreased one increment (i.e., the item’s priority will be increased by 
1) during every priority_decay_time interval.   
 
number_of_parameters:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0. Specifies the number of 
parameters that will be included in the operator scan queue at the start of the 
ADS-IDAC simulation.  If number_of_parameters is set to 0, no further  
parameter data should be entered.  If number_of_parameters is greater than or 
equal to 1, input data for each scanned parameter must be supplied or an error will 
be generated during input file processing.  Because operators cannot passively 
gather parameter value information (i.e., control panel indicators must be actively 
read by the operator), parameters that would normally be known by the operator 
at the start of the simulation should be included in the parameter scan queue list. 
 
parameter_name:   Format: String.  Range: The parameter_name must match a 
control panel parameter listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file. Contains the 
name of the parameter to be included in the scan queue. Spaces must not be used 
in the parameter_name (the underbar character “_” may be substituted for a space 
when needed). 
 
parameter_priority:  Format: Double.  Range: > 1.0.  Specifies the parameter’s 
initial priority level.  A lower parameter_priority designates a higher priority 
parameter (i.e., the highest priority items are designated with a priority level of 1).  
Because the priority level can decay over time, specifying a low 
parameter_priority level will increase the residence time of the parameter on the 
scan queue list. 
 
number_of_components:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0. Specifies the number of 
component states that will be included in the operator scan queue at the start of 
the ADS-IDAC simulation.  If number_of_components  is set to 0, no further 
component data should be entered.  If number_of_components is greater than or 
equal to 1, input data for each scanned component state must be supplied or an 
error will be generated during input file processing.  Because operators cannot 
passively gather component state information (i.e., component states must be 
actively read by the operator on the control panel), component states that would 
normally be known by the operator at the start of the simulation should be 
included in the parameter scan queue list. 
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component_name:  Format: String.  Range: any. Contains the name of the 
component to be included in the scan queue.  The component_name must match a 
control panel component listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Spaces must 
not be used in the component_name (the underbar character “_” may be 
substituted for a space when needed). 
 
component_priority: Format: Double.  Range: > 1.0.  Specifies the component’s 
initial priority level.  A lower component_priority designates a higher priority 
component (i.e., the highest priority items are designated with a priority level of 
1).  Because the priority level can decay over time, specifying a lower 
component_priority will increase the residence time of the component on the scan 
queue list. 
 
number_of_alarms:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0. Specifies the number of 
alarms that will be included in the operator scan queue at the start of the ADS-
IDAC simulation.  If number_of_alarms is set to 0, no further safety parameter 
data should be entered.  If number_of_alarms is greater than or equal to 1, input 
data for each scanned alarm must be supplied or an error will be generated during 
input file processing.  Although an alarm actuation is one method for an operator 
to passively gather information, an alarm state cannot be perceived until either the 
alarm actuates or the operator actively verifies the alarm state.  For example, the 
activation of a mental belief that includes a prerequisite condition that an alarm is 
not actuated will require that (1) the alarm had previously actuated and cleared, or 
(2) the operator actively interrogated the alarm state.  Therefore, it is 
recommended that any alarms listed in the “KB_OAT_HardWiredDiagnosis.txt” 
with an expected state of “OFF” (i.e., integer code 3023, “VOFF”) be included in 
the initial alarm scan list. 
 
alarm_name:  Format: String.  Range: any. Contains the name of the parameter to 
be biased.  The parameter name must match a control panel parameter listed in the 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Spaces must not be used in the alarm_name (the 
underbar character “_” may be substituted for a space when needed). 
 
alarm_priority:  Format: Double.  Range: > 1.0.  Specifies the alarm’s initial 
priority level.  A lower alarm_priority level designates a higher priority alarm 
(i.e., the highest priority items are designated with a priority level of 1).  Because 
the priority level can decay over time, specifying a lower alarm_priority will 
increase the residence time of the alarm on the scan queue list. 
 
4. Sample Input 
 
Scan_Period_(seconds)   30.0 
Info_Load_Sensitivity   0.05 
System_Criticality_Sensitivty  0.05 
Priority_Decay_Time_(seconds)  300.0 
Relevance_Limit    0.3 
 
Number_of_Scanned_Parameters 6 
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SUR    3 
Core_Power   1 
RATE_Core_Power  2 
Loop_A_Tave   4 
Loop_B_Tave   4 
Loop_C_Tave   4 
 
Number_of_Scanned_Components 3 
Reactor_Trip     1 
Safety_Injection     1 







This input file places eleven items on the operator’s initial scan queue list (six 
parameter values, three component states, and two alarm states).  The operator 
will update the perceived value of these items every 30 seconds (scan_period = 
30.0).  A sensitivity factor of 0.05 is applied to both the information load and 
system criticality PIFs (the maximum allowable size of the scan queue is set by 
the scan_queue_limit parameter in the “ActionTaker.txt” input file).  Assuming 
the maximum allowable scan queue size of 30 items, if the information load PIF 
value was 5.0 and the system criticality PIF was 10, these sensitivity factors 
would limit the scan queue size to eleven items: 
 
Nscan queue  =  30 * ( 1 – 0.05 * 5.0 ) * ( 1 – 0.05 * 
10.0 ) 
  =  30 * ( 1 – 0.25 ) *  ( 1 – 0.5 ) 
  =  30 * ( 0.75 ) * ( 0.5 ) =  11.25 
 
 
Every 300 seconds (i.e., the priority_decay_time), the priority level items in the 
scan queue would be reduced by one increment if their associated relevance factor 
was less than the 0.3 relevance_limit.







In order to model an operator’s mental model of the reactor plant, a functional 
decomposition of reactor plant systems and components is used to link 
parameters, components, alarms, and controls that support similar functions.  The 
“KB_OAT_System_Decomposition.txt” input file identifies the key reactor plant 
functions and maps each control panel indicator, control, and alarm to these 
functions.  The system decomposition supports two main features in the ADS-
IDAC model: (1) skipping of procedure steps, and (2) management of the 
operator scan queue.  These features are supported by the assignment of a 
“relevance factor” (in the range of 0.0 – 1.0) to each component based on the 
operator’s perceived assessment of the plant state.  Items that are considered to be 
relevant to the current plant state assessment are assigned a high relevance factor, 
while items considered to be not relevant are assigned a low value.  The relevance 
is based on the diagnosis score for the functional imbalance(s) associated with the 
component.  Thus if the operator has diagnosed that a specific imbalance event 
has occurred, items associated with the functional imbalance will be assigned high 
relevance score.  For procedure step skipping, actions associated with items 
relevant to the plant state assessment will be less likely to be skipped, while 
actions associated with non-relevant items may be more likely to be skipped.  
Similarly, the priority level of items in the scan queue list that are relevant will 
remain at a higher level and are more likely to be retained in the scan queue. 
 
ADS-IDAC utilizes a functional component categorization based on the flow of 
energy, mass, and momentum.  In this modeling scheme, the reactor plant is 
viewed as a collection of mass, energy, and momentum flow paths, each 
containing sources and sinks.  For example, in a PWR, the reactor core is 
considered to be a source of energy, while each steam generator is considered to 
be an energy sink.  Because the reactor coolant system carries the energy released 
in the reactor core to the steam generators, any imbalance between energy 
production and removal will impact the reactor coolant energy state.  In general, 
the following rules are used to identify mass, energy, and momentum imbalances: 
 
 Energy flow imbalances are generally indicated by changes in temperature for 
subcooled single phase systems and changes in pressure for saturated two 
phase systems;   
 Imbalances between mass sources and sinks are generally related to net 
inventory measures such as tank or vessel levels; and 
 Momentum imbalances are generally indicated by changes in flow rates. 
 
This modeling technique provides a powerful mechanism for linking components 
within a functional framework.  In order to functionally categorize plant 
components, it is first necessary to identify the flow path boundaries.  Plant 
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system groups are used to represent the boundaries for mass, energy, and 
momentum flow paths.  In general, it is desirable to make the plant system group 
boundaries as broad as possible in order to maximize the ability to link plant 
components within the operator knowledge base.   
 
The strong coupling among nuclear plant systems presents a significant challenge 
when identifying functional system groups.  Within a nuclear plant, energy flow is 
often carried by moving fluids such as the reactor coolant or main steam systems; 
there-fore, changes in mass flow rate can directly impact energy flow.  
Consequently, coupling can result in imbalances in one flow type influencing a 
second flow type within the same system group or a connected system group.  
Coupling can also mask the cause of disruption in energy, mass, or momentum 
flow.  For example, changes in reactor coolant system temperature due to an 
imbalance between reactor core power and turbine load (an energy flow 
imbalance) can result in variations in system volume due to the expansion or 
contraction of the coolant (which might be interpreted as a mass flow imbalance).    
An additional consideration is the diagnostic capability afforded by the system 
groupings.  It is desirable to constrain the system group boundaries such that a 
flow imbalance within a grouping can be linked to a manageable number of 
potential causes.  In practice, the identification of the system groups requires a 
balance between maximizing the linkage between plant components, minimizing 
undesirable coupling, and providing a high level of diagnosticity.  For a 
pressurized water reactor model, it is recommended that five functional system 
groups be used (Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Pressurized Water Reactor 
System Groups and Flow Paths 
______________________________________________ 
System Group   Flow Paths 
______________________________________________ 
Reactor Coolant   Energy 
Mass 
Momentum 
Pressurizer   Energy 
Mass 
Steam Generators(1)  Energy 
Mass 
Secondary(2)   Energy 
Mass 
Containment   Energy 
_____________________________________________ 
(1) Each steam generator is considered a separate system group 
(2) The secondary system group includes the turbine, main steam, 
main feed, and condenser systems. 
 
The component map describes the functions associated with every control, 
indicator, and alarm available to the ADS-IDAC control room crew.   Each 
operator knowledge base includes a unique component functional map in order to 
match operator behavior with to a desired level of knowledge, skills, and abilities.  
A three parameter coding scheme is used to identify component functions.  The 
Input File: “KB_OAT_System_Decomposition.txt” September 20, 2009 
 K-134
first parameter identifies the type of flow (i.e., energy, mass, or momentum).  The 
second parameter identifies the system group that transports the energy, mass, or 
momentum flow.  The third parameter identifies how the component affects (or is 
associated with) the flow balance in the system group.  Thus, a possible 
component functional code might read: “energy flow, reactor coolant system, 
energy source”.  More than one functional code can be as-signed for a single 
component.  The “KB_OAT_System_Decomposition.txt” component functional 
map allows each component to be meaningfully linked within the operator 
knowledge base.   
 





function_name_1   function_code_1 
.     . 
function_name_n   function_code_n 
 
Control_Panel_Decomposition 
item_name_1  item_function_1 ....  item_function_j 999 
.   .    .    
item_name_m  item_function_1 ....  item_function_j 999 
 
3. Input Description 
 
text_desription_of_functional_decomposition: Format: String. Range: any.  The 
analyst may enter any desired text into this field.  However, the entire field entry 
must be enclosed in quotation marks (quotation marks may not be used within the 
field entry) ADS_IDAC recognizes quotation marks as a special character 
delineating the functional decomposition description.  This field provides the 
analyst to describe the reactor plant functional decomposition in plain language to 
improve the clarity of input data.  Because ADS-IDAC utilizes special integer 
codes to identify component functions (rather than text strings), this field can be 
used to provide a plain language “roadmap” between the function codes and 
function description.  To improve input file clarity and reduce data entry errors, it 
is recommended that the functional codes be assigned using a consistent 
framework.  One such framework uses three digit integers where each digit 
position has a defined purpose (as described in the Sample Input section).  
Although a text entry is optional, the analyst should supply a set of empty quotes 
(“ “) if no text description will be provided to avoid an error during input file 
processing. 
 
number_of_functions:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number of 
functions that will be used by the operator knowledge base.  If 
number_of_functions is set to 0, no further function data should be entered.  If 
number_of_functions is greater than or equal to 1, input data for each function 
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(i.e., function_name and function_code) must be supplied or an error will be 
generated during input file processing. 
 
function_name:  Format: String.  Range: any.  This parameter is used to specify 
the unique description name for each function.  Each function_name should be 
associated with a imbalance event included in the “KB_OAT_Event_Matrix.txt” 
input file.  Although the simulation will not stop if ADS-IDAC is unable to locate 
the function_name in the “KB_OAT_Event_Matrix.txt”, an error message will be 
generated and the relevance factor will be set to 0.0.  ADS-IDAC recognizes the 
special function_name “Not_Applicable” – this function should be used for items 
meant to provide executive control over the simulation (such as timers or other 
items that the analyst wishes to always be assigned a relevance factor of 1.0). 
 
function_code:  Format: Integer.  Range: any.  Specifies a unique identifying 
code for each function_name.  The function_code for each entry should be 
unique (codes should not be associated with more than one function_name).  It is 
recommended that the functional codes be assigned using a consistent framework 
such as using a multidigit integers where each digit position has a defined purpose 
(e.g., first digit refers to function, second digit refers to plant system, third digit 
refers to imbalance trend, etc.).  Only one function_code is assigned to each 
function_name. 
 
item_name:  Format: String. Range: any.  Specifies the specific control panel 
control, indicator, component, or alarm that will be described by the date entry.  
Each item included in the “ControlPanel.txt” file must have a functional 
description in both the ActionTaker and Decision Maker knowledge bases or an 
error will be generated during input file processing. 
 
item_function: Format: Integer.  Range: must match a function_code.  More than 
one code may be entered for a component.  It is not necessary to enter a 
function_code, but if no codes are specified, the associated control panel item will 
always have a relevance score of 0.0.  If an item is assigned the integer code for 
the “Not_Applicable” function (a special text code recognized by ADS-IDAC), 
the relevance factor for the item will be set equal to 1.0. 
 
Note: Each item data entry line should be terminated with the integer code “999”.  
This code is recognized by ADS-IDAC as the termination of the item functional 
description.  A “999” termination entry should be used even if no item_function 
codes are entered for the item. 
 
4. Sample Input 
 
“Functional Decomposition: 
   Function Type (First Digit) 
      1 – Mass Imbalance 
      2 – Energy Imbalance 
      3 – Momentum Imbalance 
   System Type (Second Digit) 
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      1 – Reactor Coolant System 
      2 – Pressurizer 
      3 – Steam Generator A 
      4 – Steam Generator B 
      5 – Steam Generator C 
      6 – Secondary System (Turbine, Condenser) 
      8 – Containment 
   Imbalance Trend (Third Digit) 
      1 – Decrease 
      2 – Increase 
   Special Codes 
     900 – Not Applicable” 
Number_of_Functional_Items 11 
Mass_Imbalance_RCS_Low   111 
Mass_Imbalance_PZR_Low   121  
Mass_Imbalance_SG_A_Low   131 
Mass_Imbalance_SG_B_Low   141 
Mass_Imbalance_SG_C_Low   151 
Energy_Imbalance_RCS_Low  211 
Energy_Imbalance_PZR_Low  221 
Energy_Imbalance_SG_A_Low  231 
Energy_Imbalance_SG_B_Low  241 
Energy_Imbalance_SG_C_Low  251 
Not_Applicable                      900 
 
Control_Panel_Decomposition 
Time    900 999 
Watchdog_Timer  900 999 
PZR_Level   111 121 999 
PZR_Level_Setpoint 111 121 999 




This sample input utilizes a set of three digit functional codes to describe the 
system functional decomposition.  The decomposition structure is described in the  
text_desription_of_functional_decomposition field.  The decomposition consists 
of three main function types (mass balance, energy balance, and momentum 
balance), eight primary system groups, and two imbalance trends.  The special 
function code “Not_Applicable” is also used as the functional code for certain 
items used to provide executive control over the simulation (i.e., Time and 
Watchdog_Timer).  The analyst may assign any functional integer code to the 
function “Not_Applicable”.  The three digit function code is interrupted as 
follows: the first digit describes the function type, the second digit provides the 
associated system group, and the third digit provides the trend direction.  Thus the 
integer code “241” is interrupted as an decreasing trend in SG B energy.  The 
input file provides specific functional codes for eleven imbalance events – each of 
these events should have a companion entry in the “KB_OAT_Event_Matrix.txt” 
input file.  In general, the analyst should designate functional codes for every 
function that can be described by the selected decomposition framework.  In this 
example, three function, eight system groups, and two trends would require 3 x 8 
x 2 = 48 separate functional entries. 
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The sample input also provides several examples of control panel item functional 
descriptions.  In this example, the parameter “ECCS_Flow” has been associated 
with the functions 111 (low mass in reactor coolant system), 121 (low mass in the 
pressurizer), and 211 (low energy in the reactor coolant system).  Thus, if the 
operator has diagnosed a low mass condition in the pressurizer (based on the 
symptoms described in the “KB_OAT_Event_Matrix.txt” input file), the 
parameter “ECCS_Flow” will be assigned a high relevance factor.  Consequently, 
actions associated with monitoring ECCS_Flow will be less likely to be skipped 
and the ECCS_Flow parameter, if it is listed in the scan queue, will be more likely 
to be retained in the monitoring list. 
 







Each operator profile includes data to define how the time constraint load PIF 
value is calculated.  The profile contains a listing of plant parameters used to 
calculate the time constraint PIF value along with the associated critical threshold 
values. Typical parameters to calculate this PIF include steam generator water 
levels, pressurizer water level, and reactor coolant system pressure.  Two different 
threshold levels are used to calculate the PIF value – a normal operation threshold 
and an accident threshold.  When the operator’s high level goal is maintaining 
normal operation or troubleshooting an abnormal condition, the normal operation 
threshold is used.  If the operator switches to the goal of mitigating an accident 
condition, the time constraint PIF value is based on the accident threshold.  The 
use of two different threshold values allows ADS-IDAC to capture an operator’s 
changing sensitivity to key parameters depending on the overall perceived plant 
condition.  In general, the normal accident threshold is set to a level 
corresponding to reactor plant trip set points.  The accident level threshold is 
normally set to a less restrictive value that is more indicative of the availability of 
a key safety function.  For example, if a plant that has an automatic reactor trip on 
low steam generator (SG) water level, an operator might focus on the time 
available until the reactor trip set point is reached during an uncontrolled decrease 
in SG level.  However, once the reactor is tripped, the operator’s focus might shift 
to simply maintaining adequate decay heat removal capability from the steam 
generator - a function that can be often be performed with a much lower SG level.  
Thus the normal threshold might be set equal to the low SG water level reactor 
trip set point while a less restrictive value is used for the accident threshold. 
 
The time constraint load PIF value is based on information perceived by the 
operator rather than data obtained directly from the thermal-hydraulic model.  
Perceived data will differ from the actual parameter value in thermal-hydraulic 
model due to time lags in updating perceived data and any distortion introduced 
by the perception filter.  The first step in determining the time constraint loading 
PIF is to determine the time available until each time constrained parameter 











     (Equation 5) 
 
In Equation 2a, ti,available is the time until the value of parameter i (Pi) exceeds 
threshold value Pi,Threshold.  The minimum value of ti,available (denoted as tmin,i) is 
then used to calculate the time constraint load PIF for the parameter Equation (6).  
 




















PIF   (Equation 6) 
 
The tuning constants tLower and tUpper are used to calibrate the PIF value to the 
desired operator characteristics.  Similar to the information loading PIF, if the 
minimum time available exceeds tUpper, the time constraint PIF value is set to 0.  If 
the minimum time available is less than tLower, the PIF value is assumed to saturate 
at a value of 10. 
 
In order to more realistically model dynamic changes in the time constrained PIF 
factor, the updated PIF value is passed through a lag filter to simulate the buildup 
and decay of stress associated with time constrained loading.  If the parameter 
value has not crossed the lower accident threshold value, the filter output is 















   (Equation 7) 
Where 
PIFOld  is last updated PIF value, 
PIFUpdated is the output from the lag filter 
PIFNew is the unfiltered PIF value 
tlapse is the update periodicity (in seconds), and  
τbuildup is the buildup time constant (in seconds). 
 
Once the parameter passes the accident threshold, the parameter PIF value is 
allowed to decay using the following formula (Equation 8): 
 
)1(10 /)( decaythresholdcurrent ttUpdatedTCL ePIF
   (Equation 8) 
 
Where 
PIFUpdated is the output from the lag filter 
tcurrent is the current simulation time 
tthreshold is the time that the parameter exceeded the accident threshold 
value 
τdecay is the decay time constant 
 
The overall time constraint PIF factor for the operator is set equal to the 
maximum parameter time constrained PIF value (i.e., the most limiting parameter 
establishes the PIF value for the operator). 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
Num_of_Time_Constrained_Parameters  number_of_parameters  
Time_Lapse_For_Update   time_lapse 
Lower_Threshold_(minutes)  lower_threshold 
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Upper_Threshold_(minutes)  upper_threshold 
Decay_Time_Constant_(sec)  decay_time_constant 
Buildup_Time_Constant_(time_steps) buildup_time_constant 
 
time_constrained_parameter_1   parameter_name_1  
nominal_value_1 normal_threshold_1 accident_threshold_1 
. 
. 
time_constrained_parameter_n   parameter_name_n 
nominal_value_n normal_threshold_n accident_threshold_n 
 
3. Input Description 
 
number_of_parameters: Format: Integer. Range: > 0.  This parameter specifies 
the number of time constraint load parameters included in the 
“KB_OAT_Time_Constrained_Input.txt” file.  The number_of_parameters 
must equal the actual number of time constrained parameters listed in this file.   
 
time_lapse: Format: Double. Range: > 0.  Specifies the time increment (in 
seconds) between successive updates in time constrained parameter values.  
Because time constrained parameters are based on perceived information, the 
update uses the operator’s currently memorized value.  If the operator has not 
perceived a new parameter value since the last update, an updated value is 
calculated from the perceived rate of change of the parameter value. 
 
lower_threshold: Format: Double. Range: > 0.  Specifies the lower threshold 
value used to calculate the time constraint PIF factor for each monitored 
parameter.  If the time to reach the applicable threshold value is less than the 
lower_threshold, the parameter PIF value is set to 10.0.  If the time to reach 
between the lower_threshold and upper_threshold, the PIF value is 
interpolated based on the parameter value and rate of change.  
 
upper_threshold:  Format: Double. Range: > 0. Specifies the upper threshold 
value used to calculate the time constraint PIF factor for each monitored 
parameter.  If the time to reach the applicable threshold value is greater than the 
upper_threshold, the parameter PIF value is set to 0.0.  If the time to reach 
between the lower_threshold and upper_threshold, the PIF value is 
interpolated based on the parameter value and rate of change.  
 
decay_time_constant: Format: Double. Range: > 0.  Specifies the decay 
constant to be applied to the parameter PIF value when the associated parameter 
exceeds the accident threshold.   
 
buildup_time_constant Format: Double. Range: > 0.  Specifies the buildup 
time constant to be applied to the parameter PIF value.  This parameter allows a 
more realistic buildup and decay of time constrained induced stress. 
 
time_constrained_parameter: Format: String.  Range: any. Descriptive name 
for the time constrained parameter.  Spaces must not be used (use the underbar 
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character (“_”) rather than a space when needed.  It is recommended that time 
constrained parameters be given the prefix “TCL_” to improve the readability of 
the output files.   
 
parameter_name:  Format: String. Range: Must match a parameter_name listed 
in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Specifies the monitored parameter for the 
time constrained factor. 
 
nominal_value: Format: Double. Range: any, should be consistent with the 
monitored parameter.  Specifies the nominal value for the monitored parameter.  
This parameter is used to determine if the normal parameter value is above or 
below the applicable threshold values. 
 
normal_threshold: Format: Double. Range: any, should be consistent with the 
monitored parameter.  Establishes the parameter threshold value used during 
normal operation.  For the purposes of calculating the time constrained loading 
factor, normal operation is considered to apply for any crew goal except: (1) 
maintaining global safety margin or (2) troubleshooting when the reactor is 
tripped. 
 
accident_threshold:  Format: Double. Range: any, should be consistent with 
the monitored parameter.  Establishes the parameter threshold value used during 
emergency operation. For the purposes of calculating the time constrained loading 
factor, emergency operation is considered to apply when the crew goal is: (1) 
maintaining global safety margin or (2) troubleshooting when the reactor is 
tripped. 
 
4. Sample Input 
 
Num_of_Time_Constrained_Parameters   3  
Time_Lapse_For_Update    30.0 
Lower_Threshold_(minutes)   5.0 
Upper_Threshold_(minutes)   25.0 
Decay_Time_Constant_(sec)   100.0 
Buildup_Time_Constant_(time_steps)  50.0 
TCL_PZR_Pressure  PZR_Pressure  
2250.  2000.  750. 
TCL_PZR_Level  PZR_Level  
0.50  .20  .10 
TCL_SG_A_NR_Level  SG_A_NR_Level  




This sample defines three parameters that are used to calculate the overall time 
constraint load factor:  
 
 pressurizer pressure (PZR_Pressure): The nominal value is 2250 psig, the 
normal operating threshold value is 2000 psig (a value just above the 
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reactor trip setpoint), and the accident threshold is 750 psig (a value just 
above the pressure at which the safety injection accumulators passively 
inject cooling water). 
 
 pressurizer level (PZR_Level): The nominal value is 0.50 (50% water 
level), the normal operating threshold is 20% (a value just below the lower 
range of the controller range), and the accident threshold is 10% (the crew 
should initiate safety injection at a level of 0.12). 
 
 steam generator A narrow range level (SG_A_NR_Level): The nominal 
level is 44%, the normal operating threshold is 25% (a level just below the 
lower end of the normal controller range), and the accident threshold is 
10% (the minimum level required for the SG to be credited as a heat sink) 
 
Parameter values are updated every 30 seconds (time_lapse_for_update).  If the 
time to reach a threshold value is less then 5 minutes, the PIF factor is set to 10.0 
(lower_threshold).  If the time to reach a threshold is greater than 25 minutes, the 
PIF factor is set to 0 (upper_threshold).  
 









The Decision Maker fulfills the role of control room supervisor (or senior reactor 
operator) within the nuclear plant control room environment.  The Decision Maker is 
responsible for directing all written procedures (e.g., emergency operating procedures) 
and selecting high level crew goals.  However, the Decision Maker does not directly 
manipulate control panel controls.  Instead, the Decision Maker directs the Action Taker 
to execute control manipulations and provide indicator readings.  Although the Decision 
Maker can implement mental procedures, because of the limitation that all plant 
interactions must be executed by the Action Taker, the Decision Maker cannot 
independently perform activities.  The Decision Maker’s selection of high level crew 
goals influencing the overall problem solving strategy (e.g., following written procedures 
or executing knowledge-based problem solving).  Additionally, only the Decision Maker 
can initiate transitions between written procedures (e.g., between emergency operating 
procedures, or entry into functional recovery guidelines).  These input files, in 
conjunction with the procedure step input files, constitute the knowledge base for the 
Decision Maker.  The knowledge base is intended to mode the skills, abilities, and 




The following files have the same form and content as the Action Taker input file.  There 
are two main differences between the Action Taker and the Decision Maker input files: 
(1) Decision Maker input files are located in the Input/Crew/DecisionMaker project file 
directory (rather than the Input/Crew/ActionTaker directory), and (2) in general, the 
Decision Maker file names replace the acronym “OAT” with “ODM” to designate that 
the files are associated with the Decision Maker.  Additionally, the DecisionMaker.txt 
input file has the same form and content as the ActionTaker.txt input file.  Refer to the 
Action Taker input file descriptions earlier in this section for a detailed description of the 
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Because only the Decision Maker can direct knowledge-based actions, a more complete 
file description of the “KB_ODM_Diagnosis_Actions.txt” input file is included in this 
section.






Diagnosis actions are used to implement the knowledge-based problem solving 
approach when the control room crew is implementing the “troubleshooting” 
goal.  This problem-solving approach is intended to model knowledge-based 
actions that an operator might perform outside the scope of the emergency 
procedures.  Diagnostic actions are grouped within functional areas that are 
aligned with the imbalance events described in the “KB_OAT_Event_Matrix.txt” 
file.  Because many possible actions may be available to address a specific 
imbalance event, each diagnosis action is assigned a priority level and a set of 
prerequisite conditions.  Based on their perception of the plant state, operators 
might execute actions they believe to be reasonable given their situational 
assessment but are not necessarily covered by plant procedures.    Examples of 
such actions include reducing reactor coolant system water injection when 
pressurizer level is high or decreasing the steam dump rate when steam generator 
pressure is low.   Within ADS-IDAC, knowledge-based actions can be activated 
when, based on the operator’s perceived plant state, the event membership value 
of a functional imbalance diagnosis exceeds a pre-defined threshold value.  For 
example, an imbalance diagnosis of “low mass in the reactor coolant system” 
might lead an operator to increase reactor coolant system injection flow, reduce 
normal letdown flow, or actuate emergency core cooling systems.  Knowledge-
based actions have the following characteristics and properties in the ADS-IDAC 
model: 
 
 Action rules are organized within functional imbalance diagnostic groups.  
Each possible functional imbalance event can be associated with a list of 
actions intended to mitigate the associated mass, energy, or momentum 
imbalance. 
 
 Each functional imbalance diagnosis group is as-signed a priority level in 
order to reflect the relative importance of the associated actions to the 
operator.  For example, actions intended to address inadequate core 
cooling might be sequenced before actions to address low steam generator 
inventory in a single steam generator.  The priority can be adjusted to 
reflect an opera-tor’s knowledge, experience, and problem solving style. 
 
 Each action can be assigned a set of prerequisite conditions that must be 
met prior to execution of the action.  Prerequisites are used to better model 
the heuristic rules an operator might use to activate a specific action.  
Prerequisites can be associated with plant parameters, component states, 
alarms, active procedures in use, or an operator’s mental beliefs. 
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 Once an action in a functional diagnosis group has been activated, further 
actions within the functional area will be blocked for a pre-defined 
dormancy period.  The dormancy period allows the operator to address 
other, possibly lower priority, functional areas. 
 
As an example of  the implementation of knowledge-based actions, consider the 
depressurization of reactor coolant system following a steam generator tube 
rupture.  The EOPs direct the operator to reduce primary pressure in order to 
equalize reactor coolant system pressure and ruptured steam generator pressure.  
This action reduces coolant leakage through the ruptured steam generator tube 
and facilitates re-fill of the reactor coolant system.  Although a knowledge-based 
paradigm for execution of this action will not match the efficiency and stability 
afforded by the EOPs, knowledge based rules can be used to achieve a similar end 
state. 
 
In the current version of ADS-IDAC, all knowledge-based actions are initiated by 
the Decision Maker; therefore the diagnosis action file for the Action Taker does 
not affect the simulation.   
 
2. Input File Format 
 
 number_of_diagnoses number_of_imbalance_diagnoses 
 
diagnosis_name  imbalance_diagnosis_name_1 
diagnosis_priority diagnosis_priority 
reset_delay_time  minimum_time  weibull_alpha
 weibull_beta 
number_of_actions  number_of_actions 
 
action_name  action_name_1 
action_priority action_priority_1 
action_type  action_type_1 
control_input [control_input_value_1] 
[control_parameter_1] 
lower_limit  lower_control_limit_1 
upper_limit  upper_control_limit_1 
number_of_prerequisites number_of_prerequsites 
item_name_1  [parameter_1 
 parameter_2]  
[verification} 
[minimum_time weibull_alpha 




.   . 
.   . 
item_name_n  [parameter_1 
 parameter_2]  
[verification} 
[minimum_time weibull_alpha 
 weibull_beta]  
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expected_state [relationship value_1
 value_2] 






diagnosis_name  imbalance_diagnosis_name_n 
diagnosis_priority diagnosis_priority 
reset_delay_time  double_1 double_2 double_3 
number_of_actions  number_of_actions 
 
action_name  action_name_1 
action_priority action_priority_1 
action_type  action_type_1 
control_input [control_input_value_1] 
[control_parameter_1] 
lower_limit  lower_control_limit_1 
upper_limit  upper_control_limit_1 
number_of_prerequisites number_of_prerequsites 
item_name_1  [parameter_1 
 parameter_2]  
[verification} 
[minimum_time weibull_alpha 




.   . 
.   . 
item_name_n  [parameter_1 
 parameter_2]  
[verification} 
[minimum_time weibull_alpha 
 weibull_beta]  
expected_state [relationship value_1
 value_2] 
logic_flag   
 
  . 
  . 
  . 
 
 
3. Input Description 
 
number_of_diagnoses: Format: Integer. Range: > 0.  This parameter specifies the 
number of diagnosis event categories used for knowledge-based actions.  The 
number_of_diagnoses must equal the actual number of diagnosis event categories 
entered in this input file.   
 
imbalance_diagnosis_name: Format: String. Range: Must match a valid 
event_name of diagnosis type “Imbalance” in the “KB_ODM_Event_Matrix.txt” 
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input file.  Specifies the event diagnosis used to activate the associated 
knowledge-based actions. 
 
diagnosis_priority: Format: Integer.  Range: > 1.  Specifies the priority level 
of the associated imbalance_diagnosis_name.  A lower diagnosis_priority 
value designates a higher priority imbalance diagnosis (i.e., the highest priority 
items are designated with a priority level of 1).   
 
minimum_time: Format: double.  Range: > 0.0.  In conjunction with the 
weibull_alpha and weibull_beta variables, specifies the: (1) dormancy time for 
the associated diagnosis actions following activation, and (2) the required to 
evaluate action prerequisites.  In order to capture the uncertainty associated with 
the these times, a three parameter Weibull probability distribution is used.  The 



















tF exp1)(   
 (Equation 9) 
 
Where: 
   minimum_time = u (minimum time), seconds 
   weibull_alpha = α parameter 
weibull_beta  = β parameter 
 
In addition to specifying the reset delay time for the associated imbalance event, 
this parameter should be provided for all prerequisite data fields except when the 
prerequisite item_name is set to the reserved word Mental_Belief.   
 
weibull_alpha: Format: double.  Range: > 0.0.  In conjunction with the 
weibull_alpha and weibull_beta variables, specifies the: (1) dormancy time for 
the associated diagnosis actions following activation, and (2) the required to 
evaluate action prerequisites.  In addition to specifying the reset delay time for the 
associated imbalance event, this parameter should be provided for all prerequisite 
data fields except when the prerequisite item_name is set to the reserved word 
Mental_Belief.   
 
weibull_beta: Format: double.  Range: > 0.0.  In conjunction with the 
weibull_alpha and weibull_beta variables, specifies the: (1) dormancy time for 
the associated diagnosis actions following activation, and (2) the required to 
evaluate action prerequisites.  In addition to specifying the reset delay time for the 
associated imbalance event, this parameter should be provided for all prerequisite 
data fields except when the prerequisite item_name is set to the reserved word 
Mental_Belief.   
 
number_of_actions: Format: Integer. Range: > 0.  This parameter specifies the 
number of knowledge-based actions associated with the  
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imbalance_diagnosis_name.  The number_of_actions must equal the actual 
number of actions entered for the imbalance event. 
 
action_name: Format: String.  Range: Must match a valid controller listed in the 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Specifies the controller that is manipulated by the 
knowledge-based action. 
 
action_priority: Format: Integer.  Range: > 1.  Specifies the priority level of 
the associated action_name.  A lower action_priority value designates a higher 
priority imbalance diagnosis (i.e., the highest priority items are designated with a 
priority level of 1).  Higher priority actions are performed prior to lower priority 
actions.  
 
action_type: Format: Integer.  Range:  Should refer to one of the following 






Simple controller manipulation.  The 
action_name controller will be 
positioned to the value specified by 
control_input 
3112 VADDITIVE 
The action_name controller control 
value will be incremented by the 
amount specified by the control_input  
variable.   
3139 VPARAMETER_CONTROL 
The action_name controller will be 
positioned to the perceived value of 
the control_parameter indicator.  If 
the control_parameter value has not 
been perceived by the operator, no 
control manipulation is performed.  
 
 
[control_input_value]: Format: Double. Range: any, but should be consistent 
with the control range of the controller specified by the action_name variable.  
This data filed must be provided when the action_type is 3074 (VACTION) or 
3112 (VADDITIVE).   
 
[control_parameter]: Format: String.  Range: Must match a valid 
parameter_name, listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Specifies the control 
panel indicator value that will be used to provide the control value for the 
action_name controller. This field shall only be included when the action_type is 
3139 (VPARAMETER_CONTROL). 
 
lower_control_limit: Format: Double. Range: any, but should be consistent 
with the control range of the controller specified by the action_name variable.  
Specifies the lower control limit for the action_name controller.  Actions that 
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would cause the controller position to decrease below the lower_control_limit are 
not performed. 
 
upper_control_limit: Format: Double. Range: any, but should be consistent with 
the control range of the controller specified by the action_name variable.  
Specifies the upper control limit for the action_name controller.  Actions that 
would cause the controller position to increase above the upper_control_limit are 
not performed. 
 
number_of_prerequsites:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number 
of prerequisites associated with the knowledge-based action. The 
number_of_prerequisites must exactly match the number of expectation units 
included with the knowledge-based action or an error will occur during input file 
processing or program execution. Similar to procedure step expectations, action 





Figure 17, "Prerequisite Logic Tree" 
 
 
In this example, the action prerequisites are met only if all of the following 
conditions are true: (1) either expectation 1a or 1b is true, (2) expectation 2 is 
true, and (3) expectation 3 is true.  Procedure expectations are verified in 
sequential order until it is determined that either the action expectations are met or 
not met (e.g., once it is determined that the action expectation cannot be met, any 
remaining expectations will not be verified).  For the purposes of counting the 
number of prerequisites, only prerequisite units connected with “AND” logic 
gates are counted.  Therefore, this example has only three prerequisite conditions 
(since Prerequisites 1a and 1b are connected with an “OR” logic gate). 
 
item_name:  Format: String.  Range: Must meet either of the following criteria: 
(1) match a valid parameter_name, component_name, or alarm_name listed in 
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or Parameter_Difference.  If the item_name is set to a valid parameter_name, 
component_name, or alarm_name, the specified indicator is compared to an  
expected value or state.  If the item_name is set to the reserved word 
Mental_Belief, the mental belief specified by parameter_1 is compared to an 
expected state.  If the item_name is set to the reserved word 
Parameter_Difference, the difference between parameter_1 and parameter_2  is 
compared to an expected value. 
 
[parameter_1]:  Format: String. Range: Must meet either of the following 
criteria: (1) if item_name is set to Mental_Belief, parameter_1 must match a 
valid mental_belief_name listed in the 
“KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt” input file, or (2) if the item_name 
is set to Parameter_Difference, expect_parameter_1 must match a valid 
parameter_name listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  This variable is only 
provided if the item_name is set to Mental_Belief or Parameter_Difference.  
 
[parameter_2]:  Format: String. Range: Must match a valid parameter_name 
listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  This variable is only provided if the 
item_name is set to Parameter_Difference. 
 
[verification]: Format: Integer.  Range: Must be one of the following integer 
codes 3002 (VYES), 3003 (VNO), or 3045 (VNONE).  When the operator is 
relying on the use of memorized information (set by the 
information_branch_probability in the “ActionTaker.txt” or 
“DecisionMaker.txt” input files), prerequisites may be evaluated using old 
information, particularly during dynamic situations.  Although this may model 
real operator behavior in certain situations, there are times when operators would 
be expected to re-verify control panel indicators even when the indicator had been 
perceived earlier.  In order to force the operator to perform this reverification, the 
verification variable can be set to 3002 (VYES).  If the verification variable is set 
to 3003 (VNO) or 3045 (VNONE) the operator will not reverify the control panel 
indications and will always use previously perceived information (if available).  If 
the operator has not previously perceived the indicator value or state (or if the 
information is deemed to be too old), the operator will reverify the information 
regardless of the value of the verification variable.    
 
expected_state: Format: Integer.  Range: Depending on the value of 
item_name variable and/or the type of control panel indicator used to evaluate the 
















Integer code should be consistent 
with the threshold_type specified for 
the component in the 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file input 
file for the associated component 













All mental beliefs are initialized to 
the state VNONE at the beginning of 
the simulation.  
 
The expected_state is only provided if the item_name is set to either (1) 
Mental_Belief, or (2) a valid alarm or component name listed in the 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file. 
 
[relationship] : Format: Integer.  Range: 3006 (VGT), 3007 (VGE), 3008 
(VEQ), 3009 (VLE), 3010 (VLT), or 3032 (VBETWEEN). Specifies the type of 
comparison to be used to evaluate the prerequisite condition.  The following 
comparison types may be used: 
 
3006 (Integer code for “VGT”):  If parameter referenced by item_name is 
greater than the value_1, the prerequisite condition is satisfied. 
 
3007 (Integer code for “VGE”):  If parameter referenced by item_name is 
greater than or equal to the value_1, the prerequisite condition is satisfied. 
 
3008 (Integer code for “VEQ”): If parameter referenced by item_name is 
equal to the value_1, the prerequisite condition is satisfied. 
 
3009 (Integer code for “VLE”): If parameter referenced by item_name is less 
than or equal to the value_1, the prerequisite condition is satisfied. 
 
3010 (Integer code for “VLT”): If parameter referenced by item_name is less 
than the value_1, the prerequisite condition is satisfied. 
  
3032 (Integer code for “VBETWEEN”): If parameter referenced by 
item_name is between the value_1 and the value_2, the prerequisite condition 
is satisfied.  value_1 must be less than the value of value_2. 
 
[value_1]: Format: Double.  Range: any, but should be consistent with range of 
the associated item_name parameter.  Specifies the threshold value used to 
evaluate the action prerequisite. 
 
[value_2]: Format: Double.  Range: any, but should be consistent with range of 
the associated item_name parameter. Specifies the threshold value used to 
evaluate the action prerequisite.  Although the value_2 variable is only used to 
evaluate the expectation if the relationship is set to 3032 (VBETWEEN), a 
dummy value must be supplied for all other relationship values. 
 
[logic_flag]: Format: Integer.  Range:  Should be one of the following integer 
codes: 3002 (VYES), 3003 (VNO), or 3045 (VNONE).  The logic_flag is used to 
establish the Boolean relationship between successive prerequisite conditions.  If 
the logic_flag is set to 3002 (VYES), the current prerequisite condition and the 
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next prerequisite will be connected with “OR” gate logic to form one prerequisite 
unit.  Prerequisite conditions connected with the logic_flag set to 3002 (VYES) 
count as a single prerequisite unit for the purposes of setting the 
number_of_prerequisites variable.  When the VYES option is selected, satisfying 
any one of the associated prerequisite conditions will satisfy the entire 
prerequisite unit.  When the logic_flag is set to 3003 (VNO) or 3045 (VNONE), 
the current prerequisite and the next prerequisite are treated as separate 
prerequisite units and are connected by “AND” gate logic.  In this case, each 
prerequisite condition must be satisfied in order to satisfy the complete 
knowledge-based action prerequisite set.  There is no limit on the number of 
individual prerequisites that can be connected with “OR” and “AND” gate logic.  
Thus, it is possible to create complex prerequisite requirements.   
 




diagnosis_name  Mass_Imbalance_PZR_Low 
diagnosis_priority 2 
reset_delay_time  100.0 1.0 1.0 
number_of_actions  2 
 
action_name  X_PZR_PORV 
action_priority 2 
action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites  1 
PZR_Pressure  3045  0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3009 2290.0  0.0 3045 
 
action_name  X_SIAS 
action_priority 3 
action_type  3074 
control_input 1.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 3 
PZR_Level  3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3009 0.20   0.0
 3003 
PZR_Pressure 3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3009 2150.0  0.0
 3003 
Safety_Injection 3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3023 3045 
 
diagnosis_name  Mass_Imbalance_PZR_High 
diagnosis_priority 5 
reset_delay_time  200.0 1.0 1.0 
number_of_actions  2 
 
action_name  X_HPI_Pump_A 
action_priority 2 
action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
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upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 3 
A_HPI_Pump_On 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3022 3003 
Min_Sub_Cooling 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3007 10.0 0.0
 3045 
PZR_Level  3045 0.0 1.0 2.0 3045 3007 0.20 0.0
 3045 
 
action_name  X_HPI_Pump_B 
action_priority 3 
action_type  3074 
control_input 0.0 
lower_limit  0.0 
upper_limit  1.0 
number_of_prerequisites 3 
B_HPI_Pump_On 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3022 3045 
Min_Sub_Cooling 3045 1.0 3.0 2.0 3045 3007 10.0 0.0
 3045 





The above example provides knowledge-based actions for two imbalance 
diagnoses: (1) a low mass imbalance in the pressurizer and (2) a high mass 
imbalance in the pressurizer.  The low mass pressurizer imbalance condition (i.e., 
low pressurizer water inventory) includes the following actions: 
 
 Manually closing the pressurizer power operated relief valve (i.e., 
positioning the X_PZR_PORV controller to a control position of 0.0) 
provided that the pressurizer pressure is less than the PORV setpoint of 
2290 psig. Because this action has a higher priority (i.e., a priority value 
closer to 1), it will be performed first. 
 
 Manually actuating safety injection by positioning the X_SIAS controller 
to a control position of 1.0 provided that the pressurizer level is less than 
20% and pressurizer pressure is less than 2150 psig, and safety injection 
has not already been actuated. 
 
The high mass pressurizer imbalance condition (i.e., high pressurizer water 
inventory), specifies the following actions:  
 
 Manually stop the A high pressure safety injection pump by positioning 
the X_HPI_Pump_A controller to a control position of 0.0 provided that 
the pump is on, the pressurizer water level is greater than 20%, and the 
minimum subcooling margin is greater than 10 F.  This action has the 
higher priority and is performed first. 
 
 Manually stop the B high pressure safety injection pump by positioning 
the X_HPI_Pump_B controller to a control position of 0.0 provided that 
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the pump is on, the pressurizer water level is greater than 20%, and the 
minimum subcooling margin is greater than 10 F.  This action has a lower 
priority and would be performed later during the event sequence.   
 
 






ADS-IDAC includes the capability to represent both the structure and content of many 
types of plant procedures.  Procedure step execution follows the standard format of action 
execution followed by expectation verification.  If the action expectations are not met, a 
mitigative action can be performed.  Four general types of procedural actions can be 
executed: (1) changing the component operating mode (e.g., automatic vs. manual mode), 
(2) setting a specific control value for a component (e.g., throttling control valve to 50% 
open), (3) incrementing the control setting of a component (e.g., throttling open a control 
valve by an additional 10%), and (4) setting a control value based on a perceived 
parameter (e.g., setting the steam dump target pressure equal to the perceived main steam 
header pressure).  These capabilities provide sufficient flexibility to realistically model all 
significant operator interactions with the plant model. 
 
Generally, a written procedure is continued until the procedure is completed. However, 
the procedure flow may be interrupted by procedure transfers (which direct the crew to a 
different procedure), activation of an instinctive response action, or abandonment of the 
“Follow Written Procedure” strategy.  Two types of procedure transfers can be modeled: 
(1) a permanent procedure transfer and (2) a temporary transfer to an auxiliary procedure 
followed by resumption of the initial procedure.  An example of the first type of 
procedure transfer is the transfer from a general reactor trip procedure to a more specific 
emergency procedure (e.g., transfer from the Westinghouse E-0 to E-3 procedures during 
a steam generator tube rupture event).  The second type of transfer supports 
implementation of functional recovery guidelines that are used to temporarily interrupt 
the current procedure to address a degraded condition. 
 
Four types of event sequence branches can be generated during procedure execution: (1) 
mental procedure activation time branches, (2) action execution time branches, (3) action 
control value branches, and (4) step skipping.  After a mental belief listed in the 
“KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt” is activated, the associated memorized 
mental procedure is initiated after the activation time delay has elapsed.  Mental 
procedure activation time branches allow the analyst to examine the impact of variations 
in the activation time delay.  Action execution time branches enable multiple event 
sequence branches to be generated to model variations in the time taken by the control 
room crew in performing procedure actions.  Action control value branches can be used 
to model variations in control inputs such as control valve positioning and the setting of 
control system target setpoints.  Finally, procedure step skipping branches model the 
omissions of procedure actions based on the relevance of the step actions to the 
operator’s situational assessment.  The ADS-IDAC step skipping model is described in 
more detail in the “Procedures.txt” input file description. 
 


















The “MentalProcedureActivationTimeBranches.txt” input file allows multiple 
accident sequence branches to be generated when a memorized mental procedure 
is activated. Following activation of a mental belief, the operator will implement 
the associated mental procedure (if one is specified) after an activation time delay 
has elapsed.  In order to capture the uncertainty and crew-to-crew variability 
associated with the time delay between activation of a mental belief and the 
execution of the associated memorized mental procedure, the activation delay is 
modeled with a three-parameter Weibull probability density distribution.  When 
only one mental procedure activation time branch is generated, the activation time 
delay is equal to the mean value of Weibull distribution.  If more than one 
activation time delay branch is generated, the probability distribution is 
partitioned into one or more segments and the time delay for each sequence 
branch is determined by the mean value over the associated partition.  The 
partition boundaries are determined by dividing the probability range of the 
Weibull cumulative probability distribution function into a number of segments 
equal to the number of desired branches.  If five activation time branches were to 
be generated, the cumulative probability distribution would be partitioned into 






















































    μ = 25 seconds
    α = 212 seconds
    β = 1.38
♦ - Branching Time
 
Figure 18, "Partitioned Weibull Time Distribution (Activation Branching)" 
 
The activation time for each branch is the mean activation time over the 
associated partition.  For example, the activation time for the first and second 
branch partitions are found as follows (Equation 10):  
 














































   (Equation 10) 
 
Where t1-2 and t2-3 correspond to the partition times between partions 1 and 2 and 
partitions 2 and 3, respectively.  In this case, where F(t) is the cumulative 
probability density function, F(t1-2) = 0.2 and F(t2-3 ) = 0.4.  This approach 
captures the probabilistic nature of the mental procedure activation time while 
maintaining the reproducibility of the analysis. 
 









3. Input Description 
 
number_of_items:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number of 
mental procedure activation time branches included in the 
“MentalProcedureActivationTimeBranches.txt” input file.  Branching events are 
read by the program in the order that they are listed in the input file.  Therefore, if 
more than the specified number_of_items are described in the input file, only the 
first number_of_items are read.     
 
Changing the number_of_items variable provides a convenient method for 
enabling and disabling branching events.  The analyst can disable all branching 
events by setting the number_of_items variable to 0 (it is not necessary to delete 
each branching event from the file).  If only one branching event will be activated, 
the desired event is simply moved to the beginning of the branching event list and 
the number_of_items variable is set to 1 (all other branching events will be 
ignored and need not be removed from the input file). 
 
mental_belief:  Format: String.  Range: Must match a valid 
mental_belief_name in the “KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt” input 
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file.  Specifies the mental belief the mental belief that activates the branching 
event. 
  
mental_procedure: Format: String.  Range: Must match a valid mental 
procedure procedure_name listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file.  Mental 
procedures are identified by the procedure_name prefix “MPBG_”. 
 
number_of_branches: Format: Integer.  Range: > 1.  Specifies the number of 
event sequence branches that will be generated. 
 
4. Sample Input 
 
Instinctive_Response_Activation_Time_Branches  2 
SG_A_SGTR_Isolate_AFW MPBG_SG_A_Isolate_AFW  3 




The sample input describes mental procedure activation time branching rules: 
 
 When the “SG_A_SGTR_Isolate_AFW” mental belief is activated, three 
mental activation time branches are generated prior to initiation of the mental 
procedure “MPBG_SG_A_Isolate_AFW”.  Each time branch corresponds to a 
different partition of the activation time probability distribution.  The first 
branch represents the shortest activation time and the third branch represents 
the longest activation time delay. 
 
 When the “SG_A_FWRV_Manual_Mode” mental belief is activated, five 
timing branches are generated prior to initiation of the 
“MPBG_SG_A_FWRV_Manual_Mode” mental procedure. The first branch 
represents the shortest activation time and the fifth branch represents the 
longest activation time delay. 







The “ProcedureActionTimeBranches.txt” input file allows multiple accident 
sequence branches to be generated when a procedure action is executed.  The 
ADS-IDAC procedure following model allows the analyst to specify the time 
taken to execute each step action.  In order to capture the uncertainty and crew-to-
crew variability associated with the time required to perform a proceduralized 
action, the time required to execute an action is modeled with a three-parameter 
Weibull probability density distribution.  When only one action time branch is 
generated, the required action execution time is equal to the mean value of 
Weibull distribution.  If more than one action execution time branch is generated, 
the probability distribution is partitioned into one or more segments and the time 
for each sequence branch is determined by the mean value over the associated 
partition.  The partition boundaries are determined by dividing the probability 
range of the Weibull cumulative probability distribution function into a number of 
segments equal to the number of desired branches.  For example, if five activation 
time branches were to be generated, the cumulative probability distribution would 






















































    μ = 25 seconds
    α = 212 seconds
    β = 1.38
♦ - Branching Time
 
Figure 19, "Partitioned Weibull Time Distribution (Procedure Branching)" 
 
The execution time for each branch is the mean time over the associated partition.  
For example, the activation time for the first and second branch partitions are 
found as follows (Equation 11):  
 













































  (Equation 11) 
 
Where t1-2 and t2-3 correspond to the partition times between partions 1 and 2 and 
partitions 2 and 3, respectively.  In this case, where F(t) is the cumulative 
probability density function, F(t1-2) = 0.2 and F(t2-3 ) = 0.4.  This approach 
captures the probabilistic nature of the action execution time while maintaining 
the reproducibility of the analysis. 
   
 
2. Input File Format 
 
Procedure_Action_Time_Branches  number_of_items 
procedure_name_1   step_name_1   action_name_1   
number_of_branches 
.    .     .     . 
procedure_name_1   step_name_1   action_name_1   
number_of_branches 
 
3. Input Description 
 
number_of_items: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number of 
procedure action time branches included in the 
“ProcedureActionTimeBranches.txt” input file.  Branching events are read by the 
program in the order that they are listed in the input file.  Therefore, if more than 
the specified number_of_items are described in the input file, only the first 
number_of_items are read.     
 
Changing the number_of_items variable provides a convenient method for 
enabling and disabling branching events.  The analyst can disable all branching 
events by setting the number_of_items variable to 0 (it is not necessary to delete 
each branching event from the file).  If only one branching event will be activated, 
the desired event is simply moved to the beginning of the branching event list and 
the number_of_items variable is set to 1 (all other branching events will be 
ignored and need not be removed from the input file). 
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procedure_name: Format: String. Range: Must match a valid procedure 
procedure_name listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file. Specifies the procedure 
associated with the branching rule. 
 
step_name: Format: String. Range: Must match a valid procedure step_name 
listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file. Specifies the procedure step associated 
with the branching rule. 
 
   
 
action_name: Format: String. Range: Must match a control_name listed in the 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file.  If the control_name is not referenced by the 
associated procedure step, no branches will be generated (and no error will be 
generated).   
 
number_of_branches: Format: Integer.  Range: > 1.  Specifies the number of 
event sequence branches that will be generated. 
 
4. Sample Input 
 
Procedure_Action_Time_Branches 2 
MPBG_SG_A_Increase_FWRV  Step_1  X_SG_A_FWRV 2 




This sample input defines two action time branching rules: 
 
 When the action “X_SG_A_FWRV” is executed by procedure 
“MPBG_SG_A_Increase_FWRV”, step “Step_1”, two time branches will be 
generated to model variability in the specified action time.  Execution of the 
action “X_SG_A_FWRV” by a different procedure step will not generate 
branching events. 
 
 When the time delay action “Time” is executed by procedure “E_3”, step 
“Briefing_Hold_1”, three action time branches will be generated.  This 
branching rule will generate three delay times – a short time, a nominal time, 
and a long time based on the time probability distribution specified for the 
action. 
 







For procedure step actions associated with a quantitative control input (e.g., 
opening a throttle valve to 10% open), two or more branches can be generated to 
explore the effect of variations in the control input.  The 
“ProcedureControlValueBranches.txt”is used to specify when these quantitative 
control value sequence branching points will be generated and the specific control 
values to be used. 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
Procedure_Control_Value_Branches number_of_items 
procedure_name_1 step_name_1   action_name   number_of_branches 
control_value_1 branch_probability_1 
   .   . 
   control_value_m branch_probability_m 
.   .   . 
.   .   . 
procedure_name_n step_name_n   action_name   number_of_branches 
control_value_1 branch_probability_1 
   .   . 
   control_value_m branch_probability_m 
 
3. Input Description 
 
number_of_items: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number of 
procedure action time branches included in the 
“ProcedureActionTimeBranches.txt” input file.  Branching events are read by the 
program in the order that they are listed in the input file.  Therefore, if more than 
the specified number_of_items are described in the input file, only the first 
number_of_items are read.     
 
Changing the number_of_items variable provides a convenient method for 
enabling and disabling branching events.  The analyst can disable all branching 
events by setting the number_of_items variable to 0 (it is not necessary to delete 
each branching event from the file).  If only one branching event will be activated, 
the desired event is simply moved to the beginning of the branching event list and 
the number_of_items variable is set to 1 (all other branching events will be 
ignored and need not be removed from the input file). 
 
procedure_name: Format: String. Range: Must match a valid procedure 
procedure_name listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file. Specifies the procedure 
associated with the branching rule. 
 
ProcedureControlValueBranches.txt     September 20, 2009 K-165
step_name: Format: String. Range: Must match a valid procedure step_name 
listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file. Specifies the procedure step associated 
with the branching rule. 
 
action_name: Format: String. Range: Must match a control_name listed in the 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file.  If the control_name is not referenced by the 
associated procedure step, no branches will be generated (and no error will be 
generated).   
 
number_of_branches: Format: Integer.  Range: > 1.  Specifies the number of 
event sequence branches that will be generated. 
 
control_value_i: Format: Double. Range: any – the control_value should be 
appropriate for the associated controller.  Specifies the control value to be applied 
to the associated action.  
 
branch_probability_i: Format: Double. Range: the branch probability should 
be within the range 0.0 – 1.0.  If the total sum of all branch_probabilities for the 
branching rule do not sum to 1.0, an error message will be generated (but the 
branching rule will still be used if activated). 
 
4. Sample Input 
 
Procedure_Control_Value_Branches 2 









This sample input defines two control value branching events: 
 
 When the action “X_Watchdog_Timer” is executed by procedure “FRG_H.1” 
step “Step_1.2”, three control value branches are generated.  The first branch 
sets the control value for “X_Watchdog_Timer” to 1200.0 seconds with a 
conditional branch probability of 0.25.  The second branch sets the control 
value to 1800.0 seconds with a conditional probability of 0.5 and the third 
branch sets the control value to 2400.0 seconds with a probability of 0.25.  
The watchdog timer is used to trigger certain operator actions when the timer 
has elapsed to prevent excessive looping within a procedure. 
 
 When the action “X_Stm_Dump” is executed by the procedure “FRG_H.1” 
step “Step_7.5”, two control value branches are generated.  The first branch 
sets the opening position of the steam dump valve (X_Stm_Dump) to 0.07 
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(7% open) with a probability of 0.5 and the second branch sets the valve 
opening position to 0.25  (25% open) with a probability of 0.5. 
 






  a. General Overview 
 
The “Procedures.txt” input file serves two main functions: (1) providing a master 
index list of all modeled procedure steps, and (2) specifying a number of critical 
variables needed to determine the probability of skipping a procedure step.  The 
master index of procedure steps is used during input file processing in order to all 
identify the “ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt” input files provided 
for the project.  The critical variables for the procedure step skipping model 
include static factors quantifying the procedural adherence tendencies for various 
types of procedure types and step objectives. The step skipping model is 
described in the remainder of this section. 
 
  b. Step Skipping Model 
 
ADS-IDAC supports the modeling of omission of certain procedure actions in 
order model step skipping behavior.  In order to provide adequate control over the 
simulation, step skipping behavior is limited to initial step actions and 
contingency “response not obtained” actions.   The simulation approach requires 
that procedure steps be performed in sequence and that skipping behavior is 
applied at the sub step level.  Although, ADS-IDAC cannot currently model the 
skipping of whole procedure sections, if the steps within a section are subject to 
the same dependent factors, the model can generate sequences where all section 
steps are skipped.  The likelihood of skipping a sub-step is calculated by adjusting 
a base “skip step” probability by dynamic and static multipliers.  These 
multipliers reflect procedural characteristics, the relevance of the action to the 





Static factors refer to the properties of the procedure  and are not expected to 
change during the accident event.  In ADS-IDAC, static factors include procedure 
type, step objectives, and step complexity.  In the U.S., quality assurance program 
requirements require that plant operators to specify the manner in which 
procedures are to be executed (ANS 3.2/ANSI N18.7, 1976).  The methods used 
by operators to execute procedures can vary depending on the type of procedure.  
Routine procedural actions that are frequently repeated may not require the 
procedure to be present.  Conversely, procedures covering infrequent or complex 
tasks should normally be present at the job site and followed.  Six procedure types 
are considered: normal operating, alarm response, abnormal, emergency optimal 
recovery guidelines, emergency functional recovery guidelines, and mental (skill 
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of the craft) procedures.  Each procedure type is assigned a factor from 1 to 10 to 
reflect the procedural adherence tendencies of the operators (with high values 
indicating a lower adherence tendency).    
 
The objectives of procedure steps may also affect the operator’s adherence 
tendency.  For example, steps that are clearly aligned with the high level 
objectives of a procedure are unlikely to be skipped while monitoring or 
verification activities might be more likely to be missed.  ADS-IDAC uses the 
following five categories to group step objectives: monitoring, prerequisite, 
verification, objective-related, and diagnosis-related steps.  Monitoring steps 
require the operator to periodically check the value of a parameter or condition 
while verification steps require the operator to ensure that an expected condition 
exists.  Prerequisite steps support later actions but are not directly associated with 
the high level goals of the procedure.  Objective-related steps are directly 
associated with the high level goals of the procedure.  Diagnosis steps require the 
operators to assess the plant state and possibly transfer to a new procedure path.  
Similar to the procedure type, the analyst assigns a factor from 1 to 10 to reflect 
the operator’s tendency to skip these various step types.   
 
The complexity of the procedure step is also considered a static factor.  
Complexity can refer to the step structure, the type of action, and the presence of 
actions inside and outside of the control room.  Similar to the static procedural 
factors, the static step complexity factor ranges from 1 to 10, with a higher value 
reflecting a greater tendency for action skipping.  The three static factors 
(procedure type, step objective, and complexity) are multiplied together to 




Two types of dynamic factors are used to adjust the basic step skipping 
probability: (1) performance influencing factors, and (2) the relevance of the 
action to the operator’s situational assessment.   Because high time pressure may 
influence an operator’s tendency to skip procedure steps, a time constraint loading 
performance influencing factor (PIF)  is included in the step skipping model.  The 
time constraint load PIF varies in the range of 1 to 10, with a higher value 
indicating increased time pressure.  The relevance of an action to the operator’s 
situational assessment is determined by comparing the functions of the component 
references by the action to the output from the diagnostic engine.  The plant 
component functional map (Section 2.3) specifies all functions supported by a 
component.  Further, each function is directly associated to an imbalance event 
included in the diagnostic engine.  Based on information perceived by the 
operator, the diagnostic engine calculates a membership value, d, for each 
imbalance diagnosis.  A relevance score for each component action, Raction, is then 




   (Equation 12) 
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where Raction is the relevance factor and d is the maximum membership value of 
all functional imbalances associated with the action.  Because d varies from 0.0 to 
1.0, the relevance factor, R, varies from 0.1 for highly relevant actions to 10.0 for 
irrelevant actions.  Since the amount and accuracy of plant data perceived by the 
operator changes over time, the relevance factor is a dynamic quantity.  An 
operator with an accurate situational assessment will be less likely to skip 
pertinent actions, while an operator with a poor situational assessment may skip 
important steps.  Actions that are not associated with a specific component (such 
as procedure transfers) are assigned a relevance factor of 1.0.  The action 
relevance factor (Raction) is multiplied by the time constraint load PIF to yield the 
overall dynamic factor (fdynamic).  
 
Calculating Overview Skip Probability 
 
Based on the static and dynamic step factors, an adjusted step skipping probability 








   (Equation 13) 
 
where Pbase is the basic step skipping probability and Pskip is the adjusted 
probability.  The dynamic calculation of the step skipping probability provides a 
number of advantages, including: (1) the ability to consider procedure type, step 
intent, and step complexity, (2) the influence of time pressure, and (3) the ability 
to link step skipping tendencies to the operator situational assessment through the 
relevance factor. 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
Step_Transfer_Time    step_transfer_time 
Procedure_Transfer_Time    procedure_transfer_time 
 
normal_procedure_multiplier   skip_multiplier_normal 
abnormal_procedure_multiplier  
 skip_multiplier_abnormal 
alarm_response_procedure_multiplier  skip_multiplier_alarm 
optimal_recovery_procedure_multiplier skip_multiplier_EOP 
functional_recovery_procedure_multiplier skip_multiplier_FRG 














Coded_Steps  number_of_coded_steps 
procedure_name_1  step_name_1 
.    . 
procedure_name_n  step_name_n 
 
3. Input Description 
 
step_transfer_time: Format: Double. Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the nominal 
time delay to transition between steps within the same procedure. 
 
procedure_transfer_time: Format: Double. Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the 
nominal time delay to transition between different procedures. 
 
skip_multiplier_normal: Format: Double. Range: > 0.0, but should normally 
fall within the range of 1.0 – 10.0.  Specifies the step skipping multiplier for 
normal operating procedures.  Normal procedures typically include routine power 
changes and routine plant evolutions.  The skip multiplier is used to reflect the 
crew’s procedural adherence tendencies for various types of plant procedures – a 
higher value implies a greater likelihood of skipping the procedure step. 
 
skip_multiplier_abnormal: Format: Double. Range: > 0.0, but should 
normally fall within the range of 1.0 – 10.0.  Specifies the step skipping multiplier 
for abnormal operating procedures.  Abnormal procedures are typically used to 
address non-routine events that do not constitute emergency or accident 
situations.  The skip multiplier is used to reflect the crew’s procedural adherence 
tendencies for various types of plant procedures – a higher value implies a greater 
likelihood of skipping the procedure step. 
 
skip_multiplier_alarm: Format: Double. Range: > 0.0, but should normally 
fall within the range of 1.0 – 10.0.  Specifies the step skipping multiplier for alarm 
response procedures.  Alarm response procedures are used to guide operator 
follow up actions after a control panel alarm is activated.  The skip multiplier is 
used to reflect the crew’s procedural adherence tendencies for various types of 
plant procedures – a higher value implies a greater likelihood of skipping the 
procedure step. 
 
skip_multiplier_EOP: Format: Double. Range: > 0.0, but should normally fall 
within the range of 1.0 – 10.0.  Specifies the step skipping multiplier for 
emergency operating procedures.  Emergency operating procedures (EOPs) are 
used to mitigate accident conditions.  EOPs are also known as “optimal recovery 
guidelines”.  The skip multiplier is used to reflect the crew’s procedural 
adherence tendencies for various types of plant procedures – a higher value 
implies a greater likelihood of skipping the procedure step. 
 
skip_multiplier_FRG: Format: Double. Range: > 0.0, but should normally fall 
within the range of 1.0 – 10.0.  Specifies the step skipping multiplier for 
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functional recovery guidelines (FRGs).  FRGs are used to address degradations of 
critical safety functions such as inventory control, core shutdown and cooling, and 
fission product containment.  The skip multiplier is used to reflect the crew’s 
procedural adherence tendencies for various types of plant procedures – a higher 
value implies a greater likelihood of skipping the procedure step. 
 
skip_multiplier_mental:  Format: Double. Range: > 0.0, but should normally 
fall within the range of 1.0 – 10.0.  Specifies the step skipping multiplier for 
memorized mental procedures.  Memorized mental procedures are used to model 
skill-based actions carried out by the operators without reference to written 
procedures.  these actions typically fall into the broad category of skill-of-the-
craft activities.  The skip multiplier is used to reflect the crew’s procedural 
adherence tendencies for various types of plant procedures – a higher value 
implies a greater likelihood of skipping the procedure step. 
 
skip_multiplier_verification: Format: Double. Range: > 0.0, but should 
normally fall within the range of 1.0 – 10.0.  Specifies the skip multiplier for 
proceduralized actions that perform verification functions.  Verification functions 
include checking the status of parameters and components where the operator 
does not normally expect to perform recovery actions.  The skip multiplier is used 
to reflect the crew’s procedural adherence tendencies for various types of 




skip_multiplier_monitoring: Format: Double. Range: > 0.0, but should 
normally fall within the range of 1.0 – 10.0.  Specifies the skip multiplier for 
proceduralized actions that perform monitoring functions.  Monitoring functions 
are generally associated with steps where an operator is required to observe the 
status of a parameter or component while performing other actions in parallel.  
Monitoring also includes observing the status of a changing parameter in order to 
initiate action when a threshold value is reached.  The skip multiplier is used to 
reflect the crew’s procedural adherence tendencies for various types of procedure 
steps – a higher value implies a greater likelihood of skipping the procedure step. 
 
skip_multiplier_prerequisite: Format: Double. Range: > 0.0, but should 
normally fall within the range of 1.0 – 10.0.  Specifies the skip multiplier for 
proceduralized actions that perform verification functions.  Prerequisite functions 
refer to actions that do not directly address the cause or symptoms of an ongoing 
event, but are needed to support later activities or prevent undesirable 
consequences of planned actions.  For example, blocking the low pressure safety 
injection actuation prior to reactor coolant system depressurization would be 
considered a prerequisite action.  The skip multiplier is used to reflect the crew’s 
procedural adherence tendencies for various types of procedure steps – a higher 
value implies a greater likelihood of skipping procedure steps. 
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skip_multiplier_objective: Format: Double. Range: > 0.0, but should 
normally fall within the range of 1.0 – 10.0.  Specifies the skip multiplier for 
proceduralized actions that perform verification functions.  Objective functions 
directly address the cause or symptoms of an ongoing event.  These actions are 
usually central to the operator’s understanding of the overall procedure goals and 
are less likely to be skipped.  The skip multiplier is used to reflect the crew’s 
procedural adherence tendencies for various types of procedure steps – a higher 
value implies a greater likelihood of skipping procedure steps. 
 
skip_multiplier_diagnosis: Format: Double. Range: > 0.0, but should 
normally fall within the range of 1.0 – 10.0.  Specifies the skip multiplier for 
proceduralized actions that perform verification functions.  Diagnosis functions 
involve the identification of the root cause(s) of an abnormal or emergency event.  
Diagnosis activities are generally focused on the identification of a specific failed 
component or system so that mitigative actions can be performed.  The skip 
multiplier is used to reflect the crew’s procedural adherence tendencies for 
various types of procedure steps – a higher value implies a greater likelihood of 
skipping procedure steps. 
 
number_of_coded_steps: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number of 
procedure steps included in the procedure index list.  Procedure step names are 
read by the program in the order that they are listed in the input file.  Therefore, if 
more than the specified number_of_coded_steps are listed in the input file, only 
the first number_of_coded_steps are read.     
 
procedure_name_i: Format: String.  Range: Must be associated with a valid 
“ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt” input file.  Spaces must not be 
used in the procedure_name (use the underbar character (“_”) rather than a space 
when needed).Because mental procedures and functional recovery guidelines 
require special handling, the following procedure name prefixes are reserved to 
identify these procedure types:   
“FRG_” – Functional Recovery Guideline  
“MPBG_” – Mental Procedure 
 
It is also recommended (though not required) that the following procedure_name 
prefixes be used: 
“ECA_” - Emergency Contingency Actions,  
“E_”   - Emergency Operating Procedures  
“ES_” - Emergency Supplemental Procedure  
 
step_name_i:  Format: String.  Range: Must be associated with a valid 
“ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt” input file.  Spaces must not be 
used (use the underbar character (“_”) rather than a space when needed 
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4. Sample Input 
 
Step_Transfer_Time    0.5 
Procedure_Transfer_Time    5.0 
 
normal_procedure_multiplier   2.0 
abnormal_procedure_multiplier   1.0 
alarm_response_procedure_multiplier  5.0  
optimal_recovery_procedure_multiplier 1.0 
functional_recovery_procedure_multiplier 5.0 
mental_procedure_multiplier   10.0 
 
verification_step_multiplier   5.0 
monitoring_step_multiplier   7.0 
prerequisite_step_multiplier   3.0 
objective_step_multiplier   1.0 
diagnosis_step_multiplier   3.0 
 







The above sample provides profiling and indexing information needed to support 
procedure following.  Several features of note include: 
 
 The step transfer time is significantly shorter than the procedure transfer time.  
This reflects the greater ease crews would have in transitioning between steps 
within the same procedure compared to starting a new procedure. 
 
 The step skipping multipliers reflect several crew important crew tendencies.  
These include the increased likelihood of skipping steps in mental procedures 
compared to written procedures and the increased procedural adherence 
tendency for EOPs compared to normal operating procedures. 
 
 Three procedure steps are indexed in the sample input file, E-0, steps 1, 2, and 
3.  Each of these procedure steps should have an associated 
“ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt” input file.  
 








The “ZProcedure_procedure_name_step_name.txt” input file provides the 
detailed instructions to be followed when executing a procedure step.  ADS-IDAC 
utilizes a standardized format for proceduralized actions that includes an action, 
followed by the verification of expectations to normally should be observed after 
the action is completed.  If the expectations are not met, a mitigative action is 
executed.  A procedural actions fall into five main categories: (1) changing the 
component operating mode (e.g., automatic vs. manual mode), (2) setting a 
specific control value for a component (e.g., throttling control valve to 50% 
open), (3) incrementing the control setting of a component (e.g., throttling open a 
control valve by an additional 10%), (4) setting a control value based on a 
perceived parameter (e.g., setting the steam dump target pressure equal to the 
perceived main steam header pressure), and (5) simple time delays.  The first four 
action types actively change the status of a reactor plant component or system.  
The last action type is intended to model the time taken by operators to perform 
activities that are not included in the ADS-IDAC model.  For example, activation 
of the emergency plan or alignment of equipment not included in the RELAP 
thermal hydraulic model is simulated by a simple time delay when the appropriate 
step is reached.  Action expectations are modeled with a simple logic tree 





Figure 20, "Expectation Logic Structure" 
 
 
In this example, the action expectation is met only if all of the following 
conditions are true: (1) either expectation 1a or 1b is true, (2) expectation 2 is 
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sequential order until it is determined that either the action expectations are met or 
not met (e.g., once it is determined that the action expectation cannot be met, any 
remaining expectations will not be verified).  If the action expectations are not 
met, a mitigative (or non-response) action is performed (if one is specified).  In 
addition to the capability of performing all the same functions as the initial 
procedure step action, mitigative actions11 can also be used to transfer to a 
different procedure step or terminate the accident sequence.  Once expectations 
are verified and any applicable mitigative action performed, the procedure flow 
will progress to the next action step within the same procedure step (each 
procedure step can contain multiple possible action/expectation/mitigation units) 
or transition to the next procedure step. If the next procedure step is not specified, 
the procedure following strategy is terminated. 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
procedure_name  step_name "step_description" 





[parameter_name parameter_type scan_priority]  





expect_name_1    [expect_parameter_1
 expect_parameter_2]  
[verification} 
[minimum_time     weibull_alpha  weibull_beta] 
[threshold]  
[expected_state]   [relationship   expect_value_1   
expect_value_2] 
logic_flag  
.   . 
.   . 
expect_name_n [expect_parameter_1
 expect_parameter_2]  
[verification} 
[minimum_time weibull_alpha  weibull_beta] 
[threshold]  
[expected_state]   [relationship   expect_value_1   
expect_value_2] 
logic_flag   
 
non_response_action_type_1 
[procedure_name]    [step_name] 
[nonresponse_action_name_1]   
[nonresponse_indicator_type]  [nonresponse_scan_priority]  
                                                 
11 Mitigative actions are also referred to as contingency actions or non-response actions.  These three terms 
are used interchangeable in this manual. 
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[minimum_time] [weibull_alpha] [weibull_beta] 
[nonresponse_control_value] 
 [nonresponse_control_parameter]  









3. Input Description 
 
procedure_name: Format: String.  Range: Must be associated with a valid 
procedure_name and step_name listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file. Spaces 
must not be used (use the underbar character (“_”) rather than a space when 
needed).  Because mental procedures and functional recovery guidelines require 
special handling, the following procedure name prefixes are reserved to identify 
these procedure types:   
“FRG_” – Functional Recovery Guideline  
“MPBG_” – Mental Procedure 
 
It is also recommended (though not required) that the following procedure_name 
prefixes be used: 
“ECA_” - Emergency Contingency Actions,  
“E_”   - Emergency Operating Procedures  
“ES_” - Emergency Supplemental Procedure  
 
step_name: Format: String.  Range: Must be associated with a valid 
procedure_name and step_name listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file. Spaces 
must not be used (use the underbar character (“_”) rather than a space when 
needed).  
 
"step_description": Format: String. Range: any.  Entry must be delineated by 
quotation marks (“”).   Provides a descriptive title for the procedure step. 
 





Variable Name Procedure Type 
3151 VNOP Normal Operating Procedure 
3152 VAOP Abnormal Procedure 
3153 VEOP Emergency Operating Procedure 
3154 VFRG Functional Recovery Guideline 
3155 VECA Emergency Contingency Action 
3156 VMENTAL_PROCEDURE Memorized Procedure 
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The procedure_type variable specifies the category of the procedure and is used 
to calculate the step skipping probability.  The skip probability multiplier for 
these procedure types is specified in the “Procedures.txt” input file. 
 





Variable Name Step Type 
3161 VOBJECTIVE_RELATED Objective related 
3162 VPREREQUISITE_ACTION Prerequisite 
3163 VMONITORING_STEP Monitoring 
3164 VVERIFICATION_STEP Verification 
3165 VDIAGNOSIS_STEP Diagnostic 
 
The step_type variable specifies the category of the procedure and is used to 
calculate the step skipping probability.  The skip probability multiplier for these 
step types is specified in the “Procedures.txt” input file. 
 
step_complexity:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0, but should normally fall 
within the range of  0.1 – 10.0.  Specifies the step complexity multiplier used to 
calculate the step skipping probability.  Steps consisting of multiple substeps, 
actions performed from multiple locations, or convoluted structure may have a 
higher likelihood for being skipped.  In general, this parameter should be set to 1 
(neutral complexity impact).  A value of the step_complexity > 1.0 will increase 
the likelihood of skipping the step, while a value < 1.0 will decrease the 
likelihood of skipping the step. 
 
double: Format: Double. Range: any.  This is input variable is reserved for 
future use.  Enter a dummy value (e.g., 1.0) for this parameter. 
 
number_of_substeps: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number of 
procedure substeps listed in the input file.  A substep consists of an action, a set of 
expectations, and a contingency action that is performed if the expectations are 
not met.  The number_of_substeps must exactly match the number of listed 
substeps in the input file or an error will occur during input file processing or 
program execution.  If the number of substeps is 0, the substep action is a simple 
procedure step transfer and no other data fields shall be provided except for the 
next_procedure_name and next_step_name. 
 
action_name: Format: String.  Range:  Varies depending on value of the variable 
action_type and the use of special reserved words.  In conjunction with the 
action_type variable, specifies the type of control panel manipulation to be 
performed by the action.  Two special reserved values may be used for the 
action_name: 






0 Procedure transfer 
No other data fields shall be provided in 
the remainder of the input file except 
for the next_procedure_name and 
next_step_name 
SCAN 
Add control panel 
indicator to the 
operator scan queue 
The parameter_name, parameter_type, 
and scan_prioirity variables must be 
provided.  The action_type and 
control_value shall not be included. 
 
If the action_type is VADDITIVE (integer code 3112), VACTION (integer code 
3074), or VPARAMETER_CONTROL (integer code 3139), the action_name 
specifies the control to be manipulated and must refer to a valid controller listed 
in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  If the action_name will initiate a 
maneuvering action, the action_name must include the prefix “MANEUVER_” 
and should reference a valid maneuvering action listed in the 
“KB_OAT(ODM)_Maneuvering_Actions.txt” input file. 
 
[action_type]:  Format: Integer.  Range:  Should refer to one of the following 






Simple controller manipulation.  
The action_name controller will 
be positioned to the value 
specified by control_value 
3109 VVERIFY 
No active control manipulation is 
performed.  This action_type is 
used to model a time delay.  A 
dummy control_value must still 
be provided. 
3112 VADDITIVE 
The action_name controller 
control value will be incremented 
by the amount specified by the 
control_value variable.  The 
control value is bounded by the 
values for fully open/on and fully 
closed/off provided for the 
action_name control in the 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file. 






The action_name controller will 
be positioned to the perceived 
value of the control_parameter 
indicator.  If the 
contorl_parameter value has not 
been perceived by the operator, 




The action_type is not provided when the action_name is either “SCAN” or “0”. 
 
[parameter_name]:  Format: String. Range: Must match a valid 
parameter_name, component_name, or alarm_name listed in the 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Specifies the control panel indicator to be added to 
the operator’s control panel scan queue.  This field is only applicable when the 
action_type is set to SCAN. 
 
[parameter_type]:  Format: Integer.  Range: 1, 2, or 3. Specifies the type of 
parameter represented by the parameter_name variable. The operator scan queue 
contains three sub-queue lists: control panel parameters, components, and alarms.  
The parameter_type is used to place the parameter_name in the correct scan 
queue. This field is only applicable when the action_type is set to SCAN. The 





1 VALARM_STATE Control panel alarm 
2 VCOMPONENT_STATE Control panel component 
status indicator 
3 VPARAMETER_VALUE Control panel parameter 
value indicator 
 
[scan_priority]: Format: Integer.  Range: > 1.  Specifies the initial priority 
level applied to the parameter_name added to the operator scan queue.  A lower 
scan_priority value designates a higher priority control panel indicator (i.e., the 
highest priority items are designated with a priority level of 1).  Because the 
priority level can decay over time, specifying a lower scan_priority value will 
increase the residence time of the alarm on the scan queue list. This field is only 
applicable when the action_type is set to SCAN. 
 
minimum_time: Format: double.  Range: > 0.0.  In conjunction with the 
weibull_alpha and weibull_beta variables, specifies the time taken to perform the 
procedure substep action, evaluate substep expectations, or perform non-response 
actions.  In order to capture the uncertainty associated with these times, a three 
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parameter Weibull probability distribution is used.  The Weibull distribution is 



















tF exp1)(   
 (Equation 14) 
 
Where: 
   minimum_time = u (minimum time), seconds 
   weibull_alpha = α parameter 
weibull_beta  = β parameter 
 
This parameter must be provided for the following cases:  
 
 Actions:  Data field is required when the action_type is 3074 
(VACTION), 3109 (VVERIFY), 3112 (VADDITIVE), or 3139 
(VPARAMETER_CONTROL); or (2) the action_name SCAN is used.  
This parameter should not be entered for other action types. 
 
 Expectations: Data field is required for all expectation types except when 
the expect_name is set to the reserved word Mental_Belief 
 
 Nonresponse Actions: Data field is required when the 
nonresponse_action_type is set to 3074 (VACTION), 3112 
(VADDITIVE), 3139 (VPARAMETER_CONTROL), or 3140 
(VPARAMETER_SCAN).  This parameter should not be entered for other 
nonresponse action types. 
 
weibull_alpha: Format: double.  Range: > 0.0.  In conjunction with the 
minimum_time and weibull_beta variables, specifies the time taken to perform 
the procedure substep action. This parameter must be provided for the following 
cases:  
 
 Actions:  Data field is required when the action_type is 3074 
(VACTION), 3109 (VVERIFY), 3112 (VADDITIVE), or 3139 
(VPARAMETER_CONTROL); or (2) the action_name SCAN is used.  
This parameter should not be entered for other action types. 
 
 Expectations: Data field is required for all expectation types except when 
the expect_name is set to the reserved word Mental_Belief 
 
 Nonresponse Actions: Data field is required when the 
nonresponse_action_type is set to 3074 (VACTION), 3112 
(VADDITIVE), 3139 (VPARAMETER_CONTROL), or 3140 
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(VPARAMETER_SCAN).  This parameter should not be entered for other 
nonresponse action types. 
 
weibull_beta: Format: double.  Range: > 0.0.  In conjunction with the 
minimum_time and weibull_alpha  variables, specifies the time taken to perform 
the procedure substep action. This parameter must be provided for the following 
cases:  
 
 Actions:  Data field is required when the action_type is 3074 
(VACTION), 3109 (VVERIFY), 3112 (VADDITIVE), or 3139 
(VPARAMETER_CONTROL); or (2) the action_name SCAN is used.  
This parameter should not be entered for other action types. 
 
 Expectations: Data field is required for all expectation types except when 
the expect_name is set to the reserved word Mental_Belief 
 
 Nonresponse Actions: Data field is required when the 
nonresponse_action_type is set to 3074 (VACTION), 3112 
(VADDITIVE), 3139 (VPARAMETER_CONTROL), or 3140 
(VPARAMETER_SCAN).  This parameter should not be entered for other 
nonresponse action types. 
  
[control_value]:  Format: Double. Range: any, but should be consistent with 
the control range of the controller specified by the action_name variable.  This 
data filed must be provided when the action_type is 3074 (VACTION) , 3109 
(VVERIFY), or 3112 (VADDITIVE).  When the action_type is of type 
VVERIFY, only a dummy control_value need be provided (since no control 
manipulation is actually performed).  
 
[control_parameter]: Format: String.  Range: Must match a valid 
parameter_name, listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Specifies the control 
panel indicator value that will be used to provide the control value for the 
action_name controller. This field shall only be included when the action_type is 
3139 (VPARAMETER_CONTROL). 
 
skip_step_alpha: Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the α parameter in 
the procedure step skipping probability distribution.  To capture the uncertainty 
associated with skipping procedure steps, the Beta Distribution is used to model 



















  (Equation 15) 
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Two parameters must be specified, the alpha parameter (α) and the beta parameter 
(β).  During a simulation run, the step skipping probability is determined by a 
Monte Carlo sample of the Beta distribution.  To improve the reproducibility of 
simulation results, it is recommended that the α and β parameters be selected to 
minimize the variance of the failure distribution.  For example, the failure 
distributions p(x, α = 1. β = 1.) and p(x, α = 100. β = 100.) both have the same 
mean value (0.5), but the variance for the latter case is more than an order of 
magnitude lower.  A smaller variance will yield more reproducible simulation 
results.  As described in the “Procedures.txt” input file description, the base step 
skipping probability is modified by several multiplicative factors to account for 
status and dynamic effects.  This parameter must be provided when: (1) the 
action_type is 3074 (VACTION), 3109 (VVERIFY), 3112 (VADDITIVE), or 
3139 (VPARAMETER_CONTROL); or (2) the action_name SCAN is used.   
 
skip_step_beta:  Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the β parameter in 
the base step skipping probability distribution. As described in the 
“Procedures.txt” input file description, the base step skipping probability is 
modified by several multiplicative factors to account for status and dynamic 
effects. This parameter must be provided when: (1) the action_type is 3074 
(VACTION), 3109 (VVERIFY), 3112 (VADDITIVE), or 3139 
(VPARAMETER_CONTROL); or (2) the action_name SCAN is used.     
 
number_of_expectations: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number 
of expectations associated with the substep action. The number_of_expectations 
must exactly match the number of expectation units included with the substep or 
an error will occur during input file processing or program execution.  A single 
expectation unit is considered to be a complete block of verifications connected 
by “OR” logic.  For example, in the expectation example provided in Figure 20, 
Expectation 1a and 1b, together, would be considered a single expectation unit, 
and the example would consist of a total of three expectation units.   
 
If the number_of_expectations is set to 0, the non_response_action_type 
should be set to 3045 (VNONE), and no other data fields shall be provided in the 
remainder of the input file except for the next_procedure_name and 
next_step_name. 
 
[expect_name]: Format: String.  Range: Must meet either of the following 
criteria: (1) match a valid parameter_name, component_name, or alarm_name 
listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file, or (2) be set to the reserved word 
Mental_Belief or Parameter_Difference.  If the expect_name is set to a valid 
parameter_name, component_name, or alarm_name, the specified indicator is 
compared to an  expected value or state.  If the expect_name is set to the reserved 
word Mental_Belief, the mental belief specified by expect_parameter_1 is 
compared to an expected state.  If the expect_name is set to the reserved word 
Parameter_Difference, the difference between expect_parameter_1 and 
expect_parameter_2  is compared to an expected value. 
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[expect_parameter_1]:  Format: String. Range: Must meet either of the 
following criteria: (1) if expect_name if set to Mental_Belief, 
expect_parameter_1 must match a valid mental_belief_name listed in the 
“KB_OAT(ODM)_HardWired_Diagnosis.txt” input file, or (2) if the 
expect_name is set to Parameter_Difference, expect_parameter_1 must match a 
valid parameter_name listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  This variable is 
only provided if the expect_name is set to Mental_Belief or 
Parameter_Difference.  
 
[expect_parameter_2]:  Format: String. Range: Must match a valid 
parameter_name listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  This variable is only 
provided if the expect_name is set to Parameter_Difference.   
 
[verification]: Format: Integer.  Range: Must be one of the following integer 
codes 3002 (VYES), 3003 (VNO), or 3045 (VNONE).  When the operator is 
relying on the use of memorized information (set by the 
information_branch_probability in the “ActionTaker.txt” or 
“DecisionMaker.txt” input files) , expectations may be evaluated using old 
information, particularly during dynamic situations.  Although this may model 
real operator behavior in certain situations, there are times when operators would 
be expected to re-verify control panel indicators even when the indicator had been 
perceived earlier.  In order to force the operator to perform this reverification, the 
verification variable can be set to 3002 (VYES).  If the verification variable is set 
to 3003 (VNO) or 3045 (VNONE) the operator will not reverify the control panel 
indications and will always use previously perceived information (if available).  If 
the operator has not previously perceived the indicator value or state (or if the 
information is deemed to be too old), the operator will reverify the information 
regardless of the value of the verification variable.  Setting verification to VYES 
is particularly useful when the procedure requires looping until a parameter 
reaches a threshold value – without continual reverification excessive looping 
may occur. 
 
[threshold]: Format: Integer.  Range: any, but should be consistent with range 
of the associated parameter.  Specifies the threshold value used to evaluate a 
parameter difference.  The expectation is satisfied in expect_parameter_1 – 
expect_parameter_2 is greater than the threshold value. 
 
[expected_state]: Format: Integer.  Range: Depending on the value of 
expect_name variable and/or the type of control panel indicator used to evaluate 
















Integer code should be consistent 
with the threshold_type specified for 
the component in the 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file input 
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Expected state not currently 
implemented for parameter value 
expectations – a dummy integer 







All mental beliefs are initialized to 
the state VNONE at the beginning of 
the simulation.  
 
The expected_state is only provided if the expect_name is set to either (1) 
“Mental_Belief”, or (2) a valid alarm, parameter, or component name. 
 
[relationship]: Format: Integer.  Range: 3006 (VGT), 3007 (VGE), 3008 
(VEQ), 3009 (VLE), 3010 (VLT), or 3032 (VBETWEEN). Specifies the type of 
comparison used to evaluate the prerequisite condition.  The following 
comparison types may be used: 
 
3006 (Integer code for “VGT”):  If parameter referenced by expect_name is 
greater than the expect_value_1, the expectation is satisfied. 
 
3007 (Integer code for “VGE”):  If parameter referenced by expect_name is 
greater than or equal to the expect_value_1, the expectation is satisfied. 
 
3008 (Integer code for “VEQ”): If parameter referenced by expect_name is 
equal to the expect_value_1, the expectation is satisfied.  Because of rounding 
and data storage errors associated with real numbers, the VEQ condition 
should be used with care. 
 
3009 (Integer code for “VLE”): If parameter referenced by expect_name is 
less than or equal to the expect_value_1, the expectation is satisfied. 
 
3010 (Integer code for “VLT”): If parameter referenced by expect_name is 
less than the expect_value_1, the expectation is satisfied. 
  
3032 (Integer code for “VBETWEEN”): If parameter referenced by 
expect_name is between the expect_value_1 and the expect_value_2, the 
expectation is satisfied.  expect_value_1 must be less than the value of 
expect_value_2. 
 
[expect_value_1]: Format: Double.  Range: any, but should be consistent with 
range of the associated parameter.  Specifies the threshold value used to evaluate 
the expectation.   
 
[expect_value_2]: Format: Double.  Range: any, but should be consistent with 
range of the associated parameter. Specifies the threshold value used to evaluate 
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the expectation.  Although the expect_value_2 variable is only used to evaluate 
the expectation if the relationship is set to 3032 (VBETWEEN), a dummy value 
must be supplied for all other relationship values. 
 
[logic_flag]: Format: Integer.  Range:  Should be one of the following integer 
codes: 3002 (VYES), 3003 (VNO), or 3045 (VNONE).  The logic_flag is used to 
establish the Boolean relationship between successive expectations.  If the 
logic_flag is set to 3002 (VYES), the current expectation and the next expectation 
will be connected with “OR” gate logic to form one expectation unit.  
Expectations connected with the logic_flag set to 3002 (VYES) count as a single 
expectation unit for the purposes of setting the number_of_expectations variable.  
When the VYES option is selected, satisfying any one of the associated 
expectations will satisfy the entire expectation unit.  When the logic_flag is set to 
3003 (VNO) or 3045 (VNONE), the current expectation and the next expectation 
are treated as separate expectation units and are connected by “AND” gate logic.  
In this case, each expectation must be satisfied in order to satisfy the complete 
substep expectation set.  There is no limit on the number of individual 
expectations that can be connected with “OR” and “AND” gate logic.  Thus, it is 
possible to create complex expectation requirements.   
  
nonresponse_action_type: Format: Integer.  Range:  Must be one of the 






No contingency action is 
performed.  If the VNONE option 
is used, no other data fields shall be 
provided for the remainder of the 
substep input. 
3074 VACTION 
Simple controller manipulation.  
The nonresponse_action_name 
controller will be positioned to the 
value specified by 
nonresponse_control_value 
3110 VPROCEDURE 
The non-response action will 
transfer to the procedure step 
specified by the procedure_name 
and step_name data fields. 







controller control value will be 
incremented by the amount 
specified by the 
nonresponse_control_value 
variable.  The control value is 
bounded by the values for fully 
open/on and fully closed/off 
provided for the action_name 
control in the “ControlPanel.txt” 
input file. 
3116 VSTOP 
Terminates the accident sequence if 
the non-response contingency 
action is activated.  If the VSTOP 
option is used, no other data fields 
shall be provided for the remainder 




controller will be positioned to the 
perceived value of the 
nonresponse_control_parameter 
indicator.  If the 
nonresponse_control_parameter 
value has not been perceived by the 
operator, no control manipulation is 
performed.  
3140 VPARAMETER_SCAN 
The contingency will add the 
control panel indicator specified by 
the nonresponse_action_name to 
the operator’s scan queue list. 
 
The non-response contingency action is only initiated if the substep expectations 
are not met (i.e., if any expectation unit is not satisfied).  This data field must be 
provided. 
 
[procedure_name]: Format: String.  Range: Must be associated with a valid 
procedure_name and step_name listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file. Spaces 
must not be used (use the underbar character (“_”) rather than a space when 
needed).  Should only be entered if the nonresponse_action_type is integer code 
3110 (VPROCEDURE) for a procedure transfer.  
 
[step_name]: Format: String.  Range: Must be associated with a valid 
procedure_name and step_name listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file. Spaces 
must not be used (use the underbar character (“_”) rather than a space when 
needed). Should only be entered if the nonresponse_action_type is integer code 
3110 (VPROCEDURE) for a procedure transfer.  
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[nonresponse_action_name]: Format: Sting.  Range: Varies depending on the 
nonresponse_action_type - if the nonresponse_action_type is VADDITIVE 
(integer code 3112), VACTION (integer code 3074), or 
VPARAMETER_CONTORL (integer code 3139), the 
nonresponse_action_name specifies the control to be manipulated and must 
refer to a valid controller listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  If the 
nonresponse_action_name will initiate a maneuvering action, the 
nonresponse_action_name must include the prefix “MANEUVER_” and should 
reference a valid maneuvering action listed in the 
“KB_OAT(ODM)_Maneuvering_Actions.txt” input file.  If the 
nonresponse_action_type is VPARAMETER_SCAN (integer code 3140), the 
nonresponse_action_name  specifies the control panel indicator to be added to 
the operator’s scan queue and must refer to a valid parameter, component, or 
alarm listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  This data field is not entered if 
the nonresponse_action_type is VPROCEDURE (integer code 3110), VSTOP 
(integer code 3116), or VNONE (integer code 3045). 
 
[nonresponse_indicator_type]: Format: Integer.  Range: 1, 2, or 3.  
Specifies the type of parameter represented by the nonresponse_action_name 
variable. The operator scan queue contains three sub-queue lists: control panel 
parameters, components, and alarms.  The nonresponse_indicator_type is 
used to place the nonresponse_action_name in the correct scan queue sublist. 
This field is only applicable when the nonresponse_action_type is set to 






1 VALARM_STATE Control panel alarm 
2 VCOMPONENT_STATE Control panel component 
status indicator 




[nonresponse_scan_priority]:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 1.  Specifies the 
initial priority level applied to the nonresponse_action_name added to the 
operator scan queue.  A lower nonresponse_scan_priority value designates a 
higher priority control panel indicator (i.e., the highest priority items are 
designated with a priority level of 1).  Because the priority level can decay over 
time, specifying a lower nonresponse_scan_priority  value will increase the 
residence time of the alarm on the scan queue list. This field is only applicable 
when the nonresponse_action_type is set to VPARAMETER_SCAN (integer 
code 3140)  
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[nonresponse_control_value]:  Format: Double. Range: any, but should be 
consistent with the control range of the controller specified by the 
nonresponse_action_name variable.  This data filed must be provided when the 
nonresponse_action_type is 3074 (VACTION) or 3112 (VADDITIVE).   
 
[nonresponse_control_parameter]: Format: String.  Range: Must match a 
valid parameter_name, listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Specifies the 
control panel indicator value that will be used to provide the control value for the 
nonresponse_action_name controller. This field shall only be included when the 
nonresponse_action_type is 3139 (VPARAMETER_CONTROL). 
 
[skip_nonresponse_alpha]: Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the α 
parameter in the procedure non-response step skipping probability distribution.  
To capture the uncertainty associated with skipping procedure steps, the Beta 




















  (Equation 16) 
 
Two parameters must be specified, the alpha parameter (α) and the beta parameter 
(β).  During a simulation run, the non-response step skipping probability is 
determined by a Monte Carlo sample of the Beta distribution.  To improve the 
reproducibility of simulation results, it is recommended that the α and β 
parameters be selected to minimize the variance of the failure distribution.  For 
example, the failure distributions p(x, α = 1. β = 1.) and p(x, α = 100. β = 100.) 
both have the same mean value (0.5), but the variance for the latter case is more 
than an order of magnitude lower.  A smaller variance will yield more 
reproducible simulation results.  As described in the “Procedures.txt” input file 
description, the base step skipping probability is modified by several 
multiplicative factors to account for status and dynamic effects.  This parameter 
must be provided when the non_response_action_type is 3074 (VACTION) , 
3110 (VPROCEDURE), 3112 (VADDITIVE), 3139 
(VPARAMETER_CONTROL), or 3140 (VPARAMETER_SCAN).  
 
[skip_nonresponse_beta]  Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the β 
parameter in the base non-response step skipping probability distribution. As 
described in the “Procedures.txt” input file description, the base step skipping 
probability is modified by several multiplicative factors to account for status and 
dynamic effects. This parameter must be provided when the 
non_response_action_type is 3074 (VACTION), 3110 (VPROCEDURE), 
3112 (VADDITIVE), 3139 (VPARAMETER_CONTROL), or 3140 
(VPARAMETER_SCAN).  
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next_procedure_name: Format: String.  Range: Must be associated with a valid 
procedure_name and step_name listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file. Spaces 
must not be used (use the underbar character (“_”) rather than a space when 
needed).  Enter the keyword NONE if no additional procedure steps will be 
performed.    
 
next_step_name: Format: String.  Range: Must be associated with a valid 
procedure_name and step_name listed in the “Procedures.txt” input file. Spaces 
must not be used (use the underbar character (“_”) rather than a space when 
needed). Enter the keyword NONE if no additional procedure steps will be 
performed.    
 
4. Sample Input 
 
E_0 Step_4.1 "Check Safety Injection Status" 
3153 3165 1.0 1.0 
1 
A_Safety_Injection 3109 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 100.0 
4  
A_Lo_SG_Pressure_SI  3045 0.0 1.0 1.0 3023 3002 
Block_Main_Steam_Isolation 3045 0.0 0.5 2.0 3022 3003 
A_Hi_Cont_Pressure  3045 0.0 1.0 1.0 3023 3003 
A_Lo_PZR_Pressure_SI  3045 0.0 1.0 1.0 3023 3002 
Block_Low_Press_SI  3045 0.0 0.5 2.0 3022 3003 
Safety_Injection   3002 0.0 1.0 1.0 3023 3045 
3110 





The above sample input provides the proceduralized actions for Procedure E-0, 
Step 4.1, Check Safety Injection Status.”  The associated file name for this input 
file is “ZProcedure_E_0_Step_4.1.txt”.  The procedure is an emergency operating 
procedure  (3153 - VEOP) with a step objective of diagnosis (3165 – 
VDIAGNOSIS).  The step complexity factor is set to the neutral value of 1.0.   
The step consists of a single substep.  The substep action verifies the status of the 
safety injection alarm (A_Safety_Injection) with the required time modeled by 
Weibull parameters u = 0.0, α = 1.0, and β = 1.0.   The base step skip probability 
is set to a mean value of ~0.01 with Beta distribution parameters α = 1.0, β = 
100.0.  The substep includes of four expectation units:  
 
 Verify that low steam generator pressure safety injection alarm is OFF or that 
the main steam isolation has been manually blocked, and 
 
 Verify that the high containment pressure alarm is OFF, and 
 
 Verify that the low pressurizer pressure safety injection alarm is OFF or that 
the low pressure safety injection has been manually blocked, and 
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 Verify that the safety injection alarm is OFF 
 
If any of these expectations is not satisfied, the non-response action is initiated to 
transfer to Step 4.2 of Procedure E-0.  If the expectations are satisfied, the 












The plant hardware related input files are used to establish the linkage between the 
RELAP thermal hydraulic model and the ADS-IDAC environment and manage hardware 
failure events.  The “RELAP5_channels.txt” is used to set up communication channels 
between the RELAP program and the ADS-IDAC environment.  These channels allow 
information exchanges between ADS-IDAC and RELAP.  The “ControlPanel.txt” input 
file describes the ADS-IDAC control panel elements.  Similar to an actual control room, 
the ADS-IDAC control panel is the main information interface between the simulated 
operators and the reactor plant model.  ADS-IDAC allows the analyst to model two types 
of hardware failure events: (1) time dependent failures, and (2) conditional failures.  
Time dependent failures are described in the “Initiating_Event.txt” input file and allow 
the analyst to initiate hardware failures at a prescribed time during the simulation.  
Conditional failures are triggered when a specified component changes its operating state.  
Time dependent failures generate only a single failure event sequence branch while 
conditional failures generate two event sequence branches – a success path and a failure 
path.  Both failure types permit the operators to attempt to recover the failed equipment.  
If a recovery is attempted, two additional branches are generated – a successful recovery 


















The “ControlPanel.txt” input file, in conjunction with the 
“RELAP5_channels.txt” file, describes the main control panel interface between 
the RELAP thermal hydraulic reactor plant model and the operator behavior 
model.  All plant status information perceived by the operations crew must be 
displayed on the ADS-IDAC control panel and all control manipulations must be 
performed through the control panel interface.   
 
Three main categories of information can be displayed on the ADS-IDAC control 
panel: (1) reactor plant thermal hydraulic parameters (e.g., temperature, pressure, 
flow rate), (2) component operating state (e.g., on, off, open, closed), and (3) 
alarms.  Indicators for thermal hydraulic parameters can display both the value of 
an indicator or the rate of change of the target parameter.   The rate of change of a 
parameter can be used to provide a trend display for use by the simulated 
operators (similar to a strip chart recorder).  Component operating state 
information can be used to model simple panel status lights (e.g., pump operating 
status).   Finally, alarms based on parameter values, component operating state, or 
the difference between two parameters can be displayed on the control panel. 
 
Operators may manipulate two types of controllers through the ADS-IDAC 
control panel: (1) controls with fine adjustment capability (control values can be 
assigned over a range of acceptable values), and (2) simple controllers that utilize 
a discrete control value (e.g., open, close, off, or on).  Fine adjustment controls 
should be used for components that can be operated over a continuous range of 
input values such as throttle valves or setpoint controllers.  Simple discrete 
controllers should be used for components with binary operating states such as 
pumps or control switches. 
 
Although all control panel indicators and controls can be assigned a failure value 
(i.e., the displayed value or state when the instrument, alarm, or control has 
failed), this feature has not been fully implemented in the current version of ADS-
IDAC.  It is recommended that the analyst use the 
“KB_OAT(ODM)_Bias_Factors.txt” input files to model failed control panel 
indicators. 
 
The ADS-IDAC control panel provides a central link between most of the 
program modules within ADS-IDAC.  Therefore, several other input files cross 
reference indicators, alarms, and controls contained in this input file.  The analyst 
should ensure that indicators, controls, and alarms referenced by other input files 
use the same item name used in the ControlPanel.txt file or errors may occur 
during program execution. 
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2. Input File Format 
 
Control_Panel_Parameters  number_of_parameters 
Number_of_Rate_Data_Points number_of_rate_data_points 
parameter_name_1 channel indicator_type   required_time
 failure_value 
.   .  .      .               . 





heat_structure_name_1   heat_channel     indicator_type   required_time 
failure_value            heat_mesh_point 
.       .          .       . 
heat_structure_name_n   heat_channel     indicator_type   required_time 




component_name_1   trip_channel   indicator_type  required_time  
failure_state 
threshold_type     threshold_trip_value 
.   . 
component_name_n   trip_channel   indicator_type  required_time  
failure_state 




control_name_1 interactive_channel   required_time 
open/on_value   closed/off_value   neutral_value   control_failure_value 
.   .   .   . 
control_name_n interactive_channel  required_time  




control_name_1 interactive_channel  required_time  
open/on_state   closed/off_state   neutral_state   control_failure_state 
.   .   .   . 
control_name_n interactive_channel  required_time  
open/on_state   closed/off_state   neutral_state   control_failure_state 
 
 
Alarm_for_Parameter_State  number_of_parameter_alarms 
alarm_name_1  alarm_parameter alarm_weight 
required_time  logic   setpoint 
.   .   . 
alarm_name_n  alarm_parameter alarm_weight 
required_time  logic   setpoint  
 
 
Alarm_for_Component_State  number_of_component_alarms 
alarm_name_1  alarm_component alarm_weight 
required_time  state_setpoint 
.   .   .  
alarm_name_n  alarm_component alarm_weight 
required_time  state_setpoint 
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Alarm_Parameter_Difference number_of_difference_alarms 
alarm_name_1  first_parameter alarm_weight  required_time 
   second_parameter diff_setpoint 
 .   .   .   . 
alarm_name_n  first_parameter alarm_weight  required_time 
   second_parameter diff_setpoint 
 
 
3. Input Description 
 
number_of_parameters:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number of 
control panel indicators based on parameter values that are provided in 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Indicators based on heat structures are not included 
in the number_of_parameters (heat structure indicators are listed in a separate 
data field).  The number_of_parameters must exactly match the number of listed 
parameter indicators or an error will occur during input file processing or program 
execution.  Parameter based indicators are used to provide indication of basic 
thermal hydraulic properties on the ADS-IDAC control panel (e.g., pressure, 
temperature, flow, levels, etc.). 
 
number_of_rate_data_points: Format: Integer.  Range: > 1.  Specifies the number 
of parameter data points that will be used to calculate parameter trends.  During 
each ADS-IDAC time step, the elapsed simulation time and the current parameter 
value for each trended parameter is added to a storage queue.  Parameter trends 
are determined by the slope of a linear regression fit to the stored data points.  
Increasing the number_of_rate_data_points variable will result in more data 
points (over a longer time period) being used to calculate trend information.  
Although a larger number of data points can result in more stable trend 
information, it will take a longer time for an emergent trend to become evident.  
For the default ADS-IDAC time step of 0.5 seconds, 120 data points will provide 
trend information over the preceding minute of simulation time (i.e., 120 data 
points x 0.5 seconds/data point = 60.0 seconds).  Any control panel parameter 
indicator can be used to provide trend information by adding the prefix “RATE_” 
to the parameter_name. 
 
parameter_name:  Format: String.  Range: any. Descriptive name for the control 
panel parameter indicator.  Spaces must not be used (use the underbar character 
(“_”) rather than a space when needed.    
 
parameter_channel Format: String.  Range: Must refer to a valid hydraulic 
volume, hydraulic junction, or control variable channel in the 
“RELAP5_channels.txt” input file.  This parameter establishes the linkage 
between the ADS-IDAC control panel and the RELAP thermal hydraulic model. 
 
indicator_type: Format: String.  Range: Must refer to a valid indicator type for 
the selected parameter_channel.  The string variable should not be enclosed in 
quotation marks.  The indicator_type variable must be supplied for the parameter, 
heat structure, and component state data fields.  The following table lists valid 
indicator types: 
 





















Measurement units are determined by 
the value of the R5PAR_mp_SI_UNIT  
variable (true = SI units, false = 
British).  See General Notes in Section 








Measurement units are determined by 
the value of the R5PAR_mp_SI_UNIT  
variable (true = SI units, false = 
British).  See General Notes in Section 




Any valid string 
Units of indicator are set by RELAP 
control variable. The indicator type 
field is not used, but a dummy value 
must be entered.  To improve 
readability of the input file, it is 
recommended that the string “Value” 





Any valid string 
The indicator type field is not used, but 
a dummy value must be entered.  To 
improve readability of the input file, it 
is recommended that the string 
“Temperature” be used as the indicator 
type.  Only temperature may be 
obtained from a heat structure channel. 
Measurement units are determined by 
the value of the R5PAR_mp_SI_UNIT  
variable (true = SI units, false = 
British).  See General Notes in Section 
2 for more information.   
Component State 
(VT_xxx or LT_xxx) 
Any valid string 
The indicator type field is not used, but 
a dummy value must be entered.  To 
improve readability of the input file, it 
is recommended that the string 
“Trip_Time” be used as the indicator 
type.  The component state RELAP 
channel returns the time that the 
associated trip was first set to true (or -
1 if the trip is false). 
 
 
required_time: Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Originally intended to specify 
the time required for the operator to read a control panel indicator, check an alarm 
status, or operate a controller.  The required_time variable is not used since the 
time required to perform these activities is now set in the procedure step input 
files (“ZProcedure_” series).  Although this feature is not used in the current 
version of ADS-IDAC, the analyst must provide a dummy input value.  A 
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required_time variable must be provided for parameter, heat structure, 
component, controls, and alarm data fields. 
 
failure_value:  Format: Double.  Range: any.  Originally intended to specify the 
value indicated by the associated indicator or fine control after a failure.  The 
failure_value variable is not used for indicators since an instrument failure state 
can now be set by an appropriate bias factor in the operator perception filter 
(“KB_OAT(ODM)_Bias_Factors.txt” input file).  Although this feature is not 
used to model indicator failures in the current version of ADS-IDAC, the analyst 
must provide a dummy input value.  A failure_value variable must be provided 
for parameter and heat structure data fields. 
 
number_of_heat_structure_parameters: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies 
the number of control panel indicators based on heat structure values that are 
provided in “ControlPanel.txt” input file. The 
number_of_heat_structure_parameters must exactly match the number of listed 
heat structure indicators or an error will occur during input file processing or 
program execution.  Heat structure indicators are used to indicate the temperature 
of heat sources or sinks included in the RELAP thermal hydraulic model (e.g., 
fuel or clad temperature, steam generator shell temperature, or reactor vessel 
temperature). 
 
heat_structure_name:  Format: String.  Range: any. Descriptive name for the 
control panel heat structure indicator.  Spaces must not be used (use the underbar 
character (“_”) rather than a space when needed.    
 
heat_channel: Format: String.  Range: Must refer to a valid heat structure channel 
in the “RELAP5_channels.txt” input file.  This parameter establishes the linkage 
between the ADS-IDAC control panel and the RELAP thermal hydraulic model. 
 
heat_mesh_point: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the heat structure mesh 
point within the heat structure channel.  Must refer to a valid heat structure mesh 
point number or an error will occur during input file processing. 
 
number_of_components: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number of 
control panel component status indicators provided in “ControlPanel.txt” input 
file. The number_of_components must exactly match the number of listed 
component state indicators or an error will occur during input file processing or 
program execution.  Component state indicators are used to indicate the state of 
components or control systems (e.g., pump running, valve closed, reactor tripped, 
etc).  Because component state indicators are based derived from Boolean 
variables, they can only indicate two possible state values. 
 
component_name: Format: String.  Range: any. Descriptive name for the control 
panel component state indicator.  Spaces must not be used (use the underbar 
character (“_”) rather than a space when needed.    
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trip_channel: Format: String.  Range: Must refer to a variable or logical trip 
channel in the “RELAP5_channels.txt” input file.  This parameter establishes the 
linkage between the ADS-IDAC control panel and the RELAP thermal hydraulic 
model. 
 
failure_state: Format: String.  Range: Only the following strings are valid – 
ON, OFF, OPEN, CLOSE, and TRIP.  Originally intended to specify the status 
indicated by the associated component after a failure.  The failure_state variable 
has not been fully implemented in ADS-IDAC.  Although this feature is not used 
in the current version of ADS-IDAC, the analyst must provide a dummy input 
value. 
 
threshold_type Format: String.  Range: Only the following strings constitute 











The threshold_type variable was originally intended to accommodate binary state 
devices such as pumps or trip valves.  Thus the component state indicator values 
for elements with threshold_type with an “_ON” or “_OFF” suffix are VON or 
VOFF (integer codes 3022 or 3023).  Component state indicator values for 
elements with threshold_type with an “_OPEN” or “_CLOSE” suffix are VOPEN 
or VCLOSE (integer codes 3098 or 3099).  
 
The RELAP variable and logical trip channels can take two possible types of 
values: (1) if the trip channel is TRUE, the trip channel value is the time that the 
associated trip was last set to a TRUE state, and (2) if the trip channel is FALSE, 
the trip channel value is set to -1.  In order to accommodate different 
interpretations of the meaning of a TRUE or FALSE trip channel value, ADS-
IDAC allows the analyst to choose an appropriate threshold_type variable.  For 
example, the TRUE state of a variable or logical trip channel could represent a 
component state of ON or OFF, depending on the underlying logic used in the 
RELAP input deck.  There are only four unique threshold_type variable 
categories, but the analyst may find it easier using one of the companion options 
(e.g., SMALLER_THEN_OFF vice GREATER_THEN_ON) depending on the 
default state of the associated component.  In addition, the analyst can delay the 
change in the state indicated on the control panel when a component changes its 
actual operating state.  The following table provides a detailed summary of the 
available threshold_type options: 





Required to Set Trip 
Channel to TRUE in 
RELAP Input Deck 
Component State 
when RELAP Trip 
Channel is False 
Component State when 






ON when elapsed time 
since the trip last set to 






OFF when elapsed time 
since the trip last set to 






OPEN when elapsed time 
since the trip last set to 






CLOSE when elapsed time 
since the trip last set to 
TRUE is greater then the 
threshold value 
 
For most problems, it is recommended that the analyst use either the 
“GREATER_THEN_ON” or “GREATER_THEN_OPEN” threshold_type in 
order to increase the readability of the input file.  In certain cases, it may be 
necessary to modify the underlying trip logic in the RELAP input deck to 
accommodate these threshold_type options. 
 
threshold_trip_value:  Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the time delay 
between an actual change in component operating state and the indication of the 
state change on the control panel.   
 
number_of_fine_adjust_controls:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the 
number of control panel control elements with fine adjustment capability listed in 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file. The number_of_ fine_adjust_controls must exactly 
match the number of listed fine adjustment controls or an error will occur during 
input file processing or program execution.  Controllers with fine adjustment 
capability are used to model components with a continuous range of operating 
states such as throttle valves and setpoint controllers.   
 
control_name:  Format: String.  Range: any. Descriptive name for the control 
panel control element.  Spaces must not be used (use the underbar character (“_”) 
rather than a space when needed. The control_name variable must be supplied 
for control panel fine adjustment controls and binary state controllers. 
  
interactive_channel:  Format: String.  Range: Must refer to a valid interactive 
control channel in the “RELAP5_channels.txt” input file.  This parameter 
establishes the linkage between the ADS-IDAC control panel and the RELAP 
thermal hydraulic model. 
 
open/on_value: Format: Double.  Range: any.  Specifies the upper control limit 
for the fine adjustment controller.   
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closed/off_value:  Format: Double.  Range: any.  Specifies the lower control 
limit for the fine adjustment controller. 
 
neutral_value: Format: Double.  Range: any.  Specifies the neutral control 
setting for the fine adjustment controller.   
 
control_failure_value:  Format: Double.  Range: any.  Specifies the failure 
control value setting for the fine adjustment controller.  If a failure of the 
associated fine adjustment control is activated by a component status change 
referenced in the “SystemReliability.txt” input file, the controller is set to the 
control_failure_value. 
 
number_of_controllers:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number of 
control panel binary state controllers listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file. 
The number_of_controllers must exactly match the number of listed binary state 
controllers  or an error will occur during input file processing or program 
execution.  Binary state controllers are used to operate two state devices such as 
pumps and certain control switches.   
 
open/on_state: Format: Integer.  Range: any.  Specifies the open or on state for 
the binary state controller.   
 
closed/off_state:  Format: Integer.  Range: any.  Specifies the closed or off 
state for the binary state controller. 
 
neutral_state: Format: Integer.  Range: any.  Specifies the neutral control setting 
for the fine adjustment controller.   
 
control_failure_state:  Format: String.  Range: Only the following strings 
constitute valid control failure states – ON, OFF, OPEN, CLOSE, and NONE.  
Specifies the failure control state setting for the binary state controller.  If a failure 
of the associated binary state control is activated by a component status change 
referenced in the “SystemReliability.txt” input file, the controller is set to the 
control state associated with the  control_failure_state.  For example, if the 
control_failure_state was set to “ON” and the open/on_state was 1, the binary 
state control value would be set to 1 upon a failure activation.  The following 
table summarizes controller failure states: 
 
control_failure_state Failure Control Value 
OPEN or ON open/on_state 




number_of_parameter_alarms: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number 
of parameter-based alarms provided in “ControlPanel.txt” input file. The 
number_of_ parameter_alarms must exactly match the number of listed 
parameter-based alarms or an error will occur during input file processing or 
program execution.  Parameter alarms are used to alert operators when thermal 
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hydraulic parameters exceed a preset threshold (e.g., low reactor pressure, high 
reactor power, etc).   
 
alarm_name:  Format: String.  Range: any. Descriptive name for the control panel 
parameter alarm.  Spaces must not be used (use the underbar character (“_”) 
rather than a space when needed.   It is recommended that the prefix “A_” be used 
to distinguish alarms from other control panel indicators.  Using the prefix 
“A_ENDSEQ” will cause the sequence to terminate upon alarm activation.  The 
alarm_name variable must be included with parameter, component, and 
difference alarms. 
 
alarm_parameter:  Format: String.  Range: The alarm_parameter must match a 
control panel parameter or heat structure indicator listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” 
input file.  Specifies the parameter monitored by the alarm.   
 
alarm_weight:  Format: Double.  Range: any.  Specifies the weighting 
importance factor for the alarm.  This feature has not been fully implemented in 
ADS-IDAC.  The analyst should enter a suitable dummy value for this parameter.  
The alarm_weight variable must be included with parameter, component, and 
difference alarms. 
 
logic: Format: String. Range: the logic variable must be one of the following or 
an error will occur during input file processing – 
GT – greater than 
GE – greater than or equal to  
EQ – equal to 
LE – less than or equal to 
LT – less than 
Quotation marks should not be used.  The alarm_parameter value is compared to 
the setpoint using the logic factor and alarm is activated when the relationship is 
true.  For example, if the logic variable is set to GE, the alarm is activated if the 
alarm_parameter value is equal to or greater than the setpoint.  
 
setpoint: Format: Double.  Range: any.  Specifies the parameter-based alarm 
setpoint.   
 
number_of_component_alarms: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the number 
of component status alarms listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file. The 
number_of_component_alarms must exactly match the number of listed 
component state alarms or an error will occur during input file processing or 
program execution.  Component state alarms are used to alert the operators to 
changes in component or system operating status (e.g., turbine tripped, reactor 
tripped, etc).   
 
alarm_component: Format: String.  Range: The alarm_component must match a 
control panel component status indicator listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input 
file.  Specifies the component status monitored by the alarm. 
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state_setpoint: Format: String. Range: the state_setpoint variable must be set to 
either ON, OFF, OPEN, or CLOSE or an error will be generated during input file 
processing.  Quotation marks should not be used.  When the state of the 
associated alarm_component is equal to the state_setpoint, the component-based 
alarm will be activated. 
 
number_of_difference_alarms:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the 
number of control panel parameter difference alarms listed in the 
“ControlPanel.txt” input file. The number_of_ difference_alarms must exactly 
match the number of listed difference alarms or an error will occur during input 
file processing or program execution.  Parameter difference alarms are used to 
alert the operators when two parameters, which should normally be equivalent, 
diverge.  Example of difference alarms include main steam flow/main feed flow 
mismatch alarm, or pressurizer level deviation alarm (actuated when the 
difference between the actual pressurizer level deviates from the level control 
setpoint). 
 
first_parameter:  Format: String.  Range: The first_parameter must match a 
control panel parameter or heat structure indicator listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” 
input file.  Specifies the first input parameter monitored by the alarm.  
 
second_parameter: Format: String.  Range: The second_parameter must match a 
control panel parameter or heat structure indicator listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” 
input file.  Specifies the second input parameter monitored by the alarm.  
 
difference_setpoint: Format: Double.  Range: any.  Specifies the parameter 
difference-based alarm setpoint.  The parameter difference alarm is activated 
when the difference between the first and second parameters exceeds the 
difference setpoint: 
 
 first_parameter – second_parameter > difference_setpoint 
 
The parameter difference alarm is only activated by a one-sided deviation (i.e., 
the alarm will not activate if the first_parameter is less than the 
second_parameter, regardless of the magnitude of the difference).  If it is 
necessary to detect two-sided deviations, two parameter difference alarms should 
be set up – one to detect when the first_parameter exceeds the second_parameter 
and another with the first and second parameters reversed (which will detect  
when the second_parameter is greater than the first_parameter).  For example, 
the following difference alarms will alert the operators when the A steam 
generator water level deviates by more than 5% (0.05) from the SG level setpoint:  
 
A_SG_A_Level_Lo_Dev      SG_Level_Setpoint  0.5   20.0   SG_A_NR_Level        0.05 
A_SG_A_Level_Hi_Dev      SG_A_NR_Level      0.5   20.0   SG_Level_Setpoint    0.05 
 
4. Sample Input 
 
Control_Panel_Parameter    14 
Number_of_Rate_Data_Points   120 
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Time                    CV_002   Value               20.0 0.0 
Core_Power              CV_100   Value               20.0 0.0  
SUR                     CV_491   Value               20.0 1.0  
Loop_A_Tcold      HV_216   Liquid_Temperature  20.0 0.0 
Loop_A_Tave             CV_101   Value               20.0 0.0  
Loop_A_Thot      HV_204   Liquid_Temperature  20.0 0.0 
PZR_Pressure            HV_340   Pressure            20.0 0.0  
RATE_PZR_Pressure       HV_340   Pressure            20.0 0.0  
PZR_Level               CV_202   Value               20.0 0.0  
RATE_PZR_Level          CV_202   Value               20.0 0.0  
SG_A_NR_Level           CV_502   Value               20.0 0.0  
SG_A_FW_Flow            HJ_527   Mass_Flow_Rate      20.0 0.0  
SG_A_MS_Flow            HJ_282   Mass_Flow_Rate      20.0 0.0  
PZR_Level_Setpoint      CV_188   Value               20.0 0.0  
 
Indicator_Heat_Structure_Value   1 
THS_57001       HS_57001 Temperature    20.0 0.0  1 
 
Control_Panel_Component_State   3 
Reactor_Trip  LT_1698  Trip_Time   20.0   OFF  GREATER_THEN_ON  
1.0E-5  
Safety_Injection LT_1669  Trip_Time   20.0   ON   GREATER_THEN_ON  
1.0E-5  
Turbine_Trip  LT_1602  Trip_Time   20.0   ON   GREATER_THEN_ON  
1.0E-5  
 
Controls_Panel_Fine_Adjust    3 
X_PZR_Spray_Valve         IC_804   1.0   1.0   0.0  -1.0   0.0  
X_PZR_PORV                IC_805   1.0   0.33  0.0  -1.0   0.0  
X_SG_A_Atmos_PORV         IC_806   1.0   1.0   0.0  -1.0   0.0  
 
Control_Panel_Controller     2 
X_RCP_A                   IC_821   1.0   1    -1    -1   ON  
X_ACC_A_Outlet_Valve      IC_850   1.0   1     0    -1   ON  
 
Alarm_for_Parameter_State    5 
A_SG_A_Lo_Level           SG_A_NR_Level    0.5 20.0 LT     0.25  
A_SG_A_LoLo_Level         SG_A_NR_Level    0.5 20.0 LT     0.12  
A_SG_A_Hi_Level           SG_A_NR_Level    0.5 20.0 GT     0.5  
A_PZR_Lo_Pressure         PZR_Pressure     0.5 20.0 LT     2100.0  
A_ENDSEQ_Parameter        Core_Power       0.5 20.0 LT     0.001      
  
 
Alarm_for_Component_State    3 
A_Reactor_Trip                 Reactor_Trip            0.5    1.0   ON  
A_Safety_Injection             Safety_Injection        0.5   20.0   ON  
A_Turbine_Trip                 Turbine_Trip            0.5   20.0   ON   
 
Alarm_for_Difference_Between_two_Values  2 
A_SG_A_MF_Flow_Lo SG_A_MS_Flow   0.5   20.0   SG_A_FW_Flow    
350.0  





This sample input provides examples of each type of control panel element.  In 
addition, each referenced RELAP channel must refer to a valid entry in the 
“RELALP5_channels.txt” input file.






As the file name suggests, the Initiating_Event.txt input file is used to specify the 
event initiators to be included in the simulation.  Initiating events are activated 
based on the elapsed simulation time and generate only a single component failure 
branch (i.e., no success branch is generated).  As such, the sum of all sequence 
probabilities generated by a simulation can be no greater than the largest initiating 
event probability included in the simulation.  The operators may attempt to 
recover an initiating event failure one time – in this case branches for a successful 
equipment recovery and a permanent equipment failure are generated.  
 
Initiating events are distinguished from conditional hardware failures identified in 
the SystemReliabiltiy.txt input file by the following characteristics: 
 
Characteristic Initiating Event Conditional Failure 
Input File Initiating_Event.txt SystemReliabiltiy.txt 




One (failure only) 






Initiating events should be used to model time-dependent failures.  A conditional 
failure should be used when it is necessary to model a demand failure or a failure 
initiated by a change in system state. 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
Initiating_Event  number_of_initiating_events 
event_name_1 control_value time  control_name 
alpha_init  beta_init  alpha_rec beta_rec 
 .   .   .  . 
.   .   .  .   
event_name_n control_value time  control_name 
alpha_init  beta_init  alpha_rec beta_rec 
 
3. Input Description 
 
number_of_initiating_events: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the 
number of initiating events provided in the input file.  Initiating events are read by 
the program in the order that they are listed in the input file.  Therefore, if more 
than the specified number_of_initiating_events are described in the 
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“InitiatingEvent.txt” input file, only the first number_of_initiating_events are 
read.  
 
Changing the number_of_initiating_events variable provides a convenient 
method for enabling and disabling initiating events.  The analyst can disable all 
initiating events by setting the number_of_initiating_events variable to 0 (it 
is not necessary to delete each initiating event from the file).  If only one initiating 
event will be activated, the desired event is simply moved to the beginning of the 
initiating event list and the number_of_initiating_events variable is set to 1 
(all other initiating events will be ignored and need not be removed from the input 
file). 
 
event_name Format: String. Range: any.  Descriptive name for the initiating 
event.  Spaces must not be used (use the underbar character (“_”) rather than a 
space when needed. 
 
control_value: Format: Double. Range: any.  Specifies the control value that 
will be applied to the controller identified the control_name when the initiating 
event is activated 
 
time: Format: Double.  Range: any.  This parameter specifies simulation time 
that the initiating event will be activated. Due to variations in the RELAP time 
step, the initiating event may not be activated exactly at the specified time value, 
but instead will be activated at the first time step with an elapsed simulation time 
greater than the time variable.  
 
If a time less than 0.0 is specified, the initiating event will not be activated during 
the simulation.  This provides the analyst with a convenient method for disabling 
initiating events without deleting them from the input file. 
 
control_name:  Format: String.  Range: The control_name must match a 
control panel controller listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Specifies the 
controller associated with the initiating event.  Spaces must not be used in the 
control_name (the underbar character “_” may be substituted for a space when 
needed). 
 
alpha_init:  Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the α parameter in the 
initiating event failure distribution.  To capture the uncertainty associated with 
initiating events, the Beta Distribution is used to model the initiating event 



















  (Equation 17) 
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Two parameters must be specified, the alpha parameter (α) and the beta parameter 
(β).  During a simulation run, the initiating event probability is determined by a 
Monte Carlo sample of the Beta distribution.  To improve the reproducibility of 
simulation results, it is recommended that the α and β parameters be selected to 
minimize the variance of the failure distribution.  For example, the failure 
distributions p(x, α = 1. β = 1.) and p(x, α = 100. β = 100.) both have the same 
mean value (0.5), but the variance for the latter case is more than an order of 
magnitude lower.  A smaller variance will yield more reproducible simulation 
results. 
 
beta_init: Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the β parameter in the 
initiating event probability distribution. 
 
alpha_rec:  Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the α parameter in the 
initiating event  recovery distribution.  After an initiating event failure event is 
activated, the operator may attempt to return the failed equipment to a functional 
status by performing manual actions.  An operator may attempt to recovery a 
failed component only one time.  If a recovery attempt is made, two sequence 
branches are generated: one branch for successful recovery and one branch for a 
permanent (unrecoverable) failure.  To capture the uncertainty associated with 




















  (Equation 18) 
 
Two parameters must be specified, the alpha parameter (α) and the beta parameter 
(β).  During a simulation run, the recovery probability is determined by a Monte 
Carlo sample of the failure distribution.  To improve the reproducibility of 
simulation results, it is recommended that the α and β parameters be selected to 
minimize the variance of the failure distribution.  For example, the failure 
distributions p(x, α = 1. β = 1.) and p(x, α = 100. β = 100.) both have the same 
mean value (0.5), but the variance for the latter case is more than an order of 
magnitude lower.  A smaller variance will yield more reproducible simulation 
results. 
 
In some cases, a recovery from a failure event is not physically possible or 
realistic.  For example, the operators would not be able to recover from a steam 
generator tube rupture by simply “turning off” the rupture flow by resetting the 
control value for the appropriate control.  Because recovery parameters must be 
specified for all failure events, it is recommended that the analyst use easily 
recognizable dummy values for the alpha and beta parameters (e.g., 1.0) or set the 
recovery probability at a very low value (e.g., α = 1.0 and β = 106). 
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beta_rec: Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the β parameter in the 
initiating event recovery distribution. 
 
4. Sample Input 
 
Initiating_Event   3 
Loss_of_Offsite_Power 1.0  -25.0  X_LOOP 
1.0  100.0  6.0  4.0  
SG_A_SGTR   1.0      -60.0  X_SGTR_SG_A 
   99.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
SG_B_MSLB    1.0    60.0  X_SG_B_MSLB 




This sample input identifies three initiating events, only one of which will be 
actuated during the simulation.  At a simulation time of 60.0 seconds, the 
“SG_B_MSLB” initiating event will be activated by setting the control value for 
the “X_SG_B_MSLB” controller to 1.0.  The mean probability of this event is 
0.99.  Although recovery parameters are specified for this event, these are simply 
dummy values and do not represent a true failure recovery probability.  Because 
the “Loss_of_Offsite_Power” and ‘SG_A_SGTR” events are have a negative 
event time, they will be read by the program during input file processing but not 
initiated.  







The “ControlPanel.txt” and “RELAP5_channels.txt” input files map specific 
control panel elements in ADS-IDAC to the RELAP thermal hydraulic model.  
The “RELAP5_channels.txt” input file establishes the communication channels 
necessary to pass information between RELAP thermal hydraulic simulation and 
the ADS-IDAC control panel.  Seven types of communication channels can be 
used: 
 
 Hydraulic Volume – Hydraulic volume channels are denoted by the prefix 
“HV_” and are used to establish a communication link to RELAP volumetric 
elements.  Hydraulic volume channels allow the analyst to send volumetric 
quantities such as temperature, pressure, void fraction, and vapor quality to 
the ADS-IDAC control panel. 
 
 Hydraulic Junctions – Hydraulic junction channels are denoted by the prefix 
“HJ_” and are used to establish a communication link to RELAP junction 
elements.  Junction elements connect two or more hydraulic volume elements 
within a RELAP model.  Hydraulic junction channels allow the analyst to 
send junction quantities such as mass flow rate to the ADS-IDAC control 
panel. 
 
 Variable Trips – Variable trip channels are denoted by the prefix “VT_” and 
are used to establish a communication link to RELAP variable trips. Variable 
trips change state when a target parameter exceeds a preset threshold and are 
defined by RELAP input deck cards 401-599 (or cards 20600010-20610000 if 
the expanded trip option is selected).   Variable trip channels are useful for 
setting up alarms and component state indicators on the ADS-IDAC control 
panel. 
 
 Logical Trips – Logical trip channels are denoted by the prefix “LT_” and are 
used to establish a communication link to RELAP logical trips.  Logical trips 
are used to combine two or more variable and logical trips to build a logical 
expression using Boolean operators. Logical trips are defined by RELAP 
input deck cards 600-799 (or cards 20610010-20620000 if the expanded trip 
option is selected). Variable trip channels are useful for setting up alarms and 
component state indicators on the ADS-IDAC control panel. 
 
 Interactive Controls – Interactive control channels are denoted by the prefix 
“IC_” and are used to establish a communication link to RELAP interactive 
variables.  Interactive variables permit data originating from an external 
source to be used by the RELAP code.  Interactive variables are defined in 
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cards 800 – 999 in the RELAP input deck.  Interactive control channels 
provide the only means available for ADS-IDAC to change the value of a 
variable in RELAP thermal-hydraulic model.  Interactive control channels 
allow the analyst to develop controllable components on the ADS-IDAC 
control panel such as pumps, valves, and actuation switches. 
  
 Heat Structures – Heat structure channels are denoted by the prefix “HS_” and 
are used to establish a communication link to RELAP model heat structures.  
Heat structure elements are used to model heat sources and sinks such as fuel 
pins, reactor vessel walls, steam generator shells, or pressurizer heaters.   Heat 
structure channels allow heat structure temperatures to be indicated on the 
ADS-IDAC control panel. 
 
 Control Variable – Control variable channels are denoted by the prefix “CV_” 
and are used to establish a communication link to RELAP control variables.  
Control variables are defined by the 205 card series in the RELAP input deck 
and are used to perform calculations and model automatic control systems.  
The analyst can use control variable channels to indicate quantities derived 
from other basic variables on the ADS-IDAC control panel such as average 
reactor coolant temperature, total system flow for multiple train systems, or 
subcooling margin. 
 
Each of these channels permits only one-way communication.  In general, the 
channels provide a communication from the RELAP thermal hydraulic model to 
the ADS-IDAC control panel.  Only the interactive control channel provides a 
communication link from the control panel to the thermal hydraulic model. 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
Hydraulic_Volumes   number_of_hydraulic_volumes 
hydraulic_volume_name_1  hv_card_number_1 
.     . 
hydraulic_volume_name_n  hv_card_number_n 
 
Hydraulic_Junctions  number_of_hydraulic_junctions 
hydraulic_junction_name_1 hj_card_number_1 
.     . 
hydraulic_junction_name_n hj_card_number_n 
 
Variable_Trips    number_of_variable_trips 
variable_trip_name_1  vt_trip_number_1 
.     . 
variable_trip_name_n  vt_trip_number_n 
 
Logical_Trips   number_logical_trips 
logical_trip_name_1  lt_trip_number_1 
.     . 
logical_trip_name_n  lt_trip_number_n 
 
Interactive_Controls   number_of_interactive_controls 
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interactive_control_name_1 interactive_control_number_1 
.     . 
interactive_control_name_n interactive_control_number_n 
 
Heat_Structures    number_of_heat_structures 
heat_structure_name_1  hs_card_number_1 mesh_point_1 
.     . 
heat_structure_name_n  hs_card_number_n mesh_point_n 
 
Control_Variables   number_of_control_variables 
control_variable_name_1  control_variable_number_1
 units_1 




3. Input Description 
 
number_of_hydraulic_volumes: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.   Specifies the 
number of hydraulic volume channels that will be described in the input file.  If 
no hydraulic volume channels will be entered, the 
number_of_hydraulic_volumes should be 0 and no other hydraulic volume data 
should be entered in the file (i.e., do not include values for the 
hydraulic_volume_name or hv_card_number).  
 
hydraulic_volume_name: Format: String.  Range: any.  Spaces must not be 
used in the hydraulic_volume_name (the underbar character “_” may be 
substituted for a space when needed).  To improve the readability of the input 
files, it is recommended that the name consist of the prefix “HV_” followed by a 
three number derived from the RELAP card number associated with the volume.  
For example, the hydraulic_volume_name for the channel associated with 
hydraulic volume 204 (input deck card number 2040000) would be “HV_204”. 
 
hv_card_number: Format: Integer.  Range: Must refer to a valid hydraulic 
volume in the specified RELAP input deck.  The hv_card_number variable 
identifies the hydraulic component in the RELAP input deck associated with the 
channel.  The card number is a nine digit integer of the form nnnxx0000.  The 
digits nnn identifies the volume number and xx refers to the subvolume number.  
The volume number must refer to the first three digits of “Component Name and 
Type” definition card for the desired hydraulic volume.  For example, if the 
hydraulic volume channel is associated with the volume definition card 2040000, 
nnn must be equal to 204.  For most simple hydraulic volumes with a single 
subvolume, xx is “01”.  For hydraulic volumes comprised of more than one 
subvolume, xx should refer to the subvolume of interest.   
 
number_of_hydraulic_junctions: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.   Specifies 
the number of hydraulic junction channels that will be described in the input file.  
If no hydraulic junction channels will be entered, the 
number_of_hydraulic_junctions should be 0 and no other hydraulic junction data 
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should be entered in the file (i.e., do not include values for the 
hydraulic_junction_name or hj_card_number).  
 
hydraulic_junction_name: Format: String.  Range: any.  Spaces must not be 
used in the hydraulic_junction_name (the underbar character “_” may be 
substituted for a space when needed).  To improve the readability of the input 
files, it is recommended that the name consist of the prefix “HJ_” followed by a 
three digit number derived from the RELAP card number associated with the 
volume.  For example, the hydraulic_junction_name for the channel associated 
with hydraulic junction 205 (input deck card number 2050000) would be 
“HJ_205”. 
hj_card_number:  Format: Integer.  Range: Must refer to a valid hydraulic 
junction in the specified RELAP input deck.  The hj_card_number variable 
identifies the hydraulic junction component in the RELAP input deck associated 
with the channel.  The card number is a nine digit integer of the form nnnxx0000.  
The digits nnn identifies the junction number and xx refers to the subjunction 
number.  The junction number must refer to the first three digits of “Component 
Name and Type” definition card for the desired hydraulic junction.  For example, 
if the hydraulic junction channel is associated with the junction definition card 
2050000, nnn must be equal to 205.  For most simple hydraulic junctions, xx is 
“00”.  If the component has multiple subjunctions (such as a branch component), 
xx should refer to the subjunction of interest.   
 
number_of_variable_trips: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.   Specifies the 
number of variable trip channels that will be described in the input file.  If no 
variable trip channels will be entered, the number_of_variable_trips should be 0 
and no other variable trip data should be entered in the file (i.e., do not include 
values for the variable_trip_name or vt_card_number) 
 
variable_trip_name: Format: String.  Range: any.  Spaces must not be used in 
the variable_trip_name (the underbar character “_” may be substituted for a 
space when needed).  To improve the readability of the input files, it is 
recommended that the name consist of the prefix “VT_” followed by a three or 
four digit number derived from the RELAP card number associated with the 
variable trip.  For example, the variable_trip_name for the channel associated 
with trip 450 (input deck card number 0000450 or 20604500 in expanded format) 
would be “VT_450”. 
 
vt_trip_number: Format: Integer.  Range: Must refer to a valid variable trip in 
the specified RELAP input deck12.  The vt_trip_number variable identifies the 
variable trip component in the RELAP input deck associated with the channel.  
The trip number is an integer in the form nnnn and is derived from the card 
number describing the variable trip.  For example, the vt_trip_number for the 
variable trip described by card 0000450 (or 20604500 for expanded format) 
                                                 
12 Valid variable trip numbers are 401-599 (or 1-1000 for expanded trip number format). 
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would be 450.  It is not necessary to enter leading zeros if the trip number is less 
than 1000. 
 
number_logical_trips:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.   Specifies the number 
of logical trip channels that will be described in the input file.  If no logical trip 
channels will be entered, the number_of_logical_trips should be 0 and no other 
logical trip data should be entered in the file (i.e., do not include values for the 
logical_trip_name or lt_card_number) 
 
logical_trip_name:  Format: String.  Range: any.  Spaces must not be used in 
the logical_trip_name (the underbar character “_” may be substituted for a space 
when needed).  To improve the readability of the input files, it is recommended 
that the name consist of the prefix “LT_” followed by a three or four digit number 
derived from the RELAP card number associated with the variable trip.  For 
example, the variable_trip_name for the channel associated with trip 450 (input 
deck card number 0000450 or 20604500 in expanded format) would be 
“VT_450”. 
 
lt_trip_number: Format: Integer.  Range: Must refer to a valid logical trip in 
the specified RELAP input deck13.  The lt_trip_number variable identifies the 
logical trip component in the RELAP input deck associated with the channel.  The 
trip number is an integer in the form nnnn and is derived from the card number 
describing the logical trip.  For example, the lt_trip_number for the variable trip 
described by card 0000650 would be 650.  If expanded trip numbering format is 
used, the lt_trip_number for the variable trip described by card 20616500 
would be 1650.  It is not necessary to enter leading zeros if the trip number is less 
than 1000 (applicable to non-expanded trip number format only). 
 
number_of_interactive_controls: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.   Specifies 
the number of interactive variable channels that will be described in the input file.  
If no interactive variable channels will be entered, the 
number_of_interactive_controls should be 0 and no other interactive variable 
data should be entered in the file (i.e., do not include values for the 
interactive_control_name or the interactive_control_number). 
 
interactive_control_name:  Format: String.  Range: any.  Spaces must not be 
used in the hydraulic_junction_name (the underbar character “_” may be 
substituted for a space when needed).  To improve the readability of the input 
files, it is recommended that the name consist of the prefix “IC_” followed by a 
three digit number derived from the RELAP card number associated with the 
interactive variable.  For example, the interactive_control_name for the 
channel associated with interactive variable 850 (input deck card number 
0000850) would be “IC_850”. 
 
interactive_control_number:  Format: Integer.  Range: Must refer to a valid 
interactive variable in the specified RELAP input deck (i.e., 801 – 999).  The 
                                                 
13 Valid logical trip numbers are 601-799 (or 1001 – 2000 for expanded trip number format) 
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interactive_control_number variable identifies the interactive component in 
the RELAP input deck associated with the channel.  The card number is a three 
digit integer of the form nnn where nnn is equivalent to the interactive variable 
card number in the input deck.  For example, the interactive_control_number 
for the interactive variable defined by card 0000850 is simply 850.   
 
number_of_heat_structures: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.   Specifies the 
number of heat structure channels that will be described in the input file.  If no 
heat structure channels will be entered, the number_of_heat_structures should be 
0 and no other heat structure data should be entered in the file (i.e., do not include 
values for the heat_structure_name, hs_card_number, or the 
mesh_point). 
 
heat_structure_name: Format: String.  Range: any.  Spaces must not be used in 
the heat_structure_name (the underbar character “_” may be substituted for a 
space when needed).  To improve the readability of the input files, it is 
recommended that the name consist of the prefix “HS_” followed by a five digit 
number in the form CCCNN derived from the RELAP card number associated 
with the heat structure.  CCC refers to the heat structure component number and 
NN refers to the heat structure axial node number.  For example, the 
heat_structure_name for the channel associated with node 8 of heat structure 
850 would be “HS_85008”. 
 
hs_card_number:  Format: Integer.  Range: Must refer to a valid heat structure 
in the specified RELAP input deck.  The hs_card_number variable identifies the 
heat structure component and axial node number in the RELAP input deck 
associated with the channel.  The card number is a seven digit integer in the form 
of cccg0nn.  The digits ccc identify the heat structure number, g refers to the 
geometry number, and nn refer to the axial node number.  The heat structure 
number and geometry number must be consistent with the “General Heat 
Structure” card number for the associated heat structure in the RELAP input deck.  
For example, if the heat structure channel is associated with axial node 5 of the 
heat structure defined by card 12051000, the hs_card_number is 2051005   
 
mesh_point:  Format: Integer.  Range: Must refer to a valid heat structure radial 
mesh point in the specified RELAP input deck.  Specifies the mesh point number 
for the heat structure channel.   
 
number_of_control_variables:  Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.   Specifies the 
number of control variable channels that will be described in the input file.  If no 
control variable channels will be entered, the number_of_control_variables 
should be 0 and no other control variable data should be entered in the file (i.e., 
do not include values for the control_variable_name or the 
control_variable_number). 
 
control_variable_name:  Format: String.  Range: any.  Spaces must not be used 
in the control_variable_name (the underbar character “_” may be substituted for 
a space when needed).  To improve the readability of the input files, it is 
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recommended that the name consist of the prefix “CV_” followed by a three digit 
number derived from the RELAP 205 series card number associated with the 
control variable.  For example, the control_variable_name for the channel 
associated with variable 535 (input deck card number 205535000) would be 
“CV_535”. 
 
control_variable_number:  Format: Integer.  Range: Must refer to a valid 
control variable in the specified RELAP input deck (i.e., 001 - 99914).  The 
control_variable_number variable identifies the control component in the 
RELAP input deck associated with the channel.  The card number is a three digit 
(or four digit if the expanded option is used) integer of the form nnn where nnn is 
equal to the control variable number.  For example, the 
control_variable_number for the control variable defined by card 20553500 is 
simply 535.   
 
units:  Format: String.  Range: any.  Spaces must not be used in the units 
variable (the underbar character “_” may be substituted for a space when needed).   
This variable specifies the units associated with the control variable quantity.  The 
analyst should be aware that thermal hydraulic quantities derived from control 
variables will be in SI units unless the associated control variable card converts 
the quantity to another measurement system. 
 
4. Sample Input 
 









Variable_trips   1 
VT_0465 465 
 
Logical_trips  1 
LT_1507 1507 
 






Heat_structure  1 
HS_57001 5701001  8 
 
                                                 
14 An optional expanded format for control variables can also be enabled.  This expands the allowable 
control variable range to 1 – 9999. 
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Control_variables  8 
CV_002 002 Seconds 
CV_100 100 % 
CV_101 101 F 
CV_477 477 Watts 
CV_515 515 gpm 
CV_519 519 gallons 
CV_984 984 lbm/s 




This sample file provides examples of each type of RELAP Channels.  The 
associated RELAP input deck for the problem must be consistent with these 
channel definitions or errors will be generated during input file processing.






The SystemReliability.txt input file is used to identify conditional hardware 
failure events.  A conditional hardware failure event is triggered when the 
associated component state is in the “ON” state (integer code 3022, “VON”).  The 
failure state of the hardware control is specified by the controller failure_value or 
failure_state variable in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  The analyst should 
specify failure events in the SystemReliability.txt input file to generate on-
demand failure and success branches or to activate a failure event based on the 
status of a specified component state.   Failures specified in the 
“SystemReliability.txt” file are not time dependent and are generated only when 
the associated component state is activated.  The “Initiating_Event.txt” input file 
should be used to generate a single time-dependent failure branch (i.e., initiating 
events are actuated based on the elapsed simulation time and generate only an 
equipment failure branch). 
 
When a conditional hardware failure event is activated, two event sequence 
branches are generated – a success branch and a failure branch.  The operator may 
attempt to manual recover a failed component through the use of appropriate 
manual actions.  If a recovery is attempted, two additional sequence branches are 
generated – a successful recovery branch where component function is fully 
restored and a permanent failure branch.  Thus, each conditional hardware failure 
event can generate up to three branches: (1) no failure, (2) failure followed by 
successful recovery, and (3) permanent (unrecoverable) failure.  
 
2. Input File Format 
 
System_Reliability number_of_reliability_events 
component_state_name_1 control_name_1  
alpha_fail  beta_fail  alpha_rec  beta_rec 
.   .   .   . 
.   .   .   . 
component_state_name_n control_name_n 
alpha_fail  beta_fail  alpha_rec  beta_rec 
 
 
3. Input Description 
 
number_of_reliability_events: Format: Integer.  Range: > 0.  Specifies the 
number of conditional hardware failure events provided in the input file.  Failure 
events are read by the program in the order that they are listed in the input file.  
Therefore, if more than the specified number_of_reliability_events are described 
in the SystemReliablity.txt input file, only the first number_of_reliability_events 
are read.     
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Changing the number_of_reliability_events variable provides a convenient 
method for enabling and disabling failure events.  The analyst can disable all 
reliability events by setting the number_of_reliability_events variable to 0 (it is 
not necessary to delete each failure event from the file).  If only one failure event 
will be activated, the desired event is simply moved to the beginning of the failure 
event list and the number_of_reliability_events variable is set to 1 (all other 
reliability events will be ignored and need not be removed from the input file). 
 
component_state_name: Format: String.  Range: The component_state_name 
must match a control panel component state listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input 
file. Specifies the component state that will be used to activate the conditional 
hardware failure event.   Spaces must not be used in the component_state_name 
(the underbar character “_” may be substituted for a space when needed). 
 
control_name: Format: String.  Range: The control_name must match a control 
panel controller listed in the “ControlPanel.txt” input file.  Specifies the controller 
associated with the failed hardware component.  Spaces must not be used in the 
control_name (the underbar character “_” may be substituted for a space when 
needed).  When the failure mode is activated, the control value for the controller 
will be set to the associated failure_value or failure_state15.  
  
alpha_fail: Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the α parameter in the 
component failure distribution.  To capture the uncertainty associated with failure 
estimates, the Beta Distribution is used to model the probability of hardware 



















  (Equation 19) 
 
Two parameters must be specified, the alpha parameter (α) and the beta parameter 
(β).  During a simulation run, the failure probability is determined by a Monte 
Carlo sample of the failure distribution.  To improve the reproducibility of 
simulation results, it is recommended that the α and β parameters be selected to 
minimize the variance of the failure distribution.  For example, the failure 
distributions p(x, α = 1. β = 1.) and p(x, α = 100. β = 100.) both have the same 
mean value (0.5), but the variance for the latter case is more than an order of 
magnitude lower.  A smaller variance will yield more reproducible simulation 
results. 
 
beta_fail: Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the β parameter in the 
component failure distribution.  
 
                                                 
15 The failure_value is used for controllers with fine adjustment capability.  The failure_state applies to 
binary state controllers. 
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alpha_rec:  Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the α parameter in the 
component recovery distribution.  After a conditional component failure is 
activated, the operator may attempt to return the equipment to a functional status 
by performing manual actions.  An operator may attempt to recovery a failed 
component one time.  If a recovery attempt is made, two sequence branches are 
generated: one branch for successful recovery and one branch for a permanent 
(unrecoverable) failure.  To capture the uncertainty associated with recovery 




















  (Equation 20) 
 
Two parameters must be specified, the alpha parameter (α) and the beta parameter 
(β).  During a simulation run, the recovery probability is determined by a Monte 
Carlo sample of the failure distribution.  To improve the reproducibility of 
simulation results, it is recommended that the α and β parameters be selected to 
minimize the variance of the failure distribution.  For example, the failure 
distributions p(x, α = 1. β = 1.) and p(x, α = 100. β = 100.) both have the same 
mean value (0.5), but the variance for the latter case is more than an order of 
magnitude lower.  A smaller variance will yield more reproducible simulation 
results. 
 
In some cases, a recovery from a failure event is not physically possible or 
realistic.  For example, the operators would not be able to recover from a steam 
generator tube rupture by simply “turning off” the rupture flow by resetting the 
control value for the appropriate control.  Because recovery parameters must be 
specified for all failure events, it is recommended that the analyst use either easily 
recognizable dummy values for the alpha and beta parameters (e.g., 1.0) or set the 
recovery probability at a very low value (e.g., α = 1.0 and β = 106). 
 
beta_rec: Format: Double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the β parameter in the 
component recovery distribution.  
 
4. Sample Input 
 
System_Reliability 2 
Main_Steam_Isolation X_SGTR_SG_A  
50000.  5.0  1.0  100000.0 
Reactor_Trip  X_MD_AFW_Pump_A  
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This sample file identifies two conditional hardware failure reliability events: (1) 
initiation of a steam generator tube rupture in the A SG (X_SGTR_SG_A), and 
(2) failure of the A train motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump 
(X_MD_AFW_Pump_A).   Because the SystemReliablity.txt input file does not 
specify a failure control value, the component failure state must be specified in 
the ControlPanel.txt input file.  For this example, the ControlPanel.txt file 
includes the following information: 
 
Control Name     Interactive  Time    ON      OFF   Neutral   
Failure 
                   Control                                     
Value_   
 
X_SGTR_SG_A        IC_836     1.0     1.0    -1.0    -1.0       
ON 




Thus, the steam generator tube rupture event (X_SGTR_SG_A) failure state is 
specified as “ON” (control value of 1.0), and the motor driven auxiliary feedwater 
pump (X_MD_AFW_Pump_A) failure state  is specified as “OFF” (control value 
of 0.0).  The analyst must include appropriate logic in the RELAP input deck to 
support these events (see Section 2).  When the “Main_Steam_Isolation” 
component state is first set to “ON” (integer code 3022, “VON”), two sequence 
branches will be generated.  The first sequence branch will not include the failure 
(i.e., no steam generator tube rupture occurs).  The second sequence branch will 
set variable IC_836 to 1.0 (which will initiate a steam generator tube rupture in 
the RELAP thermal hydraulic model) with an average branch probability of 
0.999916.  Similarly, when the “Reactor_Trip” component state is set to “ON”, 
one branch will be generated where no failure occurs and a second branch 
generated where interactive control variable IC_828 will be set to 0.0 (which will 
cause the A train motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump to fail).  The operator 
may attempt to recovery the failed auxiliary feedwater pump with an average 
recovery probability of 0.1.  System reliability conditional failure events are only 





                                                 
16 The average branch probability is calculated from the alpha and beta factors as follows: p = 50000 / 
(50000 + 5) ~ 0.9999. 







The ZCtrlPar.txt and ZiniADS.txt input files provide critical simulation control 
information for ADS-IDAC.  The ZCtrlPar.txt file is used to specify the maximum time 
and probability cutoff truncation criteria.  The ZiniADS.txt is used to identify the RELAP 












The ZCtrlPar.txt input file is used to specify the sequence time and probability 
truncation criteria that will be used for the simulation.  These truncation criteria 
can be set by the analyst to minimize the generation of low probability sequences 
and limit the simulation time. 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
CtrlPar 
Truncation_probability   truncation_probability 
Truncation_time          simulation_end_time 
 
3. Input Description 
 
truncation_probability: Format: double.  Range: > 0.0.  Specifies the 
probability threshold for sequence truncation.  If the sequence probability 
decreases below the truncation_probability, the sequence is terminated. 
 
simulation_end_time:  Format: double.  Range: > 0.0.  The 
simulation_end_time is specified in seconds and must be less than or equal to the 
maximum RELAP end time entered in the input deck control cards (200 series 
cards).   The analyst should be aware that this time is the maximum simulation 
time for a sequence – the sequence may be terminated prior to this time if certain 
conditions are encountered.  Conditions that may terminate a sequence prior to the 
simulation_end_time include probability truncation, actuation of an 
“A_ENDSEQ_” alarm, or a “VSTOP” response not obtained action. 
 
4. Sample Input 
 
CtrlPar 
Truncation_probability   1.0E-4 




This sample input identifies a sequence probability truncation value of 10-4 and a 
sequence simulation time of 6000.0 seconds.  






The ZiniADS.txt is used to specify the path name location for the project input 
directory and the RELAP input deck thermal hydraulic model.  This file must be 
located in the same directory as the executable version of ADS-IDAC (if the code 
will be run directly from the executable) or the same directory as the C++ 
workspace .dsw file (if ADS-IDAC will be run from the MS Visual C++ 
environment). 
 
2. Input File Format 
 
Project_Directory  project_directory_location 
Input_Deck_File  RELAP_input_file 
Simulation_Type  simulation_type 
 
3. Input Description 
 
project_directory_location: Format: string. Range: any.  Specifies the path 
name location of the project input directory (i.e., the directory that contains the 
“input” and “output” subdirectories for the project.  Quotation marks should not 
be used to delineate the string and the string must be provided on a single input 
line.  The directory location must refer to an existing file directory and conform to 
standard Windows file directory naming conventions.  It is recommended that the 
analyst use short directory names within the path name and the overall path name 
length be a concise as possible.  The total string length must not exceed 80 
characters or an error will occur. 
 
RELAP_input_file: Format: string. Range: any.  Specifies the path name and 
file name of the RELAP input deck (the “.i” file).  Quotation marks should not be 
used to delineate the string and the string provided on a single line.  The directory 
location must refer to an existing file directory and conform to standard Windows 
file directory naming conventions.  It is recommended that the analyst use short 
directory names within the path name and the combined path and file name length 
be a concise as possible.  The total string length must not exceed 80 characters or 
an error will occur. 
 
simulation_type: Format: integer. Range: any.  This variable is not currently 
used.  A value of 0 is recommended. 
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This sample input identifies the “Generic_PWR” subdirectory as the location of 
the appropriate input files and specifies the “Generic_PWR.i” as the RELAP input 
deck.  It is recommended that concise, but meaningful, names be used to identify 
project related directories and files. 
 
 


















Section 5: Term Conversions 
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#if _MSC_VER > 1000 
#pragma once 
#endif // _MSC_VER > 1000 
// 
//consequences 
#define CONSEQUENCE_BASE         -1 
#define VNOKB                    -1 
#define VCONS_SUCCEED             0 
#define VTIME_TRUNCATED           1 
#define VPROBABILITY_TRUNCATED    2 
#define VTH_FAIL                  3 //RELAP5 crashed 
#define VCREW_FAIL                4 
#define VNON_RESPONSE_ACTION      5 
#define VSG_OVERFED               6 
#define VADS_SIM_ERR              7 
#define VENDSEQ_ALARM             8 
//Types of RELAP5 input deck component 
#define VHYDRAULIC_VOLUME     1 
#define VHYDRAULIC_JUNCTION   2 
#define VVARIABLE_TRIP       3 
#define VLOGICAL_TRIP        4 
#define VINTERACTIVE_VARIABLE 5 
#define VCONTROL_VARIABLE     6 
#define VHEAT_STRUCTURE       7 
// 
//Types of Display for retrieving RELAP5 information to control panel 
#define VDISPLAY_PARAMETER_VALUE    1 
#define VDISPLAY_COMPONENT_STATE    2 
#define VCONTROL_STATE          3 
#define VCONTROL_VALUE          4 
#define VALARM_COMPONENT     5 
#define VALARM_PARAMETER     6 
#define VALARM_TWO_PARAMETER_DIFFERENCE  7 
#define VDISPLAY_HEAT_STRUCTURE     8 
#define VDISPLAY_PARAMETER_TREND     9 
// 
//Types of communication 
#define VALARM_STATE          1 
#define VCOMPONENT_STATE      2 
#define VPARAMETER_VALUE      3 
#define VPARAMETER_TREND      4  //increasing, decreasing, stable 
#define VPARAMETER_STATE      5  //too high, too low, high, low 
#define VPARAMETER_DIFFERENCE 6 
#define VCONTROL_COMMAND      7 
#define VCONTROL_REPORT       8 
// 
// 
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#define VBASE             3000 
#define VFALSE            3000 
#define VTRUE             3001 
#define VYES              3002 
#define VNO               3003 
#define VCHECKED          3004 
#define VUN_CHECKED       3005 
#define VGT               3006 
#define VGE               3007 
#define VEQ               3008 
#define VLE               3009 
#define VLT               3010 
#define VDECREASING       3011 
#define VINCREASING       3012 
#define VSTABLE           3013 
#define VBYPASS           3014 
#define VAG_OPERATOR      3015 
#define VPR_PANEL         3016 
#define VPR_OPERATOR      3017 
#define VPR_PLANT         3018 
#define VNORMAL           3019 
#define VFAILED           3020 
#define VSUCCEED          3021 
#define VON               3022 
#define VOFF              3023 
#define VRELIABILITY      3024  
#define VPANEL            3025 
#define VPLANT            3026 
#define VACTIVATED        3027 
#define VSKIP             3028 
#define VSTANDBY          3029 
#define VOPERATE          3030 
#define VCONTROL          3031 
#define VBETWEEN          3032 
#define VAUTO             3033 
#define VRESET            3034 
#define VNEW              3035 
#define VFAILED_P         3036 
#define VODM_ASK          3037 
#define VODM_COM          3038 
#define VODM_ADV          3039 
#define VOAT_SEND         3040 //action taker sends information 
#define VOCT_ADV          3041 //consultant's advise 
#define VOAT              3042 //operator action taker 
#define VODM              3043 //operator decision maker 
#define VOCT              3044 //operator consultant 
#define VNONE             3045 
#define VGNOP             3046 //goal of normal operation 
#define VGTS              3047 //goal of trouble shooting 
#define VGMGSM            3048 //goal of maintain global safety 
#define VGMON             3049 //goal of monitoring abnormal cond 
#define VGMESM            3050 //goal of maintain equipment safety  
#define VSGFRC            3051 //subgoal of find root cause 
#define VSGDAP            3052 //subgoal of decide a action 
#define VSGPA             3053 //subgoal of performing a action 
#define VSWM              3054 //strategy of wait and monitor 
#define VSDM              3055 //strategy of direct matching 
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#define VSLR              3056 //strategy of limited reasoning 
#define VSIR              3057 //strategy of instinctive response 
#define VSIDR             3058 //strategy of inductive and 
//deductive reasoning 
#define VSFP              3059 //strategy of follow procedure 
#define VSTE              3060 //strategy of trial and error 
#define VSAA              3061 //strategy of ask advise 
#define VSFI              3062 //strategy of following instruction 
#define VSRTA             3063 //report taken action 
#define VSRPI             3064 //report perceived information 
#define VSGA              3065 //giving advise 
#define VSGC              3066 //strategy of give command (ODM) 
#define VSAI              3067 //ask information (ODM) 
#define VGOAL             3068 //goal 
#define VSUBGOAL          3069 //subgoal 
#define VSTRATEGY         3070 //strategy 
#define VDIAGNOSIS        3071 //diagnosis 
#define VACTIONOBJECTIVE  3072 //action task 
#define VACTIONPACK       3073 //action package 
#define VACTION           3074 //action 
#define VACTIONC          3075 //check command 
#define VACTIONAC         3076 //action command 
#define VACTIONA          3077 //direct action 
#define VCONFIRMC         3078 //the expectation check when  
      //subgoal is decide action package 
#define VACTIONI          3079 //the OAT send info to ODM 
#define VACTIONIA         3080 //the OCT gives advise to ODM 
#define VPROCESSING       3081 //processing for index 
#define VPROCESSING_A     3082 //processing and data downloaded 
#define VLOCALE           3083 //local equipment problem 
#define VLOCALP           3084 //local parameter problem 
#define VGLOBAL           3085 //global problem 
#define VREPLACE          3086 //information merge type : replace 
#define VCOMBINE          3087 //information merge type : combine 
#define VNOCHANGE         3088 //information merge type : no 
//change 
#define VINTERRUPTED      3089 
#define VWAITING          3090 
#define VOLDINFO          3091 
#define VPROCEDURE_XFR    3092 //flag for transfers between mental 
      //& paper procedures 
#define VSELF             3093 
#define VTRANSIENT        3094 
#define VBRANCH           3095 
#define VES               3096 
#define VDONE             3097 
#define VOPEN             3098 
#define VCLOSE            3099 
#define VEXPECT_CONTROL   3100 
#define VDIAALARM         3101 
#define VDIACOMP          3102 
#define VDIAPAR           3103 
#define VDIACOMBINE       3104 
#define VFAIL_TO_START    3105 
#define VFAIL_TO_RUN      3106 
#define VFAIL_TO_OPEN     3107 
#define VFAIL_TO_CLOSE    3108 
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#define VVERIFY            3109 
#define VPROCEDURE         3110 
#define VPROPORTIONAL      3111 
#define VADDITIVE          3112 
#define VSLEADV            3113 //advise 
#define VSPECIAL           3114 
#define VTRIP              3115 
#define VSTOP              3116 
#define VTRPVLV            3117 
#define VSRVVLV            3118 
#define VTERMINATE_IMA     3119 
#define VGREATER_THEN_ON   3120 
#define VSMALLER_THEN_ON   3121 
#define VGREATER_THEN_OPEN 3122 
#define VSMALLER_THEN_OPEN 3123 
#define VUNKNOWN           3124 
#define VMENTAL            3125 
#define VACTIVE            3126 
#define VPAUSE             3127 
#define VPROCEDURE_TRANSFER  3128 
#define VINFO_GATHER_MODE    3129 
#define VMENTAL_BELIEF       3130 
#define VRECOVERY            3131 
#define VGREATER_THEN_OFF    3132 
#define VSMALLER_THEN_OFF    3133 
#define VGREATER_THEN_CLOSE  3134 
#define VSMALLER_THEN_CLOSE  3135 
#define VOAT_SCAN            3136  //operator action taker scan  
      //parameters 
#define VODM_SCAN            3137  //operator decision maker scan  
      //parameters 
#define VOCT_SCAN            3138  //operator consultant scan  
      //parameters 
#define VPARAMETER_CONTROL   3139  //set action control value to  
      //parameter value 
#define VPARAMETER_SCAN      3140  //Parameter scan 
#define VNOP                 3151  //normal operating procedure 
#define VAOP                 3152  //abnormal operating procedure 
#define VEOP                 3153  //emergency operating procedure 
#define VFRG                 3154  //functional recovery guideline  
      //procedure 
#define VECA                 3155  //emergency contingency action 
#define VMENTAL_PROCEDURE    3156  //mental procedure step 
#define VOBJECTIVE_RELATED   3161  //objective related action  
      //procedure step 
#define VPREREQUISITE_ACTION 3162  //prerequisite related procedure 
//action step 
#define VMONITORING_STEP     3163  //monitoring procedure step 
#define VVERIFICATION_STEP   3164  //verification procedure step 
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